The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy

EDITED BY MARK TEXTOR

LONDON STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy
London Studies in the History of Philosophy
Series editors: Jonathan Wolff, Tim Crane, M.W.F. Stone, Tom Pink, Jill Kraye, Susan James, Daniel Garber, Steven Nadler and Christina Mercer

London Studies in the History of Philosophy is a unique series of tightly focused edited collections. Bringing together the work of many scholars, some volumes will trace the history of the formulation and treatment of a particular problem of philosophy from the Ancient Greeks to the present day, while others will provide an in-depth analysis of a period or tradition of thought. The series is produced in collaboration with the Institute of Philosophy of the University of London School of Advanced Study.

Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy
Edited by Jill Kraye and M.W.F. Stone

The Proper Ambition of Science
Edited by M.W.F. Stone and Jonathan Wolff

History of the Mind–Body Problem
Edited by Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson

The Will and Human Action
From antiquity to the present day
Edited by Thomas Pink and M.W.F. Stone

The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy
Edited by Mark Textor
The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy

Edited by Mark Textor
Contents

Notes on contributors vii

Introduction 1
MARK TEXTOR

1 Brentano’s concept of intentional inexistence 20
TIM CRANE

2 Reid and Brentano on consciousness 36
KEITH HOSSACK

3 Meinong on memory 64
FABRICE TERONI

4 Certainty, soil and sediment 89
KEVIN MULLIGAN

5 Particularised attributes: an Austrian tale 130
BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER

6 Austrian philosophers on truth 159
PETER SIMONS

7 Analyticity and logical truth: from Bolzano to Quine 184
WOLFGANG KÜNNE

8 The great divide within Austrian philosophy: the synthetic a priori 250
EDGAR MORSCHER
Contents

9 Bolzano’s political philosophy 264
ROLF GEORGE AND PAUL RUSNOCK

10 Austrian aesthetics 293
MARIA E. REICHER

Name index 324
Subject index 327
Contributors


Rolf George is professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Waterloo, Canada. He is the author of many papers and reviews and has published editions of Carnap’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Bernard Bolzano’s Theory of Science, and Franz Brentano’s books and manuscripts.

Keith Hossack is lecturer in philosophy at King’s College, London. He has published papers on consciousness, the logic of plurals and the philosophy of mathematics. He is currently preparing the book Metaphysics of Knowledge for publication.


Edgar Morscher is professor of philosophy at the University of Salzburg. He is the founding president of the International Bernard Bolzano Society and has edited works by Bolzano and volumes in the series Beiträge zur Bolzano Forschung. He publishes on ethics, philosophical logic and history of philosophy, especially Bernard Bolzano. His publications include Das logische An-sich bei Bernard Bolzano (Salzburg-München: Pustet 1973) and numerous articles.

Maria E. Reicher is university docent at the University of Graz. She works on aesthetics, philosophy of logic, ontology and the history of Austrian Philosophy. Her recent books are *Referenz, Quantifikation und ontologische Festlegung* (Frankfurt–London: Ontos 2005) and *Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2005).

Paul Rusnock is assistant professor at the University of Ottawa. He is interested in the philosophy of mathematics and logic, epistemology and Austrian philosophy. He has published the book *Bolzano’s Philosophy and the Emergence of Modern Mathematics* (Amsterdam: Rodopi 2000) and further articles on the topics above.

Benjamin Schnieder is assistant professor at the University of Hamburg. He works on ontology and philosophical logic. His publications include the books *Substanz und Adhärenz: Bolzanos Ontologie des Wirklichen* (Sankt Augustin: Akademia 2002) and *Substanzen und (ihre) Eigenschaften* (Berlin: de Gruyter 2004).

Peter Simons is professor and Director of the Centre for Metaphysics and Mind at the University of Leeds. His interests include ontology and applied ontology, logic and philosophy of mathematics and history of central European philosophy especially in Austria and Poland. His publications include the books *Parts: A Study in Ontology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987) *Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski: Selected Essays* (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1992) and numerous articles. He is director of the Franz Brentano Foundation.

Fabrice Teroni is assistant at the University of Geneva. He has recently completed his PhD dissertation on memory and currently works on the philosophy of emotions.
Analytic Philosophy has recently started to discover its roots. You will naturally ask ‘Well, what is Analytic Philosophy? When does someone count as belonging to it? Do you have a good definition up your sleeve?’ No, but I don’t need one. Analytic Philosophy is a tradition held together by the use of a distinctive family of concepts, acceptance of specific assumptions, problems and methods for their solution. There is little doubt about the main founders of Analytic Philosophy in this sense: Frege, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein provided the framework and the topics for the central debates. But none of the founders of Analytic Philosophy worked in an intellectual vacuum. It is now well known that Austrian Philosophers made contact at various points with the founders of Analytic Philosophy: Russell discussed Meinong’s assumption that there are things that do not exist. Moore states in his review of Brentano’s *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* that ‘[i]t would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this work’. Husserl’s early work on the concept of number has been discussed and criticised by Frege. Frege’s criticism led to a fruitful exchange between both philosophers. Dummett takes Frege and Husserl to be so close in philosophical orientation that he devotes a book to explain how Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy could develop in such different directions in the end.  

Another line of influence of Austrian Philosophy on Analytic Philosophy is via its Polish branch. Twardowski’s Habilitationsschrift, a second extended doctorate, *On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation* was written under the influence of...
Brentano and supervised by Bolzano’s student Zimmermann. Twardowski discusses Bolzano’s theory of objective representations from the perspective of Brentano’s theory of intentionality. He was later appointed to the chair of philosophy in Lwow (Lemberg) and founded the so-called ‘Lwow–Warsaw school’. Tarski is perhaps the most influential exponent of this school. Tarski’s work on truth and logical consequence has dominated current thinking about these notions. Its roots lie in the Austrian tradition.

The essays in this collection aim to trace central topics in Analytic Philosophy back to its roots in Austrian Philosophy. Thereby, we hope to understand the forefathers of Analytic Philosophy better, see how they differ from us and improve our grasp of what we made of their ideas. The aim of this introduction is to link the individual contributions to each other and to locate them in a wider context.

**Franz Brentano: back to Aristotle**

If I were to place a bet on the philosopher who has exercised the greatest influence on philosophy in the twentieth century through his students (and whose name is not ‘Plato’), I would place a fair amount of money on Franz Brentano (1838–1917). Brentano taught Edmund Husserl, Alexius von Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, Chr. von Ehrenfels, Carl Stumpf and Anton Marty (and others). Husserl founded the Phenomenological Movement. Stumpf, Meinong and von Ehrenfels made the birth of Gestalt Psychology possible. Meinong took Brentano’s thesis that an intentional mental act contains an object to the extreme: since we can think about non-existents, there are objects that don’t exist. Russell’s criticism of Meinong’s view was an important impetus for the development of his theory of descriptions.

Husserl’s description of Brentano’s lectures makes Brentano’s spellbinding influence on his students understandable:

I was soon fascinated and then overcome by the unique clarity and dialectical acuity of his explanations, by the so to speak cataleptic power of his development of problems and theories. It was from his lectures that I first acquired the conviction that gave me the courage to choose philosophy as my life’s work, that is the conviction that philosophy, too, is a field of serious endeavour, and that it too can – and in fact must – be dealt with in a rigorously scientific manner. The pure objectivity with which he tackled all questions, treating them as aporiai, his fine dialectical weighing of different possible arguments, his analysis of equivocations, the way he traced all
philosophical concepts back to their sources in intuition – all of this filled me with admiration and with great confidence.


Brentano was a man on a philosophical mission. According to his view, western philosophy had run through a four-stage cycle of decline three times. The positive phase of scientific philosophy was always followed by three stages of decline. In the final stage of decline, theoretical reflection is given up and blind prejudice reigns. Brentano took the dominant philosophy of his time, Kant and the German Idealists, to be the low point of philosophical development. He recommended as an antidote Aristotle’s works and propagated the return to the spirit of scientific philosophy.9 The fourth thesis defended by Brentano in his Habilitation in 1866 was: ‘The true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences’.10 Brentano taught his pupils that Kant and his successors failed to live up to the ideal of scientific philosophy. Philosophy progresses by careful description of data, and like a natural science it attempts to systematise the data. The difference is that, in general, philosophical data are not gathered in experiments. Brentano’s descriptive psychology gathers data by introspection.

In his *Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions* Russell praises the just described Brentanian methodology.11 Russell’s praise is worth quoting in full:

[I] wish to emphasise the admirable method of Meinong’s researches, which, in a brief epitome, it is quite impossible to preserve. Although empiricism as a philosophy does not appear tenable, there is an empirical method of investigating, which should be applied in every subject-matter. This is possessed in a very perfect form by the works we are considering. A frank recognition of the data, as inspection reveals them, precedes all theorising; when a theory is propounded, the greatest skill is shown in the selection of facts favourable or unfavourable, and in eliciting all relevant consequences of the facts adduced. There is thus a rare combination of acute inference with capacity for observation. The method of philosophy is not fundamentally unlike that of other sciences: the differences seem to be only in degree. The data are fewer, but are harder to apprehend; and the inferences required are probably more difficult than in any subject except mathematics. But the important point is that, in philosophy as elsewhere, there are self-evident truths from which we must start, and that these are
discoverable by the process of inspection or observation, although the material to be observed is not, for the most part composed of existing things.


Russell will later make the idea that philosophy should be done in the same way as the natural sciences part of the programme of what will become known as ‘Analytic Philosophy’.

Aristotle’s influence is strong in Brentano’s early masterwork Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt. Brentano asks the foundational question: What is the proper subject-matter of psychology? After rejecting unsatisfactory answers, he proposes his own: psychology studies mental phenomena and the distinctive feature of the mental is intentionality. Something is a mental phenomenon (is conscious) if, and only if, it exhibits intentionality. Brentano provides examples intended to help his readers to grasp the notion of intentionality: in judgement an object is accepted or rejected; hate is the hate of something, etc. Consciousness is according to Brentano essentially consciousness of something. If I am conscious of x, I have a presentation (‘Vorstellung’) of x. Presentations are mental particulars.

Brentano tries to elucidate further the concept of intentionality in a now often quoted passage:

Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object, (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity.

(PES-E I, 88; PES-G, 124–5)

In the footnote to this quote Brentano refers the reader back to Aristotle’s conception of intentionality in De Anima:

Aristotle had already spoken of this mental indwelling. In his books On the Soul he says that what is sensed as so sensed is in the sensing subject; that the sense receives what it senses without the matter, and that what is thought is in the understanding.

(ibid. I have modified the translation)

It is the distinctive feature of the mind that it can receive an Aristotelian
form without thereby instantiating it. In perceiving a tiger my mind receives the form of a tiger without becoming a tiger.

Through Chisholm’s work the intentionality thesis has found its way into Analytic Philosophy of mind. Brentano is now taken to pose the problem for the project of reducing mental to physical properties. Here is a representative quote:

Brentano’s bafflement was with the intentionality of the human mind, its apparently mysterious power to represent things, events, properties in the world. He thought that nothing physical can have this property.


Now Brentano’s text is certainly not self-explanatory. What exactly is Brentano’s thesis? Chapter 1, Crane’s ‘Brentano’s concept of intentional inexistence’, proposes an answer to this question. Brentano’s thesis should indeed be taken literally. When Brentano says that ‘an object dwells in a mental act’ he means that an object is part of the act. This is not a metaphor pointing us to a mysterious power of the mind, as modern interpreters often think. But how can Brentano propose such a bizarre view? Crane supplies the philosophical background that makes Brentano’s view less strange, but also shows the distance between his general philosophical system and modern approaches to the mind. Brentano is a ‘methodological phenomenalist’: science only accepts mind-dependent phenomena. And these can be part of a mental act. Brentano’s theory of intentional inexistence, properly understood, seems then not to be the right framework to pursue the concerns of contemporary philosophers of mind. Brentano’s problem is not Brentano’s problem.

Brentano’s theory of intentionality contains an additional epistemic thesis. Following Aristotle, Brentano held that every intentional mental act refers to itself ‘on the side’: every mental act x is topic of a presentation and of an immediately evident cognition [‘Erkenntnis’] concerning x that it occurs. After being denounced as sheer nonsense this thesis has recently been rediscovered as a serious option. Hossack proposed in an earlier paper Brentano’s double intentionality thesis as an answer to the question ‘How can we have knowledge of our conscious mental states?’ (Hossack’s answer was (roughly): ‘A conscious mental state is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. Hence, being in a conscious state is knowing that one is in it.’) Now, in Chapter 2, Hossack stages an ‘Austro-Scottish’ philosophical contest between Brentano and
Reid: whose theory of self-knowledge is preferable? Reid is well chosen as Brentano’s opponent. Brentano himself has written a critical assessment of Thomas Reid’s philosophy in which he praises Reid’s psychological insights. Hossack argues that Reid’s theory of self-knowledge is superior to Brentano’s theory because it uses the concept of knowledge as a primitive. Reid can explain the essential features of consciousness, Brentano not.

**Brentanian themes developed**

Brentano provided his pupils with a set of philosophical problems and conceptions that they expanded, explored, developed or changed in different ways. Here are three.

*The ontology of parts and particularised properties*[^21]

Brentano makes use of the notion of whole and part in his descriptive psychology and metaphysics. A paradigm example is his theory of the unity of consciousness. Different mental phenomena belong to one and the same consciousness as parts. Some of the parts of consciousness can be detached, they can exist on their own; others not, they are distinguishable, but not detachable. A thing consisting of the detachable parts is a *collective*, a thing consisting of merely distinguishable parts is a *divisive*.^22^ Consciousness is neither a collective nor a divisive. For it contains detachable (the fear of x requires the presentation of x, and the presentation of x can exist independently of the fear) and non-detachable parts (consciousness of x and consciousness of the consciousness of x are according to Brentano inseparable).

Distinguishable but undetachable parts play a prominent role in the philosophy of Brentano’s pupils. They were known then and known now under many names: ‘Adhärenz’ then, ‘particularised properties’ or ‘tropes’ now. Schnieder’s ‘Austrian tale’ (Chapter 5) analyses Meinong’s and Bolzano’s arguments for the existence of particularised properties. Schnieder makes use of a Bolzanian thesis about predication, an object may have a property in virtue of one or more of its parts having the property, in order to refute a criticism of the theory of particularised properties.

*The epistemology of perception and memory*

Brentano’s epistemology is a form of foundationalism: every judgement which constitutes knowledge is either immediately evident or can be
traced back in evident steps to an immediately evident judgement. What is an immediately evident judgement? An immediately evident judgement is a judgement made with an insight into the truth. Brentano’s pupil Husserl will say that S judges with immediate evidence iff S judges with an (immediate) awareness that the judgement fits the facts.

The insight into the truth compels you to assent with certainty to the content judged and grounds a right or entitlement to be certain of what is judged (‘mit Fug und Recht sicher’).

Meinong begs to differ from the master. We have a right to take a stance on an issue, although we can neither make a mediately nor an immediately evident judgement in Brentano’s sense. Meinong argues that our memory issues propositional attitudes about past events that are not judgements. When I remember something, I am often neither certain nor can I base my pro-attitude on another certain judgement about the past or the reliability of my memory faculty. Meinong concludes from this that there are evident surmises. This is simply incomprehensible for Brentano: epistemic authority, in the final instance, can only be due to an insight into the truth. Meinong argues (convincingly, I think) that the authority of memory surmises cannot be traced back to immediately evident judgements. Brentano’s epistemology is incomplete. Brentano remained unimpressed. In a letter to Meinong he writes:

The history of philosophy shows that man tends in these cases [problems of epistemology] to slice through the knot that he cannot unravel by the given means by assuming a special way of knowing. In this way Reid arrived at Common Sense and Kant at his synthetic a priori. You will be convinced with me that everyone has to say of himself ‘nihil humani a me alienum puto’ and you will not be cross with me if I provisionally (for I surely will have a more careful look) think that a similar thing has happened to you here.


Due to Chisholm’s translation of ‘Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Würdigung des Gedächtnisses’ Meinong’s arguments have featured in contemporary discussions of the epistemology of memory. Chapter 3, Teroni’s ‘Meinong on Memory’, locates Meinong’s epistemological argument in his philosophy of mind and intentionality. Thereby we gain
a better understanding of Meinong’s argument and can assess its importance for recent debates.

Brentano is an epistemic foundationalist and anti-dogmatist. As we have seen his foundationalism comes under attack from Meinong. His anti-dogmatism is equally problematic. Brentano takes us to have ‘blind subjective prejudices’ [‘blinde subjektive Vorurteile’]. Let me explain: we have natural belief-forming habits. For instance, we have the propensity to take our perceptions at face value. We do, but we should not. We must, Brentano advises us, ascend from taking our senses at face to reflectively endorsing what they tell us. One cannot be entitled to believe something without having an epistemic reason. Ultimately, some judgements will be self-justifying: making them is having a direct insight into the truth. Brentano’s fundamentalism complements his anti-dogmatism. Every justified belief can be traced back to such an insight. Or so says Brentano.

In his posthumously published Versuch über die Erkenntnis Brentano criticises Reid and Kant as dogmatists: ‘Kant and Reid make it a principle that we should build the whole edifice of our theory on blind prejudices’ (F. Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis, ed. by A. Kastil, Hamburg, 1970, 11. My translation). The dogmatist takes epistemic reason to be slaves to our senses:

Someone who makes this claim takes our reason to be in a state of slavery similar to that of the will of a morally depraved person, who is, against his better knowledge, governed by his emotions. We all would be incurable madmen tyrannised by obsessions, even if we had recognised that they are obsessions without any logical legitimacy.

(Brentano, Versuch über die Erkenntnis, 23. My translation)

Reid will of course reply that epistemic reason is, and ought to be, the slave of sensory compulsion. We cannot, but must trust our senses without epistemic reason.

Whether Brentano or Reid is right cannot be discussed here. But the notion of blind prejudice will gain importance in the work of Brentano’s students. While Brentano acknowledges the existence of blind prejudices only as something that should be eliminated, Husserl explores and systematises these mental states. Chapter 4, Mulligan’s ‘Certainty, soil and sediment’, shows that blind prejudice becomes a central topic in Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy. He provides a chart of the questions relating to the mental state he aptly calls ‘primitive certainty’ understood psychologically and non-psychologically. He
compares and contrasts discussions of primitive certainties (and related mental states) in Husserl, Scheler, Ortega Y Gasset and Wittgenstein. The chapter should, I hope, encourage epistemologists to mine these sources further. In doing this we might come to rethink our answers to the question whether belief or some other mental state should be at the centre of our epistemology.

Correct emotions and values

Brentano held for some time that every mental act involves an evident cognition of its own occurrence plus an affective stance to this occurrence. He revised this later and dropped the affective stance as an essential ingredient of every mental act. Yet, there are some mental acts that come with affective attitude towards themselves. Affective attitudes or emotions resemble judgements in being bipolar. A judgement is either an affirmation or a rejection of an object. Affective attitudes are either pro (love, pleasure) or anti-attitudes (hate, displeasure). The concept of an emotion is one of the central conceptual building blocks in Brentano’s theory of aesthetic and moral value. Something x has moral value iff an emotion directed towards x were correct (incorrect). And when is this the case? That an emotion is correct is recognised with immediate evidence. Not many will be satisfied with this answer. For instance, appealing to immediate evidence does not help when aesthetic judgements about the same object contradict each other. Brentano’s value theory seems in need of further elaboration.

The third part of Reicher’s ‘Austrian aesthetics’ (Chapter 10) ‘The struggle between subjectivism and objectivism: Alexius Meinong, Stephan Witasek, Christian von Ehrenfels’ is concerned with the development of Brentano’s attempt to ground value in correct affective attitudes. Reicher carefully locates the aesthetic theories on a grid of distinctions that relates them to the main contemporary questions in value theory. Meinong follows Brentano in connecting emotions and values. Meinong’s theory of value something is a value iff it can be presented through a value experience (see p. 309). And value experiences are emotional states. By assimilating emotional states to perceptions Meinong tries to avoid the snares of aesthetic subjectivism, but the problem of correctness remains. Meinong’s student Witasek and Ehrenfels will develop the aesthetic theory further.

The first two parts of Reicher’s contribution discuss the aesthetic theory of Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848). In the next section I will portray him as Brentano’s bohemian antipode. This opposition becomes
already clear by comparing Brentano’s and Bolzano’s aesthetics. Like Brentano, Bolzano tries to explain the concept of beauty by appealing to an affective attitude: experiencing pleasure. But the concept that was crucial for Brentano, correct- or aptness, plays no role in Bolzano’s definition of beauty. Something x is beautiful, very roughly, if, and only if, examining x gives us pleasure for the reason that intuitively grasping x’s Gestalt improves and exercises the faculties thereby employed. The reader may decide which proposal is the more promising.

Bernard Bolzano: the link between Kant and Frege

If I were to place a bet on the philosopher who had the least influence on the twentieth century through his students, I would place a fair amount of money on Bolzano. His influence is mainly indirect. Bolzano’s work inspired Brentano’s students. I have already mentioned the example of Twardowski who worked under Bolzano’s only pupil of notice: Robert Zimmermann. Twardowski’s On the Content and Object of Presentations discusses Bolzano’s thesis that there are presentations that have no object. As a good Brentanian he rejects Bolzano’s thesis as contradictory. Something is only a presentation if it contains an object. Hence, no presentation can be empty.

While Twardowski stays true to the spirit of Brentano’s philosophy, Husserl uses Bolzano’s work as his guide to philosophical emancipation. The first book of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, contains a criticism of psychologism. The main influences on this part of his work seem to be his discussions with Frege and his reading of Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre. Husserl writes about Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre: ‘[Bernard Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre] is a work that when it comes to logical propaedeutic far exceeds everything what the world literature has to offer as systematic conceptions of logic’ (E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen I: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, reprint of the second edition, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1980, 225). Bolzano’s influence on this part of Husserl’s work is so strong that Husserl finds it necessary to defend himself in his review of Palàgy’s book Der Streit zwischen der Psychologisten und Formalisten in der modernen Logik against the accusation of plagiarism. Husserl tells us in this review that he has finally come to understand what Bolzano’s propositions are. A proposition is a kind whose instances are judgements. This is a misunderstanding, but nonetheless it sheds light on the origin of the theory of meaning held by Husserl in the Logische Untersuchungen, according to which the meaning of an expression or the content of a mental act is the species to which these acts belong.
Bolzano’s philosophical system is close to Frege’s. No wonder that Dummett says:

The only nineteenth-century philosopher of whom it would be reasonable to guess, just from the content of his writings and those of Frege, that he had *influenced* Frege, is Bernhard [sic] Bolzano, who dies in the year Frege was born; but there is no evidence whatever Frege ever read Bolzano.


Mancuso and Sundholm have recently argued that there is a direct link between Bolzano and Frege. Whether Frege read Bolzano or not, Bolzano is an important link between the eighteenth and the nineteenth century in German philosophy. Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre* has the subtitle ‘Attempt to give a detailed and largely new presentation of logic with constant attention to its previous contributors’. Nomen est omen. Bolzano sets his own thoughts in relation to Leibniz, Kant, Neo-Kantians, (some) British Empiricists, French Sensualists and Aristotelian Logic. Not only that: many paragraphs of Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre* contain detailed analyses of arguments and concepts of Kant’s theoretical philosophy (these discussions have been collected by Bolzano’s student Franz Pröhonsky under the title *Neuer Anti-Kant oder Prüfung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft nach den in Bolzanos Wissenschaftslehre niedergelegten Begriffen*). A constructive part of Bolzano’s general philosophical project is his attempt to integrate what is worth keeping from Kant in the theory of propositions: the distinctions between intuition and concept, and between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge.

For these reasons Bolzano qualifies as one important link between Kant and Analytic Philosophy. Chapter 8, Morscher’s ‘The great divide within Austrian philosophy: the synthetic a priori’, is devoted to one focal point of Bolzano’s debate with Kant. Bolzano’s criticism and modification of Kant’s definition of analytic propositions as those that (covertly) contain the predicate-concept. Morscher shows how Bolzano’s modification leads Bolzano to classify some logical truths to be synthetic a priori. Bolzano’s theory is compared and contrasted with the latter-day ‘Austrian philosopher’ Carnap’s theory.

Bolzano is in many ways also an ‘Anti-Brentano’: Bolzano takes logical concepts to be conceptually primary and explicates psychological concepts by means of them. He takes philosophers to make an important mistake when they take truth to be a property of judgements
and arguments to be successions of judgements. The more fundamental concept is that of a proposition (‘Satz an sich’). Propositions are the contents of judgements, sentence-like objects that unlike judgements are neither in space nor time. Truth is a property of a proposition. The notions of truth and consequence can serve as points of orientation for the further discussion.

Although Chapter 6, Simons’s ‘Austrian philosophers on truth’, aims to give an overview of theories of truth from Bolzano to Wittgenstein, it is useful to list it under the second big B. For Bolzano provides the starting point of the discussion and is one extreme in the spectrum of Austrian views on truth. This spectrum may be organised along the following axes:

1. Epistemic versus non-epistemic theories of truth.
2. Ontologically parsimonous versus ontologically extravagant theories of truth.

Bolzano’s conception of truth is non-epistemic: truth is not defined by using the concept of evidence. But his conception of truth is prima facie ontologically inflationary. The bearers of truth for Bolzano are propositions. The proposition that A has b is true ‘when every object that falls under the subject idea has some attribute that falls under the predicate idea’ (see p. 160). Here propositions, constituents of propositions and properties are invoked to define truth. It may be possible to make a good case that truth (the genuine article, not a surrogate relation like true in a language in a context at a point of evaluation) can only be applied to propositions. Hence, recognising that something is true requires acceptance of propositions and consequently Bolzano’s definition is not ontologically extravagant. But it is extravagant in other respects: it only gets off the ground if (i) propositions are structured and (ii) every proposition has the same structure. These are certainly controversial assumptions.

Compare Brentano and contrast Brentano. The early Brentano takes judgements to be the things that are true (false) in the primary sense. That may seem ontologically more parsimonous than Bolzano’s theory. Propositions seem to be logical constructions; the psychological reality of judgements is hard to deny. But can one really say that both define the same notion, truth tout court? Judgements are mental events: they initiate or end the state of belief. They can be conceived of as temporal boundaries without temporal extension. However, can one say that judgements are the most fundamental truth-bearers? If one accepts a distinction between the mental event and the way it represents an
object, one will say that the judgement is true in virtue of the way it represents the world and the world being that way. Compare: the sentence ‘The sky is blue’ is true in virtue of its meaning and the colour of the sky being blue. If we look for a truth-value bearer that is not true (false) because something else is true (satisfied), one will not take sentences or judgements as truth-value bearers. Here Bolzano comes in: atomic propositions are not true or false in virtue of the truth or falsity of something else. Hence, they seem good candidates for the things that are true in the fundamental sense.

When it comes to the structure of truth-value bearers Brentano’s view is in a different way from Bolzano’s view extravagant: all judgement are existential judgements. The proper rendering of my judgement that some Greeks are humans is that human Greeks exist. One reason for this non-standard view of judgement is to avoid the assumption of a predicational tie between subject- and predicate-idea. But how should we understand the singular term ‘human Greeks’? ‘Humans that are Greek’ sounds like the right reading, but then we have re-introduced the predicational tie. Prior uses instead ‘Human-and-Greek? Yes!’ to represent how Brentano conceived of judgement.40 This makes the idea vivid that for Brentano a judgement is thinking of something in a particular way. Is the ‘and’ in ‘Human-and-Greek’ not just a stylistic variant of predication, namely of ‘human and is Greek’? No, Brentano must assume that there is a form of conjoining general terms that cannot be reduced to predication.41 More generally, Brentano will try to mimick predication by using modifiers of predicates and ‘exists’. Whether this reform can be carried off without using a meta-language that uses predication cannot be decided here.

Although Brentano’s definitions of truth change due to the development of his ontology (in his reistic phase Brentano has only room for particulars) they are all epistemic: a judgement is true iff it can be made with evidence. Brentano’s foundationalism and his theory of truth are closely linked.

Husserl and Marty modify and enrich the Austrian tools used to define truth. They introduce truth-makers. This enables for instance Husserl to develop a position that falls between the extremes (see pp. 170ff.).

When it comes to logic, broadly conceived, Bolzano makes use of a new tool to systematise relations between (true) propositions.42 He uses the idea that constituent parts of propositions can be substituted or varied. He observes that variation of a constituent leaves in some cases semantic properties of a proposition constant. He goes on to classify propositions according to their properties that remain constant when
varying certain of their constituents. The best-known example is consequence (‘Ableitbarkeit’): some propositions $c_1$ to $c_n$ are consequences of some other propositions $p_1$ to $p_n$ with respect to the common constituents $i_1$ to $i_n$ iff every systematic substitution of $i_1$ to $i_n$ that produces only true variants of $p_1$ to $p_n$ also produces only true variants of $c_1$ to $c_n$.\textsuperscript{43} This idea is applied to define \textit{logical} consequence (all and only non-logical ideas are varied) and to such notions as logical truth (a logical truth is a proposition that remains true under all variations of the non-logical ideas) and analyticity. In addition to the theory of consequence Bolzano’s work contains a theory of grounding (‘Abfolge’): the logic of a concept of objective reason: ‘The proposition that $p$ is true because of $q$’.\textsuperscript{44}

Bolzano’s definition of logical consequence has many affinities with the \textit{penultimate} version of Tarski’s definition in ‘The concept of logical consequence’. For this reason Bolzano’s theory of consequence has received more attention than most of his other theories. It has been explored and its relation to Tarski’s ultimate definition of logical consequence has been exploited.\textsuperscript{45} Furthermore, Bolzano’s definition of the notion of a logically analytic proposition is now seen as the first attempt to give a precise explication of this notion.\textsuperscript{46}

But is there \textit{the} notion of analyticity? Künne makes in his comprehensive ‘Analyticity and logical truth: from Bolzano to Quine’ (Chapter 7) a strong case for the view that there is no notion of analyticity to be analysed. Compare: knowledge. There is a pre-theoretic concept of knowledge that you and I master. It has a point in our practical life (it is in many respects better to know than to be ignorant) and we have strong intuitions about the correct application of ‘$S$ knows that $P$’. Not so with ‘It is analytic that $p$’. This is a philosopher’s term of art that is not (at least not strongly) connected to any pre-theoretical concept. There is no single notion of analyticity that can be captured by a proposed definition. Hence, Künne opts for a comparative historical study of what philosophers have understood by the term. Bolzano’s work plays the central role in the chapter and his substitutionalist account is refined and carefully elaborated. Special consideration is given to Bolzano’s substitutional concept of logical analyticity and its relations to philosophers who have been influenced by Bolzano or proposed independently substitutional conceptions (Quine). What emerges from the discussion is that the history of logic offers us a cluster of concepts of analyticity whose earlier elements cannot be seen as precursors of the conceptions now discussed and used.

We must take Bolzano into account if we want to understand the change from psychologistic to platonistic ontologies which is often seen
as defining for Analytic Philosophy. It took place before Frege or Russell were born.

So much for fact. What about value? Bolzano’s practical philosophy has been neglected. Chapter 9, George and Rusnock’s ‘Bolzano’s political philosophy’, will help to fill the gap and encourage others to help filling it. George and Rusnock outline how Bolzano’s popular public talks, his ‘Erbauungsreden’ and his political philosophy outlined in the unpublished *Vom besten Staate* complement each other. Bolzano tries to give us a picture of how a state would look like that is organised according to the highest principle of morals. George and Rusnock evaluate Bolzano’s book by taking its political and economic background into account.

The theoretical basis of Bolzano’s political philosophy is a form of utilitarianism. The highest moral principle (‘oberstes Sittengesetz’) demands the advancement of the common good. Bolzano is in his practical as well as in his theoretical philosophy Anti-Kantian.

George and Rusnock’s chapter also puts Bolzano’s logic in perspective. Bolzano says in his *Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre und Religionswissenschaft in einer beurtheilenden Uebersicht* that the highest principle of the *Wissenschaftslehre* is:

> In organising the whole realm of truth in special sciences and by the representing them in textbooks one has to proceed in way that the greatest sum of good ensues.


Reasoning and the organisation of knowledge in special sciences is in the service of the advancement of the common good. The highest moral principle governs theoretical and moral philosophy.48

Notes

* Many thanks for helpful suggestions and feedback go to Jonas Green, Wolfgang Künne, Kevin Mulligan, Tom Pink, Maria Elisabeth Reicher and Peter Simons. I also wish to thank the editors of *London Studies in the History of Philosophy*, especially Martin Stone, for their help and encouragement.

1 Wittgenstein is a philosopher from Austria, but not an *Austrian* Philosopher. Brentano, in contrast, is from Germany, but is an Austrian
Philosopher. If this sounds too puzzling, please understand by ‘Austrian Philosophy’ philosophy as a tradition.


10 Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est.

11 Many thanks to Kevin Mulligan for pointing out the connection between


15 Judgement is for Brentano not a propositional attitude, it is an objectual attitude that moreover has a negative counterpart: ‘When evaluating Brentano’s controversial theory of judgement, [. . .], one must always bear in mind that he used the term “judgement” in a much more general way than do most people in ordinary usage. One must remember that for him every perception, inner as well as external, is a judgement, that this already constitutes for him an elementary affirmation, and that he is of the opinion that any kind of mental act, from the very beginning, is bound up with an evident self-affirmation, that is a judgement in the broadest sense of the word.’ C. Stumpf, ‘Reminiscences of Brentano’ (1919), reprinted in: L.L. McAlister (ed.) The Philosophy of Brentano, London: Duckworth, 1976, p. 36.


21 For further discussion of these notions see the contributions in B. Smith (ed.) Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1982.
22 See PES-G, 223.
30 See, for example, F. Brentano, *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (1889), Leipzig: Meiner Verlag, 31934, 152.
33 See p. 29 of the German text.
37 ‘Versuch einer ausführlichen und größtentheils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter’.
39 Edited by E. Morscher and Ch. Thiel, St Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2003.
41 Thanks to Peter Simons for pointing this out to me.
43 See *Wissenschaftslehre* II, § 155, 114.
1 Brentano’s concept of intentional inexistence

Tim Crane

Franz Brentano’s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional inexistence is often cited as re-introducing the concept of intentionality into mainstream philosophical discussion. But Brentano’s own claims about intentional inexistence are much misunderstood. In the second half of the twentieth century, analytical philosophers in particular have misread Brentano’s views in misleading ways. It is important to correct these misunderstandings if we are to come to a proper assessment of Brentano’s worth as a philosopher and his position in the history of philosophy. Good corrections have been made in the recent analytic literature by David Bell (1990), Dermot Moran (1996) and Barry Smith (1994) among others.

But there is also another, more purely philosophical lesson to be learned from the proper understanding of Brentano’s views on this matter. This is that Brentano’s struggles with the concept of intentionality reveal a fundamental division between different ways of thinking about intentionality, a division which Brentano himself does not make fully clear. Making the nature of this division explicit is the aim of this chapter.

First I will attempt to expound Brentano’s concept of intentional inexistence in its original 1874 context. This will enable us to eliminate some of the relatively superficial misunderstandings alluded to above. Then I will outline Brentano’s change of mind when he later came to write the appendices to his 1874 Psychology. Although any reasonably careful reading of the text will show that Brentano did in fact change his mind, it is not always clearly recognised in the discussions of Brentano’s thesis what it is that he changed it from. Third I will show how the tension between his earlier view and the later view of the appendices is in fact the tension which is responsible for the problem of intentionality as we have it today.
Intentional inexistence and non-existence

Brentano is perhaps best known for the following passage:

> Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing) or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

(Brentano 1995a: 88)

But what is this ‘intentional inexistence’? One popular understanding of this phrase is that intentional inexistence has something to do with the possible or actual non-existence of objects of thought. We can think about objects which exist, and objects which do not exist. But what makes it possible for us to think about things which do not exist? Some have claimed that this question was what motivated Brentano’s whole theory of intentionality. According to Gabriel Segal, for example,

Brentano was particularly concerned with the problem of how we can represent things that don’t exist outside of the mind, such as unicorns. His original idea was that if one thinks about a unicorn, then one’s thought has an intentional object that does exist. The object is, not, however, a concrete inhabitant of external reality, but an ephemeral entity, existing in the mind only.

(Segal 2005: 283–4)

Segal’s claim is that Brentano introduced ‘intentional objects’ to solve the problem of how we can think about objects which do not exist, like unicorns. Brentano’s solution, on this understanding, was to say that the object of thought in this case is not something in ‘external reality’ but something in the mind only. Hence every thought has an object, it’s just that the objects of thoughts about non-existent entities are mental objects. And according to Segal, this is true of thought about existent entities too: ‘Brentano held that the objects of thought and experience
were always such intentional entities. Thus if one is thinking about Paris, the immediate object of one’s thought is an intentional object rather than a city’ (Segal 2005: 284).

The idea that the objects of thought about the non-existent are mental objects – for this is how I will understand objects as ‘existing in the mind only’ – is a view which is often discussed in connection with the problem of non-existence. There are obvious and well-known objections to the view (see Harman 1990). But I will not dwell on these objections here, since I want to examine instead the line of thought behind Segal’s interpretation of Brentano, since it is an interpretation which is frequently found in analytic philosophy. Segal seems to think that the thesis that objects of thought (intentional objects) are mental is a solution to the problem of non-existent objects of thought. The idea is this: how do we think about Pegasus? Answer: we do this by having in mind an ephemeral or mental entity; hence what we are thinking about is an ephemeral or mental entity. This suggests that if we were just considering the phenomenon of thought about what we normally take to be existing entities, then we would not have any reason to say that objects of thought are mental. A clear implication of Segal’s view is that we would have no inclination to think that an object of thought is mental if it were itself a real or existing object: say, the Darley Arabian rather than Pegasus.

But whatever the merits of this approach to the problem of non-existence, it cannot be Brentano’s 1874 view. The reason is that his original introduction of the terminology of intentional inexistence in the 1874 book does not appeal to, and nor does it presuppose, any distinction between existent and non-existent objects of thought at all. So the reason for introducing the idea of intentional inexistence can hardly have been because of any problem presented by non-existent objects like Pegasus. This is not, however, because Brentano thinks that all objects of thought exist. Rather, it is closer to the truth to say that he thinks none of them exist, not even the things we take to be ordinary physical objects. To a contemporary ear, this is a rather paradoxical or nihilistic way to put the view; it would be closer to the truth to say that none of the things we take to be ordinary physical things have any kind of ultimate or transcendent reality. At the beginning of his Psychology of 1874, Brentano discusses physical phenomena, the subject-matter of physical or natural science. He writes:

The phenomena of light, sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion which [the natural scientist] studies are not things which really and truly exist. They are signs of something real, which, through its
causal activity, produces presentations of them. They are not, however, an adequate representation of this reality, and they give us knowledge of it only in a very incomplete sense. We can say that there exists something which, under certain conditions, causes this or that sensation. We can probably also prove that there must be relations among these realities similar to those which are manifested by spatial phenomena of shapes and sizes. But this is as far as we can go. We have no experience of that which truly exists, in and of itself, and that which we do experience is not true. The truth of physical phenomena is, as they say, only a relative truth.

(Brentano 1995a: 19)

It is clear from this passage that Brentano’s view is not that there is a distinction between ‘physical objects’ which exist, and ‘intentional objects’ which do not exist. His view is rather that none of the things which are studied by science ‘really and truly exist’: they are phenomena, mere appearances, which are signs of an underlying reality but which are not real themselves. Since all objects of natural scientific investigation are phenomena, then they all have the same status vis-à-vis reality: none of them are real. But this is not because they are unreal in the way we think Pegasus is; rather it is because they are only phenomena. So Brentano did not begin with the problem that Segal says he did.

Segal sets up the problem against the background of a kind of twentieth- and twenty-first-century ‘commonsense’ realism which assumes that there is a realm of ordinary objects which exist independently of our minds, that relations hold between such objects, and that things cannot be more or less real. Given these assumptions, then the problem of intentionality can be posed as follows: how can a non-existent entity like Pegasus be the object of an act of thought, since it cannot be something which stands in relation to the subject of a mental act, because anything which stands in a relation to anything else must exist. Clearly the assumption that something can only stand in a relation to something which exists is one of the assumptions which form part of the metaphysical background of contemporary realism. Now I am not disputing these assumptions; in fact, like many analytic philosophers, I accept them. My point here is that they cannot be Brentano’s assumptions, and so the problem which Segal says Brentano is addressing cannot really be his problem. And neither, therefore, does Brentano encounter the problem with the view – that intentional objects are mental objects – which Segal then goes on to claim he does:
One’s thought is true if there is a match of the right kind between the properties of the intentional object and those of the real object. An obvious problem with this view is that it offers no account of what determines the real object of thought (Paris), and hence leaves the nature of intentionality mysterious. Brentano himself came to realise this and abandoned the doctrine.

(Segal 2005: 284)

The problem presented here is like a version of the ‘veil of perception’ objection to the sense-data theory: if all we have access to are the immediate objects of perception, then how does our perceptual experience ever reach out to (what we really know to be) the real objects of perception? But given that Brentano thinks that we have little conception of ‘that which truly exists, in and of itself’, and that science’s job is simply to account for the data of experience, then this problem does not arise for him, in the case of perception or in the case of thought. In other words, since Paris, too, is simply a phenomenon, the question of what determines Paris as the ‘real object of thought’ makes no literal sense for him.

Segal is right, however, that Brentano later abandoned his 1874 view of intentionality; we shall look into this below. But the present issue is what Brentano’s earlier views actually were. I have claimed that these views involve assumptions which would be rejected by many analytic philosophers today: that phenomena are not real in themselves but only signs of a fundamentally unknowable independent reality; and that some things are, in a certain way, more real than others. Hence philosophers today cannot accept Brentano’s views, and in a sense these views are invisible to them. If our aim is simply to get clear about the facts of intentionality then this doesn’t matter very much. But if we are going to make claims about what Brentano’s views actually were, and what therefore is alive or dead in them, then we have to see what his assumptions were, rather than ignoring them or translating them into our terminology which disguises distinctions which he might have made.

However, we have not yet said what Brentano actually meant by ‘intentional inexistence’. This is the task of the next section.

**Intentional inexistence**

To understand properly the concept of intentional inexistence, we have to set the famous passage in the context of the general project of the *Psychology*. The overall aim of the book was to establish the intellectual
foundations of psychology as a science. It is a science whose data comes from experience and introspection – hence it is psychology from an empirical standpoint. He thought that if psychology was to be established as a science, there has to be a criterion which distinguishes its subject-matter from the subject-matter of physical or natural science. In Book I of the Psychology Brentano had defined psychology as the ‘science of mental phenomena’, opposing the etymologically more correct definition of it as the ‘science of the soul’. Before we examine what makes a phenomenon mental, we should say something about this use of the terms ‘phenomenon’ and ‘science’.

These two terms should really be understood together. As we have seen, Brentano believed that natural science does not uncover the real nature of things. In particular, physics is not the science of bodies because even if we can be said to encounter the properties of bodies, ‘we never encounter that something of which these things are properties’ (Brentano 1995a: 11). All that science can ever discover are the appearances of things: these are the ‘physical phenomena’ like ‘light, sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion’. Science studies phenomena; that is all that science can do. These phenomena or appearances are things which only exist in the mind. As Barry Smith puts it:

at the time of the first edition of the Psychology Brentano conceives physical phenomena like experienced colours and sounds as existing in the mind as parts of consciousness, so that the intentionality of outer perception is in fact a relation between two mental entities, the (real) act of sensation and the (non-real, non-causally efficacious, abstract) quality sensed. The latter, for example experienced sounds and colours, have a diminished sort of existence, an existence ‘in the mind’.

(Smith 1994: 41)

Physical phenomena are the objects of experiences; but physical phenomena are appearances. Appearances are fundamentally mind-dependent (pace, for example, Morrison 1970). So Segal is quite right to say that according to Brentano’s 1874 view, intentional objects only exist in the mind. But Brentano did not think this because he was trying to solve the problem of non-existence. Rather, it is simply a consequence of the fact that sciences study phenomena.

It is easy to see, then, that the differences between sciences amount to the differences between the phenomena studied by the sciences. The distinction between psychology and physics therefore amounts to the distinction between mental and physical phenomena. But it is crucial
for understanding Brentano’s *Psychology* that this distinction is a distinction among the ‘data of consciousness’ (Brentano 1995a: 77).

Brentano talks approvingly of Lange’s idea of ‘psychology without a soul’ (Brentano 1995a: 11). What he has in mind here is that psychology can proceed while being indifferent on the question of whether there is a soul: for ‘whether or not there are souls, there are mental phenomena’ (Brentano 1995a: 18). So what, then, are mental phenomena?

This brings us back to the famous definition quoted above. A mental phenomenon (or a mental ‘act’ in Brentano’s terminology) always contains an object within itself. The ‘directedness towards an object’, ‘relation to a content’ or ‘immanent objectivity’ all therefore amount to the same thing: there is an object – that is, another phenomenon, whether physical or mental – in the mental act itself. All mental phenomena are directed upon phenomena, and such phenomena may be physical or mental. In the former case, a mental act would have as its object something like a sound or a shape or a colour. In the latter case, a mental act would have as its object another mental act. For example, one may think about the mental act of *hearing* a sound, for example. But whether physical or mental, the objects of acts are phenomena and hence fundamentally mind-dependent. Hence Brentano was not proposing how we think about mind-independent ‘external’ objects. The intentional inexistence of an object means, literally, existence *in* the mental act itself. As Smith comments, the thesis that ‘every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself’ is ‘to be taken literally – against the grain of a seemingly unshakeable tendency to twist Brentano’s words at this point’ (Smith 1994: 40; see further Jacquette 2004).

The background to this view is partly Aristotelian, as Brentano indicates in a well-known footnote (Brentano 1995a: 88). Aristotle had talked in the *De Anima* about how in perception, the perceiving organ takes on the ‘form’ of the perceived object: in seeing something blue, the eye takes on blueness without taking on the matter of blueness (see Sorabji 1991; though see Caston 1998 for further discussion). Brentano, like Aquinas, wanted to follow Aristotle in at least this respect: the proper objects of thought and perception – what it is that we are thinking of, and what makes thought possible at all – are actually *immanent* in the act of thinking, and do not transcend the mental act. In this respect, objects of thought may be compared to universals on an Aristotelian conception of them, according to which they are immanent in the particulars which instantiate them, and do not transcend those particulars.

Finally, I should briefly mention the fact that Brentano divides mental phenomena into three kinds: presentation, judgement and
emotional phenomena including love, hate and desire. A presentation (Vorstellung, sometimes translated as ‘idea’ or ‘thought’) may be inner or outer. An inner presentation may be a feeling or an awareness of some mental act; the objects of inner perception are thinking, feeling and willing. The objects of outer presentation or perception are warmth, colour, sound and so on (i.e. physical phenomena). A distinctive feature of his view is that every mental act is also directed on itself (although in what he called a ‘secondary’ sense) as well as on its primary object. Much of Book II of the Psychology is concerned with articulating the distinction between the three kinds of mental phenomena (see Mulligan 2004 for a recent discussion). In the 1874 book, Brentano held that presentations never occur alone but only together with some other mental activity (judgement or love/hate) but he later came to abandon this view, as he acknowledged in the 1911 edition of selections from the Psychology (Brentano 1995a: 276).

Methodological phenomenalism

The picture of Brentano’s 1874 views which we have arrived at is in some ways foreign to contemporary discussions of intentionality, which tend to assume a commonsense realism about the material world, and a physicalist conception of the findings of science. But, placed in wider context, the views should not be so strange. For Brentano’s conception of science has a lot in common with the kind of phenomenalism which was common in nineteenth-century philosophy of science, which survived into the twentieth century in logical positivism, and which has echoes in Quine’s claim that the purpose of science is to explain and predict the course of experience. At the beginning of the Psychology, Brentano mentions Mill approvingly as ‘one of the most important advocates of psychology as a purely phenomenalistic science’ (Brentano 1995a: 14), and although not a card-carrying phenomenalist himself, he expressed sympathy with Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism on a number of occasions (cf. Smith 1994: 41, n.8).

But Brentano was not a phenomenalist because phenomenalism holds that the world is constructed from phenomena, appearances or (in some versions) sense-data. And as we saw above, Brentano holds that there is a world which transcends the phenomena; physical phenomena are ‘signs of something real, which, through its causal activity, produces presentations of them’ (Brentano 1995a: 19). This is what distinguishes Brentano from phenomenalism proper: he believes that there is something beyond the phenomena, although we can
never know it. Nonetheless, this knowledge can never come through science; so as far as science is concerned, phenomenalism might as well be true. Peter Simons has usefully called Brentano’s approach *methodological phenomenalism* (Simons 1995: xvii) and I will adopt this label.

One obstacle for anglophone readers to seeing the importance of Brentano’s sympathy with phenomenalism is the complex and somewhat messy text which was eventually published as *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* in 1973. The text as it has come down to us is larded with footnotes by Brentano’s editor Oskar Kraus, many of them substantive and interpretative in nature, and a less than careful reader might be misled into thinking that some of them are actually Brentano’s own. After the passage on page 19 of the 1874 work, which I quoted above in full and which is central to understanding Brentano’s methodological phenomenalism, Kraus adds a note saying that this passage is ‘misleading’ because it does not distinguish light from colour, and sound from the heard sound. But Brentano can easily distinguish light from colour and still say that light is a phenomenon, that is, not something which really and truly exists and that it is still among the things which physics studies. Brentano’s methodological phenomenalism is not simply a belief in the existence of secondary qualities. Moreover, immediately after this passage, Brentano contrasts the ‘relative truth’ of physical phenomena with the phenomena of inner perception (or introspection) which are ‘true in themselves. As they appear to be, so are they in reality’. This is why he says that the phenomena psychology studies are ‘true and real in themselves’ (Brentano 1995a: 20). What Brentano is talking about here is ‘inner perception’: when a mental act is presented as the object of another mental act there is no further ‘external’ reality to which it corresponds. This is the kind of point that contemporary philosophers might express by saying that where consciousness is concerned, the ‘appearance is the reality’.

Kraus adds a footnote at this point saying that this does not mean that Brentano is a phenomenalist. Of course, it does not; but in his care to avoid casting Brentano as a phenomenalist, Kraus goes too far the other way, and tries to present him as if he were (in the 1874 edition) a realist about the physical world: ‘in Brentano’s opinion, the physicist, too, is concerned with “things which are true and real in themselves” ’ (Brentano 1995a: 20). But not only does this not follow from the denial of phenomenalism, it is also inconsistent with other things Brentano says in the 1874 text. One could deny phenomenalism and still think that physics only studies phenomena, but phenomena which are the result of an underlying reality which we cannot fully know. And this seems to be
Brentano’s actual view, clearly and un-misleadingly expressed in the passage from page 19 quoted above. As he says later, ‘what are physical phenomena if not the colours, sounds, heat and cold etc., which manifest themselves in our sensations?’ (Brentano 1995a: 69, emphasis added).

We are now in a position to take something of an overview of the doctrine of intentional inexistence. The distinction between mental and physical phenomena is that while both kinds of phenomena are among the ‘data of consciousness’, only mental phenomena are directed upon something else as an object. But this object too is only a phenomenon. So what happens when someone hears a sound is that there is a mental act (a mental phenomenon: in this case, a presentation) which is directed upon a physical phenomenon (a sound). This is an act of outer perception. In acts of inner perception, a mental act is directed upon another mental phenomenon. But there is no distinction between those phenomena – the objects of mental acts – which exist and those which do not. This is because, according to methodological phenomenalism, science can only study phenomena. Physical phenomena do not exist, in the sense in which their underlying causes exist – they ‘should not be considered a reality’ – but nor should they be thought of as unreal or non-existent, like Pegasus. From the point of view of consciousness, they are there, given to consciousness and there to be studied, like the mental phenomena whose objects they are.

Hence there is no issue, from the perspective of methodological phenomenalism, about ‘objects of thought which do not exist’. All objects of thought or presentation are in this way intentionally ‘inexistent’ in some mental act or other, and this is all that can be studied in psychology. The reality or non-reality of the causes of these phenomena is beyond scientific investigation: psychology as an empirical science can only study the data of consciousness.

The conclusion I want to draw from this account of Brentano’s theory of intentionality is therefore quite simple: Brentano’s original 1874 doctrine of intentional inexistence has nothing to do with the problem of how we can think about things that do not exist. Although his account of intentionality would certainly supply an account of thought about, say, Pegasus, this is only because it is an account of thought in general, and not because that was what was motivating the account.

But if this is true, then an interesting exegetical question remains: why have so many philosophers taken Brentano to be concerned with this question in his 1874 definition of mental phenomena? To point to a verbal similarity between ‘inexistence’ and ‘non-existence’ is surely not sufficient; more charity is needed if we are to untangle this mess of
ideas. In the next section I will answer this question, and point out a general moral.

**Brentano’s change of mind**

Those who are familiar with Brentano’s work only through those passages which are quoted by analytic philosophers of intentionality might be puzzled by what has been said so far. For in addition to the famous definition of mental phenomena discussed above, there are other often-quoted pieces of Brentano’s text which seem to contradict what I have said. Consider, for example, these passages from the 1973/1995 English edition of the *Psychology*:

What is characteristic of every mental activity is, as I believe I have shown, the reference to something as an object. In this respect, every mental activity seems to be something relational. . . . If I take something relative from among the broad class of comparative relations, something larger or smaller for example, then, if the larger thing exists, the smaller one must exist too. If one house is larger than another house, the other house must also exist and have a size. . . . It is entirely different with mental reference. If someone thinks of something, the one who is thinking must certainly exist, but the object of his thinking need not exist at all. . . . For this reason, one could doubt whether we are really dealing with something relational here, and not, rather, with something somewhat similar to something relational in a certain respect, which might therefore be called ‘quasi-relational’.

(Brentano 1995a: 272)

And later he writes:

All mental references refer to things.

In many cases, the things to which we refer do not exist. But we are accustomed to saying that they then have being as objects. This is a loose use of the verb ‘to be’ which we permit with impunity for the sake of convenience, just as we allow ourselves to speak of the sun ‘rising’ and ‘setting’. All it means is that a mentally active subject is referring to those things. It is only consistent to go on and permit such statements as ‘A centaur is half man, half horse’ although in the strict sense centaurs do not exist and so, in a strict sense, there is no centaur which has a body that is half of human form and half in the form of a horse.

(Brentano 1995a: 291)
These passages seem to be in simple opposition to the interpretation of Brentano’s views which I have advanced in the previous sections of this chapter. For Brentano here seems to be expressing the problem of intentionality in the way that contemporary analytic philosophers do (see e.g. Stalnaker 1983: chapter 1): thinking about something appears to be a relation between the thinker and the thing thought about; but relations entail the existence of their relata; yet we can think about things which do not exist. Yet everything that I have been trying to say so far has been dedicated to showing that this was not Brentano’s concern. So how can my interpretation of Brentano be correct?

The answer to this question, of course, is that Brentano changed his mind – as all those familiar with the Psychology will know. In 1911 chapters 5–9 of Book II of the 1874 edition were reprinted, under the title On the Classification of Mental and Phenomena. To this were added, as an appendix, several ‘supplementary remarks’ from which the above quotations are taken. In the Preface to this 1911 edition, describing the ways in which his views had evolved, Brentano wrote that ‘one of the most important innovations is that I am no longer of the opinion that mental relation can have something other than a thing as its object’ (Brentano 1995a: xxvi). To describe this as an ‘innovation’, however, is at worst misleading and at best an understatement. For the whole account of intentionality in the 1874 work was based on the idea of intentional inexistence, which is unproblematic only to the extent that objects of thought are immanent to the act of thinking. As we saw, this fits smoothly into a view of all science and its subject-matter: science does not treat of the real, but only of phenomena, which we have some reason to think is a causal effect of an underlying reality whose character we do not fully understand. Once it is admitted that objects of thought can be themselves real things, and therefore transcend the act of thought, then this whole picture starts to fall apart. Seen in this context, Brentano’s description of his ‘innovation’ – that the mental relation cannot have anything ‘other than a thing as its object’ – is somewhat disingenuous, for it strongly suggests that he used to think that the mental relation could sometimes have a real thing as its object, and sometimes something else. But as we saw above, he did not think this when he wrote the 1874 work; indeed, if I am right, he could not have thought this.

The situation is not helped by the fact that in 1924 a second edition, edited by Oskar Kraus, was published, with the addition of Kraus’s explanatory notes discussed above, and some extra essays. This is the edition which was then translated almost in its entirety in 1973, under the editorship of Linda L. McAlister. A reader interested chiefly in the
philosophical content, and inattentive to the way Brentano’s work has been served up to anglophone readers, might be forgiven for thinking that Brentano’s concept of intentional existence is both more obscure than it actually is, and also motivated by the problem of intentionality as we have it today. Or, to put it slightly differently: even if such a casual reading of a text is unforgivable, it is certainly understandable.

**Conclusion: the problem of intentionality**

According to many scholars, Brentano changed his mind under pressure from some of his students, who argued that objects of thought must transcend the act of thinking (see e.g. Smith 1994: 54; Moran 2000: chapter 2). Kasimir Twardowski, for instance, argued that a distinction is needed between the object of a thought and its content, where it is the *content* which is something immanent to the thought. Alexius Meinong, on the other hand, thought that the realm of objects should include objects of all kinds including non-existent and impossible objects. And, of course, in one of the most famous and influential discussions of Brentano’s doctrine of intentional inexistence, Husserl argued that objects of thought are always transcendent (Husserl 2001 [1901]; see also Føllesdal 1978). When a thought concerns a non-existent object, then we should say that there is no object at all to which the subject is related; there is only an act of thought with a certain intentional ‘matter’ (or as would be said today, intentional content). Though his thought later took an idealist turn, Husserl was never a phenomenalist, and nor was he a methodological phenomenalist as Brentano was. In his discussions of intentionality in the earlier work, Husserl was very clear that the object of thought was not immanent in the thought, and that therefore intentionality should not be conceived as a relation to its objects (see Zahavi 1998).

Brentano’s later discussions of intentionality, which entail the rejection of methodological phenomenanism, do not approach anywhere close to the sophistication of Husserl’s. Indeed, it is hard to see that they do more than state the problem. Calling something a ‘quasi-relation’ (*Relativliches*) without further explanation does little but draw attention to the phenomenon we are trying to understand. But nonetheless, we can see that with the move away from methodological phenomenalism, Brentano is facing up to the problem of intentionality as we conceive of it today. This problem is pretty much invisible as long as we stay within the framework of methodological phenomenalism. If one is a methodological phenomenalist, one construes intentional relations as relations to phenomena, which are mental or mind-dependent. Since
every intentional mental act is a relation to some phenomenon or other, then there simply is no issue about the non-existence, or the possible non-existence, of objects of thought. So, in that sense, there is no problem of intentionality. But once one moves beyond the methodological phenomenalist framework – as Brentano did when he adopted his ‘innovation’ – one has to say something about what it is that characterises your thought when the object of thought does not exist. This simply is the problem of intentionality for anyone who accepts the minimal ‘realist’ assumptions that there is a mind-independent realm of objects, our thought can concern them and, moreover, that the way they concern these mind-independent objects is what distinguishes thoughts from one another. These assumptions easily generate the conception of thought as relational – as a relation to its objects – which, together with the metaphysical assumption that relations entail the existence of their relata, give us our problem. In this way, we can see how Brentano’s move away from the doctrine of intentional inexistence, and towards the embracing of transcendent objects of thought, dramatises within his philosophy the problem of intentionality itself.

Nonetheless, it has to be admitted that the conclusion to which we are leading is a somewhat negative one: that it is hard to see Brentano’s discussions of intentionality as something which we can interact usefully with today in any depth. The concept of intentional inexistence as introduced in the 1874 *Psychology* presupposes a metaphysical and epistemological framework in which the idea of an intentional relation certainly made sense, but few would accept this framework today and it was rejected by Brentano himself (in the guise of an innovation) in the 1911 edition. Once this framework is rejected, then as Husserl saw, there is no real place for an intentional relation at all, and Brentano’s concept of intentional inexistence is not one which is profitably employed in discussions of intentionality.8

Notes

1 Two classic examples are Quine’s remark that Brentano’s thesis of the intentionality of the mental is the claim that ‘there is no breaking out of the intentional vocabulary by explaining its members in other terms’ (1960: 220); and Hartry Field’s claim that Brentano thought it was impossible to give a ‘materialistically adequate’ account of the relation between a person and a proposition (1978: 78). Both Field and Quine link Brentano’s thesis of the intentional inexistence of the mental with physicalism in the twentieth-century sense. But as we shall see, physicalism was not one of Brentano’s concerns, and Field’s and Quine’s attributions bear little relation to what Brentano really said.
2 Cf. Barry Smith: ‘one will find no coherent interpretation of Brentano’s principle of intentionality so long as one remains within the framework of our usual, commonsensical notions of both the mind and its objects’ (1994: 40).

3 Note the difference between this use of ‘empirical’ and the contemporary conception of psychology as an empirical science. From a contemporary perspective, to say that psychology is an empirical science is to say that it uses the kinds of methods (e.g. quantitative or statistical methods) which are characteristic of the other natural sciences. From that perspective, Brentano’s introspective psychology is no more empirical than William James’s. I ignore here the later distinction Brentano makes between descriptive and genetic psychology; but see Brentano 1995b, in the useful edition by Benito Müller.

4 This is a part of Brentano’s view which has been taken up recently in some discussions of consciousness; see Thomasson 2000 and Hossack 2002.

5 See Quine (1960: chapter 1) and see also (e.g.) Poincare (1958 [1914]: 14), for phenomenalism about science in the early twentieth century.

6 The English translation of the *Psychology* is by A. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and L.L. McAlister, published by Routledge & Kegan Paul in 1973; the paperback edition was published by Routledge in 1995. This is essentially a reprint of the 1973 text with an excellent introduction by Peter Simons. However, Kraus’s intrusive and misleading notes remain in this edition, a fact for which I must bear some responsibility, as one of the editors of the series in which the reprint book appeared.

7 For classic discussions, see Nagel 1974; Kripke 1980, lecture III.

8 I am grateful to Mike Martin, David Smith, Peter Simons and Dan Zahavi for discussion of these matters, and to Mark Textor for his patience and guidance. I acknowledge the support of the AHRB’s Research Leave Scheme.

**Bibliography**


Brentano’s concept of intentional inexistence


Among the principal philosophical problems that any satisfactory account of consciousness has to address are the following three. First, the problem of qualitative character: do experiences have intrinsic non-representational properties, namely *qualia*, which determine what the experience is like for the subject of the experience? Second, the problem of the necessity of co-occurrence: why is it that, necessarily, an experience and the consciousness of it co-occur, i.e. necessarily either both are present together, or both are absent together? Third, the problem of introspection: what account should be given of the introspective knowledge one has of one’s own current experiences?

In this chapter I discuss the contributions of Thomas Reid and Franz Brentano to these three problems. There is a fundamental similarity between their accounts of consciousness, for they both endorsed an ‘Identity Theory’, according to which an experience, and the consciousness of the experience, involve only a single mental event. But although they both subscribed to the Identity Theory, they meant different things by it. For the Scottish philosopher of common sense, consciousness was a species of *knowledge*; but for the Austrian founder of phenomenology, consciousness was the same thing as *appearance*. This is a fundamental difference between their two approaches: taking knowledge as the central concept in the philosophy of mind tends to promote philosophical realism; taking appearance as the central concept risks anti-realism and idealism. I shall be suggesting that Reid’s more realist approach is to be preferred to Brentano’s, since it does a better job of solving the three problems of consciousness.

I argue that Brentano’s account fails to solve the three problems because it contains three flaws. The first flaw is that he does not acknowledge the existence of *qualia*. The second is that his Identity Theory is half-hearted and psychologistic; he says the experience and the consciousness of it ‘form’ a single mental event, but he also says they can be
‘considered as’ two different presentations. The third flaw, which in my view vitiates his whole approach, is that he defines consciousness in terms of appearance rather than knowledge.

Reid’s account of consciousness is free of these three flaws. First, Reid asserts the existence of qualia, so unlike Brentano he has a straightforward solution to the problem of qualitative character. Second, Reid’s Identity Theory is neither half-hearted nor psychologistic – his claim is that an experience and one’s consciousness of its quale are literally one and the same identical thing, which is why it is metaphysically impossible to have the one without the other; he thus solves the problem of the necessity of co-occurrence. Third, Reid takes consciousness to be knowledge and not mere appearance, so his explanation of introspective self-knowledge is straightforward; we know our experiences through our knowledge by consciousness of their qualia.

The problem of introspection

Introspection is the power we have of knowing how we experience things to be. For example, at the moment I am facing a table. Also, it looks to me as if I am facing a table. These are two different facts, both of which are known to me. It is by visual perception that I know I face a table, but it is by introspection that I know that it looks to me as if I face a table. Introspection is not the same thing as perception.

Is introspection the same thing as consciousness? I am indeed conscious at the moment of it looking to me as if I face a table, but that is only to say that the experience is one of which I am conscious. I am conscious of the experience; the experience is of it looking to me as if I face a table; therefore I am conscious of it looking to me as if I face a table; but it does not follow that I am conscious that it looks to me as if I face a table. Therefore we cannot simply assume that introspective self-knowledge and consciousness are identical. Indeed, it seems plausible that they are not identical, for introspection seems to require more concepts than does consciousness. For example, I might lack the concept of a visual appearance: then I would be unable to judge introspectively that it looked to me as if I faced a table, even though it did in fact look to me as if I faced a table, and I was conscious of this visual experience.

However, introspection must certainly be closely connected with consciousness, for only mental states that are conscious are directly introspectible. For example, a belief is not a conscious state; there is nothing it is like for me to believe that I face a table. And beliefs are not introspectible. I may believe that I face a table, but in order to know that I
have this belief, I must infer it from other knowledge I have about myself. Beliefs guide actions, so by noting my actions I can infer my beliefs. Another way to find out what I believe is by introspection of the judgements I make. For example, I can use Evans’s test; to find out whether I believe that I face a table, I ask myself whether I face a table, and if I then judge that I face a table, I infer that probably I believe that I face a table. Evans’s test exploits introspection of the conscious judgement, but is not itself direct introspection of the belief. That is proved by the possibility of error in unusual cases, such as self-deception. For example, it may be evident from $S$’s conduct that $S$ believes that $S$’s marriage has failed. But if $S$ is not yet ready to face this unwelcome fact, $S$ may refuse to acknowledge it. If $S$ considers the question ‘Has my marriage failed?’, $S$ will consciously judge it has not failed. But this is self-deception, for really $S$ believes it has failed, as all $S$’s actions prove. This kind of example shows that Evans’s test is not direct introspection, but relies on introspection in an indirect and potentially fallible way.

Introspection is a special kind of self-knowledge, different from the other kinds of knowledge one has of one’s mental states. Introspection rests on consciousness, and consciousness gives one ‘privileged access’ to one’s conscious states. Other people also have knowledge of one’s conscious states; for example, if one is in pain, other people can know this fact by observing one’s behaviour. But one’s introspective knowledge of one’s own conscious states does not rely on observation of one’s behaviour. One has privileged access to one’s own experience in this sense: one has a way of knowing of it that is not available to other people.

The problem of introspection presents itself in the first instance as the epistemological problem of privileged access. But a metaphysical issue is nearby, for it is possible to introspect only one’s own conscious states. Therefore no account of introspection is adequate unless it deals with the metaphysics of consciousness, and different theories of consciousness will give rise to different accounts of introspection.

**Brentano’s account of consciousness**

In consciousness I know of my own experience in a way that is not available to other people. Does my privileged access consist in my occupying a privileged point of observation that only I can occupy? That is the ‘inner observation’ theory, which says that consciousness is observation; ‘inner’ observation differs from the ordinary kind only in respect of the vantage point from which it is made.

The inner observation theory has had many advocates, including contemporary advocates such as Armstrong. It is a theory to which
Brentano was strongly opposed. He based his opposition on a regress argument originally due to Aristotle. Suppose consciousness of an experience $e_1$ is a matter of a distinct further observation $e_2$ of $e_1$; then we can ask whether the distinct observation $e_2$ is itself conscious. If so, we require yet a further observation $e_3$ to explain why $e_2$ is conscious. And so on. We are in danger of positing an infinite series of mental acts. But it is perfectly plain that we are not conscious of any such infinite series; indeed we are not even conscious of the first accompanying mental act $e_2$. Therefore if $e_2$ exists at all it is unconscious. But what reason do we have to believe in the distinct existence of $e_2$? Since it is unconscious, its existence is unsupported by introspection. Therefore the case for its existence can only be that it is an inferred entity posited by our psychological theory. But is the theory that posits it the best theory we can discover? If there is an equally good alternative theory that does not posit it, then we have no good reason to believe in the distinct existence of $e_2$. Brentano held that an equally good alternative was indeed available, namely his own theory that one and the same mental act $e_1$, for example the hearing of a sound, also gives one consciousness of one’s seeming to hear a sound. According to Brentano, there is no need to assume the existence of a distinct mental act $e_2$.

In support of his account, Brentano quotes Aristotle in the *De Anima* as follows:

> Since it is through sense that we are aware of seeing or hearing, it must be either by sight that we are aware of seeing, or by some sense other than sight. But the sense that gives us this new sensation must perceive both sight and its object, viz. colour, so that either (1) there will be two senses both percipient of the same sensible object or (2) the sense must be percipient of itself. Further even if the sense which perceives sight were different from sight, we must either fall into an infinite regress, or we must assume somewhere a sense which is aware of itself.\(^3\)

If we are forced to assume at some stage a sense that is aware of itself, the argument suggests, we may as well assume it at the outset, so that it is ‘by sight’ that we are aware of seeing: one and the same mental act $e_1$ delivers both perception of an object and consciousness of one’s perception of an object. The single mental act has two objects, a *primary object* which is the thing seen, and a *secondary object* which is one’s experience of seeing it.

It is the same in the case of a heard sound. Brentano says there is a ‘presentation’ of the sound, so one ‘object’ of the mental act of hearing
is the sound that seems to be heard. But he says there is also a presentation of the presentation of the sound, so a second object of the mental act is the presentation of the sound; both ‘objects’ belong to one and the same mental act of hearing. Brentano writes:

This suggests that there is a special connection between the object of inner presentation and the presentation itself, and that both belong to one and the same mental act. We must in fact assume this. Referring back to the example, we have to answer the question of whether there is more than one presentation affirmatively, if we determine them according to the number of objects; with the same certainty, however, we have to answer this question negatively if we determine these presentations according to the number of mental acts in which objects are presented. The presentation of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound form a single mental phenomenon; it is only by considering it in its relation to two different objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and the other a mental phenomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two presentations. In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. What is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it has the sound as content within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at the same time. We can say that the sound is the primary object of the act of hearing, and that the act of hearing itself is the secondary object.4

The concept of presentation plays a central role in Brentano’s discussion of consciousness. By ‘presentation’ Brentano means a mental act:

By ‘presentation’ I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of being presented.5

A phenomenon is mental if it either is a presentation, or incorporates a presentation:

The term ‘mental phenomena’ applies to presentations as well as to all the phenomena which are based on presentations.6

Presentation is appearance, not knowledge, for an object can ‘appear’ that does not exist:
And such things occur whenever something appears in consciousness, whether it is hated, loved or regarded indifferently, whether it is affirmed or denied or there is a complete withholding of judgement and – I cannot express myself in any other way than to say – it is presented. As we use the verb ‘to present,’ ‘to be presented’ means the same as ‘to appear’.7

In every presentation, Brentano says, an ‘object’ is presented to the mind: ‘Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself’.8 But we must distinguish ‘object’ from ‘existing thing’, for the object presented may be only an appearance, since an object that ‘appears’ in consciousness need not exist actually. However, every object of presentation does have ‘intentional inexistence’:

Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object, (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity.9

Brentano uses the term ‘consciousness’ to mean any phenomenon with an intentionally inexistente object:

For this reason I prefer to use it as synonymous with ‘mental phenomenon’ or ‘mental act’. . . [T]he term ‘consciousness’ since it refers to an object which consciousness is conscious of, seems to be appropriate in characterising mental phenomena precisely in terms of its distinguishing characteristic, i.e. the property of the intentional inexistence of an object, for which we lack a word in common usage.10

Thus on Brentano’s account, consciousness is the same as appearance. The reason is that appearance is presentation, and presentation is characterised by the fact that its object has intentional inexistence. Since consciousness is of the intentionally inexistente, it follows that consciousness is presentation, and hence consciousness is appearance.

Because Brentano uses the term ‘consciousness’ for presentations generally, he reserves the term ‘inner consciousness’ for the presentation of experience itself. Thus in Brentano’s usage, one can be ‘conscious’ of a sound, if one seems to hear a sound; in which case one will also have ‘inner consciousness’ of that very experience of seeming to hear the
sound. So for Brentano every mental act is consciousness in a double sense. In the first place, it is consciousness of some object, the primary object of the mental act. But in the second place it is also ‘inner consciousness’ of itself – it is its own secondary object. Thus for example the Aristotelian ‘sense that perceives sight’ turns out to be sight itself, for every visual experience is consciousness both of the seen object and of the visual experience itself.

Because what Brentano means by ‘consciousness’ is appearance and not knowledge, his account of introspection is not yet complete. For introspection gives us actual knowledge of our experiences, whereas ‘inner consciousness’ is merely the appearance of experience. Brentano therefore supplements his account as follows. First, he lays down that all knowledge requires an act of apprehension: ‘One apprehends only in judgement.’ Next he claims that every mental act includes a judgement about that very act.

Every mental act is accompanied by a two-fold inner consciousness, by a presentation which refers to it and a judgement which refers to it, the so-called inner perception, which is an immediate evident cognition of the act.

Third, he says that the judgement that accompanies a mental act is infallibly true.

Whenever a mental act is the object of an accompanying inner cognition, it contains itself in its entirety as presented and known. This alone makes possible the infallibility and immediate evidence of inner perception.

It only remains to show that the judgement is justified, and Brentano’s fourth claim is that the judgement is ‘evident’:

The truth of inner perception cannot be proved in any way. But it has something better than proof; it is immediately evident. If anyone were to mount a sceptical attack against this ultimate foundation of cognition, he would find no other foundation upon which to erect an edifice of knowledge.

These four claims complete Brentano’s account of our introspective self-knowledge of our conscious states.
Reid’s account of consciousness

The account of consciousness given by Reid is similar to Brentano’s account, but there is a difference because of Reid’s philosophical realism. Brentano defined consciousness as the converse of the presentation relation:

\[ S \text{ is conscious of } x =_{df} x \text{ is presented to } S \]

For Brentano, presentation is appearance; he says: ‘“to be presented” means the same as “to appear”.’ This point of view promotes an idealist or anti-realist philosophy, for it does not require that every object \( x \) that is ‘present’ to the mind actually exists. In contrast, realists insist on a more robust conception of presentation, for they hold that, necessarily, if \( x \) is present to the mind, then \( x \) is a real thing. Thus realists wish to say that presentation is not the mere appearance of an object, but an actual cognitive encounter with the object itself: the ‘presentation’ of an object is knowledge of it.

An example of such a realist is Russell, who saw this issue as the decisive one in the debate between realism and idealism. Russell defined the mental in terms of knowledge, not appearance, and he regarded presentation not as appearance, but as the converse of what he calls ‘thing-knowledge’ or ‘acquaintance’. He writes:

I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself. In fact I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that \( S \) has acquaintance with \( O \) is essentially the same thing as to say that \( O \) is presented to \( S \).\(^{15}\)

According to Russell’s ‘Principle of Acquaintance’, one can understand a proposition only if one is acquainted with its constituents: thought about an object presupposes actual acquaintance with it. Thus Russell would no doubt have agreed with Brentano’s claim that every ‘mental phenomenon’ presupposes a presented object. The difference between their views is that for Brentano, presentation can be merely appearance, so the object of thought need be nothing real; but for Russell presentation is knowledge, so since the presented object is known, necessarily it is something real.

Reid like Russell was a realist, and for Reid as for Russell presenta-
tion in consciousness is knowledge of something real. Thus Reid’s conception of ‘consciousness’ is a species of Russellian acquaintance. But Reid’s ‘consciousness’ is narrower than Russell’s ‘acquaintance’, for Reid was insistent that ‘consciousness’ applies only to knowledge of a special kind of object, namely the ‘operations’ of one’s own mind. According to Reid: ‘Consciousness is a word used by philosophers to signify that immediate knowledge we have . . . of all the present operations of our own minds.’

All consciousness is knowledge, but not all knowledge is consciousness. Reid was concerned to distinguish consciousness from our other cognitive powers such as memory and perception.

Consciousness is only of things present. To apply ‘consciousness’ to things past is to confound consciousness with memory. Likewise consciousness is only of things in the mind, and not of external things. It is improper to say I am conscious of the table before me. I perceive it, I see it, but do not say I am conscious of it. As that consciousness by which we have a knowledge of the operations of our own minds is a different power from that by which we perceive external objects, and as these different powers have different names in our language, and, I believe, in every language, a philosopher ought carefully to preserve this distinction, and never to confound things so different in their nature.

Thus what Reid and Brentano mean by ‘consciousness’ differ in these two ways: for Reid, consciousness is knowledge, whereas for Brentano it is appearance; and for Reid consciousness is only of an ‘operation’ of one’s own mind, whereas for Brentano, consciousness can be of other sorts of object too.

In another way also Reid differs from Brentano, in that Reid gives prominence to the qualitative character of conscious states. Brentano’s account lays stress almost exclusively on the object of a presentation, or what he calls its content. The intrinsic properties of the presentation, and in particular its qualitative character, are almost entirely omitted from Brentano’s account. Brentano does acknowledge that some presentations are pleasant in themselves, and some painful; but he goes no further, and certainly does not recognise the existence of a vast array of different qualitative characters. In contrast, Reid asserts that qualitative characters come in ‘prodigious’ variety. He says that what he calls ‘sensations’ or ‘feelings’ are operations of our minds, of which we are conscious, which are distinguished from each other by their own intrinsic kind, and not by any external object they present.
In sensation, there is no object distinct from that act of the mind by which it is felt.18

A small degree of reflection may satisfy us that the number and variety of our sensations and feelings is prodigious; for to omit all those which accompany our appetites, passions and affections, our moral sentiments and sense of taste, even our external senses furnish a great variety of sensations, differing in kind, and almost in every kind an endless variety of degrees.19

According to Reid, every experience has its sensation, which will belong to some definite one of the variety of kinds of sensation of which we are capable. Thus for Reid the sensation-types form a determinable, and any actual token sensation instantiates exactly one determinate of this determinable. Reid claims that by consciousness we have immediate knowledge of the kind of sensation we are currently having. Therefore I think we may very reasonably identify Reid’s ‘kinds’ of sensation with the qualia whose existence is debated in contemporary discussions of consciousness. John Foster is a noted contemporary realist about qualia, and the account he gives of them is as follows:

The quale is just a sensation-type and the sensation is just a quale-token, but the sensation displays its quale, as an object of awareness, by displaying its own intrinsic character; and it displays its own intrinsic character because it is in the nature of any episode of consciousness to be self-revealing.20

This is so similar to Reid’s doctrine that I think we may fairly represent Reid as being, unlike Brentano, an advocate of qualia.

So far I have focused on points on which Reid’s opinions are different from Brentano’s. Despite the differences, however, Brentano and Reid are in fundamental agreement on the issue raised by Aristotle: they agree that there is no such thing as ‘inner observation’ of our experiences, in the sense of a second mental act whereby we are conscious of the experience; like Brentano, Reid endorses an Identity Theory of consciousness. Indeed the Identity Theory of Reid is a very much stronger one than Brentano’s.

Reid’s theory asserts the conjunction of two identities. The first is an identity between ‘feeling’ a sensation, and being conscious of it. He writes:

Perception is applied only to the external objects, not to those that
are in the mind itself. When I am pained, I do not say that I perceive pain, but that I feel it, or that I am conscious of it.\(^{21}\)

Or again:

When I am pained with the gout, it is not proper to say I perceive the pain; I feel it, or am conscious of it; it is not an object of perception, but of sensation and of consciousness.\(^{22}\)

‘I feel it, or am conscious of it.’ This is the first identity claim: consciousness of a pain is one and the same thing as feeling the pain.

The second identity claim is that one’s feeling the pain is identical with the pain itself:

When I am pained, I cannot say that the pain that I feel is one thing, and that my feeling it is another thing. They are one and the same thing, and cannot be disjoined, even in imagination.\(^{23}\)

When we put Reid’s two identity claims together, we arrive at the following position. Consciousness of a pain is the same thing as ‘feeling’ the pain, and feeling the pain is the same thing as the pain itself; so since consciousness is knowledge, the knowledge of the pain by consciousness is the same thing as the pain itself. This is a very strong form of the Identity Theory: only one mental act is involved in consciousness of pain, for the pain and the consciousness of it are identically the same thing. Brentano says that the pain and the ‘inner consciousness’ of it are one mental act, but that ‘we divide it conceptually into two presentations’. But Reid insists the mental act is not divisible ‘even in imagination’.

Reid intended his Identity Theory to apply not only to pain, but to sensation generally:

What we have said about pain may be applied to every other sensation.

The word feeling is used to signify the same thing as sensation, which we have just now explained: and in this sense it has no object; the feeling and the thing felt are one and the same.\(^{24}\)

This sensation can be nothing else than it is felt to be. Its very essence consists in being felt; and when it is not felt, it is not. There is no difference between the sensation and the feeling of it – they are one and the same thing.\(^{25}\)
For Reid, a sensation is simply an event that occurs in the mind; it does not of itself entail any relation to an external object:

Sensation, taken by itself, implies neither the conception nor the belief of any external object. It suppose a sentient being, and a certain manner in which that being is affected; but it supposes no more.26

I suggested earlier that Reid’s ‘kinds of sensation’ are the same thing as the *qualia* of contemporary discussion. In the ‘qualia’ terminology we can restate his theory as follows: instantiation of a *quale* ‘supposes’ only a sentient being, and a ‘certain manner’ in which that being is affected; consciousness of a *quale* is nothing other than the *quale*-token itself; one’s conscious knowledge of the *quale* of one’s experience is one and the same thing as the experience itself.

**Qualia**

In assessing the relative merits of Brentano’s and Reid’s accounts of consciousness, we shall wish to consider how each deals with the three principal problems in the philosophy of consciousness I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The problem of qualitative character is the first of the three. What is ‘qualitative character’? Let us fix our terminology. Consider any conscious state: for example the state of its consciously looking to me at the moment as if I now face a table. Then we say this conscious state belongs to a certain *psychological type*, namely, it is a visual experience. We say it has a certain *intentional content*, namely, *that I now face a table*. And we say it has a certain *qualitative character*, which is what it is like for me when it looks to me as if I now face a table. We can indicate what is meant by *qualitative character* by the following implicit definition: subjectively indiscernible experiences are similar in qualitative character, and experiences with the same qualitative character are subjectively indiscernible.

Those who postulate *qualia* do so in order to explain the qualitative character of experience. The debate about *qualia* concerns whether there are any, i.e. whether *qualia* need to be posited to explain qualitative character. The debate is not about whether experiences *have* qualitative character – that ought to be accepted on all sides. Rather it is about whether an experience’s having a certain qualitative character is anything more than its being of a certain psychological type and its having a certain intentional content. The advocates of *qualia* say that qualitative character cannot be explained in terms of just psychological
type and intentional content: they hold that *qualia* form a distinct third class of properties of experience, and that an experience has its particular qualitative character in virtue of instantiating the *quale* it does. The opponents of *qualia* deny this: they take qualitative character to be nothing over and above psychological type and intentional content.

Are there any convincing arguments for the existence of *qualia*? I shall consider four that have been put forward. The first is the argument of the inverted spectrum, which derives from Locke;\(^27\) it is suggested that it is a perfectly intelligible possibility that two people might have the qualitative character of their colour experiences inverted with respect to each other, in a way that could not be detected in behaviour. Since the experiences would have the same psychological type and the same intentional content, the argument is that it is necessary to posit *qualia* to explain the difference in qualitative character. One might object to this argument on verificationist grounds, since there is by hypothesis no way of verifying that the spectra are indeed inverted. A better objection is that it has not been shown that this is not just a case of concept inversion: since the contexts are different (different agents) the inverted colour concepts can represent exactly the same states of affairs, resulting in indiscernible behaviour. In any theory of intentional content that has concepts in play, the inverted spectrum does not appear to require belief in *qualia*, since we can put down the difference in qualitative character to differences of concepts.

A second argument for *qualia* is Frank Jackson’s.\(^28\) The argument concerns a hypothetical person Mary who lives in a black-and-white environment and has never had the experience of seeing colour. She knows what red is, and what colour vision is, but still there is something about the colour *red* she does not know. She has never had the experience of seeing red, so she is not acquainted with the qualitative character of the experience of seeing something red. But Jackson’s argument does not oblige us to believe in *qualia*, for the same reason as before. If we are willing to posit the existence of different concepts of the same thing, we can simply say that the experience causes Mary to form a new concept of red, as David Papineau has argued.\(^29\) The new concept, and the new knowledge it makes available, sufficiently explain everything in the Mary story that requires explanation.

A third and perhaps more promising argument appeals to qualitative resemblance. Where some properties are determinates of a determinable, we can speak of the distance of two of the properties in the quality space of that determinable; for example we say that a red thing and an orange thing are closer in colour space than are a yellow thing and a violet thing. The degree of resemblance depends on how close the
colours are in colour space. Now experiences resemble each other more
or less, and in different respects. Sometimes a resemblance between
experiences is a matter of closeness of psychological type, sometimes of
closeness of intentional content. If qualia are a distinct third determin-
able under which experiences fall, then it is possible that experiences
that lie far from each other in psychological type space and far from
each other in intentional content space might nevertheless lie close to
each other in qualia space, and so resemble each other in qualitative
character. And it seems very plausible that this does indeed happen. For
example, Locke reports a certain ‘studious blind man’ as follows: ‘Upon
his friend demanding what scarlet was, the blind man answered it was
like the sound of a trumpet.’ The blind man presumably did not mean
that the colour scarlet resembles the sound of a trumpet. He meant that
the visual experience of seeing the colour scarlet resembles the aural
experience of hearing the sound of a trumpet. The experiences are
distant in psychological type space; they are distant in intentional con-
tent space; yet there is a real resemblance between them. The qualia
theorist can explain the resemblance by saying that the experiences are
close in qualia space.

A fourth argument for qualia can be given by consideration of the
philosophers’ fiction of ‘zombies’, i.e. beings who look and behave just
like human beings, but who are supposed to have no consciousness.
Since a zombie is unconscious, it follows by definition of ‘qualia’ that its
experiences do not instantiate qualia. But if the zombie is a true func-
tional analogue of a human being, its experiences must at least have
properties with the functional role of qualitative character. To see why,
consider the qualitative character of pain. Noceception, the sense of
pain, is a specialised sense for the perception of bodily injury; for
example, to have a pain in one’s foot is to perceive by this specialised
sense that there is damage to one’s foot. For human agents mental acts
of noceception have a particular qualitative character, which can be
very unpleasant. Now imagine two patients who need surgery to the
foot; one patient is a zombie, the other is a normal human. Suppose
the zombie’s noceceptive experiences have no intrinsic properties that
are functional analogues of the qualia of human experience. Then the
zombie will be content to have the needed surgery without an anaes-
thetic; it will sense by noceception the bodily damage done to its foot by
the surgery, but it doesn’t mind the damage, for it knows it is temporary
and needed for health. Nor does the zombie mind nocepecting the
damage. It will know by introspection that it nocecepts that its foot is
damaged, but it doesn’t mind knowing that it nocecepts – on the con-
trary, it is pleased to know that its faculty of noceception is functioning
correctly. The zombie experiences no *qualia*, so it has no objection to the noceceptive experience, and so no objection to the surgery without anaesthetic. But the human patient does have objections. The human doesn’t mind the damage to their body that they nocecept, for they too know the damage is temporary and needful. They do not mind introspecting that they nocecept, for they too are glad to know their faculty of noceception is working correctly. But the human being does mind the noceceptive experience itself, since for the human the experience has a qualitative character that is so unpleasant that without an anaesthetic they might refuse to have the surgery altogether. The difference in qualitative character is something that cannot be explained by psychological type and intentional content, which are the same in the zombie and the human being. Nevertheless, the zombie and the human will behave differently, so they are not true functional duplicates. The conclusion this argument invites us to draw is that something that did not have at least functional analogues of our *qualia* would not behave like a human being; and therefore our *qualia* are something over and above the psychological type and intentional content of our experiences.

These four arguments for *qualia* are all inconclusive. The first and second arguments fail when due allowance is made for the conceptual aspects of intentional content. The third and fourth arguments are a little more successful: they do indeed seem to give some plausibility to the claim that experiences have properties that are not determined by psychological type and intentional content, and which are relevant to behaviour. But the arguments do not show that the other properties are *qualia* – perhaps a functional *ersatz* would suffice. If a more persuasive philosophical case is to be made for *qualia*, it will have to be in virtue of the fruitful and indispensable role they play in some larger theory. *Qualia* are indispensable in Reid’s theory of consciousness, but play no role in Brentano’s. Therefore the more we prefer Reid’s theory to Brentano’s, the more we should be inclined to give credence to *qualia*.

Brentano’s account of experience works mainly in terms of the object that appears, and he does not posit any properties corresponding to qualia. He does supplement his account by saying that a mental act may be accompanied by a feeling of pleasure or pain: ‘Experience shows that there exists in us not only a presentation and a judgement, but frequently a third kind of consciousness of the mental act, pleasure or displeasure which we feel towards this act.’ Brentano claims that the ‘accompanying feeling’ is an ‘integral part’ of the phenomenon: ‘the inner feeling which accompanies hearing, seeing and every other mental act is fused with its object and is included within the object itself.’ In recognising the ‘feeling’ of pleasure or pain which accompanies
experience, Brentano goes part of the way to recognising *qualia*. But the presence or absence of pleasure and pain is not enough to characterise qualitative character. For example, we can imagine asking whether human colour vision is qualitatively similar to Martian colour vision. The question would not be settled if we learned that visual experiences are neither painful nor pleasant in either species; ‘what it is like’ can still be different even if both experiences are ‘indifferent’, i.e. neither is painful and neither is pleasant.

In contrast to Brentano, Reid insisted that there are more kinds of sensation than just the pleasant and the unpleasant:

> But I apprehend that, besides the sensations that are either agreeable or disagreeable, there is a still greater number that are indifferent. . . . If we consider that our senses are in continual exercise while we are awake, that some sensation attends every object they present to us, and that familiar objects seldom raise any emotion pleasant or unpleasant, we shall see reason, besides the agreeable and disagreeable, to admit a third class of sensations that may be called indifferent.

On Reid’s view, the kind of a sensation is independent of its intentional content, for he defines sensations as mental acts that present only themselves: ‘Sensation is a name given by philosophers to an act of the mind which may be distinguished from all others by this, that it hath no object distinct from the act itself.’ Thus for Reid all the many kinds of sensation have the same intentional content, namely none. It follows that the ‘kind’ of sensation must vary independently of the intentional content. That appears to confirm my earlier suggestion that what Reid means by ‘kind of sensation’ is what we mean by ‘*qualia*’.

**The problem of the necessity of co-occurrence**

In this section I will suggest that *qualia* have an indispensable role in Reid’s account of consciousness. The reason they are indispensable is that they are the key to a Reidian solution of why an experience and the consciousness of it are necessarily either both present together, or both absent together. This necessary co-occurrence has two aspects, that I shall call *self-intimation* and *fattiveness*. The self-intimation of conscious experience is the impossibility of an experience occurring without consciousness of the experience. Its fattiveness is the impossibility of consciousness of an experience occurring without the experience itself. The case of pain illustrates the necessity of co-occurrence. First,
pain is self-intimating: it is possible to be in pain, and not attend to the pain; but it is impossible to be in pain, and not be conscious of the pain; one could not be in agonising pain, and not be conscious of it. Second, consciousness of pain is factive; there are no illusions or hallucinations of consciousness; if one is conscious of being in pain, then one really is in pain.

Using the symbols ‘C’ for consciousness and ‘p’ for the proposition that one is in pain, we can represent self-intimation and factiveness as follows:

\[ \text{Self-intimation} \quad \square (p \rightarrow Cp) \]
\[ \text{Factiveness} \quad \square (Cp \rightarrow p) \]

It is a striking fact that the ‘C’ operator satisfies both self-intimation and factiveness for conscious states. There is a marked contrast here with other epistemic and doxastic operators. For example, the knowledge operator ‘K’ satisfies factiveness, but not in general self-intimation. By the first principle of epistemology, we of course have:

\[ \square (Kp \rightarrow p) \]

But there are plenty of facts that are unknown to us. We do not have:

\[ \square (p \rightarrow Kp) \]

The belief operator ‘B’ differs even more from the consciousness operator, for it satisfies neither self-intimation nor factiveness, since there are many truths we do not believe, and many of our beliefs that are not true. Thus we do not have either of these:

\[ \square (p \rightarrow Bp) \]
\[ \square (Bp \rightarrow p) \]

We seek an explanation of why self-intimation and factiveness should hold for consciousness, but not for knowledge or belief. Why is it that, at any possible world, one’s pain and one’s consciousness of one’s pain are either present together, or absent together? The explanation offered by Brentano’s theory is that the experience and one’s inner consciousness of the experience are one and the same thing. But here it must be kept in mind that Brentano uses the word ‘consciousness’ in his own technical sense, which is not factive. In his usage, ‘S is conscious of x’
means only that there is for $S$ an appearance of $x$. What one is ‘conscious’ of, in Brentano’s sense, may be an ‘object’ that has only ‘intentional inexistence’, and does not actually exist. Similarly, if one is ‘conscious of’ a state of affairs, that state of affairs need not actually obtain.

To express ‘consciousness’ in the sense of Brentano, let us write ‘$Ap$’ for ‘it appears that $p$’, where ‘$p$’ expresses the state of affairs that appears to obtain when the intentional object $x$ is presented. Thus, for example, if $x$ is the dagger that Macbeth seems to see before him, then $p$ is the proposition that that dagger is before Macbeth, and ‘$Ap$’ expresses that it appears to Macbeth that that dagger is before him. As the case of Macbeth shows, the appears operator ‘$A$’ is certainly not factive: there is no inference from $Ap$ to $p$, and we do not have:

$\square (Ap \rightarrow p)$

Similarly, there are plenty of things of which no one is ‘conscious’ in Brentano’s sense, so we do not have self-intimation for appearance:

$\square (p \rightarrow Ap)$

Thus the co-occurrence conditionals of self-intimation and factiveness certainly fail to hold for ‘consciousness’ in the sense of Brentano.

This is not yet an objection to Brentano’s account, however, for we are interested here only in the special case of what Brentano calls ‘inner consciousness’, i.e. ‘consciousness’ of experience itself. As we are using ‘$Ap$’ to mean that it appears that $p$, let ‘$AAp$’ mean that it appears that it appears that $p$. ‘$Ap$’ expresses the presentation of the intentional object $x$, whereas ‘$AAp$’ expresses the presentation of the presentation of $x$, i.e. Brentano’s ‘inner consciousness’ of the presentation of $x$. Then inner consciousness would have the necessary co-occurrence property if both the following were true.

$\square (Ap \rightarrow AAp)$ (self-intimation)

$\square (AAp \rightarrow Ap)$ (factiveness)

Does Brentano’s account of inner consciousness underwrite these two entailments? According to his account, one and the same mental act $e_1$ both presents the object $x$, and presents the presentation of $x$. That is enough to explain why the two presentations do in fact occur together.
However, it is not yet enough to guarantee that they must occur together. Whether there is such a guarantee will depend on the relation that Brentano takes to hold between the presentation of \(x\) and the presentation of the presentation of \(x\). What does Brentano take that relation to be? One suggestion might be that the relation is that they have a common cause; one and the same mental act \(e_1\) causes \(x\) both to appear, and to appear to appear. But this suggestion will not give the necessary connection that we seek. For if the relation is only causal, it is metaphysically possible that \(e_1\) causes one of the two presentations, yet fails to cause the other. Thus a merely causal relation could not underwrite the necessity of co-occurrence.

Brentano says that the presentation and the presentation of the presentation ‘form a single natural phenomenon’, so perhaps the relation he has in mind is identity, i.e.:

\[
e_1 = \text{presentation of } x = \text{presentation of presentation of } x
\]

If the relation were identity, the puzzle of the necessary connection between the presentations would be solved right away. However, it is difficult to see how Brentano can make room for a strict identity in his system. It is one thing to say that the mental act which causes the presentation is identical with the mental act which causes the presentation of the presentation. It is quite another thing to say that the event which is the presentation is identical with the event which is the presentation of the presentation. It is the latter that a strict identity requires, but so interpreted Brentano’s claim is difficult to reconcile with the metaphysics of events.

Suppose we assume, following Kim, that an event is essentially the instantiation of a certain relation in a certain order by certain particulars.\(^{36}\) The time at which the instantiation occurs can be ignored in the present context, so we can individuate an event by giving in order just the relevant relation and particulars. We can represent Kimian events in a simple notation. For example, the event of Socrates’ sitting is represented by:

\[
<\text{sits, Socrates}>
\]

The event of Seth kicking Shem is represented by:

\[
<k\text{icks, Seth, Shem}>
\]

And so on. Now let \(e_1\) be Brentano’s event of the presentation of
the sound $x$ to $S$. If ‘$A$’ expresses the appearance relation, then $e_1$ is represented by:

$$e_1 = <A, S, x>$$

If $S$ has ‘inner consciousness’ of $e_1$, then there is an event $e_2$ which is the presentation of $e_1$ to $S$. The event $e_2$ is represented by:

$$e_2 = <A, S, e_1>$$

On the ‘strict identity’ interpretation of Brentano’s account we will have $e_1 = e_2$, so:

$$e_1 = <A, S, e_1>$$

This makes the event $e_1$ a ‘constituent’ of itself, which may seem odd. But since we have no reason to insist that the constituency relation is well founded, this is not in itself an objection to the account. But there is an objection in the vicinity, for the criterion of identity for Kimian events is as follows:

If $E_1$ is the event $<x_1, \ldots, x_m>$ and $E_2$ is the event $<y_1, \ldots, y_n>$, then $E_1 = E_2$ iff $m = n$ & $x_1 = y_1$ & $\ldots$ & $x_m = y_n$

That is to say, events are identical if and only if exactly the same property or relation is instantiated by exactly the same things, in exactly the same order. Now consider our events $e_1$ and $e_2$ again. Since $e_1$ is the event $<A, S, x>$, and $e_2$ is the event $<A, S, e_1>$, it follows by the criterion of identity for events that if $e_1 = e_2$ then $e_1 = x$. This identity asserts that a certain mental event, say the hearing of a certain sound, is identical with the sound that is heard. But that is absurd, for a mental act is not a sound, and moreover the mental act $e_1$ really exists, whereas the presented sound $x$ may have merely ‘intentional inexistence’. I conclude that the option of literally identifying the experience with the consciousness of the experience is not open to Brentano. We must seek some other interpretation of the relation between the two.

Brentano speaks of the presentation of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound as ‘forming a single mental phenomenon’. Two different things, $x$ and $y$, ‘form’ something if either they are both of them parts of a third thing, or one is part of the other. At other times Brentano speaks of a presentation ‘containing’ something.
Thus he may have had in mind an appeal to the part–whole relation. Could that help solve the problem of the necessity of co-occurrence? For example, suppose we tried the hypothesis that $e_1$, the presentation of $x$, and $e_2$, the presentation of the presentation of $x$, form a single phenomenon, because $e_1$ is literally part of $e_2$. That would indeed explain why $e_1$ and $e_2$ co-occur at the actual world. But for the self-intimation property $\Box (Cp \rightarrow p)$ we need them to co-occur at every world: the existence of $e_1$ needs to entail the existence of its part $e_2$. But since parthood entails non-identity, if $e_1$ is part of $e_2$, then $e_1$ is an ‘object’ ‘other’ than $e_2$ in the sense of Hume, and therefore according to Hume the existence of $e_2$ cannot imply the existence of $e_1$:

There is no object, which implies the existence of any other. . . . Such an inference would . . . imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving anything different. But . . . tis evident there can be no impossibility of that kind. 37

It may be replied that $e_1$ now is not merely part of $e_2$, but an essential part of $e_2$. But in that case the whole explanatory weight rests on the (un-Humean) claim that $e_2$ is an essential part of $e_1$. The supposition that $e_2$ is part of $e_1$ makes no independent contribution to explaining the necessary connection. I conclude that appeal to the part–whole relation does not solve the problem of necessary co-occurrence.

Let us try a different tack. Brentano’s doctrine is that there is one mental act, which is divided only ‘conceptually’ into a presentation of the sound and a presentation of the presentation of the sound. The ‘phenomenon’ is the mental act; ‘it is only by considering it in its relation to two different objects that we divide it conceptually into two different presentations.’ 38 Perhaps what Brentano is saying here is that there is only one mental act, which can be conceived of in two different ways; the same mental act falls under the different descriptions ‘presentation of $x$’ and ‘presentation of presentation of $x$’. But this proposal faces the same difficulty as before; it may explain the fact of actual co-occurrence, but it does nothing to account for the necessity of co-occurrence. Why is it that, necessarily, any mental act that falls under the one description also falls under the other description?

One strategy here would be to say that the two descriptions ‘presentation of $x$’ and ‘presentation of presentation of $x$’ are connected ‘by definition’. Such a strategy has been noticed by Lewis, 39 and endorsed by Shoemaker, 40 in the context of a functionalist account of the mind. The definitional strategy is available to the functionalist, who has in mind at least a sketch of the definition of mental states in terms of their
causal powers. The functionalist can say that a physical event \(e_1\) counts as a realisation of the mental state ‘presentation of \(x\)’ if and only if it also counts as a realisation of the mental state ‘presentation of presentation of \(x\)’: that would explain why the presentation and the presentation of the presentation must occur together. But Brentano, not being a functionalist, is not in a position to offer that kind of definition of mental states; so the definitional strategy is not available to Brentano.

I conclude that the difficulty with Brentano’s version of the Identity Theory is that it is hard to find a formulation of it that solves the problem of the necessity of co-occurrence. As we noted, it will not do to suppose that the relation between the mental act and the presentations is merely causal. Nor can the relation between the presentations be identity: Brentano has no way of making precise the proposal that the presentation and the presentation of the presentation are literally identical. It does not help to invoke the relation of part and whole; even if the presentation is actually part of the presentation of the presentation, that does nothing to explain why necessarily the one cannot occur without the other. Finally, a functionalist appeal to a merely verbal necessary connection is unattractive in the context of Brentano’s psychology.

Brentano’s account of consciousness does not seem to solve the problem of the necessity of co-occurrence, but Reid’s account does solve it. Reid takes consciousness to be knowledge not appearance, so one half of the co-occurrence problem is solved right away – he can explain the factiveness of consciousness as simply the factiveness of knowledge:

\[ \Box (Cp \rightarrow p) \text{ because } \Box (Kp \rightarrow p) \]

Reid can also explain the converse entailment, the self-intimating character of conscious experience:

\[ \Box (p \rightarrow Cp) \]

Reid’s Identity Theory says that in consciousness of pain there is a single event \(e_1\) which both is the pain, and is the consciousness of the pain. The literal identity of the pain and the consciousness of it straightforwardly explain why it is metaphysically impossible to have the one without the other, so Reid has provided us with a simple solution to the problem of the necessity of co-occurrence. However, we noted above that an Identity Theory of consciousness must not conflict with the criterion of identity for events. It may seem at first that Reid’s
version of the Identity Theory does conflict with the criterion. For if we take pain to be a property of the subject \( S \), then the event \( e_1 \) of \( S \) being in pain is represented by:

\[
e_1 = <\text{pain}, S>
\]

Let ‘\( K \)’ denote the relation of knowledge. Then the event \( e_2 \) of \( S \)’s contemporaneous knowledge of the pain \( e_1 \) is represented by:

\[
e_2 = <K, S, e_1>
\]

Pain is a monadic property and knowledge is a diadic relation, and the criterion of identity for events tells us that an instance of a monadic property can never be identical with an instance of a diadic relation, so we cannot identify \( e_1 \) and \( e_2 \) if they are represented as above. It seems that Reid’s Identity Theory fares no better than Brentano’s with respect to the criterion of identity for events.

But at this point qualia can make their contribution to a Reidian account. I have suggested that a \( \textit{qua} \)le is a Reidian ‘kind of sensation’ – a sensation type. So on a Reidian view it is a mistake to treat the \( \textit{qua} \)le as a property of the subject of experience; rather, it is a property of the experience itself. This important difference allows us to represent \( e_1 \) and \( e_2 \) in such a way that their identity is consistent with the criterion of identity for events, as follows. Let \( \mu \) be the \( \textit{qua} \)le an experience has if it is painful.\(^{41}\) Then \( \mu \) is the sensation-type \( \textit{pain} \), and a sensation that is painful is a token of this type. Let \( e_1 \) be a mental event which is a pain; \( e_1 \) is a pain because it has the property \( \mu \). Now in consciousness of the pain \( e_1 \), the subject \( S \) of \( e_1 \) is aware of something, since consciousness is knowledge. What \( S \) is aware of is the painful character of the experience, i.e. \( S \) is aware of \( e_1 \) having the property \( \mu \). Then the consciousness of the pain is an event \( e_2 \), where:

\[
e_2 = <K, S, <\mu, e_1>>
\]

Without any conflict now with the criterion of identity for events, we are able to assert the identity of the pain-token \( e_1 \) and the consciousness-token \( e_2 \):

\[
e_1 = e_2 = <K, S, <\mu, e_1>>
\]

\( S \)’s current pain – this mental event – is simply \( S \)’s current consciousness of the painful character of this very mental event; we identify the
pain and the consciousness of its painful character. The identification says the mental event is a constituent of a constituent of itself; that may again strike us as odd, but does not amount to an objection. Thus Reid’s Identity Theory can conform to the criterion of identity for events where Brentano’s cannot do so, because the introduction of the quale μ confers an extra degree of freedom on Reid’s account. Qualia are thus an indispensable component of a Reidian account of consciousness.

Knowledge is also an indispensable component, for Reid’s account only solves the problem of the necessity of co-occurrence because it is couched in terms of knowledge. Suppose we incorporate qualia into the account, but then try to identify a pain, not with one’s knowledge of its painfulness, but with its appearing to one to be painful. Let ‘A’ denote the appearance relation. Then instead of saying:

\[ e_1 = \langle K, S, <\mu, e_1> \rangle \]

we would propose to put instead:

\[ e_1^* = \langle A, S, <\mu, e_1^*> \rangle \]

The following difficulty would then arise. Pain is essentially pain – if an event e is a pain, then it is a pain at each possible world at which it occurs. Now the Reidian event \( e_1 = \langle K, S, <\mu, e_1> \rangle \) is essentially a pain: for at any world \( w \) at which \( e_1 \) exists, \( e_1 \) is identical with \( S \)’s knowledge that \( e_1 \) has the property \( \mu \), and hence by the factiveness of knowledge, \( e_1 \) does have the property \( \mu \) at \( w \), so \( e_1 \) is indeed a pain at \( w \). But the non-Reidian hypothetical event \( e_1^* = \langle A, S, <\mu, e_1> \rangle \) is not essentially a pain. At any world \( w \) at which \( e_1^* \) occurs it will indeed appear at \( w \) to be a pain, but since appearance is not factive, it does not follow that \( e_1^* \) really is a pain at \( w \), and hence it is possible that \( e_1^* \) exists without being a pain. Thus Reid’s account succeeds in explaining the necessity of co-occurrence, because it is based on knowledge, not appearance.

**The problem of introspection**

Introspection is the third of the three problems of consciousness I listed. I shall suggest that Reid’s theory is superior to Brentano’s in respect of the problem of introspection also; the reason is again that Reid defines consciousness in terms of knowledge, whereas Brentano defines it in terms of appearance.
For Brentano, ‘consciousness’ of experience is merely the appearance of experience, so a further account is needed of how we have knowledge of experience. His account of introspection is in summary as follows. An experience such as hearing a sound is a presentation of the sound heard. But it is also a presentation of itself, i.e. it makes one conscious of itself, and so it puts one in a position to refer to it. Because one can refer to it, the same experience can also ‘contain’ a judgement about itself, a judgement which is infallible and evident, according to Brentano. The reason it is infallible is that the judgement is an integral part of the very experience which the judgement is about and which makes the judgement true. That is the mechanism whereby our introspective judgements about the experiences of which we have inner consciousness give us knowledge of these experiences.

Here Brentano may seem to be following much the same line as Reid, who writes:

The operations of our minds are attended with consciousness; and this consciousness is the evidence, the only evidence, which we have, or can have, of their existence. . . . Every man finds himself under a necessity of believing what consciousness testifies, and everything that has this testimony is to be taken as a first principle.42

But here it must be remembered that for Reid ‘consciousness’ is already knowledge, whereas Brentano’s ‘consciousness’ is mere appearance. For Brentano, it is only the accompanying judgement that gives rise to knowledge. Now a judgement yields knowledge only if it is true, so because Brentano thinks that ‘inner perception’ always gives knowledge, he is obliged to claim that the accompanying judgement is always true, i.e. it is infallible. This is a far stronger claim than any that Reid needs to make. Using the operator ‘J’ for judgement, a judgement that $p$ is infallible iff

$$\Box (Jp \rightarrow p)$$

i.e. a judgement is infallible if it is factive. Now of course knowledge is factive:

$$\Box (Kp \rightarrow p)$$

The factiveness of knowledge of experience is banal and uncontroversial. But Brentano’s theory incurs a much more controversial extra commitment to the factiveness of judgements about experience. I shall
argue that such judgements are not factive, and that Brentano’s theory therefore fails.

According to Brentano, the presentation and the presentation of the presentation ‘form’ a single mental act. In just the same way, he argues, the cognition is also included in the same single mental act: ‘The characteristic fusion of consciousness and the object of consciousness is just as evident in cognition as it was there [sc. in his discussion of presentation].’ When Brentano speaks of a ‘fusion’ or of one presentation ‘containing’ another, he means there is really only a single mental phenomenon ‘which we divide conceptually into two presentations’. His suggestion is that the same can be said of a presentation and its accompanying judgement, which again form a single phenomenon, divisible only conceptually.

However, it is simply not true that a judgement about experience is divisible only conceptually from the experience itself. For example, consider a judgement that one is in pain. Even if this judgement sometimes occurs as ‘part’ of one’s being in pain, the very same judgement can occur even if one is not in pain. People are capable of believing almost anything, and they are certainly capable of judging that they are in pain when they are not in pain. For example, someone might mistake an itch for a pain. Or someone might mistakenly judge they were in pain from post-hypnotic suggestion, or in consequence of an overactive imagination. Thus Brentano cannot claim that the judgement that one is in pain is separable only ‘conceptually’ from one’s pain; for sometimes it is ‘separated’ actually. If the judgement that one is in pain can occur without one’s being in pain, then the judgement is not guaranteed to be true when it occurs; so it is not factive.

There is no such problem for Reid. Although one can judge that one is in pain when one is not in pain, one cannot be conscious of being in pain, when one is not in pain; for consciousness is knowledge, according to Reid, and knowledge is factive. Thus Reid is in a position to assert that the ‘testimony of consciousness’ is always evident, for in the cases when I am not in pain, I am not conscious of pain either – the testimony of Reidian consciousness is indeed infallible.

It remains to give a Reidian account of introspection. Consciousness of an experience is not yet introspective self-knowledge for, as we noted earlier, if subjects lack the appropriate concepts, they may be unable to advance from consciousness of an experience to knowledge that they are having that experience. However, if one does have the needed concepts, then normally if one has a conscious experience, one will be in a position to know introspectively that one is having the experience. How is the availability of this knowledge to be explained? Reid can say that
one knows that one is having the experience from its *qualia*. This does not mean one knows it *by inferring* it from its *qualia*; on the contrary, when one introspects one’s experience, the knowledge thus acquired is usually immediate and non-inferential. It is a question not of inference, but of recognition of the experience by its *qualia*. But for recognition to be possible, it is not enough that the experience possesses the *qualia* – one must know it possesses it. How does one know the *qualia* of one’s experience? Reid’s theory has already solved this part of the problem of introspection: one’s having the experience is identical with one’s knowledge in consciousness of the *qualia* of the experience. Thus one knows the *qualia* just in virtue of having the experience, and one knows introspectively that one is having the experience by recognising it by its *qualia*. The role of *qualia* in Reidian introspection explains ‘privileged access’: only I can introspect my experience, because only my knowledge of the *qualia* of the experience is identical with the experience itself.

**Notes**

1 ‘I get myself into a position to answer the question whether I believe that *p* by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether *p*.’ G. Evans, *The Varieties of Reference*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, 225.
4 Ibid., 128.
5 Ibid., 79.
6 Ibid., 80.
7 Ibid., 81.
8 Ibid., 88.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 102.
11 I am indebted to the Editor for this translation of Brentano’s text. The translation given in the English translation (ibid., 138) is ‘We only have knowledge when we make judgements.’ This does not bring out Brentano’s meaning so clearly.
12 Ibid., 143.
13 Ibid., 139.
14 Ibid., 140.

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., II xvi, 310.
19 Ibid., II xvi, 311.

21 Reid, op. cit., I 6, 222.
22 Ibid., II ix, 280.
23 Ibid., I i 12, 229.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., II xvi, 128.
26 Ibid., 312.
30 Locke, op. cit., III iv 12, 425.
31 Brentano, op. cit., 143.
32 Ibid., 144.
33 In fact Brentano appears to have given up this doctrine later. Ibid., 276.
34 Reid, op. cit., II xvii, 312.
35 Ibid., I i 2, 229.
38 Brentano, op. cit., 125.
41 Of course this is an oversimplification. In reality there are many different kinds of pain, so strictly μ should be defined as the property an experience has, if it is painful in that particular way.
42 Reid, op. cit., II 1, 231.
43 Brentano, op. cit., III 2, 139.
3 Meinong on memory*

*Fabrice Teroni*

Memory, it is frequently claimed, has nothing to do with experience. It is also held that foundationalism in epistemology must rest on what is self-evident. Each claim is a myth, as Meinong shows in his unacknowledged classic discussion of mnestic phenomena, *Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Würdigung des Gedächtnisses.*¹ Meinong’s text revolves around three fundamental theses. The first is a restricted conception of memory, very different from the liberal position advocated by most contemporary psychologists and philosophers. I expound this thesis, defend it in a new way and argue for a slightly superior, Meinongian position on the nature of memory and its links with judgements and experiences. The second consists in a subtle assessment of epistemic circularity which demolishes the attempts of many later philosophers and provides an original argument for the third: some basic beliefs have defeasible justification. I defend these two theses against various objections. Contrasting Meinong’s claims with more recent positions reveals their crucial importance for the philosophy of memory.

This chapter is structured as follows. Meinong’s primary goal is to dispense with the epistemological myth, but the best strategy is to focus first on his understanding of memory and the way he dispenses with the first myth. In this way, we will be in a better position to understand Meinong’s epistemology. This is the task of the first five sections, which expound and discuss: presentations and judgements; Meinong’s restricted conception of memory; the nature of presentations; the role of judgement; and the links between judgements and experiences. I then investigate Meinong’s epistemological position: memory judgements and direct evidence; indirect evidence and epistemic circularity; his modest foundationalism; and the nature of presumptive evidence and Brentano’s criticisms of it.
Presentations and judgements

What is Meinong’s position on the nature of memory? Meinong is concerned with memories as occurrent mental states, although the verb ‘to remember’ attributes both occurrences, as when I say ‘I remember yesterday’s dinner’, and dispositions, for instance when John who is asleep is said to remember that Napoleon crossed the Alps. Meinong does not justify this choice, but we can easily do so by arguing that dispositions to remember depend on occurrent memories: John would not dispositionally remember if he were not apt to occurrently remember in some circumstances. What are occurrent memories according to Meinong? He starts by distinguishing them from mere presentations. His conception of presentations is derived from Franz Brentano’s. The notion does not refer to ‘that which is presented, but rather to the act of presentation’. For instance, when one hears a sound, the presentation is the mental phenomenon of hearing a sound, not the sound. Presentations are for Brentano one of the three main classes of mental phenomena, together with judgements and a category which groups together affective and volitive states. Second, ‘nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing’. Thus, to judge is to accept or reject a presentation which is for this reason logically prior to these further acts. For instance, to judge that Mary left the party is to have a presentation of Mary leaving the party and accept that this event occurred. In his discussion of memory, Meinong uses the example of a painter imagining a scene prior to drawing it: he ‘has a presentation of something, but this “something” exists only in [his] thought [. . .], it is nothing but the content thereof’ (ZWG 254 (189)). According to Meinong, memory is essentially distinct from presentations because it is assessable as true or false, as justified or unjustified. One does not evaluate the painter’s activity in these ways, but one does evaluate memories. John’s claim to remember an event can be appraised or criticized. In agreement with Brentano’s conception of the relations between presentations and judgements, Meinong therefore understands memory as judgements based on presentations: ‘What is added is the clear and, here, very essential conviction [“Überzeugung”] of the person remembering, that the image in his memory relates to an actual experience’ (ZWG 255 (189)). Meinong identifies conviction and the occurrence of a judgement, contrary to philosophers who take memory to involve something more primitive than judicative acts, such as feelings of familiarity. As judgements made on the basis of presentations, memory can of course be evaluated with respect to truth and justification.
A restricted conception of memory

Brentano’s presentations include hearing a sound, imagining seeing a tree and, *cum grano salis*, thinking of a general concept. Is Meinong more specific on what occurs in memory? Yes, for even though he does not directly address this question, he consistently uses the term ‘*Erinnerungsbild*’, and sometimes ‘*Erinnerungsdatum*’. These expressions strongly suggest that, according to Meinong, memory is intimately linked with what has been traditionally called ‘images’, for he would probably have used the more neutral term ‘*Vorstellung*’ in order to cancel this implication. The notion of image is notoriously problematic, but we can use it neutrally as a way to do justice to phenomenological facts: for instance, John’s remembering last week’s party can be for him phenomenologically close to hearing the music, or seeing the people he met there. As I understand him, memory is for Meinong a judgement made on the basis of such quasi-sensory presentations, which we can call ‘memory experiences’. He is nevertheless not very clear on this topic, for he notes at one point that we remember ‘thoughts and feelings, judgements and desires’ (ZWG 256 (191)). In some of these cases, it is implausible to extend the conception of memory just mentioned, since retained judgements occur without any image. A plausible interpretation consists in distinguishing judgements that I desired or judged that p in the past from memory judgements that are constitutively accompanied by presentations of the contexts in which these acts have taken place. Then, to remember a judgement is to remember judging that p, which creates a crucial distinction between simply preserved or retained judgements and memory judgements. Another option would be to argue for the sensory character of these acts to encompass them in one’s talk of memory images, but this strikes me as far less plausible than the first suggestion.

To stress, as Meinong does, the role of memory experiences is to opt for a restricted conception of memory, which is in sharp contrast with the liberal position adopted by a vast majority of philosophers and psychologists. For it is now a commonplace to cite different kinds of memory, the usual list comprising procedural, propositional or semantic, and personal or episodic memory. Procedural memory occurs for instance when Mary remembers how to swim, something philosophers refer to as procedural knowledge or know-how. Examples of propositional or semantic memory are: John remembers that Napoleon crossed the Alps and Michael remembers that 2+2=4, whereas episodic memory is restricted to events the subject has witnessed and is commonly reported with the help of non-propositional constructions. The
main tendency in the memory literature has been to argue for the central role of propositional memory, and to award experiences a derivative and unimportant status.\textsuperscript{10} For memory experiences are simply not part of the states classified as propositional memory. In contrast to the liberal conception, Meinong takes memory to be experiential: to remember is in part to enjoy phenomenologically rich states of mind. Thus, to remember is one thing, to have retained a judgement another, and one does not remember when one judges that 2+2=4, even though one has acquired this belief in the past.

How might Meinong’s view be defended? Is the disagreement merely verbal? The classification of mental states is an important philosophical endeavour and illuminating categorizations have to answer philosophical concerns. This holds abstractly for any taxonomy, which must respect constraints inherent in the discipline of which it is part: to classify birds according to genetic code is for instance better, given the biologists’ concerns, than to classify them with respect to colour distribution. With respect to the philosophy of memory, the following question has to be answered: does the liberal position satisfy philosophical constraints on mental states? The phenomena classified as memory by liberals only share the property of retention: to remember how to swim is to retain a behavioural capacity, to remember that Napoleon crossed the Alps to retain a judgement. But proponents of a restricted conception of memory are not satisfied by this and argue that retention is too generic to do any philosophically useful work. In order to defend their position, they have to pin down fundamental properties which distinguish memory in a strict sense from other mental states. According to Meinong, memory depends on phenomenologically rich presentations, so that one has to show that their occurrence has consequences which justify a restricted conception of memory. Here are four such consequences.

First, one can point to the phenomenological dimension stressed above, and evaluate this difference as fundamental enough to motivate a crucial distinction between judgements made on their basis and other judgements. This difference can be argued to be parallel to that between perceptual judgements, on the one hand, and blind-sighters and seers who just happen to make judgements about their immediate environments, on the other. This difference shows doxastic reductions of perception to be implausible.\textsuperscript{11} Perceptual judgements are made on the basis of specific perceptual states. For advocates of the restricted conception, memory differs as much from judgements acquired in the past as perception from actual judgements: to make memory judgements is to judge on the basis of specific mnesic states.
Second, proponents of restricted accounts of memory stress that the intentionality of memory is similar to that of perception, and not like that of retained judgement, and argue from the specific intentionality of perception to the irreducibility of memory to judgement. Perception is veridical, judgements factive. To remember yesterday’s party and judge that it occurred is for the judgement to be underpinned by a different form of intentionality: the presentation is of, or about the party. Because retained judgements do not share this dimension, their intentionality is of a different form.

Third, to argue for a fundamental difference with respect to the thoughts involved is appealing to some philosophers, for memory in the strict sense seems to allow truly demonstrative thinking. Thus, if John remembers a girl he met, he can think about her demonstratively, judging for instance that *that* girl was kind, contrary to the case where he has simply retained a judgement, for the thought is here of a different nature.

Finally, and most importantly for Meinong’s own concerns, advocates of restricted conceptions of memory stress the epistemological impact of memory experiences as a way of contrasting the epistemological structures of memory and of mere retained judgements. The idea is that memory experiences provide judgements with a specific form of justification, whereas a completely different explanation has to be given for simply retained judgements. When Mary remembers the party, her judgement that it was boring is justified by her presentation of the party, otherwise the presentation does not justify but only fixes reference. But Sam’s judgement that Napoleon crossed the Alps is not underpinned by such presentations, so its epistemology is different.

In fundamental agreement with Meinong’s conception of memory, advocates of restricted accounts conclude that these fundamental differences with respect to phenomenology, intentionality, modes of thought and epistemology motivate a crucial distinction within the phenomena grouped together by liberals. They only share very generic properties, and cannot be classified together on pain of philosophical inadequacy.

The nature of presentations

On Meinong’s theory, presentations explain the specificity and, as we shall see below, epistemic status of memory. He is nevertheless not forthcoming about them. Before stressing the fundamental role of judgement, he notes that the distinction between memory and presentations cannot be reduced to
the simple fact that the contents originated in the earlier experiences of the person remembering, or the knowledge of such origins gained from psychological investigation – for both might also be present in the artist who creates out of ‘pure fantasy’.

(ZWG 255 (189))

The ‘pure fantasy’ cases Meinong has in mind are not very clear, but the fact that the content originated in earlier experiences, which he assumes to be insufficient, is necessary. Why? Remember that, for Meinong, memories are judgements based on presentations. If these bases did not originate in a specific way from earlier experiences, the result would be problematic for his primarily epistemological concerns: how could memory ever be knowledge if judgements in the past tense were not made on the basis of specific presentations? As we shall see, Meinong argues that John is justified in judging that Mary’s party was wonderful because his judgement is made on the basis of a presentation: for it to be so, the presentation must be of this specific event, fundamentally distinct, for instance, from a generic imaginative presentation of a party on the basis of which no judgement in the past tense, or about specific objects, can reach the status of knowledge. Memory presentations should be understood as allowing such doxastic practices if we deem them rational. This implies that the difference between memory and at least certain forms of sensory imagination cannot be reduced to the occurrence of a judgement directed to the past, even though Meinong’s epistemological interests lead him to stress its fundamental role. Meinong’s position thus asks for more than he is ready to provide, and has to be developed in sharp opposition to theses about the dispensability and generality of the experiences grounding memory judgements. I take these remarks to motivate developments of Meinong’s position, and one central project in this area would be to understand memory presentations by investigating their specific dependence on past perceptual episodes.

The role of judgement

Memories for Meinong are judgements made on the basis of presentations. Why does he require judgements? The answer is to be found in his classical, first person centred, methodology, especially salient when he grounds his conception by noting that ‘it would certainly never occur to anybody to say that he remembers this or that, if he lacks such a conviction’ (ZWG 255 (189)). This is no doubt the case, but one could easily question the inference: why should one’s readiness to self-
attribute mental states play any role in their definition? Even if no one would say that he remembers were he not convinced that something occurred in the past, why should this play a central role in a conception of memory? For there exist many situations where memory is attributed at a time when no judgement occurred. A first type of case is the following. At $t_1$, John has a memory presentation, but does not make a judgement in the past tense about what is presented because he has reasons to believe that such cannot have been the case. At $t_2$, he comes to know that his former reasons were completely unfounded and says ‘I remembered this, but did not at the time judge that such was the case.’ Meinong would perhaps have appealed to inclinations to believe, and not judgements, to escape this problem: John would have believed that $p$ had he no defeating reasons. What occurs whenever someone shows us, in a certain way, that the past has a very specific influence on his present doings, without his realizing that this is so, is more problematic. We say for instance that John remembers a specific event without believing that it occurred when he paints, or describes, it faithfully.

Meinong’s claim that memory is a judgement therefore depends on a questionable methodology, and has problematic consequences, but is basically sound given his central concern: even if it can be argued that to remember is not to judge, memory judgements nevertheless take central stage when epistemological problems are investigated. Take perception: a perception is not as such justified or not, but only judgements made on their basis. It is only if the man at the bar believes the place to be full of pink elephants that we evaluate him as irrational. Only judgements and beliefs are evaluated as justified or not.

Experiences and judgements

More crucial to Meinong’s concerns are the nature of typical memory judgements and their relations to experiences. Let me come back to his understanding of conviction (‘Überzeugung’) as the occurrence of a judgement. He argues that to remember is to judge that a presentation relates to an actual experience. How are memory judgements and present experiences related? What is the relation between memory judgements and past experiences? Let me investigate Meinong’s answers in turn. As regards the first, he notes that ‘while I am remembering, I can easily make a judgement about that which I am remembering, without, at the same time, making a special judgement about the remembering itself’ (ZWG 255 (190)). Typical memory judgements are, for instance,
that there was a wonderful party at John’s place last summer, or that there were a lot of people on the beach. I am not sure whether Meinong wants to restrict memory judgements to those having this specific form. To say so would be problematic, for one commonly judges not only about events, but also about objects: that this lake was nice seems a bona fide memory judgement. Be that as it may, with respect to present experiences, Meinong stresses that

cases (…) where the remembering itself forms the content of the judgement (…) must be regarded as more complicated and, in this respect, as secondary constructs, for here the simple act of memory is supplemented by reflection on itself.

(ZWG 255 (190))

We must distinguish memory acts which are, as we saw above, judgements made on the basis of specific presentations, from more complex judgements about these acts. As regards the relation between memory judgements and present experiences, Meinong’s answer is therefore that to remember one need not judge that one enjoys a specific experience: memory does not depend on these further achievements. His position can be interpreted in two ways: either as saying that to require this is to mistake dispositions and occurrences (S is simply disposed to judge that he has a memory experience when making a memory judgement), or that the disposition itself is not even required in order to form memory judgements.

Meinong’s conception of the relation between memory and past experiences is more difficult to assess, for he links this problem with generic concerns about realism. He is very sensitive to issues surrounding the existence of the external world, and chooses what he takes to be an account of memory which remains silent on this problem. Meinong’s strategy exemplifies here a classical, indirect form of realism: because judgements about past external events are problematic, they are underwritten by unproblematic judgements about one’s past mental life. Here is his argument:

1 One can only remember what one has experienced (‘erlebt’).
2 One can only experience what goes on within oneself.
3 Therefore, one can only remember what went on within oneself.

Meinong’s conclusion is more precisely that ‘we can properly [eigentlich] and directly [unmittelbar] remember only the data of the mental life’ (ZWG 256 (191)). As what follows clearly shows, Meinong
is happy to restrict the discussion to judgements about the subject’s past states of mind. For instance, to remember a party is to judge about one’s own past visual experiences, anything else being remembered ‘on the basis of such data’, as he expresses it. Judgements about past physical events are always mediated by judgements about past subjective states. Two things should be underlined here. First, that Meinong perceives knowledge of anything external to the mind as problematic, contrary to knowledge of past mental states. He shares this inclination with Bertrand Russell who, in The Problems of Philosophy, admits acquaintance with past sense-data, but not with anything other than such private entities. We tend today to conceive knowledge of the past and of the external world as being on a par, as Russell himself was to argue later. Second, that Meinong’s conception of memory judgements is not motivated in classical foundationalist fashion by arguing that uncertain judgements are grounded in certain ones, for judgements about past mental states are, as we shall see, understood by Meinong as uncertain.

Stricto sensu, memory judgements are therefore about one’s past mental states. This is in sharp contrast with Meinong’s own examples of memory judgements mentioned above, which are about normal events and seem independent of both judgements about present and about past experiences. To adopt his argument leads one to correct this impression: memory judgements are primarily directed at past experiences, those about past external events being based on them. This sounds implausible. Our memory judgements are not always about our past experiences, but more commonly about past events.

To evaluate Meinong’s argument, it will be useful to distinguish two theses about memory. According to the first, memory is about experiences in the sense that memory presentations are presentations of former experiences. This is not to say that judgements are primarily directed to experiences, and is compatible with direct realism. According to the second, past experiences are on the contrary the immediate objects of memory judgements: this form of indirect realism is parallel to the idea that the primary objects of perceptual judgements are sense-data.

Premise (1) of Meinong’s argument, that one can only remember what one has experienced, supports the first thesis: if memory presentations depend on previous experiences, this fact is respected. This undisputed claim should not be confused with the contentious one that the primary objects of memory judgements are past experiences. Moreover, premise (2) is dubious, for even if it may be true that one only enjoys what goes on inside of one, this is not to say that the primary
object of experiences or judgements is subjective. To agree with Meinong is not, as he seems to imply, to adopt a conciliatory position, but to neglect direct realism which, among other theses, argues that memory judgements can directly aim at past events. The fact that memory judgements are made on the basis of dependent presentations has no consequences whatsoever for their primary objects. One way to argue for direct realism is to show that perception is primarily directed at external objects and that perceptual judgements can directly aim at the external world, and then apply these results to memory through the notion of re-presentation of former experiences.

Meinong’s thesis that memory judgements are about past experiences is implausible and inconclusively buttressed. Criticizing his argument for indirect realism opens the way, through minor modifications, for a direct realist, Meinongian position according to which memory judgements are directly about past events: they can be independent of any judgement about experiences, past or present. For this reason, it crucially differs from an important tradition which conceives memory judgements as complex and reflexive. Locke writes that

the repository of the memory signifies no more than this, – that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before.24

According to Locke and his followers, memory judgements are complex, for they depend on the capacity to think about past experiences, an important part of what is called today a theory of the mind: memory, or at least episodic memory, judgements are metarepresentational or second-order thoughts.25 For instance, to episodically remember a party is to judge that there was a party and that one saw it. Once Meinong’s argument for indirect realism is rejected, his stress on the unsophisticated nature of memory judgements can lead to a plausible account according to which some are independent of any judgement about experiences. This Meinongian position radically differs from Lockean accounts: memory does not depend on sophisticated forms of awareness, but occurs whenever simple judgements are made, complex states of awareness being no more than sophisticated judgements made on the same presentational basis. Memory is, if we can put it in this way, a basic endowment of the mind, a distinct first-level mental phenomenon, which can be variously exploited once the relevant capacities are in place. This is to treat it similarly to perception on the basis of which one can also make reflexive judgements.
(such as ‘I am standing in front of a church’), but which does not depend on the capacity to make such judgements, for more mundane judgements are already perceptual. This Meinongian position on the nature of memory and its links with sophisticated conceptual capacities grounds in my view a highly appealing conception of mnesic phenomena.

Memory judgements and direct evidence

I have discussed so far Meinong’s conception of memory. But, as noted already, his interest in memory is primarily epistemological, the goal being ‘to take possession of this area in the name of epistemology’ (ZWG 254 (188)). According to him, the problems surrounding the epistemological assessment of memory have been neglected. Philosophers have been more interested in broad questions than in elucidating more mundane, though fundamental, data of knowledge (ZWG 254 (188)). How, then, does Meinong understand the epistemology of memory?

Meinong’s first point is that memory judgements are made ‘with a distinct claim to credibility’ (ZWG 255 (189)). When I remember that the house by the lake was made of brown wooden planks, I feel entitled to this judgement, something absent if I judge at random. The goal of epistemology, according to Meinong, is to

attempt to determine whether this trustworthiness [Vertrauenswürdigkeit] is based on something which these judgements have in common with others that epistemologists have already investigated, or whether it is based on something which, due to its special nature, requires special consideration.

(ZWG 256 (192))

Thus, his method consists in investigating the possibilities of classifying memory judgements in various categories. We already saw memory judgements to be different from judgements about memory experiences, in agreement with Meinong, and from judgements about past experiences, by criticizing his argument to the contrary. We now have to further specify them, with epistemological concerns in mind. To complete this task, Meinong uses two fundamental distinctions which can be summarized in a matrix:
The evidence of indirectly evident judgements depends on proofs, contrary to the evidence of directly evident judgements; relational judgements are about relations between entities, whereas existential judgements simply state that something exists. Starting a process of elimination, Meinong provides two reasons against assimilating memory judgements to directly evident relational ones. First, a claim to correspondence may exist in memory when the subject claims that his memory image corresponds to what was the case, but this ‘is as inessential to memory judgements (or only connected with them in the majority of cases) as the above-mentioned reflection on the remembering process’ (ZWG 259 (194–5)). To understand memory judgements as relational is to intellectualize them too much. Second, and more crucially, judgements of correspondence depend on memory, since the reality to which the present image is compared lies in the past and, according to Meinong, relational judgements are ‘only possible if both terms of the relation are given, and not if one of these terms must, as a precondition, belong to the past’ (ZWG 259 (195)). But is it not the case that John can compare his memory of Mary’s party with, say, a photograph of this event? Even if true, such a claim is irrelevant to the specification of memory judgements, which are not necessarily made with the help of such external representations. In this last case, since the only possible relational judgements depend on memory, the position is, as Meinong rightly stresses, caught in a vicious circle. Memory judgements cannot be relational.

Are they directly evident existential judgements? Meinong restricts this category, in a Cartesian fashion, to introspection, and shows how implausible it is to identify memory judgements with introspective judgements *stricto sensu* (they do not have the form ‘this occurs now in my mental life’). The only remaining option is to understand them as made on the basis of introspection, but with an eye to what occurred in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judgement based upon proof?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Existential</strong></td>
<td>Indirectly evident existential judgement. E.g. the judgement that giant lizards existed.</td>
<td>Directly evident existential judgement. Restricted to judgements of inner perception.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relational</strong></td>
<td>Indirectly evident relational judgement. E.g. a mathematical judgement derived from a proof.</td>
<td>Directly evident relational judgement. E.g. judgements of comparison and compatibility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the past, something like ‘what I enjoy now is identical with something I enjoyed in the past’. But, as Meinong notes, this is to come back to the implausible relational suggestion.

Memory judgements are neither relational nor directly evident existential, thus they are not directly evident. This indirect proof does not satisfy Meinong, who adds important comments on the directly evident. What is directly evident ‘has the characteristic of imposing an absolute firm conviction’ (ZWG 260 (196–7)). Directly evident judgements, such as that 2+2=4, or that I am enjoying a conscious experience, are indubitable. Meinong does not reduce this kind of evidence to absolute conviction: it is only one of its characteristics, and one should be careful not to confuse psychology and epistemology. For unshakable conviction is but too commonly present when no direct evidence, but prejudice, has taken root in the mind. What is absent in this case, but present when what is directly evident elicits conviction is, as I understand Meinong, the right to be sure: subjects are entitled to evident judgements. In these cases, unshakable conviction is justified or grounded because the intensity of the judgement corresponds to available evidence.28 I do not know how Meinong conceives the relation between direct evidence and conviction (is it necessary? what kind of necessity does it have?), but this is enough for my present purposes. For, as he rightly notes, not only is it common to doubt the deliverances of memory, but this is moreover evaluated as reasonable. For instance, if John seems to remember Mary’s party, but also believes that he was 3,000 miles away from her home at this time, he is reasonable in not believing having attended her party even though he indeed has. To pin down the specific epistemic status of memory beliefs is to respect these patterns of reasonableness grounding a fundamental contrast with the directly evident.

**Indirect evidence and epistemic circularity**

Meinong has thus plausibly eliminated three of the four options represented in the above matrix, but one remains: memory judgements are indirectly evident judgements of fact, i.e. their evidence depends on a proof. Its evaluation occupies an important part of Meinong’s text. To depict the epistemological status of memory judgements in this way means that their claims to credibility results from empirical verification. To show that such cannot be the case, Meinong relies on two arguments. The first is as follows:

1. The evidence of memory judgements is based upon a proof.
2 Being empirical, their specific proof consists in empirical verification.
3 Empirical verification is either ‘established by means of direct sensory perception’ (ZWG 261 (198)) or with the help of other individuals.
4 Verifications of the first type rely on memory: the comparison with what is provided by sense perception always depends in part on memory (to check my memory of the house by a relevant perception requires my believing that houses do not change, which in turn depends on memory).
5 Verifications of the second type have the same defect: ‘The memory of A is verified by the memory of B; what significance could be attributed to the whole process, if the memory of B had not been accorded a certain degree of trustworthiness?’ (ZWG 264 (202)).
6 Individual verifications of memory judgements are always epistemically circular.

The second is briefly sketched but can be reconstructed as follows:

1 Induction depends on gathering evidence which constitutes the basis of inductive reasoning.
2 Most individual verifications upon which the inductive conclusion depends have occurred in the past.
3 In order to be available now, they must be remembered.
4 The inductive procedure is epistemically circular.

Note that these arguments are directed against positions according to which the evidence of memory judgements is completely based on proofs. In this context, the first argument concerns any procedure of verification which, according to Meinong, cannot be achieved without relying on the validity of memory: the proof cannot get off the ground if memory judgements are not implicitly endowed with another form of justification not based on such proofs. The second argument is about the inductive process itself, and independent of the first: Meinong argues that one must rely on memory to constitute the evidential basis on which induction depends. Note that various theses must be distinguished:

(a) It is possible to prove non-circularly the validity of a particular memory.
(b) It is possible to prove non-circularly the validity of memory in general.
(c) It is possible to prove non-circularly the validity of memory in general through reiterating the procedure in (a).

Each of these theses must be evaluated with respect to positions which understand the status of particular memories and memory in general as dependent on proofs. Meinong’s first argument attempts to refute thesis (a), whereas the second is directed to (b). These two theses are best kept apart, for even if the validity of a particular memory can be non-circularly demonstrated, this does not show a non-circular proof of the validity of memory in general to be possible. Meinong believes that the argument needed in order to reach this further conclusion viciously depends on memory, this being the case if the only way to secure it relies on induction (that is, (b) can be reached only via (c)) and falls prey to his second argument. I cannot do justice here to the complexities arising in this area, so let me briefly broach the most important points.

Meinong rightly notes that independently of issues in epistemic circularity, the position under review is ‘artificial’ (ZWG 265 (203)). For it depends on the acceptance of thesis (d):

(d) The epistemological status of any individual memory judgement depends on a proof.

There are only two options here. Either we say that the justification of any individual judgement depends on a proof of its own validity, or we say that it depends on a proof of the general validity of memory. This constitutes a dilemma. On the one hand, individual memory judgements are almost never verified, and so would be unjustified if their status were dependent on a specific proof; on the other, general proofs of memory must be shown to be non-viciously circular for the second option to be plausible. Is there a way out of the second horn?

Let me briefly review some attempted proofs to show there is none. For Meinong is in sharp disagreement with many analytical philosophers who attempt to ground the justification of individual judgements with the help of sophisticated arguments in favour of the generic validity of memory.29 I leave aside here concerns about the psychological plausibility of such sophisticated requirements to endow any judgement with justification. For an even more pressing question arises: is it possible to prove without epistemic circularity the generic validity of memory if memory judgements derive their justification from proofs? Some attempted proofs rely on the a priori validity of the principle of induction, which is at best problematic.30 But by focusing on what he calls non-retrospective cases, what I called earlier propositional
memory, E.J. Furlong seems to succeed in proving the validity of some memory judgements. Note nevertheless that if what I said above on Meinong’s restrictive account of memory is along the right tracks, then the first argument goes through: there may be, as Furlong shows, non-circular ways to demonstrate the validity of the retained belief that 2+2=4, but not that of judgements about what has occurred in the past made on the basis of memory presentations. Why? Because in this case, the two types of verification shown by Meinong’s first argument to be circular are the only ones available.

But even if possible, such verifications would still not, as noted above, secure thesis (b). Note first that Meinong is right in understanding this generalizing move as dependent on induction. For how could one justifiably conclude to the generic validity of memory without starting from a pool of data constituted by verifications of individual memory judgements? I am justified in trusting memory through a proof only if I can say something like ‘Memory has never deceived me in the past.’ And, according to Meinong, this inductive procedure is itself epistemically circular given the resources of the option under review. Is he correct? Some externalist philosophers have argued that induction can be non-circularly proven valid through a distinction between premise and rule circularity. According to them, only premise circularity is vicious, contrary to rule circularity which constitutes an external condition of which the subject need not be cognizant: thus, S can non-circularly prove the validity of induction by using it, for he need not already know that it is reliable in order to reach justified conclusions by following inductive rules. This appealing move is precisely unavailable for advocates of the option criticized by Meinong: according to them, individual memory judgements derive all their credibility from proofs. And without memory, induction cannot get off the ground. The fact that only induction can be used to prove the general validity of memory, together with the epistemically circular nature of such a proof given the resources of this option, constitutes therefore the second horn of a serious dilemma.

Meinong’s most important conclusion, that memory judgements cannot derive their justification from proofs, is thus secured. He subtly shows proofs of the validity of memory to be epistemically circular, thereby demolishing the attempts of many later analytic philosophers. His solution, as is further discussed in the next section, is to refuse thesis (d) above by endowing memory judgements with a specific form of justification independent of proof.
The nature of mnesic evidence: a moderate foundationalism

Where does this leave us? Meinong has shown all the possibilities represented in the matrix to be unfaithful to the specificity of memory judgements. There remain two options: either to conceive them as unjustified, or to extend our conception of justification in order to deal with their peculiarities.\(^\text{32}\) The first is a very strong brand of scepticism which Meinong rejects (ZWG 265 (204)), so what is his positive account? It is that ‘memory judgements represent conjectures (Vermutungen’) (ZWG 266 (204)). Conjectures are in sharp contrast with certainty, according to Meinong, and this difference ‘can be described in terms of psychology as a difference in the intensity of the act of judgement’ (ZWG 266 (205)). Psychologically speaking, the difference between memory and introspective judgements consists in distinct degrees of confidence: the subject feels more confident in the latter than in the former. Meinong further notes that in conjectures we have ‘characteristics immanent in the types of judgement concerned’ (ZWG 267 (206)). As I understand him, this means that with conjectural judgements we can detach justification from factuality: a conjectural judgement which comes out false was not \textit{eo ipso} unjustified, whereas a false directly evident judgement is an impossibility. Meinong’s option is to remain faithful to the way memory judgements are made, i.e. with a distinctive claim to credibility. Their distinctive feature is that, contrary to directly evident ones, they are possibly mistaken, and their internal credibility is the only remaining option for the non-sceptically minded. Thus, the failure of the four options discussed in the previous sections justify a move from psychology to epistemology: it is only if such judgements are endowed with a specific form of evidence, and our doxastic practices thereby respected, that we escape scepticism.

According to Meinong, memory judgements have \textit{direct conjectural} evidence. Because they cannot be grounded on proofs, their justification must be intimately linked with them and hence direct. Because they are distinct from evident judgements, they are endowed with a specific kind of justification, conjectural evidence, which is compatible with error. Meinong concludes that ‘every individual [memory] judgement carries its whole guarantee in itself’ (ZWG 268 (207)). Memory judgements, because they are of this type, are endowed with a specific fallible guarantee. This is not the case for any kind of judgement: a mathematical judgement, for instance, is not justified for the simple reason that it is of this nature. As we saw above, the specificity of memory judgements is to
be made on the basis of presentations: being so based, they are \textit{eo ipso} endowed with justification.

But is it not possible to make unjustified memory judgements? Meinong does not directly address this question, but one can try to answer it as follows. Let us say that memory judgements are those made on the basis of mnesic presentations, and perceptual judgements those based on perceptual presentations. Unjustified perceptual, respectively memory, judgements first occur when they do not fit what is perceived, or remembered. For instance, John can judge that three sheep are in front of him, without paying due attention to the fact that there are two sheep and a distinct white sheepdog. Other unjustified judgements go further than what is underwritten by presentations: Sam can for instance judge that there were fifty people at the party, while he remembers only a few: \textit{ceteris paribus}, his judgement is not justified. The links between presentations and judgements should of course be further discussed, but what has been said here is enough in order to convey the spirit of Meinong’s position.

How is Meinong’s position best described? It is a sophisticated form of foundationalism which does not look for unshakable foundations in any area of knowledge. It is completely mistaken to model all claims to know on judgements about one’s present mental states, or about simple mathematical truths. Meinong is here in agreement with those contemporary foundationalists whose ancestor is Thomas Reid.\textsuperscript{33} His first important insight with respect to memory judgements is a form of \textit{fallibilism}, the idea that justification is compatible with error. This means that their justification is defeasible, that, as one of the most important contemporary advocates of this idea expresses it, ‘contrary to what has generally been supposed, epistemologically basic beliefs need not be incorrigible; they may be only prima facie justified’.\textsuperscript{34} A belief is justified in the last way when it is provided one has no evidence to the contrary, for instance when one seems to perceive a cow and has no reason to believe the farmers in the neighbourhood to be prone to practical jokes. I explain in the next section the deep similarity between Meinong’s presumptive evidence and the contemporary notion of prima facie evidence.\textsuperscript{35} He can claim credit for one of the most powerful arguments in its favour: the sophisticated process of elimination by which he reaches it. This fascinating procedure has had a fundamental impact on Roderick Chisholm.\textsuperscript{36}

Meinong’s second insight is provided by his \textit{particularism}: some individual judgements possess their own guarantee. One is not justified only when one subsumes a judgement under a rule, specific memory judgements being justified because one remembers specific events or objects.
This is another consequence of the epistemic circularity discussed above. By refusing thesis (d) in this way, Meinong displays a profound sensitivity to the fundamental distinction between being justified and proving that one is, which William Alston deploys so powerfully against many contemporary epistemologies.37 This exemplifies his characteristic epistemological acumen and sensitivity to psychological plausibility.

Brentano’s criticisms and the nature of presumptive evidence

In this last section, I briefly present a plausible interpretation of Meinong’s position by discussing the criticisms it elicited from Franz Brentano. Let me first mention some points about Brentano’s conception of evidence. He contrasts what he calls blind with evident judgements.38 When evident, judgements are incompatible with error, as well as doubt.39 Brentano therefore works with a restricted account of evidence which corresponds to what Meinong calls direct evidence. Finally, he conceives as mediately evident the judgements based on proofs, and as immediately evident those which are not. Armed with this conception of evidence, Brentano makes a fundamental criticism of Meinong based on the nature of knowledge of probabilities.

He first points out that we can be certain of probabilities, for instance that the probability that, if I throw this dice, I will score a six is 1/6.40 This kind of judgement can be evident, but what the subject judges with evidence is the holding of a probability. What is, more generally, the structure of this kind of knowledge? Brentano argues that ‘each probability is composed of knowledge and ignorance, of which we must be aware’.41 When Sam judges that it will probably rain tomorrow, his judgement is constitutively linked both with his awareness that, say, the present weather is a sign of rain, and that it may not rain: knowledge and ignorance always underpin probabilistic judgements. But if probabilistic judgements are composed of two elements, the Meinongian notion of immediate presumptive evidence is contradictory. Such judgements are essentially mediately grounded, their evidence depending on the weighting of reasons. Meinong thus faces a dilemma: he must show that memory judgements are not probabilistic, or renounce his appealing position.

Note first that we should try to interpret him as refusing to identify memory judgements with judgements of probability understood in Brentano’s way, because to gather evidence for or against the occurrence of an event probably depends epistemically on memory (and presumably also on judgements about remembering itself), and we saw
above how sensitive Meinong is to these problems. Moreover, he never uses knowledge of probabilities in order to illuminate his account of memory judgements, but in this case they would be ‘based on something which [they] have in common with others that epistemologists have already investigated’ (ZWG 256 (192)). something he never points out. Nevertheless, there is a passage that seems to support Brentano’s reading:

If a person (…) increases the intensity of his memory judgement to certainty, then the failure of verification will obviously reveal his error; but is he now going to renounce his memory judgement in the same way as he would have to cease to trust a mathematical axiom at any time if this axiom had (…) been included in a calculation and led to a wrong result? By no means; his exaggerated confidence is somewhat reduced but not destroyed, and no one has succeeded in exorcizing it.

(ZWG 268 (207–8))

Let me first construe this passage in what I take to be Brentano’s way, before suggesting another interpretation. For it is indeed a puzzling passage. In the first sentence, is it implied that if the judgement is not made with certainty, then the failure of verification will not reveal the subject’s error? By MTT, we have at least the following: if the failure of verification does not reveal his error, then the judgement was not made with certainty. And Meinong seems to imply that this is the case for memory judgements which are compatible with error. But whereas the judgement that p is not compatible with evidence in favour of p’s falsity, the judgement that p is probable is compatible with such evidence. Hence, via Brentano’s plausible remarks, we reach a dramatic conclusion. This is unsatisfying on two counts. First, in the case of probabilistic judgements, the degree of conviction must be tuned to the evidence gathered for and against the occurrence of an event, and this would, as noted above, run against the whole thrust of Meinong’s argument.

Second, this means that memory judgements are probabilistic: for instance that it is more probable than not that I had some specific mental state in the past. This does not respect their nature in two ways. (a) The suggestion is psychologically implausible: normal memory judgements simply do not have this form. And (b), dynamic considerations show that this is wrong: when I make a memory judgement about Mary’s party, and later find a reason against its having occurred, I do not modify the strength of my inclination to believe, but more dramatically cancel the judgement. But, if it were probabilistic, then one would
not be required to modify its intensity even in the face of ‘error’. For judging with certainty that the probability of a specific past party having occurred is 75/100 is compatible with its not having occurred. More generally, what the judgement is about is one thing, its intensity another. Many combinations are possible: to judge with certainty that the probability of throwing a dice and scoring six is 1/6 is sound in some places, as well as to judge with presumptive evidence that there was a party.

Meinong’s passage can be reconciled with these criticisms by looking more closely at the original: the translation is misleading because it uses ‘memory judgement’ twice, whereas Meinong writes, first, ‘die Intensität seiner Gedächtnisurteile’ (plural) and next ‘das Urteil seines Gedächtnisses’. Thus, he can be interpreted as saying that someone who is certain of his memory judgements in general will not cease trusting memory because one of them is mistaken, but will tune his trust to their specific evidence. This does not imply that particular memory judgements can be maintained in the face of defeating evidence, and hence they need not be understood as probabilistic. So, if Meinong does not defend the implausible position Brentano attributes to him, what is his position?

A Meinongian can easily use the distinctions just mentioned in the following way. First, by arguing that memory judgements are not, for the reasons sketched above, probabilistic: to judge that there was a fire in one’s house is not to judge that this event probably occurred. Second, by stressing that presumptive evidence is an epistemological notion. One is justified to make some judgements on the basis of memory presentations, and its (psychological) intensity has to respect mnestic evidence. This evidence is for Meinong presumptive: one has no right to be certain. But this is not at all equivalent to conceiving memory judgements as probabilistic, for there is a more plausible explanation of the way subjects are tuned to this specific evidence: by being open to correction. This is to stress that presumptive evidence is a way judgements have to be made, and not judgements with a specific objective. In this sense, someone who systematically maintains his memory judgements in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary is irrational. Judging correctly in this area is not to judge probabilistically, but judging with an eye on possible mistakes. Thus, we reach a foundationalism according to which judgements based on the deliverances of our primitive faculties are justified until proven guilty, in Thomas Reid’s words, or prima facie justified, according to the current idiom. When one makes prima facie justified judgements, one does not deny their having been justified when one finds defeating evidence, acknowledging
their compatibility with mistakes, but nevertheless does not maintain them with any degree of confidence in the face of such evidence. Therefore, two possibilities open up: to remember without believing, when one mistakes misinformation as defeating evidence, and to be justified though mistaken in one’s memory judgements.

Conclusion

Meinong’s essay on memory constitutes a fundamental discussion of this basic endowment of the mind. I argued above that his conception of memory, as well as his remarks on different memory judgements are important in the context of contemporary debates. Meinong’s own brand of foundationalism and his original argument in its favour are also very interesting. It satisfies an internal constraint: memory judgements are justified because they are made on the basis of specific memory presentations. He is therefore in sharp opposition with pure externalist accounts of memory. His particularism, his sensitivity to issues of epistemic circularity, as well as his fallibilism, ground fascinating positions on the epistemic structure of fundamental judgements. Many contemporary epistemologists have been seduced by these antidotes to classical foundationalism, and can only profit from interaction with Meinong’s seminal discussion of memory.

Notes

* Thanks to Christoph Hoerl, Mark Textor and Kevin Mulligan for many helpful comments. While writing, I benefited from grants from the Fondation Ernest Boninchi and the Philibert Collart Fund.


3 Ibid., 80. See also 198.

4 See for instance Russell, B.: The Analysis of Mind, London: Routledge, 1995, chap. 9. This important point is only superficially broached in what follows.

5 Brentano, F.: op. cit., 79.

6 This expression is sometimes, correctly in my opinion, translated as ‘memory image’. See for instance ZWG 262 (199).

7 The phenomenological dimension of memory is stressed in Martin, M.G.F.:
8 Meinong uses in a later text the notion of make-believe or as-if emotions to explain affective memory. For discussion and references, Mulligan, K.: ‘La Varietà et l’Unità dell’Immaginazione’, Rivista di Estetica 11 (1999), 53–67, 62.


13 Advocates of the restricted conception argue that the neglect of this distinction is responsible for endless debates in the epistemology of memory between those who stress the role of experiences and those who appeal to what justified the judgement in the past.


16 See sections ‘The nature of mnesic evidence’ and ‘Brentano’s criticisms and the nature of presumptive evidence’ below for further discussions.


18 He similarly refuses to conceive memory judgements as sophisticated judgements of correspondence, see ZWG 259 (195).

20 My emphasis and translation.
27 This is also supported by the distinction between sophisticated and modest judgements discussed above.
28 This is in contrast with Schubert-Kalsi, M.-L.: *Meinong’s Theory of Knowledge*, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987 who opts for a more subjective reading of evidence. One thing is clear: Meinong distinguishes here evidence from conviction.


See Alston, W.: *Epistemic Justification*.


Ibid., 145.

Ibid., 145, the reference is to Laplace.

See the beginning of the first section ‘Presentation and judgement’ above.

4 Certainty, soil and sediment

Kevin Mulligan

Primitive certainty: soils, sands and seas

Within the large family of belief, judgement, acceptance, conviction, taking for granted, being under the impression that, certainty, acquaintance, apprehension (‘Erkennen’), knowledge, one possibly fundamental category is that of primitive certainty. Ortega y Gasset says:

I did not ‘notice’ the seat or arm-chair I am sitting on . . . In some way I was counting on (‘contar con’) the seat . . . When we go down the stairs we are not properly speaking aware of every step, but we count on all of them; and in general we are not aware of most of the things which exist for us but we count on them.

(ULM, 47)

Wittgenstein writes: ‘I believe that there is a chair over there . . . But is my belief then grounded?’ (OC §173); ‘I act with complete certainty’ (OC §174). I shall call the ‘basic beliefs’ (creencias) of which Ortega says that ‘we count on them – always, without interruption’ (VLI, 43) and the ‘propositions’ which, according to Wittgenstein, ‘stand fast for me’ (OC §152) primitive certainties (a term used by Russell and Husserl).

Many twentieth-century Austro-German philosophers were convinced that primitive certainty provides a foundation for most human activity, including cognitive enterprises, and knowledge. The philosophers in question are Husserl and his heirs, in particular the realist phenomenologists – Leyendecker and Scheler – as well as philosophers heavily influenced by these such as Ortega y Gasset, Reiner and Gehlen – and, of course, Wittgenstein. The first three high points of twentieth-century philosophy of primitive certainty occupy a period of 40 years: 1911–13 (Leyendecker, Husserl, Scheler), 1934–36 (Ortega) and 1950–51 (Wittgenstein). The foundations are laid in 1913. In his Ideas
Husserl sketches an account of what he took to be the most primitive, theoretical attitude, ‘naïve certainty’. In his *Formalism* Scheler provides a dense, descriptive analysis of what he calls ‘practically counting on something’ (‘rechnen mit’). Scheler’s account of primitive, practical certainty provides Ortega with an analysis of what he calls ‘basic beliefs’ in publications in Spanish, English and German which appeared in 1936, 1937 and later. Searle’s later exploration of what he calls the ‘Background’ takes up many of the problems isolated by these Austro-German philosophers.

Ortega’s main account of his distinction between what he occasionally calls ‘basic beliefs’, ‘certainty’ and more often than not simply ‘beliefs’, on the one hand, and ‘ideas’ or ‘adherence to ideas’, on the other hand, is set out in his article, ‘Ideas y Creencias’, the first chapter of which appeared in German, ‘Von der Lebensfunktion der Ideen’ (‘On the vital function of ideas’), in 1937. Ortega’s terminology is in many ways unfortunate as his German translator, who translates ‘creencia’ as ‘Glaubensgewißheit’ or doxastic certainty, seems to have recognised. His account is anticipated in earlier writings, in which he speaks of ‘convictions’ (*En Torno a Galileo*) and developed in his paper ‘Historia como sistema’, which appeared for the first time in 1936, in English, as ‘History as a System’ and in 1943 in German.2

Many names have been given to the primitive type of belief or certainty – ‘simple or straightforward (schlicht), naive certainty’ (Husserl), ‘simple or straightforward belief’ (Scheler), or simply ‘belief’ (Ortega) and ‘unfounded belief’ and ‘certainty’ (Ortega, Wittgenstein) – and to the less fundamental type of belief or certainty – ‘critical belief’ (Scheler), non-naive certainty, confirmed certainty (Husserl), ‘adherence’ (Ortega).3 Primitive certainty, if we believe these philosophers, is everywhere. It is involved in perception, action, in one’s relation to one’s own mental states and in our relations to a great variety of contingent and non-contingent propositions or states of affairs, banal and exotic, of merely local and of global importance. It is sometimes solitary and usually collective. Thus Ortega says:

> It is very difficult for a belief, in the precise sense I give to the word, to exist in the form of an individual belief or as the belief of a particular group. Belief . . . is normally a collective fact . . . [O]ne believes in common with others. Belief acts . . . in the form of what ‘binds collectively’ (*en forma de vigencia colectiva*).

(Ortega 1985, 151)
The solid ground of primitive certainty, then, is to be distinguished from the shifting sands of competing hypotheses and also from a sea of doubts. According to some friends of primitive certainty, just as the solid ground of primitive certainty is to be distinguished from the shifting sands of critical certainty, so too seas of doubts come in two varieties – primitive uncertainty or doubt is to be distinguished from critical uncertainty or doubt.

The philosophers of primitive certainty like to describe the roles of primitive certainty by means of metaphors geological:

- soil, ground or rock-bottom (‘Boden’),
- subsoil (‘subsuelo’),
- firm (‘fest’) ground, the ground beneath our feet,
- fundament (‘Fundament’),
- earth, strata, continent, sediment,

and architectural:

- scaffolding (‘Gerüst’)
- Grundpfeiler (‘keystone’, ‘foundation pillar’)
- built or constructed (‘montado’, ‘errichtet’)
- foundations.

A fairly typical passage is:

There is no human life which does not rest from the start on certain basic beliefs, which is not so to speak built on these . . . These . . . do not occur at a moment in our life, we do not come to have them thanks to particular acts of thought, in a word they are not thoughts we have . . . or inferences . . . They form the continent of our life and thus do not have the character of particular contents within life. They are not ideas we have but ideas that we are.

(ICI i, 24; VLI, 42)

The geographical and architectural metaphors describe the relation between primitive certainties and the rest of our lives impersonally. But what is our personal relation to primitive certainties? As we have seen, both Ortega and Wittgenstein reply to this question with glosses each of which is the converse of the other. Ortega’s gloss is that we count on (‘contar con’, ‘rechnen mit’) our primitive certainties, Wittgenstein’s that they stand fast for us.
Critical belief and certainty vs primitive certainties: phenomenological and Wittgensteinian

Many of the most important questions about primitive certainty have to do with the distinction between primitive certainty as a practical attitude or disposition and primitive certainty as a psychological attitude and with the distinction between these and primitive, objective certainty. In the case of primitive certainty as a psychological attitude we may further distinguish between certainty as a theoretical attitude and primitive affective certainty. I sketch first Scheler’s account of practical counting on something, an account exploited to great effect by Ortega. I then turn to Husserl’s account of primitive, theoretical certainty, set out some of the main claims made by Austro-German philosophers about primitive certainty, objective and non-objective, give the main putative examples of primitive certainty and consider the relations between the examples and the claims.

Scheler’s account of what he calls ‘practically counting on something’ (‘praktisches Rechnungstragen’, ‘rechnen mit’, F, 153ff, tr. 139ff.) is part of his account of the relation between a creature and its milieu or ‘Umwelt’. Practical counting on is, with natural perception and natural language, one of three main components of the natural world view. It is not a mere occurrence or a disposition but a practical attitude which has intentionality (F, 155, tr. 141). In particular, his description of practical counting on is part of the answer he gives to the following question: What is the relation between our actions, ‘practical objects’ and the situation they belong to? (F, 138, 137). Practical objects are goods or bearers of values (F, 148), they belong to a milieu (F, 153) and so to the natural world view. A practical object is a ‘milieu-thing’ and so ‘belongs to an intermediate sphere lying between our perceptual content and its objects on the one hand and . . . objectively thought objects on the other hand’ (F, 154, cf. tr. 139–40). The practical objects which help to make up a milieu, ‘milieu things’, are not the objects of science. The milieu sun is not the sun of astronomy, stolen meat is not a sum of cells. Practical objects belong to the natural world view and are units of value. They belong to an intermediate realm in between the realms of perceived objects and thought objects since a change in the milieu can be experienced which cannot be traced back to any change in what is perceived. One practically counts on the existence or non-existence of things, on their being thus or so without the intervention of perception or thought. In other words, what we count on is the obtaining of states of affairs rather than the truth of propositions or thoughts. In 1926, in the course of arguing that there is no such thing as an absolutely
constant natural world view but many ‘relative natural world views’, Scheler says that to such a relative world view belongs everything that ‘counts as unquestionably given’, that is ‘considered and felt neither to need nor to be capable of justification’ (WG, 61). As we shall see, Scheler employs his account of practical counting on in his analysis of perception and in his account of our relation to the rules we follow and break.

Husserl describes primitive theoretical certainty as something which stands outside all epistemic projects. Critical belief and certainty, on the other hand, are closely connected to epistemic projects. Clearly, then, in order to understand the relation between primitive certainty and critical belief we need to understand epistemic contact with the world. Husserl and his heirs distinguish four types of such epistemic contact: knowledge that, apprehension (‘Erkennen’), acquaintance and coming to be acquainted with something (‘Kenntnisnahme’). Apprehension and coming to be acquainted with something are episodes, knowledge that and acquaintance endure and are not episodes. Knowledge that and apprehension must be propositional, unlike acquaintance and coming to be acquainted with something.

Early and late, Husserl thinks that acts of meaning that judge and critical, propositional beliefs are essentially bound up with cognising, they are essentially confirmable or falsifiable; judgements ‘reach their goal’ in confirmation and falsification (LI VI §13). Verifiability, so understood as an essential possibility, is not restricted to what we are able to verify. Husserl’s formulations often give the impression that he thinks that judgement and belief are independent components of apprehension and so of knowledge that. Thus he says that ‘we prefer to speak of apprehension where an opinion, in the normal sense of a belief, has been confirmed’ (LI VI §16, EU § 68, 341). Such passages suggest that Husserl shares the view that knowledge is justified, true belief. Unlike some friends of this view he thinks that what justifies a belief in the simplest cases is a perception of the same state of affairs represented by the belief (LI VI §8) and that beliefs are essentially bound up with possible verifications. Nevertheless, beliefs, it seems, are more fundamental than and components of knowledge. But some formulations suggest that Husserl did not always accept this last claim. Thus, speaking of fulfilment (another name for apprehending (LI VI §8)) he says: ‘there is a peculiar principle to the effect that all inauthentic fulfilment implies authentic fulfilments, and indeed borrows its character of fulfilment from these authentic cases’ (LI VI §20, 727). And ‘The judgements . . . [investigated by the logican] occur as would-be pieces of knowledge (“prätendierte Erkenntnisse”)’ (EU §37); ‘mere
judging is an intentional modification of cognising judging ('erkennendem Urteilen')” (EU §3, 15). Apprehension, the suggestion now seems to be, is complex, it involves a unity of fulfilment. But the unity is that of propositional thought and experience or intuition not a unity of belief and intuition. And the concept of apprehension is prior to that of mere belief or mere judgement.

Whether or not this conception of propositional belief is correct, ‘believe’ occurs in at least four quite distinct constructions: believe that p, believe someone, believe in someone or something (Scheler S, 96, Reiner 1934, 25) and believe someone or something to be F. Belief, certainty and conviction have all been called ‘judgements’ but are obviously different from episodic judgings and assertings, as Reinach points out in his classic account of (critical) conviction, belief and certainty. (ZtnU, 95). Assertion, Reinach thinks, is normally based on conviction or belief, which is an attitude or set (‘Einstellung’). Conviction is an answer or response, typically to apprehension, and so is not part of apprehension. In this case, we have what Reinach calls ‘cognitive convictions’ (‘Erkenntnisüberzeugungen’). Here conviction or belief comes after cognitive contact. Conviction and belief, unlike assertion, thinking, judgement or (the act of) meaning (‘Meinen’), come in degrees:

Either something is asserted or it is not asserted; degrees of assertion simply do not exist ... The situation is quite different in the case of conviction. Here there is indeed good sense to talk of levels or degrees. Alongside conviction there lie conjecture and doubt and with each of these the ‘degree of certainty’ sinks lower and lower.

(ZtnU §2, 99)

Similarly, Wittgenstein thinks there are cases where ‘complete certainty is the limit of a belief which differs by degrees’ (RPP II, 567, cf. BB, 111). ‘I make assertions about reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance’ (OC §66, cf §415).

Conviction, Reinach claims, is an attitude which is a state:

Conviction or belief, that which develops in us in the presence of a particular object, always involves some aspects which we may designate if not as feelings, at least ... as a state of consciousness. Assertion, on the other hand, does not ‘develop’ within us but is rather ‘made’ (‘gefällt’) by us, is totally different from every feeling, from every state, and is much rather to be characterised as a spontaneous act.

(ZtnU, 99; cf. tr. 320)
Assertion, so understood, can also be called ‘acceptance’ (‘Anerkennen’ ZTNU, 98, tr. 318). Is belief or conviction a state only, or a disposition rather than a state, or both a state and a disposition? Wittgenstein sometimes endorses the latter view: ‘Believing is a state of mind. It has duration; and that independently of the duration of its expression in a sentence, for example. So it is a kind of disposition of the believing person’ (PI II x, cf. LW II, 9).

In 1900 Husserl distinguishes between ‘convictions as psychic experiences’ and as ‘dispositions’ (LI I §3). But many phenomenologists and Husserl himself went on to argue that conviction and belief are states in a sense narrower than that in which every disposition is a state. They argue that belief is a state which is not a disposition but a habitual (Husserl) or ‘inaktuell’ or ‘überaktuell’ (Reiner 1934, 27f., cf. Scheler 1957, 240f.) set or attitude, like the result of a decision, because once belief begins (once one comes to believe or know that p), once one has taken a decision, one can always come back to it (‘darauf zurück kommen’).

Long-lasting states or attitudes should be distinguished not only from such episodes as assertions and thinking but also from the episodes which mark the adoption or coming into being of an attitude, from taking a position:

From those acts, such as acts of presentation and meaning, in which we lay hold of something objectual (either by having it as our object or by being directed towards it), we have to distinguish experiences which, as in the case of conviction or belief, involve our taking a position with regard to something . . . striving after something, expecting something. There is an opposition running through this second class of acts – but not through the first – between positivity and negativity . . . Now we find exactly the same in the case of conviction.

(ZtnU, 109, tr. 332)

Wittgenstein makes a similar distinction

A proposition, and hence in another sense a thought, can be the ‘expression’ of belief, hope, expectation. But believing is not thinking . . . The concepts of believing, expecting, hoping are less distantly related to one another than they are to the concept of thinking.

(PI §574)

The relation, Reinach thinks, is that just as there is positive and negative
striving and willing, so, too, there is a positive and a negative conviction or belief. ‘Sam believes that not-p’ and ‘Sam disbelieves p’ are equivalent but do not mean the same thing. Polarly opposed attitudes and states are the hallmark of affective and conative phenomena. So belief and disbelief are not, it seems, purely intellectual phenomena. But Reinach does not say they are affective or conative phenomena. We should not think of belief as feelings accompanying speaking or thinking (PI II, xi) although there is a tone of belief (PI §578). Belief is no Gemütsbewegung, there is no bodily expression typical of belief (RPP II §154); to believe is not to be occupied with belief’s object (RPP II §155).

Judging, on the other hand, argue Husserl and Reinach, like Bolzano and Frege, has no polarly opposed counterpart. To deny that p is just to judge that not-p. Failure to grasp this point, Reinach says, is due to the confusion between judging that not-p and the activity of polemic negation. Nevertheless, Brentano’s view that judging does have a polarly opposed counterpart continues to find adherents. At bottom, the disagreement is perhaps due to the fact that Husserl and Reinach take seriously the point that in any account of what we know, for example, in a textbook, we find no denials or at least no denials that are ineliminable. If we consider cognitive activity, on the other hand, we do find ineliminable denials.

Primitive certainty differs from both knowledge and from critical belief or certainty, its friends think, in the following way. If someone knows that p, then it is legitimate to ask how he knows that p and, in principle, there is an answer to the question. If someone believes that p, then the same is true of the question why he believes that p. If something is primitively certain, however, no justification can be given. Primitive certainties are not justified. A further, more ambitious claim is that primitive certainties do not justify either. This claim is made by Scheler and Ortega.

Subjective or practical vs. objective certainty

To the essence of doubt there belongs the possibility of a solution.

(Husserl, EU §21 (d))

Where there’s no logical method for finding a solution, the question doesn’t make sense either. Only where there’s a method of solution is there a problem.

(Wittgenstein, PB, 172)
If we distinguish between primitive theoretical certainty and critical 
certainty or belief we should also distinguish, in each case, between 
subjective certainty and objective certainty. On this point Husserl and 
Wittgenstein agree. Husserl’s account of the distinction between sub-
jective and objective certainty is the starting point for his explorations, 
in *Ideas, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* and *Experience and Judgement*, 
of the relation between types of mental modes, acts or attitudes, on the 
one hand, and a variety of formal concepts and properties, on the other 
hand. To the mental state of doubt corresponds the functor ‘It is doubt-
ful whether p’. To the propositional state of sadness there corresponds 
the axiological functor ‘It is sad that p’. To the mental act of judging 
that p corresponds ‘the state of affairs that p obtains’. To each of the 
psychological modes on the left-hand side there corresponds on the 
right-hand side a ‘correlate’ which can be expressed with the help of a 
functor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological Mode</th>
<th>Correlate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>naive certainty</td>
<td>reality/certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-naive certainty</td>
<td>really so/really certain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doubt</td>
<td>doubtful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suggestion (‘anmuten’)</td>
<td>real possibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presumption, surmise (‘vermuten’)</td>
<td>probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inquiring (interrogative) attitude</td>
<td>questionable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>empty certainty</td>
<td>open possibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What does ‘correspond’ mean? Husserl seems to have thought that 
the attitudes of doubt or sadness are intentionally directed towards, but 
do not represent, the doubtfulness or sadness of propositions or states 
of affairs. He also points out that a state of doubt or sadness is right or 
correct if and only if the state of affairs represented by the attitude is 
doubtful or sad. Similarly, like other phenomenologists, he sometimes 
thinks that judgement aims at truth and is directed towards the obtain-
ing of a state of affairs although it need not represent either truth or 
states of affairs and is right if and only if the state of affairs obtains.

In the different subjective–objective couples, certainty occupies a 
privileged position.8 Certainty, Husserl (I §§103–7, EU §21) points out, 
comes in two kinds. The most basic variety is ‘simple, naive certainty’ 
which is illustrated by much ordinary perception. But there is also the 
certainty which, for example, emerges out of doubt or hesitation and 
subsequent confirmation or disconfirmation, ‘confirmed certainty’ 
(AzpS §9). Doubt and confirmed certainty, for example, are modalisa-
tions of certainty. But there are two ways of drawing the line between
what is and is not modiﬁed (or modalised or modal). We may say that doubt, surmise or presumption (‘Vermutung’), the interrogative attitude, suggestion (‘Anmutung’) and non-naive certainties are all modiﬁcations or modalisations of naive certainty. Or we may say that certainties, naive or not, are the unmodalised starting points for the other attitudes. Husserl endorses the former view. All doxastic modalisations refer back to simple, naive ‘Glaubensgewissheit’, ‘Urdoxa’. As Husserl points out, his analysis entails that the theory according to which belief merely differentiates itself into certainty, surmise, etc. is ‘grundfalsch’ (I §104). Subjective, unmodalised certainty, Husserl repeats on many occasions, ‘is not only the foundation of every individual cognitive act . . . and judgement about what there is but also of every individual evaluation and practical action’ (EU §12, 53).

The different modalisations of naive certainty mentioned all pertain to cognitive activities whereas naive certainty itself is what underpins all theoretical activity. But Husserl also argues that all affective and conative intentional phenomena manifest either naive certainty or one of its modalisations. There is naively certain being pleased by, wishing and willing and also Wunschannmutungen, Wunschvermutungen, Wunschzweifeln, etc. (VEW, 325–27, cf. I, 116–17) This is, arguably, required if primitive certainty is to play the foundational role Husserl wants to ascribe to it and is anyway a plausible and important generalisation.

Thus the phenomenologists have identiﬁed three distinct types of primitive, non-objective certainty: (a) the naive certainty, modalisations of which belong to theoretical activity, (b) naive affective and conative certainty and (c) practical counting on. To each type of non-objective certainty there correspond different types of objective certainty.

Husserl’s account of the distinction between subjective and objective certainty suggests three natural developments. First, since non-naive or conﬁrmed certainty exhibits degrees it may seem natural to claim that primitive certainty manifests no degrees. This is not a claim explicitly made by Husserl, as far as I can see. Reiner (1934, 101) argues that in the case of the most basic type of belief ‘differences of certainty of belief play no role’. But his claim is embedded in a series of heideggeresque elucubrations which make it difficult to evaluate. Thus he claims that the most fundamental type of belief has grounds or credentials, but these are not ‘critical’, involve no weighing of grounds. Newman 1956 (ch. 6 cf. Price 1996, 133ff.), followed by other Oxford philosophers, argues that taking for granted does not admit of degrees. Second, a difference which is more than merely verbal, between belief and knowledge, on the one hand, and certainty, on the other hand, is
suggested by perusal of Husserl’s list of subjective–objective couples. The ‘correlate’ of subjective certainty is ‘that p is certain’. We use the same term to describe the subjective state and its objective counterpart (cf. ‘sad’, ‘question’, ‘shame’). But the correlates of belief and the objects of knowledge are not described using these words – belief and knowledge are only mental states.

Third, this difference between knowledge and belief, on the one hand, and certainty, on the other hand, does not presuppose that objective certainty cannot be analysed in subjective terms. Meinong, like Husserl much concerned with subjective–objective couples, coined the expression ‘recessive account’ for analyses of apparently non-psychological concepts or properties in psychological terms. For example, a recessive account of objective sadness would be the claim that for it to be sad that p is just for a psychological state of sadness that p to be appropriate. Two more recent names for recessive accounts of value are ‘buck-passing accounts’ and ‘neo-sentimentalism’. Meinong himself endorses a recessive account of objective certainty:

[T]hat 3 is greater than 2 is . . . certain. Yet certainty and uncertainty are without any doubt first of all properties of judgement-experiences . . . But what . . . has the intensity of human judgements to do with a relation between numbers? Clearly only that this relation is so constituted that its obtaining can correctly be affirmed in a judgement of certainty . . . In this way the property of being certain is transferred to the objective grasped insofar as one also calls the suitability for being judged with certainty in a justified way certainty . . . What holds for certainty holds of course also for uncertainty. (UMW §6)

Even if Meinong is right, it would not follow that ‘It is certain that p’ is a derelativisation of ‘someone is certain that p’, as ‘It is known/believed that p’ certainly is a derelativisation of ‘someone knows/believes that p’.

Two of the more striking ‘theoretical’ distinctions in On Certainty are the distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ certainty and the apparent distinction between two types of objective certainty:

With the word ‘certain’ we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people. That is subjective certainty.

But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn’t mistake be logically excluded?

(OC §194)
A second type of objective certainty seems to be mentioned at §273:

But when does one say of something that it is certain?
For there can be dispute whether something is certain; I mean, when something is objectively certain.
There are countless general empirical propositions that count as certain for us.

Subjective certainty is an attitude. And Wittgenstein seems to suggest that it always admits of degrees. But does he think that ‘counting as certain’ always admits of degrees? Objective certainty of each kind involves the attribution of a predicate to a proposition. Objective certainty of the first kind logically excludes error. Objective certainty of the second kind is the result of debate or the possible object of debate, debates in which compelling (‘zwingende’) ‘telling’ (‘triftige’, OC §§271–2) grounds are adduced.

What is the nature of our relation to objective, primitive certainties? Husserl’s answer, as we have seen, is that primitive, subjective certainty is intentionally directed towards objective certainties but does not represent these as certain. Since the latter but not the former are factive his view seems to be that in very many cases of primitive, subjective certainty it is also the case that primitive objective certainties obtain.

The answers given by Scheler, Ortega and Wittgenstein to our question are contained in the claims that we count on primitive, objective certainties or that these stand fast for us, that certain propositions or states of affairs count as certain. Our relations to primitive certainties involve dispositions, behavioural dispositions. But if we think that such dispositions are also states then a merely dispositional account is incomplete.

Do some primitive certainties emerge from epistemic projects? From past epistemic projects of the person for whom such certainties are primitive? Of the community he belongs to? Can a primitive certainty become the object of critical inquiry? If so, can the very same proposition be at one time primely certain and, at another, the object of epistemic evaluation? Suppose that Pierre in his youth is a devout Christian to whom it has never occurred to wonder whether his God exists. He then stumbles on a defence of atheism. Is the proposition or state of affairs which enjoyed primitive certainty during his youth the very same proposition or state of affairs discussed in the defence of atheism?

All basic beliefs were once ideas, Ortega (IC II, iii) suggests at one point and denies elsewhere, although most of my basic beliefs were never ideas of mine: ‘The person who believes possesses certitude (‘cer-
tidumbre”) precisely because he has not forged it for himself. Belief is a certitude in which we find ourselves without knowing how or where we entered into it’ (IC II, iv). Beliefs, he says, are inherited backgrounds (VLI, 51, OC §94). And Wittgenstein famously says: ‘We don’t, for example, arrive at any of them [hinge propositions] as a result of investigation’ (OC §138). Husserl likes to talk of the sedimentation (‘Sedimentierung’, ‘Niederschlag’) and ‘tradionalisation’ of beliefs (K, 52), including scientific beliefs (K §36). Wittgenstein imagines describing some empirical propositions as ‘erstarrt’, ‘hardened’ (OC §96). He mentions the possibility that ‘hardened’ experiential propositions become fluid and vice versa (OC §96) and the possibility that all beliefs were once critical beliefs but does not endorse it:

Much seems to be fixed, and it is removed from the traffic.

(OC §210)

Perhaps it was once disputed. But perhaps, for unthinkable ages, it has belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts.

(OC §211)

I believe that I had great-grandparents . . . This belief may never have been expressed; even the thought that it was so, never thought.

(OC §159, cf. §87)

If someone believes something, we needn’t always be able to answer the question ‘why he believes it’; but if he knows something, then the question ‘how does he know?’ must be capable of being answered.

(OC §550)

Primitive certainty does not belong to any cognitive enterprise. Reality, Ortega says, is made up of primitive certainties but ‘What is evident . . . is not reality for us’ (VLI, 46); ‘Belief is what is not disputable’ (‘das Unbestreitbare’, Ortega 1943, 36). (As we shall see, for Ortega, what we believe stands outside every cognitive enterprise simply because it is not an object.) Similarly, for Wittgenstein: ‘At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded’ (OC §253, cf. §175, §504). In the case of critical belief and of knowledge, it is always legitimate to ask ‘How does x know that p ?’, ‘Why does x believe that p ?’ But not in the case of primitive certainty: ‘Knowledge” and “certainty” belong to different categories’ (OC §308).

In her discussion of the problem posed by examples such as that of
Pierre, Danièle Moyal (2003) argues that the sentence ‘God exists’ expresses one proposition in Pierre’s primitively certain youth and a different proposition, an *Ersatz* proposition, when he comes upon it in his doubting adolescence. An alternative view, the disappearing functor view, is that in his youth Pierre counts on ‘It is primitively certain that God exists’ but later the object of his inquiries is simply what is expressed by the embedded clause.

Wittgenstein grapples inconclusively with the relation between objective and non-objective certainty. One the one hand, ‘all psychological terms merely lead us away from the main thing’ (OC § 459). On the other hand, many objective certainties count as certain for us (‘gelten uns als gewiß’, OC §273). But how should such ‘Geltung’ for us be understood? A reply in the spirit of the phenomenologists might run as follows: primitive certainty is really primitive when there is primitive theoretical certainty or primitive practical certainty and the proposition or state of affairs which is certain is also objectively certain.

But then why is the combination of primitive psychological certainty that p and the primitively certain fact that p not simply a type of knowledge, primitive knowledge? This is an important objection to Husserl since, as far as I can see, he does not allow for primitive practical certainty as described by Scheler. On Husserl’s view of coming to know that p or coming to be acquainted with an object such episodes consist of an act of identification, in the simplest case, of an identifying of what is seen with what is thought where the seeing grounds the thinking. If knowledge involves identification, then primitive certainty is never knowledge. (Husserl occasionally refers to primitive cognition (EU §12, 53) but does not make clear its relation to identification.) A second possible difficulty for Husserl’s account stems from the claim that primitive certainties are not and cannot be justified. For what cannot be justified cannot have intentionality. But Husserl seems to think that primitive certainty does enjoy intentionality. These difficulties may be thought to provide ammunition for Scheler’s view that primitive certainty is practical. There is, however, an alternative. When Husserl talks of justification he often has in mind what we might call more or less direct justification – an internal relation of defeasible or non-defeasible justification between acts and their contents or the objective counterpart of this relation, objective grounding (‘subjective’ vs. ‘objective’ motives or reasons). But, as Follesdal has shown, there is much to be said for the view that Husserl’s epistemology is anti-foundationalist and accords an important role to justification which arises from coherence, what one might call more or less indirect justification. If this is right, then Husserl could say that,
although primitive certainties are not directly justified by any particular acts and contents, they are indeed indirectly justified by the way they cohere with other certainties, primitive and critical, and knowledge.11

**Primitive certainties are not doubles**

What is the relation between primitive beliefs and what is believed? The thesis that certainties are not doubles of what is believed is attributed to Wittgenstein, without references, by Brand (1975), who perhaps only has in mind Wittgenstein’s hostility to propositions and other shadows. Ortega’s beliefs, however, unlike episodic thoughts, are not any sort of double of reality:

> precisely because they are so radical, they are indistinguishable for us from reality itself – they are our world and being –, thus they lose the character of ideas, of thoughts which might not have occurred to us.

(IC I i, 24, VLI, 42)

> [Ideas] always already presuppose our life. But our life rests on ideas as beliefs which we do not create.

(VLI, 43)

As we have seen, Ortega says that we are our beliefs. He also says that we are in our beliefs and mentions the idiom ‘to be in the belief that’ (IC I i, HS I, HaS, 283f.). Just what the relation between being in beliefs and being made of beliefs is supposed to be – doubtless a problem of existential mereology – is not clear.

There is a certainty (‘Sicherheit’) which Wittgenstein regards as ‘(a) form of life’ (OC §358). But, since he is not happy with this way of putting things, it is his description of the foundation (Fundament) of our language-game, the language-game of which he says ‘It is there – like our life’ (OC §559) which resembles most closely Ortega’s description of our beliefs as ‘our world and our being’. Of the fact that water boils and does not freeze under such and such circumstances Wittgenstein says that it is ‘fused (“eingegossen”) into the foundations (“Fundament”) of our language-game’ (OC §558); ‘[The language-game] stands there – like our life’ (OC §559). As Ortega says, ‘[Beliefs are] silently included (“eingeschlossen”) in our consciousness or thinking’ (VLI, 44), ‘they form the foundation (“Fundament”) of our life’ (VLI, 45). To be an object is to be an object of, for example, a
thought or of some act of meaning that p. Thoughts are doubles of their objects. What we believe, Ortega says, is no object of our thought: ‘What we believe is not the object of reflection’ (VLI, 43); ‘These . . . beliefs are not thoughts we have about something’ (VLI, 42); ‘We are not explicitly aware of them . . . we have no idea (“Vorstellung”) of them’ (VLI, 45). Primitive beliefs lack objects, says Ortega, in the sense that ‘everything we reflect about is ipso facto for us a problematic reality’ (VLI, 43).

Beliefs are not what we come to have in the course of trying to obtain insight, rather they are at work in us when we begin to reflect about something. That is why we do not tend to express them as propositions but content ourselves with alluding to them (‘anzuspielen’) as something which is simply real for us.

(VLI, 43)

Husserl also points out the peculiarity of verbal expressions of naive certainties but neither he nor Ortega are as fascinated by this phenomenon as Wittgenstein is in his discussions of Moore.

**Systems of primitive certainties vs. systems of critical certainties**

What relations hold between primitive certainties? In the answers given by the phenomenologists and Wittgenstein to this question the notion of a system looms large. Self-evidence, knowledge and systems are inseparable according to the argument set out by Husserl in the prolegomena to the *Logical Investigations* (Prolegomena, ch. 11, 182ff.). As one of his commentators puts it, ‘self-evidence is completely determined only in the context of a system’ (Reimer 1919, 291). Another commentator notes the tension within phenomenology between its account of knowledge and the requirement of systematicity, in particular of relations of justification between parts of a system: the first leads to realism, the second to idealism (Winkler 1921, 76ff.). The ‘Systemgedanke’ is also omnipresent in Wittgenstein’s reflections (cf. Lange 1992) and there undergoes many developments.

According to Ortega, our primitive certainties form systems and our non-primitive certainties, the ideas we adhere to, also form systems. But in each case ‘system’ means something very different. In the first case, the systems are formed of non-logical relations and the relevant systems are not doubles of reality. In the second case, the system is made up of logical relations and stands over against the world as its constructed double:
The truth of ideas presupposes their being the object of questions; truth comes about thanks to the proof we try to give. Ideas need criticism as lungs need oxygen. Ideas last and establish themselves because of the support they receive from other ideas, which in turn rest on other ideas, in such a way that they all come together in the unity of a system. They set up a world distinct from and next to the real world.

(VLI, 46)

In the sense in which ideas or critical beliefs form a system, primitive beliefs do not form systems:

I have spoken of [beliefs] as a repertory to indicate that the plurality of beliefs on which an individual, a people or an age is grounded never possesses a completely logical articulation, that is to say, does not form a system of ideas. The beliefs that coexist in any human life, sustaining, impelling and directing it, are on occasion incongruous, contradictory, at least confused.

(HaS, 284, HS, 10)

The last three predicates in the last sentence pertain to what is believed, its content. The first three predicates pertain to belief’s function. From this functional point of view, primitive certainties do indeed form a system, ‘the system of our real beliefs’ (VLI, 45):

beliefs, a mere incoherent repertory in so far as they are merely ideas, always constitute a system in so far as they are effective beliefs; in other words while lacking articulation from the logical or strictly intellectual point of view, they do none the less possess a vital articulation, they function as beliefs resting on one another, combining with one another to form a whole. They always present themselves as members of an organism, of a structure. This causes them among other things always to possess their own architecture and to function as a hierarchy. In every human life there are beliefs that are basic, fundamental, radical, and there are others derived from these, upheld by them and secondary to them.

(HaS, 284, HS, 11)

Why this order?

Should the beliefs by which one lives lack structure, since their number in each individual life is legion there must result a mere
pullulation hostile to all idea of order and incomprehensible in consequence.

(HaS, 284, HS, 11)

Wittgenstein, too, thinks of unfounded beliefs as forming a system – the last avatar of the concept of system in his thought:

Not that I could describe the system of these convictions. Yet my convictions do form a system, a structure.

(OC §102)

All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.

(OC §105, cf. §603)

When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions.

(OC §136)

they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgements.

(OC §137, cf. OC §83, §136, §213)

When a child acquires a ‘system of what is believed’ the part that ‘stands unshakeably fast’ ‘is held fast by what lies around it’ (OC §144).

What, then, is the type of structure peculiar to systems of primitive certainties? In some cases, the relations between primitive certainties are mereological: my certainty that I have two hands is a part of my certainty that I have a body which in turn is part of my certainty that the world exists. But this is at best part of the right answer to the question.

*Primitive doubts and holes in systems*

The opposite of belief is disbelief, the opposite of certainty that p is uncertainty whether p. Thus the opposite of primitive certainty is
primitive uncertainty, a phenomenon at the centre of Ortega’s analysis. Unfortunately, just as Ortega misleadingly often calls primitive certainties ‘beliefs’, he also typically calls primitive uncertainties ‘doubts’. But doubt, as normally understood, is a phenomenon on the continuum between critical belief and critical disbelief. Occasionally, Ortega is slightly more careful and distinguishes between ‘true doubt’ and intellectual doubt.

Primitive uncertainties, like primitive certainties, form a system, for they are holes in systems of beliefs:

The most basic stratum of our life, that which supports and carries all the others is formed by beliefs. These are, then, the firm ground on the basis of which we work . . . But in this basic area of our beliefs, here and there, enormous holes (‘agujeros’) of doubt open up, like trap-doors. This is the moment to point out that doubt, real doubt, not merely methodical or intellectual doubt, is a mode of belief and belongs to the same stratum as this in the architecture of life. One is also in doubt . . . The gaps (‘huecos’) in our beliefs are, then, the vital place where . . . ideas intervene . . . the substitution for the unstable, ambiguous world of doubt of a world in which ambiguity disappears.

(IC I, iii)

Wittgenstein does not consider the distinction between critical and unfounded doubt or uncertainty except en passant. He is perhaps thinking of the latter when he writes ‘(My) doubts form a system’ (OC §126). In the Investigations he writes

It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap (‘Lücke’) in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts.

(PI §87)

The point here may simply be that critical doubts rely on primitive or non-primitive certainties. At one point Wittgenstein says that philosophy produces ‘general uncertainty’ (BB, 45). Perhaps in 1950 he might have been prepared to say that this is not critical uncertainty.13

Although there is primitive doubt or uncertainty and primitive certainty, there is an asymmetry between them, according to Ortega. Doubt leads to cognitive activity but doubt, critical or primitive, cannot be the starting point for cognitive activity in general: ‘Man cannot
begin by doubting’ (IC II, iv). Husserl and Wittgenstein agree: ‘That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn’ (OC §341).

In the year in which Husserl first set out his account of primitive certainty, his pupil Reinach briefly indicated that there is a primitive uncertainty:

Every perplexity (‘speechlessness’, ‘Fassungslosigkeit’) involves an uncertainty about the relevant thought-content. One should beware of confusing this uncertainty with doubt or another position one may adopt (‘Stellungnahme’). A doubt can be as certain as a conviction and a conviction as uncertain as a doubt. Uncertainty is a peculiar feature which can occur both as the coloration of a position one adopts and as an independent attitude (‘Einstellung’) of a subject before all positions, whether of doubt or not.

(Ü, 282)

It is perhaps because the principal philosophers of primitive certainty paid so little attention to the opposed phenomenon of primitive uncertainty that they failed to raise the possibility that of the two, primitive certainty and primitive uncertainty (whether subjective, practical or objective), it is primitive uncertainty which wears the trousers in the couple. On this view, primitive certainty is the absence of primitive uncertainty, as freedom is the absence of constraint, health the absence of illness and grammaticality the absence of ungrammaticality. Such a view is suggested by the plausibility of a similar account of a phenomenon closely related to primitive certainty: familiarity is the absence of surprise and strangeness (cf. PI I §596, IC I).

Examples: perceptual, psychological, worldly, earthy, normative and political

Even if the above elements of an account of primitive certainty add up to a coherent account, a further distinct question is whether there are actually any primitive certainties. I consider the main candidates advanced by the philosophers of primitive certainty. Each candidate suggests modifications of the general account given so far.


**Primitive perceptual certainties**

Leyendecker (1913) argues that my relation to the perceptual background of what I perceive and the objects in the background is a type of certainty which does not involve any ‘Kenntnisnehmen’ or cognising nor any type of discovery (31). I ‘have’ a background and the objects in it – they are ‘mitgehabt’ – in much the same way in which I have a body, without any discovery or any other sort of cognitive relation thereto. On all these counts, my perceptual relation to the background of what I see differs from my relation to what I see, to what occupies the foreground.

In his first full accounts of primitive certainty, Husserl concentrates on primitive perceptual certainty (external perception, what is called at AzpS, 47 ‘empirical, primitive certainty’). The transitions noted above from naive certainty to doubt or presumption or non-naive certainty all typically occur within perceptual experience. These transitions all have counterparts, he thinks, in the sphere of judgement and of other thought-involving attitudes. Whereas Leyendecker had insisted on primitive certainty in background perception, Husserl argues that perception itself is the basic form of naive certainty. To see is normally to be naively certain.

Husserl thinks that perceptual experience has a non-conceptual content. From the point of view of later terminologies, it is perhaps unfortunate that he often refers to pre-predicative perception as perceptual belief and perceptual meaning (‘Meinen’, but not as perceptual judgement). Non-conceptual perceptual contents are in part constituted by the primitive relations of actual and possible fulfilment and conflict in which they stand. This strand in Husserl’s account of perception may be thought to be difficult to reconcile with his claim that visual perception is often a case of primitive certainty. Indeed it might be thought that endorsement of perceptual certainty is best combined with the view that visual perception involves no sort of content, conceptual or non-conceptual, a view defended by Linke.

Primitive certainty looms large in Scheler’s analysis of pre-predicative perception and intuition although, as we have seen, according to his account, practical counting on lies in between perception and thought and so perception is not a type of practical counting on. In every act of external intuition ‘the existence of nature as a sphere is certain’ (S, 253). Scheler makes a similar claim about the relation between different act-types, on the one hand, and the spheres of the external world, of the inner world and of the body, on the other hand. This makes possible an interesting account of perceptual illusions and
hallucinations. In illusions the subject assigns a mental object to the
wrong sphere, although no conceptual misattribution is involved.

One of the clearest examples of counting on given by Scheler
concerns the background of perception:

There belongs to the momentary ‘milieu’ not only the series of
objects that I perceive (either through sense or representation),
while I am walking in the street or sitting in my room, but also
everything on whose existence or absence, on whose being so or
otherwise, I simply practically count, e.g. the cars and people that I
avoid (when I am lost in thought or when I fix my sight on a man
far away) . . . In all areas in which we grasp objects (in the percep-
tion of present and past objects) we possess the ability to take
practical account of things, which implies an experience of their
efficacy and changes in it that is independent of the perceptual
sphere. It is this same ‘practical accounting’ which experiencially
determines our acting in this or another way, and which is itself
‘given’ only in such experienced changes of determination – but not
before, as a ‘reason’ for them.

(F, 154–5, cf. tr. 140)

Many of the empirical propositions which enjoy primitive certainty
in On Certainty are expressed by perception-based utterances dealing
with parts of the immediate environment, in particular demonstrative
and indexical sentences (cf. Beermann 1999, 122f.):

Here is a hand (§1).
That is a book (§17).
There is a chair over there (§173).
I am sitting in my room (§195).

It is presumably part of Husserl’s view that visual perception,
although often naive and primitive, is often interrupted by critical and
cognitive episodes in which we wonder whether what looks like a rab-
bbit really is a rabbit and so begin to think and evaluate hypotheses.
But even a friend of the view that the most basic kinds of visual
perception are simple and concept-free may jibe at the claim that sim-
ple seeing is a kind of certainty. After all, ‘certain’, unlike ‘see’, must
take a sentence as its complement. On the other hand, some con-
temporary philosophers, such as Ruth Marcus, have argued that
(critical) belief is a relation to states of affairs, existential and non-
existential, that is to say, entities containing objects, properties and
relations but no concepts. Similarly, phenomenologists such as Husserl, Reinach and Scheler, clearly think that ‘Erkennen’ has a state of affairs as its object and need involve no thought. It is then a type of intuition in which both sensory properties, constancies of different kinds and formal relations (numerical difference, similarity, parthood) as well as aspects of organisation are directly given. If this view is plausible, then so too is the view that primitive certainty is directed towards states of affairs and need not involve any conceptualisation of these. As Husserl puts it, ‘external perceptions, before all complications with conceptualisations and predication, are perceptual certainties and that which is certain in them is a . . . state of affairs’ (EP, 364).

**Primitive certainty in action**

Primitive certainty is manifested most tangibly in the relations to contingent propositions or states of affairs which go to make up action. As Ortega says:

> The reader is at home and decides to go out into the street for one or another reason. What in such behaviour can be called thinking? . . . In the most favourable case he is aware of his motives, the decision he has taken, the execution of the movements involved in walking, opening the door, going down the stairs. But even in this case he will look in vain for any thought to the effect that the street exists. There is no question for the reader at any moment about whether there is or is not a street. Why? It cannot be denied that in order to decide to go out into the street it is of some importance whether the street exists. This is indeed more important than anything else, the presupposition of everything else . . . The reader was counting on the street although he was not thinking of it and because he was not thinking of it.

(IC I i, 27–8, VLI, 44)

Beliefs are all those things that we absolutely take for granted even though we don’t think about them . . . but instead take them automatically into account in our behaviour. When we go down the street we never try to walk through the walls of buildings; we immediately avoid bumping into them without ever having to think: ‘walls are impenetrable’. At each moment, our life is supported by a vast repertoire of such beliefs.

(IC II I, 42, as tr. in HR, 19)
As Wittgenstein puts it,

One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that one does not doubt. But that does not mean that one takes certain presuppositions on trust. When I write a letter and post it, I take it for granted that it will arrive – I expect this.

If I make an experiment I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before my eyes. I have plenty of doubts, but not that. If I do a calculation I believe, without any doubts, that the figures on the paper aren’t switching of their own accord, and I also trust my memory the whole time, and trust it without any reservation. The certainty here is the same as that of my never having been on the moon.

(OC §337)

Are the primitive certainties of perception and of action independent of each other? Critical realism inclines philosophers to assume that perception is independent of action for it is awareness at a moment of sense-data. The view that to see is always to think and conceptualise also inclines philosophers this way. Both critical realism and the view that to see is to think are rejected by the phenomenologists and by Wittgenstein (PI II, xi, OC §90). If visual perception is typically direct and thoughtless, ‘quick, stupid and reliable’ as Bühler’s pupil Brunswik puts it, then it is plausible to say that the primitive certainties of perception and of action are inseparable. Thus when Ortega says that counting on is ‘the decisive presupposition of our acting and so to speak its fundamental support’ (‘Grundpfeiler’, ‘básico supuesto’, VLI, 44) and Wittgenstein that ‘I act with complete certainty’ (OC §174) ‘action’ should be taken to mean the action–perception couple.

My primitive certainties about my mental states

What is my relation to my mental (‘seelische’) and spiritual (‘geistige’) states, acts and activities? Ortega thinks that a person’s relations to his episodic thoughts, feelings and perceptions typically amount to counting on them. In such cases the relation is not any sort of cognitive relation nor does it involve any sort of critical belief, although counting on may give way to knowledge. This claim is set out in articles published in Spanish in 1931 and republished as Qué es conocimiento? (QC, 54ff.), perhaps Ortega’s first application of his views about primitive certainty, and in Unas Lecciones de Metafísica, which was written in 1932/3 and first published in 1966:
When my teeth hurt the fact that they hurt is no knowledge ('saber'), knowledge is not pain, although the fact of pain doubtless implies an ingredient which is the existence of the pain for me, my realising ('darme cuenta') that I am in pain in the sense of having to count on ('contar con') this. In addition to this simple and primary realising without which the pain in my teeth would not hurt I can observe or pay attention to this pain . . . in sum, know it sensu strictu . . . It is always possible for me to convert this ‘counting on’ into a real observation.

(ULM III, 51)

Similarly, my self is not typically an object of knowledge or acquaintance for me but something I count on (QC, 54).

Ortega’s claim about mental states had been made by Leyendecker in 1913: ‘in thousands of cases in which our attitude is cognitive or behavioural . . . we are quite immediately certain that we are perceiving and not merely imagining or dreaming without any reflection’ (Leyendecker 1913, 42–3). Leyendecker thinks that this is shown by a well-known feature of ‘psychological judgements’:

e.g. ‘I remember he had a beard’, ‘I am thinking about what I should write to him’, ‘I can hear the clock strike’. All judgements whose psychological content is not by any means judged but rather merely expressed. The sense of these judgements is not at all ‘that I have just remembered’ that he had a beard but that he had a beard. In order to express the fact that I have just remembered this . . . no reflection about my conscious state . . . is necessary at all.

(Leyendecker 1913, 43)

The claim, then, is that psychological utterances express psychological states which enjoy primitive certainty. This claim goes beyond the claim that I typically express my mental states and do not have private knowledge about these.

The view of Leyendecker and Ortega belongs to a complicated and unfamiliar philosophical context. It will help to understand Ortega’s claim about the primitive certainty of toothache if we contrast it with a number of rivals. Primitive certainty is not any sort of epistemic contact. So it is not any private, incorrigible, cognitive access to a private mental state. Nor is it the sort of corrigible but private mode of access to private objects described by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. Ortega’s view is also distinct from Scheler’s claim that to be an object is, essentially, to be a public object and from Scheler’s further claim
that only certain types of my and your physical and non-physical states, the ‘seelische’ or psychological ones, can be objects and so directly known. Although to be an object is to be a public object, Scheler argues, not every feature of a person can be given as an object as opposed to being merely described. Psychological states are public objects, geistige or spiritual ‘acts’ and attitudes are not public objects because they are not objects. Your meaning (Meinen) that it rains by saying ‘Es regnet’ is, for example, not a possible object of my direct cognition. Rather, I understand what you mean by co-accomplishing (‘mitvollziehen’, ‘mitmeinen’) your act of meaning. My most immediate contact with your meaning that p, your loving, hating, despair and willing is through collective intentionality or participation. Finally, Ortega’s view differs from the idea that there is ‘knowledge without observation’ of psychological states. According to the phenomenologists, as we have noted, knowledge always involves the identification of what is thought and what is perceived (or something that plays the same role as what is perceived). Knowledge without observation involves no identification.

In his first description of counting on one’s mental states Ortega attempts to say what it is to count on something: ‘“Counting on” is an acting, a “doing”, a dynamic character which consciousness sensu stricto, noticing, never has’ (QC §55). Wittgenstein, too, likes to stress the dynamic nature of primitive certainty: primitive certainties do not merely stand fast for one, it is as though there were an immediate grasping or taking-hold of something, which corresponds to a sureness, not to any knowing (OC §§510–11).

Brand (1975 §17, cf. §34, §95, §268) attributes to Wittgenstein the view that each of us stands in the relation of primitive certainty to his mental states and episodes. But it might be more exact to say that this view is compatible with much that Wittgenstein says before On Certainty about our relation to our mental states. Wittgenstein did not live to say more about the relation between first-person psychological utterances and his new account of primitive certainty. Suppose there are n Wittgensteins, two, three or four Wittgensteins corresponding to the major transitions in his thought. Then there is, of course, Wittgenstein n + 1. This is the possible Wittgenstein who reworked some of his earlier views in the light of his account of groundless belief. The view Brand attributes to Wittgenstein ought rather to be attributed to Wittgenstein n + 1.

Before OC Wittgenstein writes:

‘“I have consciousness” – that is a statement about which no doubt
is possible.’ Why should that not say the same as: ‘“I have consciousness” is not a proposition’?

(Z §401)

‘Nothing is so certain as that I possess consciousness.’ In that case, why shouldn’t I let the matter rest? This certainty is like a mighty force whose point of application does not move, and so no work is accomplished by it.

(Z §402)

The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

(PI §246)

He also writes ‘“But can you doubt that you meant this?” – No; but neither can I be certain of it, know it’ (PI §679). Perhaps in 1952 he would have said that I typically enjoy primitive certainty about what I mean or suffer and about what you mean or suffer.

_Earthly and worldly certainties_

There can be no stronger realism than this, if by this word nothing more is meant than: ‘I am certain of being a human being who lives in this world, etc., and I doubt it not in the least’. But the great problem is precisely to _understand_ what is here so ‘obvious’.

(Husserl, C, 187)

And what we expect with certainty is essential to our whole life.

(Wittgenstein, RFM, IV, §52)

The certainties of perception and action and the certainties based thereon should be distinguished from the certainties which take the certainties of perception as their model, for example propositions belonging to a Weltbild or Weltanschauung. Wittgenstein says ‘[M]y picture of the world . . . is the inherited background’ (OC §94) and Ortega says ‘In large measure [man] has inherited [the world] from his ancestors and it continues to work in the form of a system of certain beliefs’ (VLI, 51). Husserl compares the function of ‘sedimentations’ which are not ‘dead’ to the way the background functions in perception (K §40, 152). Ortega notes that when he says that beliefs form the most fundamental stratum of our lives and are the ‘firm earth’ underlying
our activities the metaphor has its origin in one of the most funda-
mental beliefs, that the earth is firm (IC, 34). Wittgenstein writes: ‘The
existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture which forms
the starting-point of belief for me’ (OC §209). And at this stage in his
thought to say that ‘a system is so to speak a world’ (PB, 178) would be
to make a claim about systems of primitive certainties.

The claim that the world is a background throws light on the claim
that there are no doubles in the case of primitive certainties. Even in the
case of critical perceptual beliefs the perceptual background is not
something which allows us to distinguish between reality and appear-
ance. The reality–appearance distinction applies primarily to what we
(seem to) see in the foreground.

The primordial belief in the world (‘Welt-Glaube als Urdoxa’) is
presupposed by all doubts and denials, says Husserl. In the case of
ordinary beliefs we know how to distinguish between appearance and
reality. But not in the case of our belief in the world (EP, 54). ‘The
world is not a hypothesis’ in the way in which scientific hypotheses are
hypotheses (K, 265).22 The Lebenswelt is the ‘ground’ or ‘Boden’ for all
theoretical and extratheoretical praxis. And ‘[to live] is to live continu-
ously in the certainty that the world exists (“In-Welt-Gewissheit-
Leben”)’ (K §37).

As we have seen, the minimal claim to which a friend of primitive
certainty is committed is that primitive certainties are not directly justi-
ﬁed by other mental states or attitudes and their contents (as opposed
to indirect justiﬁcation through coherence). This leaves open the ques-
tion whether what is primitively certain for someone at a time is the
result or sedimentation of past cognitive achievements. Unlike Ortega,
Husserl typically rejects the stronger claim that primitive certainties
cannot justify. Thus he calls for investigation of ‘the way the Lebenswelt
functions continuously as a subsoil, how its varied pre-logical validities
ground logical, theoretical truths’ (K, 127, my emphasis; cf. EU §10).23
But it is not clear whether Husserl is here thinking of direct or of
indirect justiﬁcation in virtue of coherence.

If naive, visual certainties are not justiﬁed and do not justify, what
account should be given of the case where, when asked whether it is
raining outside on returning from a walk, I reply in the affirmative, and
to the question ‘How do you know?’ I reply ‘I saw that it was raining’?
Presumably, the naive visual certainties I enjoyed in the rain become
critical certainties when I reply to the question. The only alternative is
to drop the claim that primitive visual certainties cannot justify.

Husserl says that his account of naive perceptual certainty needs
to be completed by accounts of other types of naive, non-perceptual
certainty – for example, memory and judgement, both empirical and essential (EU §66, §76, I, 214, AzpS, 48). It would perhaps be in the spirit of his account to say that all primitive certainty is either perceptual or intuitive or inherits some of the features of perceptual or intuitive certainty. Part of Husserl’s programme was carried out in some detail by Ortega, who considers a number of primitive normative and axiological certainties but, as we have seen, does not understand primitive certainty in just the way Husserl understands it.

Normative and axiological certainties vs. the normativity of certainties

The putative examples of primitive certainties considered so far are certainties about what is non-normative and non-axiological. This is true also of Scheler’s practical certainties even though, as we have seen, these concern states of affairs containing goods, to the extent that the states of affairs themselves are not ‘Wertverhalte’. But there are also, Ortega thinks, primitive certainties concerning what is normative and axiological.

It has been argued that wittgensteinian primitive certainties are normative.²⁴ Is this view compatible with the apparently well-founded distinction between certainties about what is not normative and certainties about what is normative, between Pierre’s certainty that God exists and his certainty that he ought to go to Mass on Sunday or that ‘transubstantiation’ may be used to refer to transubstantiation? It is a view which is perhaps encouraged by the absence of any discussion by Wittgenstein of certainties of the political or ethical varieties. Wittgenstein is tempted by the idea that empirical propositions can be transformed into norms of representation (OC §319) but, given his views about norms and values, it is not clear what it would mean to transform an ethical or political normative proposition into a norm of representation. There at least three objections to the view that primitive certainties are norms. First, no psychological attitude is a norm, nor is the attitude or disposition of practically counting on something. Second, propositions dominated by the functors of objective certainty and uncertainty do not exhibit the same logical multiplicity as propositions dominated by deontic and axiological functors and predicates. Friends of the view will doubtless reply that hinge-propositions function like or are treated as norms or have the status of norms, epistemic norms or norms of representation. But none of this, a realist claims, entails that such propositions are normative or express norms. Finally, our relation to political, ethical and aesthetic norms does not resemble at all our relation to
epistemic norms. Reactions to a crumbling primitive political certainty tend to be much stronger than reactions to the breakdown of a primitive, syntactic, semantic or epistemological certainty.

Throughout his later writings Ortega discusses a number of historical examples of basic beliefs about what is normative and axiological, such as the history of the belief in reason, of the belief in science and of the death of Roman belief in the law (‘Un capítulo sobre la cuestión de como muere una creencia’, Ortega 1985; ‘Sobre la volatilización de una fe’, Ortega 1986, 134ff.). His account of the role of cognitive values and norms as primitive certainties is at the origin of the analyses of foolishness in his most popular writings. His interest in these matters was in large measure due to his conviction that history and sociology should begin by studying primitive certainties. It is doubtless this aspect of Ortega’s work which Collingwood (1937, 145) had in mind in applauding Ortega’s ‘strikingly original’ ‘History as System’. Like Ortega, Collingwood thinks historians systematically neglect the presuppositions which constitute world views.

Rules and norms, cognitive, conventional, social, ethical and political are not, Ortega argues, typically the objects of epistemic enterprises. Customs and what Ortega calls ‘uses’ (‘usos’), linguistic and non-linguistic, have invariably been misunderstood, he thinks, because the fact that they are primitive certainties has been overlooked. If correct, Ortega’s claim is of great importance for any account of rule-following and rule-breaking and also for any account of what he calls the ‘binding nature’ or ‘vigencia’ of rules and uses. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to by talking of the ways in which rules compel compliance, push and pull us, enjoy normative force. If there are rules which enjoy the status of primitive certainties then it is wrong to say that these rules are known and scepticism in this respect, although true, can be completed by a positive account of our relation to rules.

Rules, norms and customs are not merely primitively certain but also enjoy collective primitive certainty and so constitute social power (Ortega 1985a, 105ff.; HS, HG). ‘Every use . . . is essentially old’ and ‘consists in a form of life’ (HG, 215). It is fundamentally wrong to understand uses, in particular the ‘immense system of verbal uses’ which is a language (HG, 194) in terms of behavioural regularities or frequencies. There are many types of movement which are very frequent but do not correspond to uses (HG, 198): ‘something is not a use because it is frequent, rather we do it frequently because it is a use’(HG, 200). Ortega’s rejection here of what has been called ‘regulism’ about rules is combined with a rejection of the view that what makes rules
binding is the adherence of a community, of what has been called ‘communitarianism’. The binding nature of uses does not consist in the adhesion of individuals, however numerous . . . [S]omething is a use because it imposes itself on individuals . . . The socially binding character [of uses] does not present itself to us as something which depends on our individual adhesion, on the contrary it is indifferent to our adhesion, it is there, we have to count on it.

(HG, 267, 268; cf. HaS, 289)

Since uses are primitively certain we do not understand them, they are unintelligible, although we understand what we have to do, we comply with a use because the use is what one does (HG, 192).

In On Certainty Wittgenstein seems to accept that semantic relations are primitively certain (cf. OC §369, §446, §455, §456, §506, §515, §519). But linguistic rules other than semantic rules – such as ‘It is wrong to call a duck a “rabbit”’ – for example syntactic rules and pragmatic rules concerning what entitles one to assert what are even more plausible candidates for the role of primitive certainties, if only because they are much more difficult to formulate for the ordinary speaker than semantic rules. Perhaps Wittgenstein n + 1 would have endorsed the view that linguistic rules are typically primitively certain. In the tradition that goes back to Brentano and Marty, it is above all Ahlman (1926) who develops the idea that semantic, syntactic and pragmatic relations are normative: ‘the symbol relation between sign and object is, from the logical point of view, always normative’ (Ahlman 1934, 259).

Ortega’s innovation within this tradition is to argue that linguistic norms are primitive certainties.

One of the examples given by Scheler in 1913 of what we practically count on is laws, in the sense of rules rather than of laws of nature. We obey and disobey rules, legal, ethical and aesthetic, although we have no perception or knowledge of them we practically recognise them. Our (dis)obedience is a ‘practical obeying’ and ‘disobeying’ of rules. Such rules are ‘experienced as fulfilled or broken in the execution of acting. And it is only in these experiences that they are given’ (F, 155, tr. 141; cf. F, 565). As he later puts it,

Whenever we for example infer according to a law of inference, without inferring ‘from’ it, obey an aesthetic rule (like the product-ive artist), without in any way having this rule as a formulated proposition in mind, then essential insights come into play (‘in
Funktion’) without thereby standing explicitly before the mind. It
is only in the experience of incorrectness, of deviation from a law,
which we are not conscious of as a law, that we have a dawning
awareness that some insight was leading and guiding us.

(VW, 446)

Wittgenstein, of course, agrees with Scheler’s negative claim that we
typically have a non-cognitive grasp of the rules we follow and break. In
a central passage from the Investigations he says

that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation
(Deutung) but which is exhibited (sich äußert) in what we call ‘obey-
ing the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases of application
(‘Anwendung’).

(PI §201)

Wittgenstein does not, like Scheler, say that this way of grasping a rule
is given or experienced but that it is exhibited. But they agree that grasp
of a rule is exhibited or given only in particular instances of rule-
following and rule-breaking. Perhaps by 1951 Wittgenstein might have
agreed with Scheler that this grasp is a type of practical counting on.

Scheler gives the following example of counting on rules:

[I]t belongs to the essence of ‘crime’ that he who breaks laws
experiences himself as breaking them while acting; these are laws
with which he reckons in practise, in his own case and in that of
others, without having to have the slightest knowledge of such laws,
and without having to have ‘thought’ about them. On the other
hand, one who knows the laws and still breaks them is definitely not
a ‘criminal’. The mere ‘breaker’ or ‘enemy’ of a legal system is no
‘criminal’ for he accords it no practical recognition. The criminal,
although he does not necessarily have to recognise laws in a special
act of ‘recognition’, nevertheless experiences laws as effective in his
willing and acting, and thus ‘recognises them practically’ (thus he
expects others to follow the law ‘as a matter of course’, not in a
particular, experienced act of ‘expectation’). He is a criminal
because he rises against that whose domination he experiences as
effective, and it is this experienced conflict that makes him different
from a mere law-‘breaker’.

(F, 156, cf. tr. 142)27

‘There is an aspect of blindness’, Scheler thinks, ‘in the compulsion
(‘Nötigung’) of duty, an aspect which belongs essentially to it’ (F, 201). And what is true of duty is true, too, he says, of norms in general (F, 202). They also display a moment of blindness. It would, then, be in the spirit of Scheler’s account to say that we follow rules blindly because and to the extent that we practically count on them.

Norms and rules about what we ought and ought not to do, the phenomenologists think, are partially grounded in values, if they have grounds at all. And to the extent that they are so grounded they are not blind. Thus the essential insights Scheler refers to in the last but one passage quoted (VW, 446) are supposed to be insights into relations amongst values. What values, if any, might underlie linguistic rules and norms? Perhaps the value we attach to the form of life of which a language is a part. Scheler’s much stronger version of this view has it that ‘wherever there is a community, forms of life have an intrinsic value’ (UW, 141) and that ‘reverence’ is the appropriate attitude towards such values (UW, 141). But primitive certainties are not grounded. Nevertheless, if primitive certainties form systems, it is possible to argue that the primitively certain rules and norms depend on but are not justified by axiological certainties or even that they are indirectly justified through their coherence with what they make possible.

We have already noted that Husserl thinks that some essential truths may be primitively certain. Many of the sentences which, according to Husserl, express essential truths, analytic and synthetic, are treated as grammatical propositions or expressions of rules by Wittgenstein. On both views, primitive certainty about what is not contingent turns out to be ‘gappy’. Suppose the rule for addition is primitively certain for Pierre with respect to a range of numbers. If a situation arises in which he must apply the rule to new numbers he may well find himself in a state of primitive uncertainty. If Ortega is right to say that there are holes in systems of certainties about what is contingent, it is equally plausible to expect holes in systems of primitive certainties about what is not contingent.

One primitive axiological certainty discussed by Ortega is the value of political legitimacy (IHU, 139ff., 174; RM; Ortega 1998, 111–18). When the ‘collective belief’ that a form of political organisation is legitimate ‘cracks, then legitimacy weakens or disintegrates’ (IHU, 147). The content of beliefs about legitimacy have the form

the authority of x is legitimate because x is monarchic/liberal democratic/aristocratic etc. because p.

The content of ‘p’ is, of course, variable and may refer to input,
procedures, God, elites, history, output and much else beside. Ortega’s claim might, then, be formulated as follows:

the authority of x is legitimate only if it is primitively certain that (x is legitimate because x is monarchic/liberal democratic/aristocratic, etc. because p).

Ortega comes close to saying just this:

Something is legally legitimate – the king, the Senate, the consul – if its exercise of Power is founded on the compact belief which protects every nation that it does in fact have the right to exercise that power.

(IHU, 147)

Understood in this fashion Ortega’s claim appears to express an idea often defended in the tradition of political thought running from Burke through to the Austrian economist and philosopher Hayek. Indeed Ortega takes himself to be developing

Hume’s acute suggestion that the theme of history consists in demonstrating how the sovereignty of public opinion, far from being a Utopian aspiration, [and] is what has actually happened everywhere and always in human societies.

(Revolt, 97; RM, 145)²⁸

This tradition is opposed to the much more popular rationalist or ‘constructivist’ (Hayek’s) view that political legitimacy should and therefore can be the object of widespread and permanent critical discussion. Constant once said that ‘there is something miraculous in the awareness of legitimacy’ (De l’esprit de conquête). If Ortega is right, the mystery disappears once we see that legitimacy must be primitively certain. The ‘great fears’ described by historians of illegitimacy such as Guglielmo Ferrero and by Ortega then look like very good examples of primitive uncertainty. And primitive political certainty appears to be one of the more plausible illustrations of the view that primitive certainty is just the absence of primitive uncertainty. Ortega understands primitive political certainty in terms of counting on. But we may think that it also involves an affective element, for example, trust. If so, then it is also a good example of Husserl’s category of primitive affective certainties.²⁹

The deepest stratum the philosopher can lay bare, Husserl thinks, is pure consciousness. As Winkler puts it, for Husserl pure consciousness
is something ‘final’ that ‘cannot be shattered’. ‘Here is hard ground that provides all digging down beneath the surface with a goal’ (Winkler 1921, 6). Ortega, as we have seen, disagrees: what we count on, in particular rules, ‘constitutes the basic stratum, that which lies deepest in the architecture of our life’ (HaS, 288). Perhaps Wittgenstein would have agreed that the bedrock which turns the philosopher’s spade (PI §217) is what we count on.30

Notes

1 A version of this chapter was given at the 2001 Bologna Wittgenstein conference and subsequently elsewhere. I am grateful to Mark Textor, Mathieu Marion and Manuel García-Carpintero for help and especially toDanièle Moyal for stimulating discussions about what Wittgenstein must have meant. Some of the points dealt with here in passing are discussed more fully in Mulligan 2002, 2003, 2004.
2 M. van den Hoven pointed out some of the most important similarities between the analyses of certainty in Ortega and Wittgenstein in his 1990 paper.
5 Reiner 1934, 27f., cf. Bassenge 1930 on hexis as disposition vs hexis as ‘actual having’.
6 Against the idea that belief is any sort of affective or conative phenomenon, cf. Scheler 1957, 240f. A recent defence of the nineteenth-century view of belief as a matter of ‘credal feelings’ and as a passive disposition is Cohen 1992 (cf. Engel 2000). Cohen contrasts belief and what he calls ‘acceptance’. His account of episodic acceptance has much in common with that given by Reinach, his account of acceptance as an enduring policy resembles Husserl’s account of the results of spontaneous judging and decision. Although Husserl argues that judging has no polar opposite outside pragmatic contexts, his 1896 version of the propositional calculus contains a rejection operator.
7 Clearly, friends of primitive certainty owe us an account of justification. For many of them, I suspect, admissible answers to the how and why questions must be internally related to what they justify or ground.
9 On ‘recessive’ accounts, see Meinong 1968, 596. Marty 1908 §63 rejects Meinong’s claim that certainty and uncertainty may be properties of objectives.
12 The Spanish is more accurately translated as: ‘the plurality of beliefs in which an individual, a people or an age is/ finds itself’ (HcS, 10).
13 Other examples of primitive uncertainties are the uncanniness described by Freud and many states described by Gogol and Kafka.
14 Wittgenstein’s remark, ‘The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief’ (OC §160), suggests that his earlier investigations into the
conceptual connections between learning and meaning might be usefully revised by taking into account the distinction between founded and unfounded beliefs. The same is true of the philosophical parts of Bühler’s even earlier account of the relation between child psychology and the theory of language and mind.

Claims to the effect that an apparently positive property does not wear the trousers are often extremely vague. A table is not ill, nor is it healthy. Perhaps we should say that for something to be healthy is for it to be possibly ill, in virtue of its nature, and for it not to be ill.

Ortega’s remarkable account of primitive certainty doubtless owes much to Husserl and the other phenomenologists already mentioned or to be mentioned below. But Ortega seems to have developed the main features of his account of primitive certainty above all by reflecting on the historical works of Dilthey. In a paper published in 1933 and 1934, ‘William Dilthey and the Idea of Life’ (D) Ortega sets out to formulate what he takes to be Dilthey’s most important ideas. The task is, he points out, a difficult one since Dilthey himself never managed to formulate these ideas (D, 152). It is perhaps because of this that Ortega’s reconstruction rarely quotes or gives precise references to Dilthey’s writings. Dilthey saw, dimly, Ortega thinks, that if we take a belief or thought and reconstruct all the chains of motivation which lead someone to believe that something is the case we will eventually come across ‘a repertory of basic convictions (‘convicciones elementales’) . . . For example, all my claims to knowledge about material objects bear in themselves, as ingredients, the conviction that the external world exists’ (D, 173–4). These basic convictions are threads in a texture which forms all my concrete pieces of knowledge but they themselves have no motivation. They are not conditions of possibility of knowledge and belief but conditions of their actuality (D, 173). They are rooted in sentiments and the will (D, 176). They are ‘the deepest stratum of our subjectivity’, a ‘mental soil’ (D, 195). A further stimulus for Ortega’s reflections on belief was perhaps Fustel de Coulanges’ classic study of ancient beliefs, La Cité antique: étude sur le culte, le droit, les institutions de la Grèce et de Rome, a work he knew well.

On non-judgemental perceptual conviction, see Hazay 1913, a development of Meinong’s views.


Perhaps the earliest discussion of certainty in action by one of Brentano’s heirs is Scheler (1899) 1971, 110ff.

Cf. Husserl on ‘inaktuell’ or pre-reflective awareness of one’s mental states as belonging to a background, which is neither perception nor reflection nor knowledge (I, 95).

Hartmann (1931, 20; 1935, 30 b) describes the feature common to such future-directed ‘acts’ as expecting, intimation, presentiment, readiness, rejoicing as a counting on, and as a special type of certainty.

Transcendental phenomenology is not Cartesian foundationalism (K, 193).


Cf. Wright 1985, III; Wright 2004; Kober 1993, 198ff. Kober argues that wittgensteinian certainties are not prescriptive but are nevertheless ‘epistemic norms’ (208). Gehlen 1940 §36 distinguishes between normative and non-normative ‘irrational certainties’.
25 In this connection he distinguishes between beliefs and pseudo-beliefs (HaS IX) and between dead and living beliefs, a distinction he traces back to Mill On Liberty, ch. ii. Cf. HS I 1936, 287, HcS I-VII; Unas Lecciones de Metafísica IV, V, VIII, XIV; Qué es Filosofía? III, VI.


27 Scheler notes that the story of the hero of Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas is that of his transition from being an apparent criminal to being an enemy of the legal system.

28 Like Hayek, Ortega attaches great importance to English legal gradualism and common law (IHU, 182f., 284f.).

29 All friends of primitive certainty tend to slip into talking about trust, belief in and even faith while describing certainty. But trust and mistrust are affective attitudes towards people and other animate beings and attitudes towards states such as memory. They are forms of belief in. But one can believe in both people and non-people, for example, a state, the American Way of Life, deconstructionism and science. Just as to believe someone is to believe him to be trustworthy, so too, to believe in something, where it is not simply a belief that it exists, is to believe it to have some positive value. On trust and belief in cf. Reiner 1934, Schottländer 1957, Mulligan 2003.

30 Winkler goes on to reject the comparison with digging down as inappropriate to Husserl’s views. The philosopher must rather try to get into focus what is in fact close at hand, to which he has become blind (Winkler 1921, 6). Ortega sometimes agrees (HaS, 285). And so does Wittgenstein; if nothing is hidden, spades are superfluous (cf. Mulligan 1993).

Bibliography

Abbreviations used in this chapter for the most frequently quoted texts are given in the form of capital letters in brackets.


— (1933) 1999 Unas lecciones de metafisica, Madrid: Alianza (ULM).

5 Particularised attributes
An Austrian tale

Benjamin Schnieder

Introduction: the stage and the players

For philosophers interested in ontological issues, the writings of the important figures of Austrian philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contain many buried treasures to rediscover. Bernard Bolzano, Franz Brentano, Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl, to give just four grand names of that period, were highly aware of the importance of a feasible ontology for many of the philosophical questions they addressed throughout their works.

In this chapter, I will discuss some ideas that these philosophers had with respect to the ontological category of particularised attributes; the discussion is intended to be a contribution both to the history of ontology, and to ontology itself. In the first part of the chapter I will review three arguments to the effect that we should allow particularised attributes into our ontology. In the second part, I will discuss certain problems for the idea that particularised attributes have a unique bearer and present two alternative solutions to them.

Before I enter the discussion, a remark on nomenclature is in order: the entities I am concerned with are known under many names. At least sometimes, when philosophers spoke about (individual) accidents, modes, particularised qualities (or: properties), instances or cases of properties, (individual) moments, or tropes, they were alluding to what I have called particularised attributes.¹ For the present purpose, I shall freely choose between the different terms and, to honour a philosopher whom Dummett once called the great-grandfather of analytic philosophy, I shall also use yet another title for them when I call them by Bolzano’s title of an adherence.²
Why accept particularised attributes?

An argument form: accounting for abstract reference

For some analytic philosophers, grown up in the twentieth century, the idea of particularised qualities may seem somewhat extraordinary. Especially during the boom of formal semantics and topics related to modal logics, philosophical mainstream was mostly concerned with properties conceived of as shareable entities. But things have not always been like that; particularised attributes were quite generally acknowledged in early Austrian philosophy (as well as in many other philosophical periods). But even when philosophers felt generally inclined to accept particularised properties, they sometimes articulated reasons to do so – I shall inspect three such reasons in the following sections. Here, I will briefly introduce the general kind of reason I am concerned with.

Among the existing variety of arguments for the acceptance of particularised properties we can distinguish between two sorts: some philosophers constructed such arguments in terms of the philosophical utility of those entities and argued either that they serve certain theoretical purposes better than entities of other sorts, or that they are needed to resolve some philosophical puzzles. Other philosophers argued from a more descriptive point of view to the effect that particularised properties belong to the ontological framework shared by ordinary thinkers; i.e. that particularised attributes play an irreducible role in everyday thought and speech. In what follows I will discuss three arguments of the latter type which can be extracted from the writings of Husserl, Meinong and Bolzano.

The arguments I shall concentrate on share some common structure, which is similar to that exhibited by a much-debated argument for the existence of (shareable) properties, to be more precise, the argument from the phenomenon of abstract reference, an explicit version of which can be found in Husserl (LU II, §2).³ Let me briefly introduce the argument: it seems hardly controversial that the statements ‘Wisdom is a virtue’, ‘Red is a colour’ and ‘Impatience can be annoying’ are true. If the logical form of these statements is mirrored by their grammatical form, then they are of some simple subject–predicate structure, and we can conclude by the truth of these statements that their subject-terms are non-empty singular terms. So, if these terms really refer to properties (as they certainly seem to do), then we can conclude that there are properties.

To make its structure more transparent, we can put the argument as follows:
(1) There are statements which are
   (a) apparently true,
   (b) apparently of a subject–predicate structure, and which
   (c) apparently involve reference to some property as their subject.
(2) A non-conniving subject–predicate statement of the form ‘a is F’
    can only be true if its subject term has a reference.
(3) The appearances mentioned in (1a) to (1c) are not deceptive.
(C) Therefore, there are properties.

Here one can easily see what line a possible defence could take. Premise
(1) just states some undeniable linguistic data, and also premise (2)
seems hard to reject. Accordingly, it is the remaining premise (3) which
has usually been under attack from those who deny the existence of
properties. This premise can be denied by declaring one of the observa-
tions (1a) to (1c) to express some deceptive appearance after all. The
first of these three options (i.e. declaring the statements in question to
be false, despite the appearance) would lead to a very general and
unattractive error-thesis. What about the third alternative? If someone
denies that the subject of ‘wisdom is a virtue’ refers to a property, even
though it seems to be the case, she should provide us with some
Ersatz-entity that is in fact referred to. In the case of properties, at least some
nominalists were attracted to the idea of substituting sets for properties
(while it seems fair to say that the debates about this idea made its
prospects look dismal). The last option for a sceptic with respect to
properties is to assign some logical form to statements apparently deal-
ing with properties that deviates sufficiently from the surface grammar
of the statements. Thus, one might hold that a meaning-preserving,
though more perspicuous, paraphrase of such statements will show that
the singular terms seemingly referring to properties merely appear to be
singular terms, because in the proper paraphrases they will be replaced
by some expressions of a different logical status. At least in some cases
it is easy to produce promising paraphrases; thus, many philosophers
would agree that the sentence ‘Socrates possessed wisdom’, which
apparently expresses a relation between a particular and a universal, is
merely a stylistic variant of ‘Socrates was wise’, a statement which has
no relational structure at all. But there are more complicated cases
which might pose insurmountable problems to this strategy.4

Enough about shareable properties. As I said earlier, I introduced this
well-known argument in favour of an ontology of properties, because I
shall discuss some arguments in favour of particularised properties
which I take to share the general structure of the argument. The argu-
ments will start from the observation that there are certain (apparently)
true statements which seem to deal with particularised properties (they contain phrases of the form ‘x’s F-ness’, which friends of particularised properties regard as the canonical means to refer to such entities). To account for the truth of these statements, the arguments proceed, we should countenance particularised properties.

While the arguments thus can easily be seen to share their structure with the argument from abstract reference above, there remains one potentially important difference. The statements from which the arguments for particularised properties will start are in general more complex than those which underlie the argument for shareable properties. This is already due to the fact that canonical designators of particularised properties are definite descriptions, that is, logically complex terms; but also some of the predicates that will appear in the statements are of a complex character. Presumably, this fact leaves more room for quarrelling about the logical form of the statements.

Furthermore, the strategy of finding some Ersatz-entities as referents of alleged singular terms for particularised properties is more promising and will, accordingly, be endorsed by more philosophers than in the case of shareable properties. Two Ersatz-entities suggest themselves, because the terms employed – phrases of the form ‘x’s F-ness’ – are systematically ambiguous and can be used (i) to refer to some universal attribute rather than some particularised property; thus, one can refer to a particular shade of green which is multiply exemplifiable by referring to it with the phrase ‘the green of my bathroom tiles’. And (ii) such terms seem to allow for a use in which they refer to facts rather than to particularised properties; on some occasions such terms seem to be interchangeably used with that-clauses (or even that-clauses prefixed with the phrase ‘the fact’). Thus, to say that a husband was aware of his wife’s infidelity seems to be just a variant of saying that he was aware (of the fact) that his wife was unfaithful.5

To defend the arguments against such reactions, their proponents will have to provide reasons that at least in some cases only particularised properties can fulfil the job in question, whereas both Ersatz-entities prove to be unsuited for it (of course, the availability of Ersatz-entities does not, in itself, show that instead of particularised qualities, the Ersatz-entities are actually referred; but if there are suitable Ersatz-entities, this takes the sting from the argument from abstract reference, since then it cannot show any more that we have to accept particularised qualities because of the statements we make).

No more introductory remarks; let us turn to the arguments.
Argument 1: passing away

In his early *Hume-Studien I*, Meinong put forward an argument to the effect that whenever we say that two objects share one and the same property, we do not really mean what we say – in mentioning sameness (or: identity) here, we speak rather loosely:

Suppose we have two congruent triangles, A and B. Is the triangularity of A identical to the triangularity of B? – i.e. is the triangularity of A the triangularity of B? No one will deny that A can persist if B has been annihilated, – equally, it will not be disputed that the attribute adheres to its object, that it persists with it, and that it passes away with it. Now, if B no longer exists, then the triangularity of B no longer exists either, while A and its triangularity continue to exist undisturbed. But according to Mill, the triangularity of A is the triangularity of B, so that the same triangularity exists and yet fails to exist; but no one would be inclined to regard this as possible. – What these apparently idle considerations should show is merely the following: when we call two attributes that are alike but belong to different things identical, we just cannot mean identity in the strict sense of the word.

(Meinong, *Hume-Studien I*: 22f.)

Here Meinong presents the following argument:

(1) \( A \) and \( B \) are two congruent triangles.
(2) Triangle \( B \) is destroyed.
(3) Every attribute adheres to its bearer (i.e. the object possessing it), in such a fashion that the attribute vanishes if its bearer vanishes.
(C–1) Therefore, the triangularity of \( B \) vanishes.
(4) But the triangularity of \( A \) persists.
(C–2) Therefore, the triangularity of \( A \neq \) the triangularity of \( B \).

Premises (1) and (2) are true by assumption, and premise (4) is indisputably correct. The remaining premise (3) has to carry the whole burden of the argument then – but is it suitable to do so? It seems not; the premise is neither particularly lucid, nor, if given a clear reading which supports the argument, is it likely to be accepted by everyone. Whoever takes attributes to be abstract objects lacking spatio-temporal existence will certainly object to it. Thus, a Platonist might point out that (i) wisdom is an attribute, and (ii) wisdom will not vanish on the
day the last wise human dies. But then, wisdom provides a counter-
example to the general claim formulated in (3). Hence we see that Mei-
nong should better not rely on this principle, which seems acceptable
only in light of the doctrine of particularised properties, i.e. the
doctrine which is to be established by the argument.9

But there is more to Meinong’s reasoning than this. He introduced an
element into his argument which is not mandatory for its purpose and
even distracts attention from its important core: the superfluous ele-
ment is that in Meinong’s setting not only the attribute of the second
object, but the object itself passes away. Objects may loose some attrib-
utes without thereby going out of existence. And it is the vanishing of
the attribute that carries the burden of the argument. Meinong’s basic
point seems to be that given two objects a and b, which are said to have
an attribute in common, it may be correct to say that a’s attribute
persists for a longer time than does b’s attribute. Then, the argument
goes on, it cannot be one and the same attribute after all, which
immediately follows from the uncontroversial direction of Leibniz’s
Law:

(LL) \( \forall x \forall y (x \text{ has some feature which } y \text{ lacks } \rightarrow x \neq y). \)

Talk about attributes persisting and vanishing is entrenched in ordinary
discourse: the colour of an old photograph can disappear over the
years, an old man may lament the loss of his former strength, and
somebody’s hopes can perish. So we do say that attributes may vanish;
and if one person’s timidity is gone, it surely does not follow that
anybody else’s timidity must also be gone. In so speaking, then, we
distinguish between the attribute of one thing and the attribute of
another, not in virtue of a qualitative difference between the attributes,
but in virtue of their being possessed by different objects.

Hence Meinong’s argument applies to any two objects which are said
to share an attribute while one of them loses it before the other does.
And since a difference in modal properties of some entity x and some
entity y already secures the non-identity of x and y, the argument even
applies to any pair of objects sharing a property that they can loose
independently of one another (which is the default case when it comes
to contingent properties of distinct objects). The argument then runs
as follows:

(1) A and B both contingently (and independently of one another)
possess F-ness.
(2) If (1) is true, then $B$’s $F$-ness may vanish, while $A$’s $F$-ness persists.

(C) Therefore – by (LL) – $A$’s $F$-ness $\neq B$’s $F$-ness.

Unlike Meinong’s own version, this reduced variant of his argument is not laden with any metaphysically dubious premise; the only metaphysical principle on which it relies is the variant of *Leibniz’s Law* (LL); and this is better left untouched. Of the two premises, (1) is true by assumption, and (2) seems analytic.

Is the argument convincing, then? There are two possible lines of defence here, which parallel those mentioned with respect to the argument from abstract reference:

(i) One might deny that terms of the form ‘$x$’s $F$-ness’, as employed in statements concerning the vanishing of some attribute (such as the second premise) are genuinely referring terms. After all, what is said by ‘$x$’s $F$-ness is gone’ seems pretty close to what is said by ‘Once, $x$ was $F$, while now it is not $F$ any more’. This would block the transition from the premises to the conclusion.

(ii) One might agree that whatever we refer to by terms like ‘$x$’s $F$-ness’ in the discussed cases cannot be a shareable attribute, but deny that it is a particularised attribute. Someone who disbelieves in such attributes but countenances facts might hold that in using sentences of the form ‘$x$’s $F$-ness has vanished’ we really talk about facts, meaning as much as: while it used to be a fact that $x$ is $F$, it is not a fact any more. Then the conclusion would still follow, but it would only assert the difference of two facts (which doubtless are different).

These proposals cannot easily be dismissed out of hand. We should conclude that Meinong’s argument, though making an interesting point, provides no conclusive evidence for the acceptance of particularised properties in everyday speech.

*Argument 2: attributes as the subjects of change*

A passage from Bolzano’s *Athanasia*, albeit not containing an explicit argument for the acceptance of particularised properties, equips us with a second reason to acknowledge such entities:

It is true that not every object to which we ascribe a change has to be a substance; for we can also say about a mere adherence, for instance about the mere colour of this flower, that it has changed.
That is because mere attributes have themselves their attributes, which can be present at one time and absent at another; the colour of the flower, for example, may be paler today than it was yesterday.

(Bolzano, AT: 23f.)

Bolzano points out that the subjects of some statements of change seem to be attributes, and he is certainly right about this. We can say that Jeanne’s beauty became more autumnal over the years, that Tiresias’s sight grew dim, that the temperature of the oven is rising, that John’s anger cooled rapidly, and that Orson’s instincts developed astonishingly. But attributes, conceived of as universals, shareable and abstract entities, do not seem capable of undergoing changes. A particularised property, however, seems a better candidate of being the subject of a change.

We can construct an argument along these lines which can be called the argument from change. Let me use Bolzano’s example of a flower (say, a rose) whose colour has been fading to formulate the argument:

(1) The colour of the rose has been fading.
(2) If (1) is true, then whatever we refer to by ‘the colour of the rose’, as employed in (1), must have been fading.
(3) The colour red cannot fade.
(C) What we refer to by ‘the colour of the rose’, as employed in (1), is not the colour red.

Premise (1) is a statement which is true by hypothesis. Premise (2) seems to be the outcome of a relatively uncontroversial principle:

(SP) A subject–predicate statement of the form ‘F(a)’ is true iff a denotes an object which has the property signified by ‘F’.

The final premise (3) is evidently true (indeed, one can hardly make sense of its contrary, i.e. the proposition that the colour red is fading). So, when we use the term ‘the colour of the rose’ in (1), we do not refer to an abstract colour. Having established this conclusion, the proponent of the argument will continue: what we refer to in (1) then is nothing universal (nor, obviously, a fact), but rather a particular instance of the colour red, an instance which belongs to the flower before us, and which is capable of undergoing changes in a way that is barred to abstract, shareable properties. Is the argument convincing?
I am afraid it is not; not, at least, without further ado. To see this, let us take a look at the following statements:

(4) The number of saved people is still rising.
(5) My annual income has increased.

It is obvious that statements like these can be true. But it is equally obvious that whatever their subject-terms refer to are not the right kind of thing to undergo some intrinsic change. No natural number, such as the number 46 for example, can rise (or shrink). And a certain sum of money – say, 20,000 Euros – cannot increase (except in the sense that you earn interest for it; but earning interest for some money does obviously not involve a genuine change of that amount of money). However statements (4) and (5) have to be understood, a reading according to which they attribute some change called _rising_ to a number, or some change called _increasing_ to an amount of money is rather far-fetched.

How could we parse (4) and (5), then, in a more perspicuous way which does not even superficially suggest the absurd readings? The first step to an answer consists in realising the implicitly indexical character of the definite descriptions which make up the subject phrases of the two statements. These phrases are not temporally neutral; that which is my annual income _now_ was not my income _last year_, and to speak of the number of saved people is always to speak of the number of people that have been saved _up to a certain moment_.

It is this feature of a hidden indexical reference to a time that the predicates of the sentences exploit. Let me explicate this by an example; for this we assume that

(6) The number of people that have been saved _by now_ is lower than the number of people that will have been saved _by tomorrow_.

This is a precise, but cumbersome way of speaking; saving some breath, we can express the same by uttering the following:

(6*) Tomorrow the number of saved people will have risen.

So we see that some statements of change do not attribute some alteration to the entities which their subject terms seem to refer to. Correctly understood they rather postulate that two different entities satisfy a certain functional description at different times. Those statements will in general be of the form
(F) $x$’s $F$ is $\phi$-ing,

where $\phi$ is a verb of change that implies a certain terminus of comparison, $R$ (of course, the tense of the sentences can vary; I chose the present progressive only for illustration). These statements are to be read as

(F*) What is currently the $F$ of $x$ will by replaced by some different entity, that will then be the $F$ of $x$, and which is $R$-related to its predecessor in this office.

The particular predicates will dictate the terminus of comparison; if, for instance, the predicate is ‘rise’, the relation in question could be called being of a higher value.

Returning to the statements relevant to the argument, i.e. statements which apparently attribute some change to a particularised property, we see that they contain relational descriptions of attributes. Bolzano’s example contains ‘the colour of this rose’, other relevant examples contain phrases such as ‘John’s anger’, ‘the temperature of the oven’, etc. And these descriptions are temporally sensitive; what we refer to with ‘John’s anger’ in a certain context may be distinct from what we refer to in another context (this should be agreed upon by both friends and foes of particularised properties). But then these statements might behave as those about numbers discussed before; they might be statements about the replacement of some attribute by another of a related sort, rather than about an alteration of one and the same attribute. That

(1) The colour of this rose has been fading,

would then amount to the claim that

(1*) The current colour of the flower is paler than the colour which the flower had previously.

Similarly, the statement that

(7) John’s anger cooled rapidly,

might then amount to nothing but

(7*) John went quickly through states of anger with decreasing intensity.
Now if these statements are understood in terms of replacement, they cannot feed the argument for particularised properties. For such replacements could be replacements of shareable attributes, and someone who wants to avoid particularised properties can therefore easily produce some *Ersatz*-referents for the alleged designators of adherences in these cases. (By the way: even if such statements are concerned with replacements only, they might be about particularised properties; but they will not show the need for such entities then.)

Thus, the value of the argument above depends upon a decision in this matter. But how are we to decide whether such statements are about some replacement or some genuine change of one entity? The question is delicate and I feel uncertain how to answer it. Michael Slote thinks that the replacement reading is at odds with our linguistic practise. He writes that we can say that Helen’s beauty is less brilliant than *it* was. But now assume that we are confronted with a box of clothes whose content has just been replaced; we would not say in such a case that the clothes in the box are drabber than *they* were. Slote seems to stress that the use of anaphoric pronouns has a kind of linguistic signal function for the act of re-identifying one and the same entity. Though he is principally right about this, he overlooks that we have at our disposal the so-called ‘lazy’ use of pronouns which is free from re-identifying import. And there are clearly uses of lazy pronouns in replacement-statements of the sort relevant to our argument. We can say that the number of unemployed people is higher than *it* has ever been before – the use of the pronoun in no way commits us to a strange view about rising numbers here. What the pronoun does is holding place for its grammatical antecedent, which will, however, receive a different reference embedded in the second clause than it has embedded in the first. And notice that at least sometimes we can make a similar use of a lazy pronoun when we talk about substances. The chancellor of Germany has never been invited to this ceremony, the French minister might say on a particular occasion, but now we decided to invite *him*. At least in one reading of what he uttered, he was not only speaking about the current chancellor.

Finally, it is important to see that in the case of some statements which apparently attribute a change to an adherence there are good reasons to retreat to the replacement reading – reasons which are independent of one’s stance towards adherences. The colour of Rudolf’s nose, we might note, keeps constantly changing from pink to red, depending upon the amount of drinks he has had since he got up. But is it a sensible assumption that there is one instance of a colour which switches between being an instance of the colours red and pink
respectively? Most philosophers who acknowledge particularised properties would not think so. An instance of a property cannot become an instance of a different property.\(^{13}\) So if we talk about the colour of Rudolf’s nose changing from pink to red, we need a replacement interpretation of this claim.\(^{14}\) And the fact that we sometimes need such an interpretation anyway might make the general defence against the argument from change less vulnerable.

In summary, it seems to me that the argument from change has its weaknesses. True; if we really acknowledge that attributes can be the subjects of changes, they should be particularised. But whether such a view plays any major role in ordinary thinking is hard to see. To establish a convincing case, the friends of particularised properties would do better to mobilise other arguments.

**Argument 3: attributes as causal relata and objects of perception**

Let us turn to a third reason for acknowledging particularised properties. As I remarked before, Bolzano coined his own term of art for particularised properties – he called them adherences. When he introduces the notion of an adherence, however, he does not mention particularity as a defining feature. Rather, he defines an adherence as an actual (‘wirklich’) attribute.\(^{15}\) The notion of actuality, which he employs, is intimately connected to the notion of causal efficacy; actual objects are those which can be affected upon or take effects themselves and which, generally speaking, occupy some spatio-temporal position (contemporary metaphysicians would sometimes talk about concreteness, where Bolzano talks about actuality).\(^{16}\) Ordinary objects such as chairs, persons, clocks and moles are clear examples of actual objects. But Bolzano holds that such objects (substances, in his sense of the word), are not the only things which possess actuality: ‘[There are cases] in which we may and must attribute actuality to a property – namely those where the object in which the property inheres possesses actuality itself’ (WL I, §80: 387).\(^{17}\) Bolzano’s adherences are features of actual objects and ‘inherit’ the ontological status of their bearers. Meinong shared this contention with Bolzano; thus we read in his Hume-Studien that ‘attributes are not less actual than the things to which they adhere’ (Hume-Studien I: 49). He never gave up this idea; it recurs, for instance, in his late treatise on possibility and chance, where he talks about ‘attributes or states which are made concrete by their inherence in some concretum, as for example the colour of this table which is just as actual as the table’ (*Möglichkeit*: 169). That attributes can be actual in the relevant sense implies that they can be causally efficacious. And this
latter idea seems to be in accordance with ordinary thinking. Davidson prominently stressed the fact that we take individual, datable events to be causes and effects, and Bolzano would wholeheartedly agree. As we have seen, he subsumes events under his category of adherences, he regards them as attributes of a dynamic kind.

But we do not have to resort to the classification of events as attributes to see that we attest attributes causal powers. Take individual states as an example. We say that desires and beliefs cause people to do something. And a particular conviction, such as Candide’s belief in the benevolent nature of being, can be the cause of some occurrence, be it a tragedy or a comedy. Thus, Candide may come to realise finally that his naive belief was among the causes of his personal misfortunes. And what is true of states is also true of other attributes; a friend’s paleness can shake us, Jean’s courage can decide the battle, and Socrates’ wisdom can help to solve a certain riddle. The stock of causal entities acknowledged in ordinary parlance includes properties and states as well as events.

But to be causes, attributes should be particularised: Bolzano’s conviction that the tempest is looming may be causally efficacious and relevant to the explanation of his behaviour – he may, for example, have closed the shutters of his windows because of this conviction. In that case, it was his conviction and nobody else’s that had moved him. Even if his neighbour had a conviction with the same content, it will not have moved Bolzano to close his shutters – no matter how similar his neighbour’s conviction may have been. Similarly for Jean’s courage. From the fact that it decided the battle, it does not follow that anybody else’s courage decided the battle too – no matter how alike that other person may have been to Jean in respect to her courage.

The simple lesson from these considerations is that causally efficacious things have to be particular rather than universal. They have to be situated in time (and, at least usually, space), and be distinguished from other potential causes. Universal properties are not the right kind of entity to play such a causal role – so if we allow attributes to have causal powers at all, we should better stick to particularised attributes for that purpose.

Some philosophers, however, accept facts to be causes and effects. They might then want to offer facts as Ersatz-referents for terms apparently referring to adherences in causal claims. Because the canonical designators for particularised properties are usually nominalised expressions, they can rephrase the relevant causal statements either by using factive nominalisations instead, or by denominalising the designators into sentences and using the sentential connective ‘because’.
Thus, they could claim that

(1) Candide’s belief that nature is benevolent caused his misfortunes,

means either as much as

(1*) Candide’s misfortunes were caused by the fact that Candide believed that nature is benevolent

or as much as

(1**) Candide’s misfortunes took place because Candide believed that nature is benevolent.

But such paraphrases will not always be faithful to the import of the original statements. Imagine Kriton paying a visit to the imprisoned Socrates; he is alarmed by the condition that Socrates was in; indeed

(2) Socrates’ paleness shook Kriton.

But of course, Kriton had been aware of the unpleasant situation that Socrates was in, and he had expected Socrates to be pale. It is just that he did not expect him to be that pale. And thus, while (2) is true, the corresponding sentential causal statement is false; it is not the case that

(2*) Kriton was shaken because Socrates was pale.

And the same holds for the formulation in terms of facts; it is not that

(2**) Kriton was shaken because of the fact that Socrates was pale.

Hence, causal contexts lend support to the friends of adherences.

The case made can even be strengthened if we focus on perceptual contexts in which we seem to refer to adherences (if certain causal theories of perception are on the right track, then perceptual contexts will constitute a subclass of the broader group of causal contexts). In many statements we assume that attributes can be perceived. We can not only see pale people, coloured noses and kicking folk, but we can also see the paleness of a particular person, the colour of some nose and kicks delivered by certain people. Now if we see the colour of one guy’s nose, we do not thereby see the colour of anybody else’s nose. It is, therefore, not a shareable attribute that we take to be the object of our perception.
But again, some philosophers would want to rephrase such perceptual statements, so that the alleged designators of adherences disappear in favour of the sentences from which the designators were derived. But this manoeuvre will not generally yield adequate results. Take the statement that

(4) Kriton saw Socrates’ paleness.

Now (4) is not equivalent to the result of substituting the apparent designator of an adherence, ‘Socrates’ paleness’, for a that-clause:

(4-E) Kriton saw that Socrates was pale.

The reason for the non-equivalence of (4) and (4-E) is that constructions of the form ‘x saw (heard, perceived, etc.) that p’ have some epistemic import – if such a phrase is true of a subject x, then x should, on the basis of her perceptual input, believe that p. But Kriton may have seen Socrates’ paleness without noticing that it was Socrates to whom the paleness belonged. So (4) could be true in cases where Kriton lacks the belief which the truth of (4-E) would require him to have.

One might try to circumvent this reasoning by allowing a de re-reconstrual of (4-E), such that it would only amount to something like

(4-E*) Kriton saw of Socrates that he was pale.23

(4-E*) is compatible with Kriton not realising whom he saw to be pale. But if perceiving that really has the epistemic import we said it has, then (4-E*) is still more demanding than (4). Ascriptions of object-perceptions may be true even if the perceiving subject forms no perceptual beliefs whatsoever from his perceptions. The subject may, for example, erroneously believe himself to suffer from some extreme perceptual hallucination and mistrust every single thing he seems to see.24 If Kriton were in such a predicament, he might still see Socrates’ paleness – but radically disbelieving his senses he would not see of anybody that he is pale.

The upshot of these considerations is that if we accept the cleavage between perceiving some object and perceiving that such-and-such is the case, then the apparent reference to an adherence in (4) cannot be paraphrased away by means of a that-clause which replaces the designator ‘Socrates’ paleness’. But could we not perhaps find some adequate paraphrase of (4) which ascribes only some object-perception to Kriton, though some perception of a different object than an adherence?
The most likely candidate

(4-O) Kriton saw the pale Socrates

falls off the mark badly. Obviously, Kriton could have seen the pale Socrates without seeing his paleness – he could have seen him from the distance, in the dark, or only some non-pale part of him (probably most pale fellows are not pale all over). Talk about the perception of adherences, be they events or particularised properties, seems to be a hardly reducible affair that lends considerable support to the friends of adherences.

**Taking stock**

I have discussed three arguments in favour of particularised properties; the arguments from *vanishing attributes*, from *change*, and from *causality (and perception)* respectively. While the first two of these could not prove their points, the last one holds under scrutiny. Once this argument is accepted and adherences are allowed a place in our ontology, resistance to the first two arguments appears less reasonable. Taken together, the three arguments show how adherences, attributes that are distinguished for being possessed by different objects, feature prominently in an important part of ordinary discourse.

**Bearer-uniqueness**

Particularised attributes are usually said to have a *unique bearer*, which is seen as somewhat characteristic of these entities. However, there are cases which make this claim rather doubtful. After introducing the problems for the uniqueness thesis, I will present two possible reactions (inspired by Brentano and Bolzano respectively).25 But before I turn to the thesis of bearer-uniqueness, I shall briefly comment upon Brentano’s and Husserl’s ideas about the relation between *bearerhood* and *parthood*.

**Particular properties and parthood**

For the current purposes, I presuppose some basic grasp of the relation of *bearerhood* in which an object stands to one of its particularised properties, and the converse relation which may be called *inherence*. But can we perhaps say something illuminating about the nature of this relation?
Some philosophers suggested that particularised qualities and their bearers stand to each other in the relation of parts to wholes. Among those who think so there is a wide consensus about which of the entities involved in this affair will play the role of the part, and which the role of the whole: the particularised property is taken to be part of its bearer.

But, somewhat surprisingly, there is a dissident voice raised in early Austria. Franz Brentano thought that accidents are more comprising than the substances to which they belong; the former, he held, contain the latter as parts. To what extent this conflicts with other doctrines about adherences I cannot definitely say. For we must notice that Brentano’s conception of an individual accident is not wholly congruent in spirit with the more traditional conception of, say, Bolzano, Meinong and Husserl (although their sources of inspiration overlap, and Brentano’s theory contains elements common to the other conceptions).26 When Brentano talks about accidents, his examples sometimes differ from the commonly accepted examples of individual accidents. Instead of particular smiles, such as Belmondo’s smile, and instances of redness, such as this apple’s redness, Brentano talks about smiling people, such as the smiling Belmondo, and red apples, such as this red apple.27 These ‘accidents’ he distinguishes from their substances, in our case, Belmondo and this apple. The distinction he makes seems eccentric to a considerable degree and can be doubted on good grounds. But assume we buy the distinction for the nonce and interview Brentano about how Belmondo and the smiling Belmondo differ. It is in his answer to this question where he employs the mereological notion of a part: Belmondo is a part of the smiling Belmondo, he would say.

Now if Belmondo is only a part of the smiling Belmondo, it seems reasonable to ask what constitutes the rest of the latter. I must confess that Brentano’s answer strikes me as esoteric: there is no rest, he would say. Even though Belmondo is only a part of the smiling Belmondo, the latter is not composed by the former and some other part(s).28 This contention seems evidence to me that Brentano does not employ any ordinary notion of parthood here. It seems constitutive of such notions that for any part of some object, there is at least one other part of it which together with the former composes the whole. If this is the analytic truth I deem it to be, then either Brentano’s claim is blatantly false, or it involves some other concept which he only inadequately invokes by the title ‘part’.

We might better leave Brentano behind and turn to the other side of the medal. According to Edmund Husserl, a particularised property is a part of its bearer – with this contention, he surely is in bigger company
than Brentano. But in what sense is a particularised property part of its bearer? Husserl seems to feel the need of explicating his usage of ‘part’; thus he announces the following:

We shall take the concept part in its broadest sense, in which it is feasible to call everything a part which is distinguishable ‘in’ an object or, to use some objective vocabulary, which is ‘present’ in it. A part is everything that the object ‘has’, in the ‘actual’, or better real sense of the word ‘has’, in the sense of something actually composing it.

(Husserl, LU III, §2: 228)

Husserl’s inflationary use of scare quotes in this passage indicates that he is moving on slippery grounds. Indeed he is. The first explication he gives concentrates on the little word ‘in’: a part of x is something distinguishable or present in x. While this explication may warrant to call some particularised qualities parts of their bearers, it does certainly not warrant to call all of them this way: whereas a smile can be said to be (present or distinguishable) in a face, the redness of this apple is in no sense of the word in the apple (and, a fortiori, neither is it present nor distinguishable in the apple). And the same is true for an object’s surface, its weight or its smell: all of them are not in the object. Furthermore, many things which we do call parts of other things (and rightly so) are not in the other things; kidneys are in bodies and at the same time parts of them, but fingers are equally parts of bodies while only seldom they reside in bodies. A surgical treatment is among the rare cases in which a finger might really be present in a body, and this possibility shows another problem with the explication above: that some physician’s finger might one day find its way into my body would not make it part of my body.

The second explication, employing the monosyllable ‘has’, is neither of much help. You can have lots of things: TVs, husbands, debts and bad dreams, but none of these things will, because you have it, be a part of you. Perhaps Husserl wanted to exclude such cases by the addition of ‘in the “actual”, or better real sense of the word “has” . . .’. But the meaning of this remark is rather elusive to me.

I shall stop being snappish. Certainly, the assimilation of inherence (the relation holding between particularised properties and the objects they are properties of) to parthood is not endangered by my remarks. But it seems to me that there is indeed no perfectly easy and natural way for such an assimilation, contrary to what Husserl may have suggested. Perhaps, the ordinary distinction between parthood and characterisa-
tion may be given up if theory presses hard enough – but this question cannot be settled here.

**The principle of bearer-uniqueness and its problems**

Now for the thesis of bearer-uniqueness, a thesis which is often proposed in the literature. In fact, we saw this idea to play a role in Meinong’s argument for the acceptance of particularised properties, and Bolzano relied on it in a letter to Exner when he wrote that

> this red (numero idem) cannot be found at any other rose. The red which can be found at another rose may, if you like, be alike to it, even very much alike, but it cannot be the same, because it is not the same rose; two roses require two reds.

(Bolzano, BE: 32f.)

The following semi-formal formulation may suggest itself as a precise rendering of the idea of bearer-uniqueness (i.e. the idea that a particularised quality has a unique object to which it belongs).

(BU) For all particularised qualities $a, b$ and all objects $x, y$:

$$(a \text{ is a quality of } x \& b \text{ is a quality of } y \& x \neq y) \rightarrow a \neq b.$$  

Notice that this principle is free from modal operators and therefore should be distinguished from modalised variants of it; furthermore, it is not identical to the claim that particularised qualities are individuated via their bearers. While this latter claim postulates a certain ontological priority of the bearers of particularised qualities, the former is neutral upon this question. Uniqueness of the bearer might be compatible, for example, with things being bundles of particularised qualities which receive their individuality from the qualities which compose them. Presently, I shall be only concerned with the weaker principle (BU).

And now for the troublemakers: (BU) does conform with simple standard examples of particularised qualities; Joan’s courage is distinct from Socrates’ courage, since Socrates and Joan are different persons, and the redness of this nose is to be distinguished from the redness of the nose over there, because we are confronted with two noses.

But then there are also quite straightforward counter-examples to (BU): my butter-knife is sharp, and so is its blade. Hence, there is the
sharpness of my butter-knife and there is the sharpness of its blade. It
seems crazy to deny that they are just one and the same sharpness,
however it seems equally mad to declare the knife and its blade to be
identical. Thus, the butter-knife defeats (BU). Analogous examples
come in legion; the redness of this delicious apple is identical with the
redness of its skin, but the skin is not the apple.36

There are furthermore examples based on metaphysically more con-
troversial claims.37 The lump of clay over there, some philosophers
would hold, is not identical with the statue occupying the same place.
Whoever agrees on this should notice that nevertheless the weight of
the statue surely is just the same as the weight of the lump, and thus
provides another example against (BU). Equally for a person’s strength
and the strength of her body, etc. So, how could one handle these
cases?

_Brentano’s simple solution_

When Brentano formulated a similar claim to the principle of bearer-
uniqueness, he made a careful choice of words which opens a straight-
forward way of how to improve upon (BU). Let me quote the relevant
passage:

> An individual accident which belongs to an individual substance
cannot belong to a wholly distinct substance. Just as the substances
are two, so are the accidents; they are differentiated, even if they are
alike in all other respects, by the different substances which they
contain.

(Brentano 1933: 54f. My emphasis)

It seems that according to Brentano a particularised property may
belong to different substances, as long as they are not wholly distinct.
Although the phrase ‘wholly distinct’ is not completely transparent and
the textual evidence does not seem decisive, Brentano may take wholly
distinct objects to be those which are (at least) meroologically disjoint,
i.e. which are neither part and whole nor overlapping entities. Further-
more, we may say that objects standing to each other in some relation
of (non-merological) constitution, are distinct, but not wholly so.
Given this reading of ‘wholly distinct’, Brentano proposed a principle
which differs from (BU) in having a limited scope, and which thereby
can cope with the counter-examples that endanger (BU). We may
take him as proposing the following principle (with ‘#’ signifying the
relation of being wholly distinct):
(BU*) For all particularised qualities $a$, $b$ and all objects $x$, $y$:

$$(a \text{ is a quality of } x \& b \text{ is a quality of } y \& x \neq y) \rightarrow a \neq b.$$  

The relation expressed by ‘#’ may then either be taken as mereological disjointedness, or, by those who believe in a constitution relation different from identity, as disjointedness together with constitutional independence. (BU*) is immune against the known counter-examples to (BU), because they always involve different bearers of a particularised property which stand in some intimate mereological (or constitutional) relation.

**Bolzano on a peculiarity of certain predicates**

While Brentano provides us with a suitable reaction, I want to explore an alternative which is loosely based on an idea by Bolzano. To do so, I have first to prepare some conceptual grounds; having done so, I will return to (BU) and a second reaction to the alleged counter-examples in the following section.

(BU) is intended as a principle of ontology, dealing with particularised qualities. The examples that raise doubts about its correctness are formulated in everyday language. The crucial expressions which are taken to refer to particularised qualities are constructions in which a quality term is specified by a genitive phrase; if we take ‘$F$-ness’ to be representative for quality terms in general, we can say that the expressions in question exhibit the form

$$x's \ F\textrm{-ness (or: the } F\textrm{-ness of } x).$$

That the examples are apt to defeat (BU) depends on the question whether the genitive in expressions of the form (PQ) is taken to signify the ontological relation that is at issue in (BU). Particularised qualities have bearers, they belong to them, or to use a rather arcane term, they inhere in them. It might be natural to identify the relation of inherence with the relation signified by the genitive in expressions of the form (PQ), so that the following holds:

$$\text{(TR)} \quad \text{The particularised quality } q, \text{ to which we refer by ‘}x's \ F\text{-ness}, \text{ is a quality which inheres in } x.$$  

Natural though this may be, we can ask for alternatives. In an interesting discussion of how predicates apply to compound entities, Bolzano made the following observation that will lead us the way to a different view:
Often we allow ourselves to attribute a certain feature (or change) to a whole where basically it is present (or occurs) only in one or several parts of that whole. Thus we say that a town was on fire, if actually only one or several houses were on fire.

(Bolzano, AT: 33)

Here we can read Bolzano as highlighting a certain usage that many predicates in natural language have and which we might call partitive. I call the use of a predicate $F$ in a true statement ‘$x$ is $F$’ partitive, if it satisfies the scheme:

(Partitive Predication)

$x$ is $F$, and it is so because there is a (prominent) part $y$ of $x$, such that $y$ is $F$.

Some apples are red, we are inclined to say. They are red despite the fact that of course most parts of them (their whole insides) are not red at all. They are red, because their skin is so. Thus, ‘is red’ as applied to standard red apples is used partitively in the way described. The same holds for ‘is sharp’, when we are talking about my butter-knife. The knife is sharp, true, although many of its parts are not. But it is nevertheless, because its blade is so.

To acknowledge the partitive usage of many verbs should not lead to the wrong conclusion that many (or even most) things that we call, say, red, are not really red. To say that some thing $x$ is not really $\varphi$ suggests that (i) given a literal, non-conniving use of ‘is $\varphi$’, it is false that $x$ is $\varphi$, and (ii) there is a conniving use of ‘is $\varphi$’, in which it is true to say that $x$ is $\varphi$. But this is not the case with ‘is red’. This delicious apple is red, and it is really red; to say that something is red just does not mean saying that it is wholly red, or that all of its parts are red. Now this is not a conniving use of the predicate ‘is red’, it is its central, actual use.

In general there are many predicates having partitive uses, such that there is no corresponding non-partitive use of the predicate (or an equivalent predicate). We could of course invent a predicate ‘is NP-red’, such that an object $x$ is NP-red only if it is red and it is not the case that $x$ is red because a part of it is red. But this is a predicate which has no simple equivalent in common English and there is no special usage of ‘is red’ in which it is synonymous with ‘is NP-red’.

Apart from partitive usages of predicates we can also talk of partitive properties or relations, by which we mean properties and relations signified by a verb partitively used (such that being red would be an
example of a partitive property, and kissing or being sharper than examples of partitive relations).

If we now consider cases of constitution, as material constitution, we see that if constituted objects are different from the constituting ones, then a similar phenomenon to partitive predication can be made out: if for example a statue is to be distinguished from the lump of clay which constitutes it, then it will be correct to say that the statue weighs, say, 200 pounds, because the lump of clay constituting it weighs 200 pounds. So we can call the use of a predicate $F$ in a true statement ‘$x$ is $F$’ constitutive, if it satisfies the scheme:

(Constitutive Predication)

$$x \text{ is } F, \text{ and it is so because there is an object } y \text{ which constitutes } x, \text{ such that } y \text{ is } F.$$ 

To have a term which covers both kinds of predication I have talked about, I shall use ‘derivative’ (as should be clear from what I have said above, I do not want to suggest that if someone uses a predicate for a derivative predication, she uses it somewhat connivingly or non-literally, or even worse, that she abuses it).

**A subtler solution**

Now back to our apparent counter-examples to (BU). From them it can easily be seen that genitive-constructions of the form $(PQ)$ often involve a derivative use of the genitive. This redness is the apple’s redness, because there is a part of the apple, its skin, such that this redness is *its* redness. This sharpness is the knife’s one, because there is its blade and the sharpness is *its* sharpness. But now a possibility opens for handling these examples without giving up (BU). For why not say that the relation of *inherence*, which (BU) is meant to be concerned with, is *not* derivative? It might be that there is no common expression signifying this relation. But this is because detailed ontological distinctions do not play a role important enough to be always mirrored by linguistic conventions.

In effect, this strategy amounts to holding that

(i) The relation of *inherence* that ontologists are interested in is non-derivative.

(ii) Accordingly, the ‘is a quality of’ in (BU) should be given a technical, non-derivative reading.

(iii) The genitive in expressions of the form $(PQ)$ signifies a *derivative*
relation, and thus not the relation of inherence. What it signifies is rather a relation that holds between a particularised quality \( x \) and an object \( y \) roughly if either \( x \) inheres in \( y \), or \( x \) inheres in a (prominent) part \( y \), or \( x \) inheres in an object which constitutes \( y \).

Very seldom then in everyday discourse do we really specify the bearers of qualities, in the sense of specifying that in which the qualities inhere. Very often this might indeed be hard to do. But the metaphysician might be content with noticing that common people simply are not interested in exactly the same as what she is interested in. So she can stick to (BU) without having to limit its scope in any way, by denying a one-to-one correspondence between expressions of the kind (PQ) and her metaphysical vocabulary.

Now we have seen two alternative ways of defending the idea of bearer-uniqueness against the problem cases: we can either modify (BU) into a version with a limited scope, or demand a non-derivative reading of the ‘is a quality of’. Which of these alternatives is preferable is not easy to see, although I am inclined to choose the latter option since it provides us with a general principle that seems to square best with some traditional opinions on the ontology of particularised qualities. However, I lack the space to explore the respective advantages of both options in detail and must therefore leave the decision to the reader.

**Bearer-uniqueness and particularised versus non-particularised qualities**

To conclude my discussion of the principle of bearer-uniqueness, I will make some remarks on the significance of this principle. Sometimes, the bearer-uniqueness of particularised attributes is thought to distinguish them from non-particularised attributes, which are universals and shared by many objects.

But although this claim may hint at a way of distinguishing particularised attributes from non-particularised ones, it evidently does not suffice for such a distinction: there are presumably some shareable attributes which are, as a matter of contingent fact, not shared by multiple objects, but which are exemplified by a single object. Even worse, there could be non-particularised attributes which can, for conceptual reasons, be exemplified only by one object (being an even prime number) or even by none (being a round square). But this would not make them particularised attributes in the sense we are concerned with, and so it seems that the numeric criterion of possibly having multiple bearers
vs. necessarily having a unique bearer cannot fix the distinction between particularised and non-particularised attributes.

Nevertheless, this criterion may be a helpful hint at the nature of this distinction. And there might still be the possibility of exploiting the criterion in a more sophisticated way to draw a general distinction between the two categories. Perhaps, a tempting thing to say would be the following: it is a categorial feature of a particularised attribute that it cannot be shared by a variety of bearers. Given any particularised attribute, its bearer-uniqueness is secured by its belonging to the ontological category of particularised attributes. On the other hand, any example of a non-particularised attribute that can be possessed only by one entity (or even by none) will not be so in virtue of its categorial belonging. It is not in virtue of its being an attribute that being even and prime can be possessed by only one number. Rather, its limited exemplifiability will be due to certain reasons of mathematics, or perhaps due to the specific nature of the property in question.

Whether such an account is feasible in the end cannot be settled here. But we have seen that the admitted importance of the principle of bearer-uniqueness for the ontology of particularised attributes should not be overrated; it does not serve as a distinguishing line between particularised and non-particularised attributes.

Notes

1 The different terminologies are sometimes connected with different conceptions of particularised properties and related entities. For some remarks and references on the variety of terms see Schnieder (2004b: 155–61).

2 When Bolzano introduces the term ‘Adhärenz’ in his Athanasia (AT: 21), he does not proclaim it to be his own coinage but rather alludes to an established use by ‘the philosophers’ – unfortunately without mentioning whom he had in mind.


4 Cf. Jackson (1977), and also Künne (op. cit.), Loux (op. cit.).

5 Cf. Slote (1974: 79f., 106). The somewhat classic linguistic investigations by Zeno Vendler (1967) are particularly interesting in this context; though Vendler himself concentrates on singular terms which can both be used to refer to facts as well as to events, his observations easily expand to terms which are ambiguous between designating particularised properties and facts.

6 The passage quoted has been taken to show that Meinong was some kind of a moderate realist – that he dispensed with shareable attributes in favour of particularised ones (see Barber 1970: 555ff. and Grossmann 1974: 5ff.). Rollinger (1993: 46f.), however, points out that there is a tension between the quotation (and the interpretation) and a nearby passage
Particularised attributes: an Austrian tale

I: 49), in which Meinong seems to regard attributes as shareable entities; Rollinger concludes that Meinong wavered between incompatible ontological positions. I cannot decide this dispute. But whatever Meinong’s contention in his early years may have been, at least in his later writings he certainly accepted both shareable and particularised properties (see, as a particularly clear example, Erfahrungsgrundlage: 26ff.).

7 Cf. also Husserl (LU II, §19: 155).
8 For Mill’s position, which Meinong is attacking, see e.g. System Book I, Ch. ii, §4: 29f.
9 In their discussions of Meinong’s argument, both Grossmann and Barber (op. cit.) concentrate on the controversial claim (3) and rightly criticise the argument for this assumption. But they dismiss Meinong’s point too hastily because they overlook that a boiled-down version of the argument does not need this premise (see below).
10 Here and henceforth, I shall be concerned only with genuine changes rather than mere Cambridge changes.
14 Cleland (1991) would deny this; according to the semantic theory she developed, even a statement such as ‘the colour of his nose went from green to red’ attributes a genuine change to an adherence. For her proposal, she has to assume that there are, in addition to instances of completely determinate properties, also instances of determinable properties and that terms such as ‘the colour of his nose’ refer to them. While the former claim is certainly debatable (but see Ehring 1996: 461ff.; 1999: 19ff. for a defence of the opposite view), the latter seems to me clearly at odds with our usage of such terms.
15 See Bolzano (AT: 21; WL I, §118: 557; WL III, §272: 10).
16 On Bolzano’s notion of actuality see also Schnieder (2002: 21–6). The notion was common property among metaphysicians for a long period; Husserl expresses it by the term ‘real’ (cf. LU II: 123ff.), while Frege still employs it under the same title as Bolzano, ‘wirklich’; see Frege (1884: §85; 1903: §74).
17 Cf. also Bolzano (BE 79; WL II, §142: 65).
18 See Davidson 1967.
20 Of course, one can also accept facts and other entities (events, states, or what you like) as different kinds of causes and effects (perhaps combined with some idea about the primacy of some class of entities as causes). Proponents of factual causation that also accept event causation include, for instance, Bennett (1988) and Mellor (1995).
21 The following reasoning was brought forth by Helen Steward (1997: 148).
23 Constructions such as ‘x saw of y that she was F’ are admittedly awkward. An alternative phrasing to the same effect would perhaps be ‘x saw y and furthermore that she was F’ (in our case: Kriton saw Socrates and furthermore that he was pale).
25 I discuss another promising, but in the end unsuccessful, reaction in Schnieder (2004a: 221ff.).
26 For a concise reconstruction of Brentano’s ontology see Smith (1994: ch. 3).
27 His own example is a thinking soul – not a thought (Brentano 1933: 53).
28 Cf. Brentano (1933: 11, 53ff.).
29 Thus, Husserl’s view is part of many recent trope theories (see for instance Campbell 1990 and Simons 1994).
30 In the original text, Husserl seems to make a subtle and hard to understand distinction between his use of the German word ‘real’ (which he puts in scare quotes; in the translation above: ‘actual’) and his use of the German word ‘reell’ (in the translation above: real).
31 For some formulations of this idea (varying with respect to the modal strength of the formulation), see for instance Künne (1998: 238), Mertz (1996: 10), Stout (1923: 114), and Wolterstorff (1970: 134).
32 I limit my interests to monadic particularised qualities; several of my formulations would have to be modified as to apply to polyadic particularised qualities (instances of relations).
33 The following alternative formulation of the principle might be slightly easier to comprehend (although it is strictly equivalent to the version above):

For all particularised qualities $a$ and all objects $x, y$:

$$(a \text{ is a particularised quality of } x \& a \text{ is a particularised quality of } y) \rightarrow x = y.$$ 

For certain reasons of presentation, however, I prefer the formulation given above.
34 (BU) could be modally strengthened in different ways; cf. Schnieder (2004a: 220).
35 The first who drew attention to those was (to my knowledge) Jerrold Levinson in his 1980 paper ‘The Particularisation of Attributes’; later on Keith Lehrer and Vann McGee provided similar examples in their 1992 paper.
36 The knife is Levinson’s example (1980: 114), Lehrer and McGee use a grapefruit and its yellowness (1992: 43). I prefer the apple, since a grapefruit sometimes tends to be yellow not only at its skin.
37 As Levinson notes (1980: 114f.); another example of this kind was produced by Lowe (1998: 79).
38 Lehrer and McGee (1992: 43) also opted for this kind of reaction to the problematic examples and replaced their pendant to (BU) by a formula equivalent to (BU*) in the mereological reading of ‘#’. Notice that the examples considered so far do not force upon us the restriction to disjoint entities, but only to those not standing in a part–whole relation to each other. However, there are others that demand the further restriction: the white of the two left thirds of the tricolour over there is the same as the white of the two right thirds of it. Now the two left and the two right thirds do not relate as part and whole, but only overlap. To cope with examples like this we have to demand disjointedness in the modification of (BU).
39 I indicate some relevant points in Schnieder (2004a: 226ff.).
Bibliography


—— [Möglichkeit] Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, in: MGA VI.


In this chapter, I shall consider what the principal Austrian philosophers from Bolzano to Popper have had to say on the subject of truth. Since I shall cover a fair number of philosophers and theories, my considerations will be mainly confined to two linked questions:

What – according to the philosopher in question – is the nature of truth?
What ontology is required to explicate truth according to their account?

Further questions concerned with our access to and knowledge of the truth will only be considered as necessary, since they lead into a tangle of issues for which I shall not have the space here. Neither shall I justify my selection of this or that philosopher as ‘Austrian’, but simply press on.

Bolzano

Truth was very important to Bolzano for several reasons. It is at the core of his emphasis on the objectivity of knowledge, including in particular mathematical and theological knowledge, and his opposition to Kant. He employs the concept of truth to refute scepticism, to prove the existence of an infinity of objects, and to justify his Platonism of concepts and propositions. On the nature of truth itself, Bolzano is very modest and modern. Having distinguished a number of senses of ‘truth’, he takes the principal one to be truth as a property of propositions (Sätze an sich): a proposition is true if it states things to be a certain way and they are that way: ‘I shall mean by a truth in itself any proposition which states something as it is.’

Taking a proposition of the form $A \text{ has } b$, which consists of a subject
idea (in itself) A, a predicate idea b, and a copula has, Bolzano tells us that it is true ‘when every object that falls under the subject idea has some attribute (Beschaffenheit) that falls under the predicate idea’. To modern ears this sounds strange because Bolzano allows both subject and predicate terms to denote several objects. If we take as an example the sentence ‘Tomatoes have redness’ then the proposition this sentence expresses is true if and only if every tomato has some (shade of) redness. This is indeed a sensible reading of the sentence. Bolzano believed that all propositions can be put into the canonical form A has b. This somewhat quaint and optimistic adherence to the subject–predicate form can be given a better run for its money than might appear at first sight possible, but it is ultimately not worth retaining. If propositions can have more than one form then a schema such as Bolzano uses will not cover all cases and either a meta-formula such as ‘says things to be in a way they in fact are’ will need to be invoked or truth will need to be spelled out somehow for all forms of sentence and propositions, whether by listing, induction or some other way. This problem will occupy us again later. Because Bolzano does have something which is a recognizable precursor to Tarski’s Condition T, it is tempting to say Bolzano supports a correspondence theory of truth. If satisfying such a condition is all it takes to have a correspondence theory, then it is all right to say he does. I prefer to say Bolzano has a realist account of truth but not a correspondence theory, since he is mercifully free of reference to correspondence, agreement, adequation and the like.

Bolzano ascribes truth and falsity in the primary sense to objective propositions, which are abstract entities expressed by linguistic sentences and entertained or thought in judgements. A sentence (judgement) is true (false) if the proposition it expresses (the judger entertains) is true (false). Bolzano embraces these abstract propositions because he considers them the only way to guarantee the objectivity of knowledge. A proposition is true or false irrespective of whether anyone ever entertains, judges or believes it, and irrespective of whether it is ever put into words. He even thinks he has an existence proof which is at the same time a refutation of scepticism. Here is his argumentation:

That no proposition has truth disproves itself because it is itself a proposition and we should have to call it false in order to call it true. For, if all propositions were false, then this proposition itself, namely that all propositions are false, would be false. Thus, not all propositions are false, but there are also true propositions. There are truths, at least one.
This is typical of Bolzano’s highly analytic mode of argumentation. However Bolzano draws from his refutation of the sceptical hypothesis the unwarranted conclusion that there are truths in themselves, i.e. true propositions. The sceptical hypothesis that there are no truths in themselves could be true if there were truths of another sort, such as judgements or sentences or statements. The ‘proof’ that there are infinitely many truths is also flawed. Take any truth, such as the negation of the sceptical hypothesis,

There is at least one truth.

In Bolzano’s canonical notation this would be tortured into the form

The idea of a truth has objectuality.

Call this proposition $T$. Now consider the proposition that $T$ is true, in canonical form

The proposition $T$ has truth.

This has a different subject and predicate from $T$ so is a different proposition. Call it $T’$. Then the proposition

The proposition $T’$ has truth

is another different proposition as it too has a different subject from $T’$. So we can generate an unending chain of such propositions each saying that the previous one has truth, and they are all different, therefore there are infinitely many propositions. This ‘proof’ is less than convincing, especially for those redundancy theorists who consider the propositions $p$ has truth and $p$ to be two ways of saying the same thing, and therefore variant expressions of the same proposition.

It is important that for Bolzano propositions that are false have the same ontological status as propositions that are true: they exist in themselves independently of us and are false independently of what we think or say. The difference between truths and falsehoods is not ontological but semantic.

It is very clear what ontology Bolzano invokes to account for truth: a realm of abstract propositions and their parts (ideas) which is objective and infinite, and which we can express in language and think in thoughts. Quite how we manage to access such propositions is something Bolzano is not very clear about, only that we can somehow grasp
them. In giving his account of the canonical form of propositions Bolzano also invokes subjects and attributes. Subjects may be anything, abstract or concrete, including propositions and ideas. Attributes are abstract universals.

Truth is for Bolzano an absolute, all-or-nothing affair. There are no shades of truth and no truth relative to circumstances. In his account of tense, for example, traditionally associated with the idea that a proposition (such as Mark is now sitting down) can change its truth-value, Bolzano adopts the then revolutionary but now commonplace tactic of taking the temporal determination to restrict or be part of the subject and not of the predicate or copula. The proposition Mark—at—t is sitting down (where ‘t’ stands for a definite time) is timelessly, objectively true or false:

A proposition of the form ‘The Object A—has at time t—the attribute b’, if its parts are to be clearly indicated, must be expressed in the following way: ‘The object A at time t—has—(the attribute) B’. For it does not happen at time t that the attribute b is claimed for the object A; but the object A, inasmuch as it is thought to exist at time t (hence to have this determination) is claimed to have attribute b.7

Bolzano uses the concepts of proposition and truth in a myriad of ways in his Wissenschaftslehre to define important logical concepts such as validity, deducibility, analyticity, probability, and science. It is no exaggeration to say he gives the most comprehensive and rigorous account of truth and associated concepts between the Middle Ages and Frege, and in several respects his range and vision is not recovered until the work of Tarski and Carnap in the twentieth century. That is not to say that his views are unproblematic. Any Platonism is problematic, and Bolzano’s Platonism (like Frege’s) is sufficiently thorough to harbour contradictions.8 It is easy to formulate semantic paradoxes in Bolzanian, such as

The proposition expressed by this sentence is false.
The attribute of not applying to itself both applies and does not apply to itself.
The idea of not falling under itself both does and does not fall under itself.

It may be that with some fancy footwork we can tweak Bolzano’s semantics to avoid paradoxes, but it would be wishful romanticism to suppose Bolzano himself was clearly aware of such problems.
In sum, his whimsical view on subject–predicate form apart, Bolzano’s theory of truth is a century ahead of its time and still stands up remarkably well to the most rigorous scrutiny.

**Brentano**

Like all his philosophy, Brentano’s views on truth underwent a complicated and at times tortuous development. This impression is heightened by reading the collection of writings *The True and the Evident*, which was posthumously gathered together by his editor Kraus and furnished with copious notes and explanations. Kraus distinguishes an early view and a late view, the early view dating from the 1880s and the late view from the 1900s. This misses out the historically most important work of Brentano, the 1874 *Psychology*. When that is considered, it turns out that Brentano’s development is more complex, with an early phase (up to the 1880s), a middle phase (1880s–1890s, Kraus’s ‘early’ phase) and a late phase (1900s onwards). Also, the early phase is closer to the later phase in many respects, and it is the middle phase that is the odd one out. In the middle phase, Brentano pays somewhat half-hearted lip-service to Aristotle’s correspondence theory and he also toys with the idea of a special object or content of judgement, which later emerges in Meinong, Husserl and Marty as the concept of state of affairs or something similar. Either side of this middle phase, Brentano’s theory is much leaner and also more original, emphasizing the concept of evidence. This sandwich theory of Brentano’s development is a slight simplification, but it is close enough for present purposes. I shall concentrate first on what is common to the early and late periods.

Brentano takes the primary bearers of truth and falsity to be judgements, individual dated mental acts. His theory of intentionality tells him that all mental acts have an object, though not all in the same way. Brentano rejects the subject–predicate analysis of judgement because it does not adequately cover existential judgements, whether positive, like *Socrates exists* or *There are lions*, or negative, like *Hamlet does not exist* or *There are no unicorns*. Accordingly he sees existential or *thetic* judgements as involving the simple acceptance or rejection of an object or kind of objects, in our examples accepting Socrates and lions while rejecting Hamlet and unicorns. *Synthetic* or predicative judgements appear to have a different form but Brentano can easily show that they are equivalent to thetic judgements with complex material, for example *All men are mortal* involves the rejection of immortal men. There is a complication about judgements with
existential import in the subject position but it makes no essential difference and I shall disregard it.

Suppose the correspondence theory of truth – which Brentano takes from Aristotle – were right. In Aristotle this takes the form of saying a true judgement combines in thought what is combined in nature and separates in thought what is separate in nature. This analysis works reasonably for subject–predicate or synthetic judgements, but what about thetic judgements, in particular true negative existential judgements like our examples? If a judgement truly denies the existence of Hamlet or unicorns, what is there for it to correspond to in reality, since these things are precisely absent? Early and late, Brentano rejects the idea of there being an item called the non-existence of Hamlet, and equally rejects a non-existent Hamlet so he is forced to reject the correspondence theory. Instead he comes at the concept of truth in a completely different way, via the concept of insight (Einsicht) or evidence (Evidenz: the German word does not carry the forensic connotations of the English). Taking his cue from Descartes, Brentano declares that there are certain judgements about which we cannot be mistaken, which we judge with evidence. These comprise analytic judgements on the one hand, which are necessarily true, and judgements of inner perception on the other hand, which are contingently true, and which consist in our judging on our own inner conscious state, e.g. I judge that I am now seeing a keyboard or feeling hungry. All judgements made with evidence are true and their negations are false, but not all judgements are made with evidence. On many matters we are not in a position to judge evidently, e.g. about events in the past or future or remote in space from us, things otherwise hidden from access, such as the mental states of others. So we cannot simply define true judgements as evident ones. A more hopeful definition would be to say that a true judgement is one which is evident, or which would be judged with evidence by someone in a position to do so. A negative way to obtain the same result would be to say that a true judgement is one which cannot contradict an evident judgement. This view satisfied Brentano for a long time. But here is an objection due to Ehrenfels.12 Suppose there are some propositions wholly inaccessible to any knowledge, for example whether or not there exists a diamond weighing exactly 100 kilograms. Neither the positive nor the negative proposition can be brought into contradiction with what is evident. So it seems both a proposition and its contradictory are true, which cannot be. Kraus answers this for Brentano by stating that if there is such an unknowable diamond then while positive knowledge is ruled out only because of inaccessibility, negative knowledge is ruled out both because of inaccessibility and because there
cannot be knowledge that there is no such diamond if there is one in fact; the argument is symmetrical if there is no such diamond. In my view this is no answer at all unless one accepts the principles that no knowledge is false, which is uncontroversial, and that a judgement (evident or not) that there is no such diamond cannot be true if there is in fact such a diamond. This is simply one part of a Tarski-style disquotational principle (there will be two, one for acceptance, one for rejection):

A judgement that an $A$ exists is not true if an $A$ does not exist.
A judgement that an $A$ does not exist is not true if an $A$ does exist.

Whether one wants to call this a correspondence theory or not, what dictates the truth or falsity of a thetic judgement is not evidence or its possibility but whether the object accepted or rejected does in fact exist or not. That is as Aristotelian as it gets.

Brentano’s insistence on defining truth of judgements (often Brentano prefers the term ‘correct’ to ‘true’) via evidence means that there can be no such thing as a false but evident judgement. The sort of strong subjective convictions to which fanatics and enthusiasts are prone cannot be evident as they are often wrong. So evidence is not given by subjective strength of conviction, and it remains something of a mystery as to how we can recognize evidence when we meet it in ourselves. Brentano is himself sure that we have some evident judgements and that we recognize them as such, and I think he is right about that, but it is far less plausible to suppose our recognition of evidence is itself infallible, and fixing the range of the evident is not likely to be easy if indeed it is possible at all.

In the later reistic philosophy Brentano de-emphasizes judgements in favour of (concrete) judgers, but allowing for this the account of truth in terms of evidence remains much the same:

Someone is a correct-judger-that-$p$ if and only if there can be no evidently-correct-judger-that-not-$p$.

In the middle phase Brentano is more sympathetic to Aristotle and the correspondence theory and so to take account of the problem of true negative existentials tentatively postulates what he calls judgement-contents (Urteilsinhalte), such as the non-existence of Hamlet or the existence of Socrates. Someone who correctly judges that Hamlet does not exist does so because there is such a judgement-content as the non-existence of Hamlet whereas there is no such thing as the non-existence
of Socrates. These existences and non-existences, and similarly possibilities and impossibilities, are not real objects but abstract, or as Brentano calls them, irreal. However in line with his generally nominalistic inclination he fairly soon casts them off again in favour of an ascetic ontology of things, including judges, and judges-with-evidence. In his letters to Marty, Husserl and others in this late period, and in his dictated notes, Brentano makes great play of rejecting their equivalents of judgement-contents and goes on an intellectual crusade against irrealia, to which Kraus adds with shrill commentary and harsh accusation against Meinong and Husserl (not his teacher Marty) of basically making free with Brentano’s middle-period ideas and then obstinately refusing to recognize his refutations of them. In tone as well as content, this kind of fervent Brentano-advocacy, in which Kraus was seconded by Alfred Kastil, was as unprofessional as it was ultimately unenlightening. Brentano is best left to speak for himself, even if his manuscripts are complex and his message changes through his work.

**Marty**

Brentano’s closest early pupil, the Swiss-born Anton Marty (1847–1914), counts as Austrian by dint of his long tenure in Prague. Marty agreed with Brentano on many things but not on the theory of truth and judgement-contents. He refused to make the reistic turn Brentano completed in his final years. Marty accepts judgement-contents because he accepts a modest and modernized form of the correspondence theory of truth. A judgement is true if it corresponds to a judgement-content and false if it doesn’t. Judgement-contents are the ontological correlates of judgements and sentences as things are the correlates of ideas and words. Marty’s writings are not easy to read, because he typically proceeds by tedious polemical confrontation with others’ views rather than by connectedly setting out his own. In particular his *opus magnum*, the *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie* is, at nearly 800 pages, very dated in its polemics and unlikely ever to be translated.

Judgement-contents are in effect what Husserl and others later called states of affairs. Marty occasionally uses this term but usually elects to use the Brentanian term in order to emphasize their role as contents or objects of judgement. That does not mean they only exist if judgements exist: on the contrary, they exist independently of whether there are any judgements and judges or not, but it is of their nature to be such that judgements can have them as objects. Unlike states of affairs on most interpretations, they are not timeless beings but exist in time. However,
like standard states of affairs they are non-spatial and cannot interact with physical things: they are ‘anergetic’ (wirkungsunfähig). So in all these regards they are non-real. Marty’s view is that only true judgments correspond to judgement-contents: there are none for false judgements. In this they are unlike both Meinong’s objectives and Bolzano’s propositions. Marty’s view marks the first appearance in Austrian philosophy of a clear role distinction between truth-bearers (judgements) and truth-makers (judgement-contents), and in addition to allowing a correspondence theory to be formulated in a way which takes account of Brentano’s puzzle example of true negative existentials, the theory guarantees (as do those of Bolzano and Brentano in their different ways) the objectivity of truth.

Judgement-contents fall into different types, correlated with the kind of judgement to which they may correspond. We have those of

- **Being**: e.g. the being of Socrates
- **Non-being**: e.g. the non-being of Hamlet
- **Being-so**: e.g. the being-human of Socrates
- **Being-impossible**: e.g. the being-impossible of a triangular square
- **Being-necessary**: e.g. the being-necessary of God

and there are others such as being-probable. What there are not are negative ones of the form being-not-so, since if Socrates is not a basketball player this is made true by the non-being of the judgement-content that Socrates is a basketball player. (For this to work we obviously need contents of non-being and cannot eliminate these in the same way.)

The temporal existence of judgement-contents gives a peculiar and interesting twist to Marty’s version of the correspondence theory, because it allows him to give a neat account of the truth of tensed propositions. A judgement such as *Socrates is in the marketplace* will vary in its truth-value, being true at some times and false at others. When it is true, it will be because of the existence of a judgement-content of the being-in-the-marketplace of Socrates, which ceases to exist when he leaves that location. The next time he enters, a new such judgement-content comes into existence to make the present-tense proposition true. Judgement-contents, being non-spatial and anergetic, are not caused to come into or go out of existence, though their comings and goings depend on the doings of the real objects they are about. The truth-values of other tensed judgements are determined by their relation to the time of existence of present-tensed ones. The judgement that *Socrates will be in the marketplace tomorrow* is true iff a
judgement-content of the being-in-the-marketplace of Socrates will exist on the day following the occurrence of the judgement. There is no need for non-present-tensed judgement-contents.

Despite its peculiarities and some drawbacks, Marty’s theory is a quite elegant compromise between ontologically inflationary and deflationary accounts of truth, and deserves to be better known.\textsuperscript{14}

**Meinong**

Of Brentano’s students, the one whose doctrines most distanced himself from the master was Alexius Meinong, though Meinong’s infamously large ontology developed slowly out of nominalist beginnings.\textsuperscript{15} Like middle Brentano and Marty, Meinong adopted special contents or objects for judgement, which he insisted on calling **objectives**. Objectives are never spatial or causal, and unlike Marty’s judgement-contents they are atemporal. In role they hover uncertainly between Bolzano’s propositions and Marty’s judgement-contents, because every (well-formed) judgement and also every assumption (like a judgement but lacking the element of conviction) corresponds to an objective, just as every judgement corresponds to a proposition in Bolzano. Objectives are thus fit to play the role of sentence-meanings, since a well-formed sentence will always have an objective it expresses. They are also truth-bearers, like propositions. However Meinong contrives to make them truth-makers as well, because they do not all have the same ontological status. Those corresponding to and expressed by true judgements subsist (bestehen) while those corresponding to false judgements do not subsist, but are objects outside being, a status they share with the notorious round square and other denizens of ontology’s outer darkness. Objectives cannot migrate in status: they either subsist or do not. Meinong also calls subsisting objectives factual (tatsächlich) or facts (Tatsachen) and non-subsisting ones unfactual (untatsächlich) or even unfacts (Untatsachen). Objectives share several features with the propositions of early Moore and Russell, which misled Russell into thinking they were exactly alike, which they are not in two respects: not all objectives subsist, and the things objects are about are not parts of them, whereas for Russell the proposition *Mont Blanc is over 4,000 m high* has the mountain as a part.\textsuperscript{16}

On this basis one would have thought Meinong had a perfectly straightforward way to define truth for judgements and sentences: a judgement (sentence) is true if its corresponding objective subsists and false if it doesn’t. Somewhat perversely, Meinong elects not to use the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ in this way but to confine those terms to factual
(respectively, unfactual) objectives which are actually apprehended by someone. This makes no practical difference as regards judgements, assumptions or sentences, since when there is a judgement or assumption or a sentence with meaning, someone automatically apprehends the corresponding objective, which is then a truth or untruth depending on whether it is a fact or an unfact. So Meinong’s theory is not a correspondence theory between truth-bearers and truth-makers: when an objective is apprehended the truth-bearer or falsehood-bearer is the same item as the truth- or falsehood-maker. What is made true is not the primary truth-bearer (which itself already is true) but the judgement or assumption.

Like Marty, Meinong distinguishes a number of ‘grammatically’ different kinds of objective, namely objectives of being, of being-so (divided into being-what and being-how), of not-being and (unlike Marty) of not-being-so, as well as various modal objectives, for which one can give similar examples. A not-being-so is to be distinguished from the not-being of a so-being. This is because of Meinong’s notorious incomplete objects, like the object which is mountainous, golden and nothing else. This is (by Leibniz’s Law) a different object from the mountain which is golden and not blue and nothing else. The blueness of the golden mountain is a non-subsistent being-so, since the golden mountain is not blue. The non-blueness of the golden non-blue mountain is a not-being-so that has being. It sounds worse than it is. Normally it goes without saying that an object that is golden is not blue, but not for Meinong, because for him there is also the golden blue mountain, which in addition to being incomplete is also impossible because materially inconsistent in colour. It is only existing objects or ones which could exist (possible objects) for which such things go without saying.

In his final years when developing his theory of probability, Meinong made an interesting enlargement to his theory of objectives. In addition to factual and unfactual objectives, he added a third class of subfactual (untertatsächlich) ones, indeed a whole range of degrees of subfactuality were admitted, which stretch in magnitude between those whose degree of factuality is 1 (the factual) and those where it is 0 (the unfactual). The connection with probability is obvious. If an incomplete object such as the next throw of this die is embedded in an objective such as the next throw of this die’s being a six, the objective’s degree of factuality measures the probability of the outcome of the actual next throw being a six (for a fair die, 1/6 of course). In this way, Meinong somewhat unexpectedly became one of the precursors of many-valued logic, since the three (counting ‘subfactual’ as one value) or infinitely
many (counting all the degrees) values add to the classical two. It is interesting that when Meinong was developing his theory one of the visitors to Graz was the young Jan Łukasiewicz.17 Meinong’s views are often as in this case idiosyncratic and to accept them fully one would need to accept his big ontology of objects outside being. However, they are very systematically thought out and not inelegant. For a while they captivated and influenced the young Russell, though Russell never fully understood them and later savagely misrepresented them, resulting in a caricature of Meinong becoming prevalent in English-speaking philosophy.18 Meinong’s ideas were taken up and modified by other members of the Graz School such as Mally and Ameseder, but I shall not go into that.

Husserl

Brentano’s most illustrious and influential student adopted and maintained a correspondence theory of truth but added in aspects of Brentano’s notion of evidence. Truth is principally about the relationship between representations (whether mental or linguistic) and the world; it was natural then that when Husserl for methodological purposes turned his back on the world in the transcendental phenomenological reduction, the notion of truth should recede in importance in his work. In the pre-transcendental Logical Investigations, however, a fully-fledged and committed account of truth is to be found. Husserl, like Marty and Meinong, adopts a special category of objects whose role is to make truths true:

The full and entire object corresponding to the whole judgement is the state of affairs [Sachverhalt] judged: the same state of affairs is presented in a mere presentation, wished in a wish, asked after in a question, doubted in a doubt etc.19

In Husserl we actually find the term ‘make true’ [wahrmachen] for the first time as a description of the role of states of affairs, though this may not be apparent to those who do not read the original: in Findlay’s English translation ‘wahrmachen’ is rendered as ‘verify’: ‘At each step, […] one must distinguish the verifying [wahrmachenden] state of affairs from the state of affairs constitutive of the self-evidence itself’.20

Husserl was (at this time, 1900–1) as part of his anti-psychologism, and under the acknowledged and explicit influence of Bolzano, a robust Platonist about propositions, which provide the content for judgements but are not themselves mental, and the truth of a proposition consists
in there being a correlated state of affairs to which it corresponds. A false proposition is one for which there is no corresponding state of affairs. This is a rather straightforward form of correspondence theory and Husserl appears to regard it as sufficiently obvious not to have to go into detail about what the correlation consists in, for example. Of rightness or correctness of a judgement or proposition, Husserl simply remarks, ‘We have [. . .] the rightness, e.g., of the judgement in the logical sense of the proposition: the proposition “directs” itself to the thing itself, it says that it is so, and it really is so.’\textsuperscript{21} This rightness shows itself in our experience as a sense of matching which is at its most potent in the experience of self-evidence (\textit{Evidenz}), which term Husserl takes from Brentano, but makes criterial not of truth per se but of our most secure awareness that things are as we take them to be, when the object of judgement, the state of affairs, is given most fully or adequately.\textsuperscript{22} Because (self)-evidence was not part of the definition of truth, Husserl could afford to be more relaxed about its fallibility than Brentano.

As a phenomenologist, Husserl is far more interested in the experience of self-evidence than in truth itself. In his struggle to overcome relativism, especially psychologism, Husserl stressed the objectivity of truth and its independence of the nature of those who judge it, pointing out its relational or, as Husserl would later put it, two-sided nature. A proposition is true not because of some fact about a thinker but because of an objectively existing abstract proposition’s relation to something that is not a proposition, namely a state of affairs. While connections among truths are correlated (in true accounts and theories) with connections among things, the two are distinct, as are the categories of proposition and state of affairs themselves.

After Husserl had his transcendental turn, truth itself lost much of its theoretical immediacy for him. Returning almost three decades later to the question of how propositions stand to reality and how the laws of logic have their justification, Husserl replaced his simple but robust realism, which he sustains only ‘in brackets’ as part of the natural attitude, by a feeble attempt at a transcendental justification for the laws of logic. It was, however, the earlier, rather commonsensical theory of the \textit{Logical Investigations} which recommended itself to the young Turks of the phenomenological movement, such as Daubert, Reinach, Conrad and Ingarden. These realist phenomenologists were dismayed by Husserl’s new transcendentalism and refused to turn with him. By contrast, during his realist heyday Husserl managed artfully to combine elements of the theories of Bolzano and Brentano.
Twardowski and later Poles

Twardowski’s first achievement was to crystallize the distinction between contents and objects of presentations, which his teacher Brentano had not originally made. He does go on to discuss the case of judgement but he does not propose, as do Marty, Meinong and Husserl, a special category of judgement-objects, but is content to work with the ontology of things and their attributes in accounting for truth. Twardowski’s principal legacy to the theory of truth is his insistence that truth is an absolute property and is not relative to circumstance, whether of utterance or other contextual feature. A judgement is simply true or false, not true for some and false for others, or true here and false there or true now and false later. Twardowski had read Bolzano and it is likely he was influenced by this aspect of Bolzano’s account, though as a good Brentanist he did not embrace Bolzano’s ontology of abstract ideas and propositions. Twardowski’s 1900 article ‘On so-called relative truths’ became an article of faith among his Lvov pupils, and later Polish philosophers and logicians who studied with him, such as Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski, Ajdukiewicz and Kotarbiński, all, despite their many differences in other matters of doctrine, upheld a theory of truth as an absolute property. Łukasiewicz introduced the novel idea of a third truth-value, but his reason for doing so, namely his concern to refute determinism and account for future contingents, had already inspired a quality debate between Kotarbiński and Leśniewski in 1913. Like Brentano, Łukasiewicz studied Aristotle attentively, and it was Aristotle’s classic account of truth, ‘To say of what is not that it is and of what is that it is not is false; to say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not is true’ was transmitted by Łukasiewicz to later Poles and was used by them as the statement of a realist theory which is lean in its commitments, lacking the elsewhere familiar resort to facts or states of affairs. It is no accident that when Tarski came to formulate his theory of truth for formal languages he appealed to this ontologically lean account, or that Kotarbiński went out of his way to avoid commitment to facts or states of affairs. The other aspect of Polish interest in truth that fed into their discussion was the concern about semantic paradoxes, which had been raised in the early twentieth century as part of the general worry about paradoxes in and around the foundations of mathematics. Łukasiewicz again supplied the classical source, but it was Leśniewski who obsessed about paradox and enforced the strict use/mention object language/metalanguage distinction which became a crucial element in Tarski’s account. Leśniewski himself rejected Tarski’s account of truth because it employed the hated set theory and
other Platonic instruments. For Leśniewski, as for Frege, truth in logic was to be sought by getting the axioms and rules right, not by bringing an extraneous theory to bear. Philosophical and mathematical posterity has however backed Tarski against Leśniewski, as it backed Carnap against Wittgenstein, and preferred the freedom openly to engage in explicit semantics.

In general the Polish discussions of truth, because of their subsequent influence, have a more ‘modern’ air than the others we have considered, but they are reluctant to engage in heavy theory about what truth consists in. Whereas for Twardowski the truth-bearers of choice were mental judgements, from Łukasiewicz everyone took physical sentences to be the truth-bearers. This was felt to be more scientific, though the change was not without its drawbacks in regard to forcing indexicality to be ignored for the sake of the absoluteness of truth. The other outstanding aspect of Polish discussion is the much enhanced precision they bring to the discussion, with punctilious observance of use/mention, clear accounts of quotation, and a detailed specification of the languages for which truth was being considered. Of the Austrians, only Carnap could match this precision, and much of the technical assurance of modern discussion goes back to the Polish innovations.

Wittgenstein

In the *Tractatus* and the writings leading up to it, Wittgenstein developed, in opposition to Frege and in (not always harmonious) tandem with Russell, a subtle and attractive realist theory of truth with many ramifications. Wittgenstein’s starting points were his rejection of Frege’s conception of sentential clauses as singular terms denoting truth-values, his insistence on the true/false bipolarity of propositions, and his modified acceptance of Whitehead and Russell’s account of logically atomic propositions as being true because of the existence of corresponding complexes. Propositions have different logical forms, so the truth of propositions is not to be explained in a unitary way. A disjunction is true if and only if at least one disjunct is true and false if neither is: it inherits truth from its disjuncts and passes falsehood down to them, and that is the model of how logical constants work, not by their being functions among truth-values as Frege thought. Wittgenstein’s is therefore not a correspondence theory of truth, because there is no uniform relation of correspondence, but it is a realist theory, because the basis of all propositions, the atomic ones, are true or false depending on what there is.25 That whose existence makes an atomic proposition true Wittgenstein calls a state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*), and
he construes states of affairs as utterly non-object-like. An existing state of affairs Wittgenstein also calls a fact (*Tatsache*), and it consists of simple objects in configuration, the objects being directly named in a proposition and the meaningful relation among the names which constitutes the proposition symbolizing the configuration among the objects. So for Wittgenstein a proposition is not a complex but itself a fact, the fact of names being configured in a certain way. This exact picturing earns the theory its name of the *picture theory*. But names and propositions still function quite differently, names by standing for objects, propositions by being true or false depending on whether the state of affairs depicted exists or not. If it exists, the state of affairs makes the relevant atomic proposition true; if it does not, the proposition is false by default. In not asking for a special negative entity to make a negative atomic proposition true, Wittgenstein’s logical atomism is more austere than Russell’s. Likewise the function of extensional logical constants (which Wittgenstein shows can be reduced to a single multigrade constant of joint denial) is not to picture something special of their own, not even a special function, but to determine the truth-value of the complex propositions they build in terms of the truth-possibilities of the constituent simpler propositions. Wittgenstein was the first to explain the role of truth-functions in this deflationary but adequate way. Logic arises because certain combinations cannot fail to be true, and dually to this, other combinations cannot fail to be false.

Wittgenstein’s account is more complex than Russell’s logical atomism developed at the same time, having subtleties that even Wittgenstein did not always (then or thereafter) explain fully. Nevertheless, it is possible to descry a realist position according to which truth consists in one of a myriad of detailed relations between language or other signs, propositions and the world of facts, which can be loosely indicated by saying that a proposition is true if things are the way it says they are and false if they are not. The obverse to this cheerful realism was a series of doleful prohibitions on what could meaningfully be said, including anything about the relationship between language and the world, thus rendering semantics, whether logical or linguistic, and with it any theory of truth, literally nonsense. With dubious coherence Wittgenstein applied the same prohibitions to his own work, declaring it to be nonsense. This limiting feature of his account of language and truth was the one which least satisfied his contemporaries.

Wittgenstein’s theory of truth has its blue passages and its difficulties, for instance the idea that propositions or sentences are facts cannot be sustained, nor obviously is it nonsense to do semantics: one can find an exit, as Russell suggested, in a hierarchy of languages or something
similar. Nor is its very brief dismissal of intensional contexts with their attendant difficulties for an extensional account of meaning at all convincing. Nevertheless, it is somewhat unjustly belittled as a hopeless dead end: properly tidied up and modified, it can be made to work very nicely within its limitations. By contrast, in his middle years Wittgenstein became convinced by Frege’s and Ramsey’s position that truth is not a substantive notion, ‘it is true that \( p \)’ being tantamount to ‘\( p \)’ and ‘it is false that \( p \)’ to ‘\( \neg p \)’. With this now familiar deflationary position he turned his back on the idea of a theory of truth, influencing many others in the process.

**Schlick**

Wittgenstein’s briefly intensive and occasionally fraught interaction with Schlick’s Vienna Circle was brought about by the latter’s admiration for the *Tractatus*. It was Wittgenstein’s ability to combine knowledge of modern logic with philosophical depth that attracted Schlick, but like others he was less happy about the limitations imposed by the Tractarian doctrine of showing. Schlick’s role as initiator and mentor of the Circle, his selfless shepherding of the hypersensitive Wittgenstein into the cut-and-thrust of Circle debate, and finally his dramatic and absurd murder have conspired to somewhat overshadow his own philosophical achievements, which were not inconsiderable. In particular Schlick was a constant friend and supporter of the correspondence theory of truth. His 1910 *Habilitationsschrift* was on *The Nature of Truth in Modern Logic*, and in it Schlick defends a version of the correspondence theory: ‘A judgement is true if it univocally designates a specific state of affairs’.26

Schlick takes the correspondence relation to be the semantic one of one-to-one or univocal designation; the second term of the relation he also calls *facts*. He makes a clear distinction between this *definition* of truth and the *criterion* of truth, which he takes – as early as 1910 – to be verification. If a judgement fails to designate just one fact, then it is false. Schlick does not consider the case of a judgement wholly failing to designate any facts, but regards falsehood as arising when a judgement designates two or more facts, and is thus equivocal. This is a view which is not widespread among philosophers of truth, but he reiterates it with minor alterations in his 1918 *General Theory of Knowledge*,27 the main difference being that now a true judgement is allowed to designate not just one but a whole group of facts, but to do so in a univocal way, whereas a false judgement designates two or more groups of facts. Schlick emphasizes, in rather modern fashion, the relatively
platitudinous and uncontentious nature of the position that he upholds:

The account that will be offered here of the essential nature of truth is modest and unpretentious; yet we shall quickly see that it is indeed able to do justice to all the properties ascribed to truth both in science and in ordinary life – from the plainest to the most exalted – those that make truth one of the highest human goods.28

Schlick is faithful to correspondence to the end. In one of his last major pieces, the essay ‘On the Foundations of Knowledge’ of 1934,29 he comes down in favour of the correspondence theory again, though negatively, by way of excluding its rival, the coherence theory, which had been defended by his co-Circular Otto Neurath. Schlick’s argument is the one made familiar by Russell, that coherence cannot be anything more than logical consistency, and that many consistent systems of sentences are possible, of which only one can be the truth, since the systems are mutually incompatible. Therefore while consistency may be a partial criterion of truth (no inconsistent set of sentences can all be true), it cannot be what truth consists in, which leaves only the correspondence theory as a serious contender.

Neurath and Carnap

The Vienna Circle’s intellectual mentor Ernst Mach had next to nothing to say about truth, which is precisely what one would expect from a phenomenalist and positivist. It was Schlick especially and Wittgenstein to some extent who brought the subject of truth into the Circle. Of all the Viennese, Neurath was the most consistently and vehemently anti-metaphysical.30 Adapting Wittgenstein’s view that we cannot in language talk about the relationship between language and the world, and refusing to accept any trick which would somehow enable us to do so after all, Neurath rejected the correspondence theory because it precisely claimed truth to consist in a relationship between something linguistic and something extra-linguistic. Consistently with his radical physicalism, Neurath would accept neither abstract propositions nor mental judgements as truth-bearers, taking them instead to be physical sentences (events and inscriptions). If it is illegitimate to talk about how language relates to something else (which according to Neurath would involve somehow using language to step outside language), then truth could only consist not in relations between sentences and the world but among sentences themselves. This view, which was
known from the British neo-Hegelians, had no other major supporters among Austrian philosophers. Neurath insisted with Duhem that it is not individual sentences which are tested for their truth but whole interconnected systems, and that since we can attain to no perspective outside language from which to judge the adequacy of a system, if we come across discrepancies between what we think and say and what we find to be going on, the system of sentences needs to be overhauled from within language. This led Neurath to his famous metaphor of our being like mariners in a ship which has to be repaired at sea and cannot put into drydock. The physicalism, Duhemian holism and the absence of an external viewpoint were taken up after the war by Neurath’s most influential emulator in this regard, Quine.

During the intensive phase of his collaboration with the Vienna Circle, especially with Neurath, who converted him to physicalism, Carnap had very little to say on the subject of truth, because semantic paradoxes like the Liar and Grelling’s Paradox of heterologicality convinced him that a consistent theory of truth was not to be had. There is a mere passing mention in The Logical Syntax of Language, and no definition of truth. The situation changed dramatically in the Circle when Tarski’s consistent theory of truth for certain formalized languages became known in the early 1930s, even before its publication. Carnap quickly adopted Tarski’s position, which was fairly easy to fit into the theoretical framework that Syntax had constructed for logic. In his later writings in America such as Introduction to Semantics, Carnap was quite happy to revert to the truth-values of his teacher Frege and to construct an elaborate system of extensions and intensions for expressions of all kinds, including sentences, which expressed propositions but denoted truth-values. Carnap’s decisions came to inform much of what later became ‘West Coast’ semantics and linguistics.

Neurath was however suspicious of Tarski’s theory from the start, seeing it, perceptively indeed, as a Trojan horse which would reintroduce the hated metaphysics back into scientific philosophy. Once all those entities – objects, sequences, functions – that Tarski employed to make his apparently innocuous theory of truth work were taken at face value, one was up to one’s ears in metaphysics. Neurath was prepared to reject Tarski’s semantics, including his account of truth, rather than allow this. Carnap was however unbothered by the apparent ontological commitments because he considered these to be matters not of genuine metaphysical discovery but of scientific expediency, and apparent commitments could be explained away in terms of misleadingly treating talk about expressions as though it were talk about things denoted by expressions. Quine too, after explicating the touchstone
quantifier test of ontological commitment, latterly became insouciant about the genuine strength of commitment, retreating to a metaphysical indifference which is closer to Carnap’s tolerance than Neurath’s intolerance. It would be misleading however to say that Carnap became tolerant of metaphysics: he was prepared to exploit entities for theoretical purposes but their choice was dictated by pragmatic and instrumental rather than external metaphysical considerations. Both Carnap and later Quine, influenced by the successes of Tarski’s theory, were deflationists about truth.

**Popper**

Like the Vienna Circle, and for similar reasons, Karl Popper initially fought shy of truth, and in his Logik der Forschung it gets barely a mention, and what is said even Popper later admitted to be naive. Like Carnap, however, Popper was impressed by Tarski’s formal feat in showing how to define a truth predicate for certain (relatively weak) formal languages. Popper later made constructive suggestions on how to simplify Tarski’s theory, using finite rather than infinite sequences to define the crucial concept of satisfaction of a sentence (closed or open) by a sequence. In later years Popper looked on Tarski as a saviour of the correspondence theory of truth, and praised him as such. It is at best an overinterpretation of Tarski to call his very particular view a correspondence theory. Although Tarski does encourage the identification by glossing the ‘classical’ theory as ‘true – corresponding with reality’ and quoting with approval Kotarbiński’s formulation of correspondence in the form ‘a true sentence is one which says that the state of affairs is so and so and the state of affairs indeed is so and so’, in fact the term of art ‘state of affairs’ immediately drops out of discussion, and Tarski proceeds to his extremely careful account without ever raising or defining anything that might be termed ‘correspondence’, or even mentioning a second term to a truth relation as any normal correspondence theorist would. Tarski’s famous (and unhappily-named) Convention T, in reality a stipulatory test for the material adequacy of any definition of ‘true sentence’ for the language in question, is at least as close to Ramsey’s redundancy idea as it is to any idea of correspondence. A T-sentence like

> The German sentence ‘Der Schnee ist weiß’ is true if and only if snow is white

does not provide a second term for a relation, such as a fact or state of
affairs, as a correspondence theory would: it merely states a condition that has to be satisfied by any adequate account of truth for suitable bits of German. Nevertheless, Popper is happy to say

When in 1935 Tarski explained to me (in the Volksgarten in Vienna) the idea of his definition of the concept of truth, I realized how important it was, and that he had finally rehabilitated the much-maligned correspondence theory of truth, which, I suggest, is and always has been the commonsense theory of truth.35

Popper’s eagerness to ascribe a correspondence theory to Tarski has much more the air of an outpouring of gratitude for sanctioning Popper to take up the realist idea of correspondence to the facts with a clear scientific conscience: Popper even talks about his ‘intense joy and relief’36 at learning from Tarski (‘the one man whom I could truly regard as my teacher in philosophy’),37 though he also (rightly) suspected Tarski would not be so happy at the heavily realist gloss Popper put on his work.

In his later years, Popper introduced into his philosophy an innovation which brings us neatly full circle in this account of Austrian theories of truth. This is his doctrine of World 3. Frege had distinguished three realms or domains, one of physical things, a second of mental things, and a third realm (Frege used the retrospectively unfortunate term ‘drittes Reich’) of things which are not spatiotemporal but are yet objective, which included his Platonic numbers and other mathematical objects but also the truth-values and all the propositions and other senses of his semantics. Popper chose the more politically anodyne terms ‘World 3’ or ‘The Third World’ for this, and expressly mentions Bolzano’s idea of truths and other statements (in themselves) as a forebear which had always impressed him.38 Popper embraced this view once he could convince himself that to do so would not commit him to idealism of any sort, and he stressed the reality of World 3 items, which include problems and theories, of the sort crucial to a philosopher of science. While Popper’s World 3 objects, unlike those of Bolzano, enjoy only limited autonomy from us, since they are brought into being by our creative acts, they also legitimately be termed ‘real’ because they change and are able to exert a causal influence on affairs in Worlds 1 and 2. Popper’s adoption of World 3 did not however materially change his view that truth consisted in correspondence to reality of the facts: it merely made it clear that the first term of the relation, the truth-bearer, could be a World 3 entity as it had been for Bolzano.
Overall

Austrian philosophers are an assorted bunch, and this comes out especially clearly in the variety of conceptions of truth they uphold – as would be expected of several highly intelligent philosophers whose work spreads over a century and a half. Nevertheless, there are a number of features which recur often enough to enable us to make some generalizations. They are all realists of some sort, so they regard truth as an objective and not a created or constructed attribute of whatever it is that bears truth. They resolutely avoid idealism and its attendant account of truth, except for Neurath, who is the odd one out in many respects, though he is no idealist. They regard truth as a cardinally important property, especially as it is the prime virtue of propositions, theories and judgements, and an essential moment of knowledge. They differ in how much they stress the criteria as distinct from the essence of truth. Above all, the ontologies they invoke to explicate truth vary considerably, from the semantic Platonism of Bolzano, Husserl and Popper, to the extreme reism of Brentano: some take the truth-bearers to be abstract, others take them to be mental, yet others take them to be physical linguistic tokens. Some have special truth-making proposition-correlates (facts, state of affairs), others make do with a more traditional ontology. Most adhere to some form of a correspondence theory, though the degree and satisfactoriness of explanation of correspondence are uneven. The common concern for truth is an abiding one among Austrian philosophers, while their varying responses provide an illustrative cross section of their rich variety.

Notes

1 Bolzano WL § 24.
2 Bolzano WL § 25.
4 As explained clearly in WL § 24.
5 Bolzano WL § 31.
6 This is Bolzano’s argument in the subsequent section, WL § 32.
7 Bolzano WL § 127, Paragraph 5.
8 As argued in Morscher 1987.
9 In the Introduction to the second edition of Brentano’s Psychology.
10 Brentano Psychology Book II, Ch. I, § 5.
11 Brentano Psychology Book II, Ch. VII, § 5.
12 Discussed by Kraus in his editor’s Introduction.
13 The scattered imprecations are gathered in Brentano 1952.
14 For a balanced survey see Morscher 1990.
15 As detailed in Grossmann 1974.
16 On the similarities and differences see Simons 1992.
17 See Simons 1986 on this connection.
19 Husserl L1, 579. Husserl probably took the term ‘Sachverhalt’ over from his older Halle colleague and fellow Brentano-student Carl Stumpf, a contemporary of Marty who shared much of his philosophy with other students of Brentano but fails to count as Austrian because he was German and only worked briefly in Prague.
20 Husserl, Inv. VI, § 39.
21 Ibid.
22 In this connection Husserl himself uses the word ‘correspondence’: Inv. VI, Introduction.
24 Twardowski 1900, 1902, 1999.
25 Tractatus 4.25: ‘If an atomic proposition is true, the state of affairs exists; if the atomic proposition is false, the state of affairs does not exist.’
26 Schlick 1979, 94.
27 Schlick 1925, 1974: see especially § 10, ‘What is Truth?’
28 Schlick 1925, 1974, § 10.
30 See e.g. Neurath 1934.
31 Carnap 1934.
32 Carnap 1942.
33 Tarski 1956, 153.
34 Ibid., 155.
35 Popper 1976, 98.
36 Popper 1972, 322. Chapter 9 is entitled ‘Philosophical Comments on Tarski’s Theory of Truth’.
37 Ibid.
38 Popper 1972, 126.

Bibliography

In many cases the works from which quotations are taken exist in different editions and with different page numberings, as well as in translations, sometimes more than one, also with different editions and different page numberings. To expedite reference, citations are to chapter and/or section numbers rather than pages, in the case of Brentano’s Psychology to the chapters and sections of the second German edition, which the English translation follows. Major available editions are listed.


In Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ which he began to study when he was 18 he was at once attracted by the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements, although he could never put up with Kant’s explanation of that distinction.

Bernard Bolzano [c. 1831]

It seems to me that . . . the lines between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ might be drawn in many different ways. As it is, I do not think that the two terms have any clear meaning.

G.E. Moore [1942]

Truth-value bearers and the concept of truth

For Bolzano analyticity, like truth and falsity, is a property of propositions (Sätze an sich). He takes the concept of a proposition to resist analysis or conceptual decomposition (Erklärung), but there are other ways of ‘achieving an understanding (Verständigung)’ of a concept. Consider a report of the following type: ‘Johanna said that copper conducts electricity, Jeanne said the same thing, though in different words, and Joan believes what they said.’ Here a that-clause is used to single out something that is (1) said by different speakers, (2) distinct from the linguistic vehicles used for saying it, and (3) believed by somebody. ‘Now, this is the sort of thing I mean by proposition,’ Bolzano would say, ‘propositions are sayables and thinkables, possible contents of sayings and thinking, that can be singled out by that-clauses.’

For Bolzano it is a matter of course that propositions resemble sentences in being structured wholes:

(B-1) It seems indisputable to me that every, even the simplest, proposition is composed of certain parts, and that parts do
not . . . merely appear . . . in the verbal expression of a proposition, but are contained already in the proposition.

Es däucht mir . . . unwidersprechlich, daß jeder auch noch so einfache Satz [sc. an sich] aus gewissen Theilen zusammengesetzt sey: daß sich nicht etwa . . . nur in dem wörtlichen Ausdrucke eines Satzes [sc. an sich] erst gewisse Theile . . . hervorhun, sondern daß diese Theile schon in dem Satze an sich enthalten sind.

(Wissenschaftslehre [1837], I 222)

Taking the notion of a proposition to be understood, he explains what he means by ‘notion’ (or rather, by ‘Vorstellung an sich’):5

(Df. N) x is a notion (Vorstellung an sich) :⇔

∃y (y is a proposition & x is a part of y & ¬ (x is a proposition)).

We need the concepts of a proposition and of non-propositional parts of propositions in order to grasp Bolzano’s ‘analytic definition of truth (Erklärung des Begriffes der Wahrheit)’.6

(B-2) A proposition is true if [and only if] . . . every object which stands under its subject-notion has a property which stands under its predicate-notion.

Ein Satz an sich ist wahr, wenn jeder Gegenstand, welcher der Subjectvorstellung des Satzes untersteht, eine Beschaffenheit hat, die der Prädicatvorstellung desselben untersteht.

(Letter to Exner [1834], 90)7

Bolzano assumes that every proposition P can be expressed by a sentence of the form ‘A has b’. In this schema the word ‘has’ is to be understood in the sense of ‘exemplifies’, and the small letter ‘b’ is a place-holder for an abstract singular term (such as ‘courage’) that purports to name the property of being B, where the capital letter ‘B’ is a dummy for a general term (like ‘courageous’) whose nominalization stands in the position of ‘b’. Bolzano calls the notions expressed by (a substitution-instance of) ‘A’, by ‘has’ and by (a substitution-instance of) ‘b’ respectively the subject-notion or Unterlage of P, the copula or connecting concept (Bindebegriff) of P, and the predicate-notion or Aussagetheil of P.8 Bolzano reads ‘Socrates is mortal’ as ‘Socrates has mortality’, and ‘All men are mortal’ as ‘Man has mortality’. So (B-2) is meant to cover immediately both the proposition that Socrates is
mortal and the proposition that all men are mortal. In the former case, every object falling under the subject-notion of the proposition is identical with Socrates. In a sentence like ‘This cloth has redness’, which is the canonical reformulation of ‘This cloth is red’, Bolzano takes the predicate-expression to express a notion under which many properties fall, namely all maximally specific shades of redness. Finally we should register that in Bolzano’s (as in Aristotle’s) eyes, the quantifier ‘every’ has existential import. Taking the variable ‘x’ to range over propositions, we can render his conception of truth in the following way:

\[ (Df. T) \ x \text{ is true } \iff \exists y \ (y \text{ falls under the subject-notion in } x) \land \forall y \ (y \text{ falls under the subject-notion in } x \to \exists z \ (z \text{ falls under the predicate-notion in } x \land y \text{ has } z)) \]

Since Bolzano assumes bivalence, we can add: a proposition which is not true is false. Note for future reference that Bolzano’s explanation of the concept of truth is non-epistemic. As he himself puts it, ‘in the concept that I associate with the word “truth” the concept of knowledge is by no means contained as a component’. Suppose, as Bolzano is inclined to do, that necessarily there is an omniscient deity: nevertheless, he insists, it is not the case that thinking of something as true is thinking of it as something that is, or can be, known by someone.

Before moving on, let me mention at least one problem with (Df. T). Suppose that every sentence can indeed be paraphrased, salvo sensu, by a sentence of Bolzano’s canonical form. Now Bolzano’s account of truth presupposes a unique decomposition for each proposition. But what is the subject-notion, what is the predicate-notion, of the proposition expressed by ‘The sun is larger than the moon’? Certainly, this sentence is multiply decomposable, so when Bolzano wants to put it into his canonical form, he has three options: ‘The collection (Inbegriff) consisting of the sun and the moon has the property that the former is larger than the latter’; ‘The sun has the property that it is larger than the moon’; and ‘The moon has the property that the sun is larger than it’. The propositions expressed by these sentences necessarily have the same truth-value, but they differ as to their subject-notions and their predicate-notions, they ascribe different properties (that don’t even have the same extension) to different individuals; so they are different. Bolzano thus has to claim that there is no such thing as the proposition expressed by ‘The sun is larger than the moon’.
Degress of validity – rediscovered by Łukasiewicz

Bolzano defines analyticity in terms of validity (Gültigkeit). So let me first sketch the conception of validity which Bolzano introduces in section 147 of Wissenschaftslehre, and then examine Łukasiewicz’s comments on it. Bolzano’s most important contribution to the philosophy of logic is his use of systematically varying non-propositional components of propositions in offering a unified account of a whole range of (broadly) logical concepts such as validity, analyticity and deducibility. Consider the (false) proposition

\[(P1) \quad \text{[The Galician university town Lemberg lies at the Vistula].}\]

Following Quine, I use square brackets to form a designator of the proposition or notion that is expressed by the filling of the brackets (in a given context). (Because of the example I have chosen, it may not be superfluous to remind some of my readers of a few geographical and historical facts: the former Austrian crownland Galicia had two university towns, Cracow, which does lie at the river Vistula, and Lemberg alias Lwów alias Lviv.) Now let us consider variants of (P1) which differ from (P1) in that the notion expressed by ‘Lemberg’ is replaced by a different notion. Call propositions which differ from (P1) at most with respect to this notion ‘[Lemberg]-variants of (P1)’. For the sake of the definitions to be given in the sequel, a proposition P is to be counted as a variant of itself, and two restrictions are imposed on what counts as a variant, and as one variant, of P.

**Non-emptiness:** a variant of P that is different from P is counted only if its subject-notion is ‘objectual (gegenständlich)’, i.e. non-empty.

**Non-equivalence:** variants of a proposition P with respect to a notion x contained therein are counted only if x is not replaced by a co-extensive (gleichgeltend) notion, and they are counted as more than one variant only if x is replaced by notions that are not co-extensive with each other. Let us call P itself and all other variants of P that are counted in compliance with Bolzano’s constraints relevant variants of P. Because of the non-emptiness constraint, the proposition

\[
\text{[The Galician university town Warsaw lies at the Vistula]}
\]

is not a relevant [Lemberg]-variant of (P1). Because of the non-equivalence constraint,

\[
\text{[The Galician university town whose Polish name is ‘Lwów’ lies at the Vistula]}
\]
is not a relevant [Lemberg]-variant of (P1), and the propositions

[The Galician university town Cracow lies at the Vistula],
[The Galician university town which was the capital of Poland before 1596 lies at the Vistula]

have to be counted as one and the same relevant [Lemberg]-variant of (P1).

Bolzano now explains what he means by ‘Degree of Validity’ as follows:

(DV) The degree of validity (Grad der Gültigkeit) of a proposition P with respect to the notion x contained in P is the ratio of the number of the relevant true x-variants of P to the number of all relevant x-variants of P.

Note that the degree of validity is always relative to a given non-propositional component of the proposition in question. The degree of validity can be represented by a fraction, the numerator of which is the first of the numbers mentioned in (DV) and the denominator of which is the second. Thus the degree of validity of our proposition (P1) with respect to the notion [Lemberg] is 1/2, because of the two relevant variants of (P1), one about Lemberg and one about Cracow, only the latter is true.

If Bolzano had not imposed the non-emptiness constraint, no proposition would have the degree of validity 1 with respect to its subject-notion: this is due to the first conjunct in the definiens of (Df. T). (Soon propositions with that degree of validity will be at the centre of our attention.) But suppose there are both true and false variants of a proposition P with respect to a certain notion, as in the case of (P1). If Bolzano had only imposed the non-emptiness constraint, then we could not determine the ratio of the number of P’s true variants to the number of all its variants, since for each notion there is an unsurveyable multitude of extensionally equivalent notions. There is no limit to the ways Lemberg can be thought of, and if we replace [Lemberg] by the more complex notion [which is not not identical with Lemberg], we see that Bolzano can reasonably claim that there are infinitely many different notions subsuming Lemberg, each of which contains an even number of negations.23 The same holds mutatis mutandis for [Cracow], of course. So Bolzano was well advised to impose the non-equivalence constraint.

Jan Łukasiewicz’s German monograph on ‘The Logical Foundations
of Probability (Die logischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung), published in Cracow in 1913, contains a section on ‘Bolzano’s Concept of Validity’. Łukasiewicz’s theory centres around the concept of an indeterminate statement (unbestimmte Aussage). (In what follows ‘statement’ is to be read as an abbreviation for ‘declarative sentence’, not as a name of a speech-act, let alone of its content.) An indeterminate statement contains a (free) individual variable. Hence, strictly speaking, an indeterminate statement is no more a statement (a complete declarative sentence, that is) than a toy duck is a duck. Łukasiewicz takes the range of values of the variable to be a non-empty class of finitely many individuals (such as the class of university towns in Galicia). You turn an indeterminate statement, such as ‘x lies at the Vistula’, into a determinate one if you substitute for the variable a designator of one of the values in its range, e.g. ‘Lemberg lies at the Vistula’. (What Łukasiewicz actually says is: if ‘one of its values is substituted’ for the variable; but it would be a difficult job to replace a variable by a town.) ‘Determinate statements are either true or false.’ So far all this is rather plain sailing: indeterminate statements seem to be Russellian propositional functions by another name, and, alas, there is also the same use-mention oscillation as in Russell.

Now Łukasiewicz stipulates that indeterminate statements are to be called ‘true’ iff all their substitution-instances are true (sc. determinate) statements, and that they are to be called ‘false’ iff all their substitution-instances are false (sc. determinate) statements. Indeterminate statements which have at least one true and at least one false instance are neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’ (in the stipulated sense). On this basis, Łukasiewicz introduces the notion of a ‘truth-value (Wahrheitswert)’ in a way which deliberately departs from Frege’s (actually rather idiosyncratic) use of this term:

\[(TV_{\ell}) \text{ The ‘truth-value’ of an indeterminate statement is the ratio of} \]
\[
\text{the number of its \textit{true} instances to the number of \textit{all} its instances.}\]

Such a ‘truth-value’ can be represented by a fraction, the numerator of which is the first of those numbers and the denominator of which is the second. Łukasiewicz then goes on to characterize probability as a property of indeterminate statements, and he identifies the ‘degree of probability’ of an indeterminate statement with its ‘truth-value’.

Now this conception of ‘truth-value’ (or degree of probability) is strikingly similar to Bolzano’s conception of degrees of validity, and Łukasiewicz duly acknowledges this. It may seem that his conception
does not require any (counterpart to Bolzano’s) constraints. This appearance is deceptive, however. Łukasiewicz only considers indeterminate statements whose variables have a non-empty range of values, and he takes their substitution-classes to comprise only designators of these values, so a counterpart to the Bolzanian non-emptiness constraint is at work. As for Bolzano’s non-equivalence constraint, the deplorable use-mention oscillation in Łukasiewicz’s text tends to hide the fact that he has to treat co-referential designators as if they were one. Each element of the class of Galician university towns is designated by various terms. If the indefinitely many determinate (English) statements that say about Lemberg that it lies at the Vistula, or those that say the same thing about Cracow, were not to be counted as one and the same substitution-instance of the indeterminate statement ‘x lies at the Vistula’ (for the domain of Galician university towns), then our indeterminate statement would have more than two substitution-instances (one falsehood about Lemberg and one truth about Cracow), and its ‘truth-value’ (degree of probability) would not be correctly determined as 1/2.

The most obvious difference between Łukasiewicz’s and Bolzano’s conceptions is, of course, that for Łukasiewicz the bearers of truth and falsity (in the ordinary sense) are declarative sentences, rather than the propositions expressed by them. Łukasiewicz himself emphasizes another fundamental difference, and he offers an explanation for this difference:

(L-1) Bolzanian validity is a property of determinate statements whereas truth-values can only be attributes of indeterminate statements. This primary difference is due to the fact that Bolzano does not know the concept of an indeterminate statement and he cannot acknowledge it as long as he is in the grip of the Aristotelian prejudice.


(Grundlagen [1913], 60)

Is it true that the concept of an indeterminate statement is unknown to
Bolzano? One thing is clear: in Bolzano’s class of logical objects (logische Gegenstände), which comprises notions, propositions and collections thereof, there is no such thing as an indeterminate proposition: ‘Each proposition is either true or false’, and no constituent of the proposition that Cracow lies at the Vistula is expressed by ‘x lies at the Vistula’. But under a different name the expressions Łukasiewicz calls ‘indeterminate statements’ do play an important role in Bolzano’s logic. He calls them ‘forms of propositions’:

(B-3) The expression ‘Some A are B’ is such a form. . . . Whenever I speak of notions, propositions and arguments as falling under a certain form, I mean by form a certain complex of words or signs by means of which a certain kind of notions, propositions, or arguments can be represented.

Thus the expression ‘Some A are B’ is a form that represents all and only those propositions which can be expressed by substitution-instances of ‘Some A are B’, and the expression ‘x lies at the Vistula’ is a form covering exactly those propositions which can be expressed by substitution-instances of that expression. (On the Bolzanian acceptation of the term ‘form’, a proposition expressible in English can be represented by at least as many English forms as it has constituents.) Łukasiewicz overlooked the fact that *WL* even provides us with a *terminus technicus* for indeterminate statements, but he was acutely aware of the fact that Bolzano makes use of indeterminate statements at certain key points of his (philosophy of) logic. Łukasiewicz sees this as a reason for accusing Bolzano of inconsistency:

(L-2) As striking evidence for the claim that logic cannot proceed without the concept of an indeterminate statement one can adduce Bolzano’s own procedure: without any awareness of the inconsistency thereby incurred Bolzano expresses all logical laws by means of indeterminate statements.
Dafür, daß man in der Logik nicht ohne den Begriff der unbestimmten Aussage auskommen kann, kann als frappantes Zeugnis das Vorgehen Bolzano’s selbst angeführt werden: ohne sich der Inkonsequenz bewußt zu sein, die er sich dadurch zu Schulden kommen läßt, drückt Bolzano alle logischen Gesetze mit Hilfe der unbestimmten Aussagen aus.

(Grundlagen, 64)

If Łukasiewicz is right, Bolzano is inconsistent because he actually formulates logical laws by means of indeterminate statements (or, as he would have put it, by means of forms) while at the same time accepting the ‘Aristotelian prejudice’. The allegedly fatal Aristotelian prejudice is the adoption of the principle of bivalence according to which whatever is truth-evaluable is either true or false. Now Bolzano does indeed accept (the propositional version of) this principle. But it is hard to see that one denies this principle as understood by Bolzano if one introduces new readings of ‘true’ and ‘false’, under which they abbreviate ‘has only true substitution-instances’ and ‘has only false substitution-instances’ respectively, that allow for the application of these predicates to indeterminate statements. The principle of bivalence, as Bolzano understands it, concerns the old sense of ‘true’ which is only defined for propositions, determinate propositions, that is, and as regards them (or rather their sentential expressions) the Łukasiewicz of 1913, too, still accepts bivalence. Therefore I do not think that the charge of inconsistency he directs at Bolzano really hits its target.

Analyticity (in the broader sense)

Some true propositions have only true relevant variants with respect to a notion they contain: such truths are, as Bolzano puts it, ‘universally valid (allgemeingültig)’ with respect to a certain variandum. Thus the proposition

(P2)  [Pope John-Paul II is Roman Catholic]

has the degree of validity $I$, it is universally valid, as regards the notion [John-Paul II]. (Note that unlike validity in the modern acceptation of the term this is not a property of a sentence form, but a relational property of a proposition.) Some false propositions have only false relevant variants with respect to a notion they contain: such falsehoods
are ‘universally invalid (allgemein ungültig)’, with respect to a certain variandum. Thus

(P3) [Pope John-Paul II is Muslim]

has the degree of validity $\theta$, it is universally invalid, as regards the notion [John-Paul II]. Appealing to these relativized concepts, Bolzano introduces, in section 148 of his Wissenschaftslehre, a pair of absolute concepts, and in christening them he takes the liberty of adopting Kantian terminology:

(B-4) If there is even a single notion in a proposition which can be varied arbitrarily without interfering with its truth or falsity, i.e. if all propositions which result from replacing this notion by arbitrary others are either all true or all false, provided that they have objectuality, then this is a property noteworthy enough to distinguish such propositions from all others for which this is not the case. So I venture to call propositions of this kind, borrowing an expression from Kant, analytic, and to call all other propositions, i.e. all those in which there is not a single notion that can be arbitrarily varied while preserving their truth or falsity, synthetic.

Wenn es . . . auch nur eine einzige Vorstellung in einem Satze gibt, welche sich willkürlich abändern läßt, ohne die Wahr- oder Falschheit desselben zu stören; d.h. wenn alle Sätze, die durch den Austausch dieser Vorstellung mit beliebigen andern zum Vorscheine kommen, entweder insgesammt wahr oder insgesammt falsch sind, vorausgesetzt, daß sie nur Gegenständlichkeit haben: so ist schon diese Beschaffenheit des Satzes merkwürdig genug, um ihn von allen, bei denen dieß nicht der Fall ist, zu unterscheiden. Ich erlaube mir also, Sätze dieser Art mit einem von Kant entlehnten Ausdrucke analytische, alle übrigen aber, d.h. bei denen es nicht eine einzige Vorstellung gibt, die sich ihrer Wahr- oder Falschheit unbeschadet willkürlich abändern ließe, synthetische Sätze zu nennen.

(WL II 83)

We can codify this explanation as follows:

(Df. A) $x$ is analytic $\iff$

$$(\exists y)(y \text{ is a notion } \&$$
A proposition which is not analytic is *synthetic*.

Both (P2) and (P3) comply with the definiens. Hence in the Bolzanian sense of the term, an analytic proposition can be false. In this respect Bolzano’s use of ‘analytic’ diverges from Kant’s and/or Frege’s who reserve this label for truths. But this difference is superficial, for by itself it does not prevent ‘analytic and true’ in Bolzano and ‘analytic’ in Kant and Frege from having the same extension. So let me emphasize some other consequences of (Df. A) which make for more dramatic differences.

*A synthetic proposition can entail an analytic proposition.* Bolzano himself shows this with the help of the following example: 40 The synthetic truth

(P4) \[\text{[In each triangle the sum of its angles equals two rights]}\]

entails the analytic truth

(P5) \[\text{[In each equilateral triangle the sum of its angles equals two rights]}\] \[\text{uv: [equilateral]}\].

Hugo Bergmann, Kafka’s classmate in Prague, who wrote the first philosophically substantial monograph on Bolzano’s philosophy, 42 took it to be ‘the most fatal objection’ against (Df. A) that it makes our verdicts as to the analyticity of a proposition dependent on arbitrary features of its linguistic formulation. Bergmann correctly reports that Bolzano classifies the proposition that in each three-angle (Dreieck) the sum of its angles equals two rights as synthetic. Then he claims that the sentence

(S1) \[\text{‘In each three-angle the sum of its angles equals (3–2) \times 2 rights’}\]

expresses the same proposition, and he points out that the proposition expressed by this ‘reformulation’ is universally valid with respect to the notion [three]. So ‘we would fall victim to the whims of our language’, Bergmann concludes, ‘if we were to rely on Bolzano’s definition.’ 43 Bolzano has a very good reply to this, I think: the notions [2] and [(3–2) \times 2] are co-extensive (gleichgeltend), even necessarily so, but they are two different notions. After all, the concept of multiplication, for
example, clearly is a constituent of the latter notion, but not of the former. So Bergmann’s (S1), far from reformulating (P4), actually expresses a different proposition. Nevertheless, his misplaced criticism points at another interesting consequence of Bolzano’s account: according to (Df. A), of two propositions which necessarily have the same truth-value one may be synthetic and the other analytic.

You may take my word for it that the following proposition is true:

(P6) [Each professor who took part in a secret meeting in Tiechobus in September 1838 was Roman Catholic].

Consequently, the following truth about the hero of this chapter

(P7) [Professor Bolzano who took part in a secret meeting in Tiechobus in September 1838 was Roman Catholic] is analytic in the Bolzanian sense, which shows: a proposition that is analytic according to (Df. A) can be contingent, and it can be the content of a belief that is justifiable only by historical (or other empirical) research. Furthermore, (P7) entails

(P8) [There is at least one Roman Catholic].

This truth is synthetic. So a proposition that is analytic in the sense of (Df. A) can entail a synthetic proposition.

Perhaps Bergmann would have done better to base his objection against (Df. A) on an example like (P7). How is this proposition related to the proposition expressed by the next sentence?

(S2) ‘Professor Bolzano took part in a secret meeting in Tiechobus in September 1838, and Professor Bolzano was Roman Catholic.’

If you substitute the notion [Hegel] for the notion [Bolzano] in (P7), you obtain a non-objectual proposition: since it does not comply with the non-emptiness constraint it does not undermine the claim of (P7) to the title of Bolzanian analyticity. Now consider the proposition expressed by (S2). The [Hegel]-variant of that proposition is as false as can be, but it is by no means non-objectual. Since it contains no other component that is exchangeable without detriment to its truth-value, it is synthetic in Bolzano’s sense. But isn’t (S2) just a stylistic variant of the sentence we have used to express (P7)? Doesn’t Bergmann now turn
out to be right when he complains that (Df. A) makes our verdicts as to the analyticity of a proposition dependent on arbitrary features of its linguistic formulation? Well, I am not sure. Bolzano might turn the tables and say: ‘Look, you yourself observed that substitution of the name “Hegel” has very different effects on (S2) and the sentence bracketed in the name of (P7): it transforms only the latter into a sentence with an empty singular term. I take this to be a sufficient reason for denying your presupposition that those sentences are just stylistic variants. Moreover, as the canonical rephrasal of (S2) shows, the proposition expressed by this sentence says about a certain pair of propositions that it contains only truths, so it has a different subject than (P7).’

**Logical analyticity**

So far we have considered only propositions which Bolzano would have classified as ‘analytic in the broader sense (analytisch in der weiten Bedeutung)’. Within the genus Analytic Proposition Bolzano tries to circumscribe a species, and he begins by giving an open-ended list of sub-species of the species he has in mind:

(B-5) The following are some very general examples of analytic propositions which are also true: [A is A], [A which is B, is A], [A which is B, is B], [Every object is either B or non-B], etc. . . . Propositions like these . . . may be called logically analytic, or analytic in the narrower sense.

Einige sehr allgemeine Beispiele von analytischen Sätzen, die zugleich wahr sind, haben wir an folgenden Sätzen: A ist A; A, welches B ist, ist A; A, welches B ist, ist B; Jeder Gegenstand ist entweder B oder Nicht-B u.s.w. . . . [Man könnte Sätze dieser Art] logisch analytische oder analytische in der engeren Bedeutung . . . nennen.

(WL II 84)

Let us substitute propositions for Bolzano’s propositional schemata, for only truth-value bearers are candidates for the title ‘logically analytic’. Then we obtain examples like

(P9) [Every human is human] uv: [human]
(P10) [Every human who is happy is human] uv: [happy], [human],
(P11) [Every human who is happy is happy] uv: [happy], [human],
(P12) [Everything is either coloured or not coloured] \(\mathrm{uv: \text{[coloured]}}\),

and we certainly don’t misunderstand Bolzano’s ‘und so weiter’ when we add

(P13) [Nothing is both coloured and not coloured] \(\mathrm{uv: \text{[coloured]}}\).

Bolzano classifies (P9), and all other propositions which are expressed by instances of the schema ‘(Every) A is A’ as identical or tautological propositions.\(^{47}\) (P10), (P11) and other propositions that are expressed by instances of the schemata ‘(Every) A which is B is A’ or ‘(Every) A which is B is B’, come closest to Kant’s paradigms of analyticity.\(^{48}\) I shall call them resolving propositions. (The standard Latin translation of \(\alpha\nu\alpha\lambda\nu\sigma\iota\zeta\) was \(\text{resolutio}\).) In his earlier writings Bolzano had actually reserved the title ‘analytic’ for resolving propositions. This usage conforms with the literal meaning of this word which is invoked by Kant when he talks of a ‘Zergliederung (dissection)’ of the subject-notion.\(^{49}\)

Of course, we could express a resolving proposition like (P10) more briefly by

(S3) ‘Every happy human is human’.

But Bolzano’s more roundabout formulation has a logical advantage. If we replace ‘happy’ in (S3) by ‘alleged’ we obtain a sentence that expresses a falsehood containing a non-empty subject-notion. The same happens if we supplant ‘happy’ and ‘human’ by ‘expectant’ and ‘mother’ respectively. If these propositions are relevant variants of (P10), we have shown that (P10) is not universally valid. But of course, we did nothing of the sort. A sentence with the surface structure of (S3) does not express a resolving proposition, Bolzano can retort, unless it can be rephrased as ‘Every A which/who is B is A’. So our observation is evidence for his claim ‘that a linguistic expression does not always properly specify the components of a proposition. “Round hat” and “painted fish” [as applied to the representation of a fish in a Dutch still life, say] are built up in the same way, and yet the concepts must not be [thought of as] built up in the same way’.\(^{50}\)

Bolzano’s exposition in (B-5) implies that all tautological, and all resolving, propositions are (analytic and) true.\(^{51}\) But this cannot be his considered opinion, and elsewhere he explicitly denies it.\(^{52}\) According to his Aristotelian reading of ‘every’, the tautological proposition that every witch is a witch, and the resolving proposition that every mountain which is golden is a mountain, are both false, because their
subject-notions are not objectual. (So let us not be misled by Tractarian associations of the term ‘tautological’: some tautologies in Bolzano’s sense, far from being unconditionally true, are not even true.)

As regards tautological and resolving propositions Bolzano gets entangled in a difficulty which results from his paraphrastic programme. If the canonical rephrasal of an instance of ‘(Every) A is B’ has the form ‘(Every) A has b’, then ‘Every human is human’ has to be transformed into

\[(S4) \, \text{‘Every human has humanness’}.\]

But then one begins to wonder whether any notion occurs twice in \((P9)\). After all, what falls under the notion [humanness] is a property, whereas human beings fall under [human]. One can solve this problem (without giving up Bolzano’s paraphrastic programme) by expanding what we took to be the canonical rephrasal. Actually, it should look like this:

\[(S5) \, \text{‘Everything which has humanness has humanness’}.\]

So strictly speaking I should have said about \((P9)\) that it is universally valid with respect to the notion [humanness], and similarly for \((P10–11)\). For the sake of greater readability I refrain from using such stilted formulations, as Bolzano himself does most of the time.

Two further sub-species of the kind Logically Analytic Proposition were exemplified above by \((P12)\) and \((P13)\). None of the schemata he uses when introducing his conception of logical analyticity covers tautologies in the Tractarian sense, but there can be no serious doubt that he would classify, say,

\[(P14) \, [\text{If the moon is round, then the moon is round}]\]

as a logically analytic truth. Incidentally, would Bolzano have regarded \((P14)\) as a member of the sub-species Identical or Tautological Proposition? Yehoshua Bar-Hillel thought that ‘we must leave it open whether Bolzano intended to characterize also compound propositions of the form “If \(p \) then \(p\)” as identical’, whereas Jan Berg claimed that ‘there is no doubt that Bolzano would have characterized propositions of the last-mentioned form as identical’. I think they are both wrong. Bolzano’s canonical paraphrase of the bracketed sentence looks like this:
The proposition expressed by (S6), that is to say, (P14) is clearly not identical or tautological (in Bolzano’s sense), for it does not have the form ‘A is A’, or rather, ‘Everything which has (the property) a has a’.

Now, what do all members of the kind Logically Analytic Proposition have in common? Bolzano’s answer is:

(B-6) The concepts which form the invariable part of these propositions all belong to logic.

[Die Begriiffe, welche den unveränderlichen Theil in diesen Sätzen bilden, gehören alle der Logik an.]

(WL II 84)

Putting this the other way round, all non-logical concepts which form part of these propositions are variable, i.e. they can be varied salva veritate vel falsitate. So the explanation that is apparently intended can (at least provisionally) be codified as follows:

(Df. LA₁) x is logically analytic :

as regards the non-logical notions contained in x,

x is universally valid or universally invalid with respect to each of them.

Note that according to (B-6) logical concepts form the invariable part of logically analytic propositions. Since ‘part’ in Bolzano always means: proper part, his characterization implies that no logically analytic proposition consists of nothing but logical notions. (Df. LA₁) is meant to accommodate this point: a proposition satisfies the definiens only if it contains at least one non-logical notion.

Bolzano concedes that we have no absolutely firm grasp on the distinction between those analytic propositions that are logically analytic and those that are not:

(B-7) This distinction, I admit, is rather unstable, as the whole domain of concepts belonging to logic is not so sharply circumscribed that controversies could never arise.

Dieser Unterschied hat freilich sein Schwankendes, weil das Gebiet
Bolzano’s own use of the title ‘logical concept’ is very broad indeed. It covers not only the notions that are expressed by logical constants, such as ‘not’, ‘or’ and ‘there is’, and by the word ‘has’ when used to signify exemplification of a property, but also

(†) concepts of formal ontology, as Husserl would call them, e.g. *object, property, collection, part,* and

(*) *meta-logical concepts,* as one might call them, such as *proposition, notion, truth, validity, deducibility, objectuality.*

Translations of sentences containing logical constants into Bolzano’s canonical language invoke ‘formal-ontological’ and meta-logical concepts. Here are three translations that we shall need later on:

\[\neg p \iff \text{[p] has falsity}\]
\[p \lor q \iff \text{There is a true proposition that is part of the collection \{[p], [q]\}}\]
\[\exists F \iff \text{[F] has objectuality.}\]

Now it is easy to see that many propositions that contain only logical concepts are relevant variants of logico-analytic truths like (P9–13), for example

(P9†) [Every object is an object] \(\text{uv: [object]}\)
(P11*) [Every proposition which is true is true] \(\text{uv: [proposition], [true]}.\)

So (Df. LA1) has the irritating consequence that they are *not* logically analytic, although (P9) and (P11) are. For all I know, Bolzano nowhere discusses any propositions like (P9†) or (P11*) in the light of his distinction between broad and narrow analyticity. They are analytic in the broader sense if (as assumed in my annotations on the right-hand side) concepts of formal ontology and meta-logical notions may also be varied. (I am not aware of any passage in which Bolzano declares them to be exempt from variation.)

Notice that this problem is not made to disappear if one takes only truth-functional connectives, quantifiers and their variables, and ‘=’ to express logical concepts. The sentence used to express the proposition
(P15) \[ \exists x \exists y \neg (x = y) v \neg \exists x \exists y \neg (x = y) \]

is exclusively phrased in the vocabulary of the predicate calculus with identity, but (Df. LA1) does not allow us to classify (P15) as \textit{logically} analytic.

It is also worth noticing, however, that the problem would disappear if one were to regard nothing but connectives and (first-order) quantifiers with their variables as expressing logical concepts.\textsuperscript{65} If the identity sign is excluded from the list of logical constants, (P15) contains just one non-logical concept, that concept can be varied \textit{salva veritate}, and so (P15) turns out to be logically analytic after all. (In the final section, I will plead for affirming the antecedent.)

The truth that every human is human, (P9), is \textit{logically} analytic, and so is the truth that nothing is both coloured and not coloured, (P13), but these are \textit{not} propositions of pure logic. By contrast, the following truths which, as it were, comment upon them are \textit{not} logically analytic, but they \textit{are} propositions of pure logic:

(P16) [Every proposition which is objectual and tautological is true]
(P17) [Every proposition of the form ‘Nothing is both B and not B’ is true].\textsuperscript{66}

Why are (P9) and (P13), the two propositions just referred to, that fall under the subject-notions of (P16) or of (P17), not themselves truths of pure logic?

(B-8) In its theorems (though maybe not in its examples) logic is not concerned with any particular, fully determinate proposition, \ldots but rather with a whole genus of such propositions at once, i.e. with all propositions some parts of which are fixed while the remainder is variable.

\textit{[D]ie Logik betrachtet – (in ihren Lehrsätzen wenigstens, in ihren Beispielen kann es ein Anderes seyn) – nie einen einzelnen völlig bestimmten Satz \ldots, sondern gleich eine ganze Gattung von solchen Sätzen, d.h. alle Sätze auf einmal, die, wenn auch einige ihrer Bestandtheile festgesetzt sind, in ihren übrigen noch so oder anders lauten können.}

\textit{(WL I 46)}

Some truths of pure logic, Bolzano claims, are not even analytic in his broader sense:
As evidence for this contention, Bolzano first presents examples like

(P18) [There is at least one notion]
(P19) [Some notions are complex],

and he might as well have reminded his readers of the proposition which was the first main topic of his ‘Theory of Fundamentals (Fundamentallehre):68

(P20) [There is at least one true proposition].

These truths consist of nothing but logical concepts (in the Bolzanian acceptation of this term), they are propositions of (what he calls) pure logic, and yet they are synthetic. This is indeed incontrovertible.69

But then Bolzano goes on to present an example like our (P16) and (P17), namely

(P21) [From two propositions of the form ‘Every A is B’ and ‘Every B is C’ a third proposition of the form ‘Every A is C’ is deducible],

as further evidence for his claim that some propositions of pure logic are synthetic. But are these three truths really synthetic? It seems not, since they are universally valid with respect to the notion [proposition] contained therein. (Only propositions are covered by the Bolzian concept of form that occurs in (P21), and every notion under which some propositions of those syllogistic forms fall, e.g. [mathematical truth], can replace [proposition] in (P21) salva veritate.)

In the passage from which I have excerpted (B-7) Bolzano gives a partly epistemic account of the difference between logically and non-logically analytic propositions:70

(B-10) In order to appraise the analytic nature of the former, no other than logical knowledge is necessary, since the concepts which form the invariable part of these propositions all belong to logic. By contrast, for the appraisal of the truth or falsity of the [latter
type of analytic propositions] a wholly different kind of knowledge is required, since concepts alien to logic intrude.

Notice the order of explanation: the basic account of the difference is in terms of the conceptual make-up of the propositions in question. But on this basis, Bolzano claims, an epistemic difference can be established. For a logico-analytic truth like (P13), [Nothing is both coloured and not coloured], logical knowledge does indeed suffice for recognizing its analyticity. But is this generally true? Consider the following resolving propositions, the first one being expressed in context c (in a certain lecture hall at a certain time):

(P22) [The Canadian expert on Bolzano who is currently with us in this room is a Canadian expert on Bolzano].
(P23) [All readers of Bolzano’s WL in Canada are readers of Bolzano’s WL].

There might not have been any Canadian readers of, let alone experts on, Bolzano. But actually there are such people in Canada, I am happy to report, and one of them, I assure you, turned up in context c. So both propositions are true, and each of their objectual variants as regards the non-logical notions they contain is true as well. (Recall that, by Bolzano’s lights, neither proposition would be true if its subject-notion were non-objectual.) So according to (Df. LA1) propositions (P22–23) are logico-analytic truths. But surely we cannot find out that they are without acquiring empirical knowledge about Canadians and the whereabouts of one of them. So Bolzano’s epistemological claim should be weakened: (A) if we know that a proposition x is true and if x is logically analytic, then logical knowledge suffices for recognizing the analyticity of x; and (B) by deleting ‘logically’ (A) is turned into a falsehood.

There are some formal problems with (Df. LA1) which I have so far put aside. The first one concerns the range of admissible substitutes,
and it affects already the notion of universal validity. One of the non-propositional parts of the proposition that 4 is prime and 7 is not prime is this: \([4 \text{ is prime and } 7]\). This \textit{Strange Item} (as I shall call it) is a notion in the sense of (Df. N) in the first section above, and this makes for a problem. If we uniformly replace \([7]\) in

\[(P24) \ [7 \text{ is prime, or } 7 \text{ is not prime}]\]

by the Strange Item, we obtain a falsehood.\(^{73}\) But surely, we do not want to take this as proof that (P24) is not universally valid with respect to the non-logical notion \([7]\) and consequently not a logico-analytic truth. So a constraint on admissible substitutes is required. Under the reasonable assumption that a string of words which does not form a grammatically coherent sentence (and which, unlike ‘Yes’, for example, cannot function as a stand-in for such a sentence in the context of an utterance) does not express a proposition, something like the following restriction might do: \(^{74}\) notion X is interchangeable with notion Y \textit{only if} the result of replacing X in a proposition by Y is always a proposition. If you replace \([7]\) in \([8 > 7]\) by the Strange Item, the result is not a proposition but just a heap of notions, since the string ‘8 > 4 is prime and 7’ isn’t a grammatically well-formed sentence (and no context of utterance would allow you to understand it as a stand-in for such a sentence). So the logical status of (P24) is no longer put at risk.\(^{75}\) We should consider another critical case, lest we become jubilant too early. It requires some stage-setting. There are two ways of paraphrasing ‘7 is not prime’ in Bolzano’s canonical language: as an external negation, ‘The proposition that 7 is prime is false’, or as an internal negation, ‘7 has lack of primality’.\(^{76}\) Let us focus on the latter reading. One would like to think that

\[(P24^*) \ [7 \text{ has primality, or } 7 \text{ has lack of primality}]\]

is universally valid with respect to both non-logical notions contained therein. As we saw in the first section above, Bolzano takes both \([7 \text{ has primality}]\) and \([\text{Each number has primality}]\) to be propositions of the same form. But if we uniformly replace \([7]\) in (P24*) by \([\text{each number}]\), we obtain a falsehood.\(^{77}\) Is the result of supplanting the numeral ‘7’ by the quantifier phrase ‘each number’ ever grammatically garbled? Certainly: just try this substitution in ‘They have 7 children’. But this example is not really pertinent, because here the numeral does not stand in singular term position. Our question should be whether replacing the numeral in singular term position by the quantifier phrase ever
produces grammatical garbage. I can’t see that it ever does, and if this is not due to myopia on my part, the required restriction on substitutability cannot be motivated in the same way as in the case of the Strange Item. So we haven’t really solved the first problem. All we know is that the method of variation must not allow an interchange of notions that do not belong to the same category, and the notion of a category has to be such that [7] and [each number], for example, belong to mutually exclusive categories.

The second problem with (Df. LA₁) concerns the question which notions that are contained in a proposition may be varied. Surely, \[human\ who\ is\ happy\] is a notion in the sense of (Df. N), but if we replace this notion in (P₁₀), \[Every\ human\ who\ is\ happy\ is\ human\], by the notion [fish], say, we obtain a falsehood. Since we do not want to regard this as showing that (P₁₀) isn’t a logico-analytic truth after all, the set of varianda has to be circumscribed more tightly: a notion X is exchangeable in a proposition P only if there is no other notion Y in P such that Y is a proper part of X.

As for the third problem, consider

(P₂₅)  \[Nothing\ that\ is\ blue\ is\ a\ witch,\ or\ something\ that\ is\ coloured\ is\ a\ witch\].

Since there are no witches, (P₂₅) is universally valid with respect to each of the three non-logical notions it contains, and hence it is an analytic truth in the Bolzanian sense. But one would not like to classify it as a logically analytic truth. Now (P₂₅) does have false variants if several notions can be varied simultaneously. By simultaneously varying [blue] and [witch], we get falsehoods such as \[Nothing\ that\ is\ an\ organ\ work\ is\ a\ fugue,\ or\ something\ that\ is\ coloured\ is\ a\ fugue\]. Once we have provided for varying notions not only singly but also two or more at a time, we are spared the awkward result that (P₂₅) is a logically analytic truth. So we should expand the definiens of (Df. LA₁) along the following lines:

(Df. LA₂)  \[x\ is\ logically\ analytic\] :
\[\leftrightarrow\] as regards the non-logical notions that are contained in x and have no other notion contained in x as a proper part, x is universally valid or universally invalid with respect to each of them and with respect to each collection of them.

Let us now apply Bolzano’s account of logical analyticity to an issue
over which advocates of ‘orthodox’ modern logic and friends of ‘free logic’ are divided. (Here, and for most of the remainder of this chapter, the difference between definitions $\text{LA}_1$ and $\text{LA}_2$ will not matter.) Is the proposition

\[(P26) \ [\text{There is something which is identical with (the planet) Mercury}]\]

a logical truth? If an ‘orthodox’ logician takes ‘Mercury’ to be a genuine singular term, something that can be replaced by a name-letter in his formal language, then he must classify $(P26)$ as a logical truth. After all, it is derivable, via existential generalization, from the identity statement that Mercury is Mercury, and the latter is in turn derivable, via universal instantiation, from the logical law that everything is identical with itself. ‘But $(P26)$ is an astronomical truth,’ all advocates of ‘free logic’ will protest, ‘not a logical one!’ ‘From the logical law that everything is identical with itself we can only derive a statement of the form $a$ is identical with $a,$’ friends of ‘negative free logic’ will continue, ‘if the condition $\text{There is something which is identical with } a$ is satisfied. This condition happens to be satisfied in the case at hand, but with some names it is not, even when they are not used as fictional names. Thus in the nineteenth century some astronomer had thought that there was a planet in Mercury’s orbit, so far unobserved, whose existence explains certain anomalies, and he introduced the name “Vulcan” as a name for this postulated planet. Later on it turned out that there was no such planet. Since nothing is identical with Vulcan, no property can be correctly ascribed to Vulcan, and there is no such thing as the property of being identical with Vulcan.’

In this debate, Bolzano would take the side of the advocate of ‘negative free logic’. Why? The proposition

\[(P27) \ [\text{There is something which is identical with (the planet) Vulcan}]\]

is a [Mercury]-variant of $(P26)$. Is it a relevant variant? Translating the sentence within brackets into Bolzano’s canonical language and assuming that the translation expresses the same proposition, we can say that $(P27)$ is the same proposition as

\[(P27^*) \ [\text{[Identical with Vulcan] has objectuality}].\]

Bolzano’s non-emptiness constraint is observed, since the subject-notion of $(P27^*)$ is objectual, the object being a notion, not a heavenly body. So $(P27^*)$ is a relevant [Mercury]-variant of $(P26)$. Since this
variant is false, the proposition subjected to variation is not analytic, let alone logically analytic.

**Merely apparent analyticity and hidden analyticity**

The make-up of an utterance may suggest a wrong answer to the question whether its content is analytic or not. Here as elsewhere sentential appearance is not a reliable guide to propositional reality.

(B-11) If one wants to determine whether a proposition which is given in a certain linguistic expression is analytic or synthetic, more is required than a cursory inspection of its words.

Die Beurtheilung, ob ein in seinem sprachlichen Ausdrucke gegebener Satz analytisch oder synthetisch sey, fordert oft etwas mehr als einen bloß flüchtigen Hinblick auf seine Worte.

(WL II 84, Note 1)

On the one hand, there is the phenomenon of merely apparent analyticity. Sometimes an utterance of a sentence that can be used to convey an analytic, even a tautological, truth is not properly understood if one does not realize that it is actually meant to convey a synthetic truth. One of Bolzano’s examples is taken from the Gospel of St John. When Pilate said to the chief priests,

(S7) ‘What I have written, I have written’,

they would have badly misunderstood him if they had taken his message to be a tautological truth. What Pilate told them was that he was not willing to change the inscription on the cross, so he used (S7) in order to convey a synthetic proposition. Bolzano might also have pointed at the other side of the same coin: sometimes an utterance of a sentence that can be used to convey an analytic falsehood is not completely understood unless one realizes that it is actually meant to convey a synthetic truth. Take an utterance of ‘Enough isn’t enough’ that is addressed to a student who notoriously overestimates the amount of his daily work. In both examples there is a difference between what an unambiguous sentence expresses in a given context in virtue of its lexico-grammatical meaning and what it is used to convey. But it is not only in such cases that more is required than a cursory inspection of an utterance if one wants to determine whether an analytic proposition is meant to be conveyed. Does an utterance of the English sentence
express a logically analytic truth? ‘It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which one might make a false statement in these words.’

On the other hand, there is the phenomenon of hidden analyticity:

(B-12) A proposition may be analytic, perhaps logically analytic, or even tautological, though its verbal expression does not make this immediately apparent.

Es kann ein Satz zu den analytischen, wohl gar den logisch analytischen, selbst den identischen gehören, ohne daß es sein wörtlicher Ausdruck gleich anzeigt.

(WL II 84, Note 1)89

Is the following proposition analytic?

(P28) [A foal is a horse]

There is no doubt that

(P29) [A horse which is young is a horse] uv: [young], [horse],

is a logically analytic (resolving) proposition. Now the notion [foal] just is the notion [young horse]. So (P28) is identical with the logically analytic proposition (P29), and the variant of (P28) in which the notion [horse] is uniformly replaced by [dog] is not the falsehood that a foal is a dog, but the truth that a dog which is young is a dog. Anders Wedberg has made this point a long time ago: ‘[T]he [notion] which is varied can have linguistically hidden occurrences in the proposition in which it is varied.’90 Here is another example. Is

(P30) [A serpent is a snake]

analytic? Clearly, the next proposition is logically analytic (tautological):

(P31) [A serpent is a serpent] uv: [serpent].

Now [serpent] and [snake] are one and the same concept. So (P30) is identical with the logically analytic truth (P31). Hence the variant of (P30) in which the concept [serpent] is uniformly replaced by [dog] is
not the falsehood that a dog is a serpent, but the truth that a dog is a dog. Both examples show that sentences which do not instantiate a logically valid schema (in the modern sense) may nevertheless express a logically analytic proposition. (As we shall see in the final section of this chapter, hidden analyticity is especially important when one wants to get clear about the relation between Bolzano’s and Quine’s views.)

Bolzano himself uses two rather unfortunate examples to illustrate the phenomenon of covert analyticity. Both have a structure which we would describe as follows: if x stands in relation R to y, then y stands in the converse relation R* to x. Consider the proposition

\[(P32) \quad \text{[If the sun is larger than the moon, then the moon is smaller than the sun].}\]

It is analytic, since it is universally valid with respect to the notions [sun] and [moon]. Is it logically analytic? In our text Bolzano argues for an affirmative answer. His argument presupposes that the next two sentences express one and the same proposition:

\[(S9) \quad \text{‘The sun is larger than the moon’}\]
\[(S10) \quad \text{‘The moon is smaller than the sun’}.\]

But later in WL, he comes round to denying this very presupposition, and actually he is committed to this denial at least as long as he sticks to his paraphrastic programme. Sentences like (S9) and (S10), he now argues, are ‘by no means just different expressions of one and the same proposition, rather they express two different propositions that have different subject-notions and different predicate-notions’. Taking for granted that both sentences can be decomposed in only one way, Bolzano contends that

\[(P33) \quad \text{[The sun has (the property of) being larger than the moon] is the proposition expressed by (S9) and that}\]

\[(P34) \quad \text{[The moon has (the property of) being smaller than the sun] is the proposition expressed by (S10). Now these are different, though necessarily equivalent, propositions. So Bolzano’s earlier argument for the claim that (P32) is logically analytic fails. In order to bypass this problem I have explained Bolzano’s reflections on hidden analyticity by means of examples with (as we would put it) one-place predicates.}\]
Contrasts

In the subtitle of WL, Bolzano promises ‘Constant Attention (stete Rücksicht) to Earlier Writers on Logic’. It is not only in the section on analyticity that he keeps this promise. Let us examine his assessments of Locke and Kant in the Notes to that section. In the course of this, we will find occasion to have a glance at Frege (who did not pay much attention to earlier writers on logic – and none whatsoever, I am sorry to say, to Bolzano), and we shall also confront (the least common denominator of) the Logical Positivists’ reading(s) of ‘analytic’.

(B-13) Locke . . . introduces the concept of trifling propositions;93 he defines them as propositions that do not enlarge our knowledge. Among them, he counts (a) all identical ones, (b) all those in which part of a complex idea is asserted of the object of such an idea.94 He obviously had analytic judgements in mind, and almost gives a more perspicuous explanation of them than Kant himself, as we shall see below. But Locke committed a serious blunder when he added that all propositions where the species is the subject and the genus is the predicate fall into this category,95 since not every concept of a species contains that of its genus as part.

Let us begin at the end. Why is Locke’s additional claim seriously mistaken? Here is Bolzano’s favourite piece of evidence for this verdict.96 Each actual object is a possible object, but not every possible object is an actual one, so the actual is a species of the possible. Now the proposition that every actual object is a possible object could only be analytic by being (covertly) resolving. But the notion [actual] does not
contain the notion [possible] as a proper part. (When you try to give an analysis you are stuck with ‘An actual object is a possible object that is, er, actual’, which is true enough but not exactly what you intended to offer.) Therefore our proposition is synthetic.

As for the bulk of (B-13), it is unfortunately extremely misleading. Tautological and resolving truths are logically analytic truths which are indeed trivial. As Locke puts it, they ‘must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood,’ they ‘bring no increase to our knowledge’. But not every analytic truth in Bolzano’s sense is a case of *Cela va sans dire*. This is obvious for non-logical cases such as (P5), [In each equilateral triangle the sum of its angles equals two rights] and (P7), [Professor Bolzano who took part in a secret meeting in Tiechobus in September 1838 was Roman Catholic]. But even truths which are logically analytic are not always trivial: just think of the propositions expressed by instances of very complex schemata in the classical predicate calculus. Bolzano is certainly in the right when he says elsewhere in *WL*:

(B-14) Not every analytic truth goes without saying, so that trying to communicate it to anyone would be entirely superfluous.

\[ \text{[N]icht jeder analytische Satz [spricht] eine Wahrheit aus . . ., die sich von selbst versteht, so zwar, daß es ganz überflüssig wäre, sie Jemand beibringen zu wollen.} \]

\[ (WL \ IV \ 115) \]

Some analytic truths in Bolzano’s sense fall squarely under the Lockean *opposite* of ‘trifling’: they are ‘instructive’, they ‘enlarge our knowledge’. In this respect Bolzano is in complete agreement with Gottlob Frege who was to emphasize that ‘propositions which extend our knowledge (*Sätze, welche unsere Erkenntnisse erweitern*)’ may very well be analytic. So being a trifling proposition is not a necessary condition for being a logically analytic truth. And it isn’t sufficient either. Some of Locke’s ‘trifling propositions’ are neither identical nor resolving, e.g. ‘White is not Black’. They are not instructive, but according to Bolzano’s definition they are synthetic. So whatever Locke may have ‘had in mind’, it was certainly not analytic truths in either of Bolzano’s senses.

The deepest difference consists in the fact that Locke’s concept of being trifling is explained in epistemic terms, whereas Bolzano’s definition of analyticity is a thoroughly *non-epistemic* explanation. Here is what he says about another key concept of his logic:
(B-15) It seems to me that deducibility is one of those relations between propositions that obtain objectively, i.e. regardless of our faculty of representing things and acquiring knowledge, and hence should be rendered accordingly.

Certainly, he would have been ready to make a similar claim for analyticity. This seems to mark a major difference between Bolzano’s and Frege’s conception of analyticity as well, for (somewhat surprisingly) Frege does appeal to epistemic notions when he explains what he means by ‘analytic’:  

(Df. A_{FREGE}) x is analytic : ↔  

x is true & the ‘ultimate ground’ for taking x to be true is provided by  
(a) ‘logical laws’ that neither need nor admit of proof, and  
(b) definitions.

To be sure, there is no reference to our cognitive faculties in this definiens, but still it invokes epistemic notions. (It has often been observed that as it stands Frege’s explanation leaves the status of self-evident logical laws and definitions undetermined.)  
Kant’s account of what he calls ‘analytic’ may seem to get an epistemic touch when, in the Introduction to the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, synthetic judgements are characterized as ‘ampliative (Erweiterungsurteile)’, but his official explanation of ‘analytic’ in terms of conceptual containment is no more epistemic than Bolzano’s.  
(I follow Bolzano in assuming that in this context Kant means by ‘judgement’ the content of an act of judging rather than the act and that the subjects and predicates he is talking about are subject-notions and predicate-notions.) After having made the obligatory bow to Kant, Bolzano quotes this explanation and complains:

(B-16) [It seems to me that Kant’s explanation] does not fully meet the requirements of logical strictness. . . . If one says . . . that in analytic judgements the predicate is (covertly) contained in the sub-
ject, or that the predicate does not lie outside the subject, or that it already occurs as a component of the subject, . . . then these are in part only figurative modes of speech that do not dissect the concept to be explained, in part expressions that permit an interpretation under which they cover too much. Everything stated here . . . might as well be said of propositions which nobody will want to call analytic, e.g.

(P35) [The father of Alexander, King of Macedonia, was King of Macedonia].

[Kants Erklärung dünkt mir . . . der logischen Strenge nicht ganz zu entsprechen. . . . Sagt man . . . daß in den analytischen Urtheilen das Prädicat in dem Subjecte (verdeckter Weise) enthalten sey, oder nicht außerhalb desselben liege, oder schon als Bestandtheil darin vorkomme; . . . so sind dieses theils bloß bildliche Redensarten, die den zu erklärenden Begriff nicht zerlegen, theils Ausdrücke, die eine zu weite Auslegung zulassen. Denn auch von Sätzen, die Niemand für analytische ausgeben wird, z. B.: Der Vater Alexanders, des Königs von Macedonien, war König von Macedonien, . . . läßt sich Alles, was hier gesagt wird, behaupten. (WL II 87–8, Note 4)\(^\text{104}\)]

Bolzano’s cute example exhibits a weakness in the way Kant presents his explanation of ‘analytic’: as it stands, Kant’s formulation really makes (P35) come out as analytic, which is surely undesirable also by his own lights. The expression ‘King of Macedonia’ is a significant component of the longer expression ‘father of Alexander, King of Macedonia’. Hence the sense of the shorter expression is a constituent of the sense of the longer one. Therefore Bolzano takes the concept [King of Macedonia] to be an ingredient of the concept [father of Alexander, King of Macedonia]. But presumably Kant would take the predicate-notion to be contained in the subject-notion only if nothing can fall under the subject-notion without falling under the predicate-notion. If he does, this part of Bolzano’s criticism misfires, for, obviously, a person does not have to be King of Macedonia if he is to fall under the concept [father of Alexander, King of Macedonia]. So under this proviso, which Kant unfortunately fails to make explicit in the Introduction to his first ‘Critique’, his account is no longer open to refutation via example (P35)\(^\text{105}\).

No doubt, there are vast differences between Kant’s and Bolzano’s conceptions of analyticity. Obviously not everything that is B(olzano)-
analytic in the broader sense of the term is K(ant)-analytic: just recall (P7), the contingent empirical truth about the meeting in Tiechobus. So it is an enormous understatement when Bolzano says that his ‘explanation makes the concept of analytic propositions somewhat wider than it is usually thought to be’. But not even all truths that are B-analytic in the logical sense are covered by Kant’s explanation of ‘analytic’ in terms of conceptual containment. If the contained notion has got to be a proper part of the containing notion, not even the tautological proposition that every human is human turns out to be K-analytic, which is contrary to Kant’s intentions, I suppose. Bolzano is also right in taking the following question to be rhetorical:

(B-17) Should we not count among analytic judgements . . . also [propositions of the form] ‘Everything is either B or not B’?

Sollte man nicht auch . . . das Urtheil: Jeder Gegenstand ist entweder B oder Nicht-B, zu den analytischen zählen?

(WL II 88, Note 4)

Many have tried to defend Kant against such objections by turning to his characterization of analytic truths as truths whose denials are self-contradictory. It should be noted, however, that Kant himself takes this characterization to be dependent on his official explanation of ‘analytic’. As his confused formulation of the law of non-contradiction (‘No thing is such that a predicate applies to it which contradicts it [Keinem Dinge kommt ein Prädicat zu, welches ihm (sic) widerspricht]’ suggests, he would argue: the judgement that some husbands are unmarried (which is equivalent to the negation of the analytic judgement that all husbands are married) is self-contradictory because the predicate-notion is incompatible with a notion that is contained in the (covertly conjunctive) subject-notion. So an appeal to the law of non-contradiction, as understood by Kant, does not help to overcome the limitations of the containment view of analyticity.

Kant emphasized that ‘every reasonable man must admit that every existential statement is synthetic’. When asking whether Bolzano would underwrite this, one must be careful to avoid a terminological trap. For Kant ‘Lions exist’ means the same thing as ‘There are lions (Es gibt Löwen)’, whereas for Bolzano the former is equivalent to ‘Lions are efficacious (wirklich, wirksam)’. In Bolzano’s idiolect, what Kant calls existential statements are expressed by ‘Es gibt’-sentences (‘There are As’, ‘There is an A’). So the question is whether every reasonable man must admit that no proposition expressible by an ‘Es gibt’-sentence is
analytic in the Bolzanan sense. The answer is, No.\textsuperscript{113} The sentence ‘There is an object which is either coloured or not coloured’ expresses a proposition to the effect that a certain notion is not empty, namely

\[(P36) \text{[[Object which is either coloured or not coloured] has objectuality].}\]

This is true, since (a) everything is either coloured or not coloured and (b) there is something rather than nothing, i.e. the notion [object] is not empty. Bolzano calls the proposition

\[(P37) \text{[[Object] has objectuality]}\]

a ‘basic truth (Grundwahrheit)’.\textsuperscript{114} (P37) consists only of logical concepts, if we may assume that not only ‘object’ but also ‘[object]’ expresses a logical concept, and it is a synthetic truth, because exchange of the subject-notion by the notion [witch], for example, preserves the objectuality of the proposition but results in a falsehood, and so does replacement of the predicate-notion by [courage], say. By contrast, (P36) is a logico-analytic truth, for the only non-logical notion it contains can be exchanged \textit{salva veritate} by any other notion. So some truths expressible by ‘\textit{Es gibt}’-sentences are logically analytic in Bolzano’s acceptation of this term.\textsuperscript{115}

Bolzano’s classification of (P37) as synthetic betokens another divergence from ‘orthodox’ modern logic.\textsuperscript{116} The sentence between square brackets is the canonical rephrasal of

\[(S11) \text{‘There is at least one object’.}\]

In the language of the classical predicate calculus with identity we can approximate this as follows:

\[(S12) \text{‘}\exists x (x = x)\text{’}.\]

But in that calculus (S12) follows from the Principle of Identity,

\[(Id) \text{‘}\forall x (x = x)\text{’},\]

since classically only non-empty domains feature in the definition of validity. So, whereas from Bolzano’s point of view the proposition expressed by (S12), i.e. [[Self-identity] has objectuality], far from being a logico-analytic truth, is \textit{synthetic}, standard predicate logic classifies sen-
tence (S12) as logically true. Interestingly, one of the inventors of that logic disapproved of this very feature of his invention. Bertrand Russell wrote:

\[ (R) \text{ There does not . . . seem to be any logical necessity why there should be even one individual. . . . The primitive propositions in Principia Mathematica [I, 20] are such as to allow the inference that at least one individual exists. But I now view this as a defect in logical purity.} \]

\[ (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], 203 and fn.)^{117} \]

Advocates of ‘universally free logic’ took this message to heart:\(^{118}\) Their definition of validity makes room for the empty domain. (Id) is true also with respect to the empty domain, since there is nothing in it, let alone a counterexample to (Id). But (S12) is false with respect to that domain, for it does not contain anything, let alone something which is identical with itself. This is in line with Bolzano’s verdict on (P37).

Let us return to our comparison of Bolzano and Kant. We have seen that not every logically analytic truth in the Bolzanian sense (let alone every truth that is analytic in his broader sense) is covered by Kant’s explanation of ‘analytic’ in terms of conceptual containment. Now it has been said that ‘by implication, if not by explicit statement, Kant held the propositions of formal logic themselves to be analytic’.\(^{119}\) Suppose this reading is right (and as we shall soon see, Bolzano takes it to be right), then Kant cannot appeal to his official explanation of ‘analytic’ when it comes to justifying the classification of the propositions of pure logic as analytic. At this point he may be invoking what I propose to call the autarky conception of analyticity (‘α’). It comes in two varieties, propositional (‘απ’) and sentential (‘ασ’):\(^{120}\)

\[ (Df. A_{\alpha\pi}) \text{ x is analytic } \leftrightarrow \\
\text{ x is a proposition \& x is true solely in virtue of} \\
\text{ the components of x and the structure of x.} \\
\]

\[ (Df. A_{\alpha\sigma}) \text{ x is analytic } \leftrightarrow \\
\text{ x is sentence \& x is true solely in virtue of the meaning of x.} \\
\]

If (Df. A_{\alpha\pi}) captures the notion under which Kant wants to subsume the propositions of pure logic,\(^{121}\) then not every truth that Kant takes to be analytic in that sense is Bolzano-analytic:

\[ (B-9^+) \text{ As regards logic, Kant claims that it (viz. pure general logic) } \]
consists of nothing but analytic propositions. . . . I am unable to accept this decision; to me it seems incontrovertible that logic, too, contains an immense number of synthetic . . . propositions.

Was nun die Logik anbelangt, so behauptete K[ant], daß sie (die reine, allgemeine nämlich) lediglich aus analytischen Sätzen bestehe. . . . Dieser Entscheidung vermag ich nicht beizupflichten; sondern mir däucht es unwidersprechlich, daß auch die Logik eine beträchtliche Anzahl synthetischer Sätze . . . enthalte.

(WL III 240)

In the section ‘Logical analyticity’ above, where part of this passage was quoted as (B-9), we saw that Bolzano provides us with examples which suffice to make his point (as well as with dubious evidence).122

As for the sentential variant of the autarky conception of analyticity, let us ponder for a moment on its origins and its credentials. Charles Parsons has wondered:123

(P) Where does the notion of ‘truth by virtue of meanings’ come from? Quine writes (in 1951) as if it were quite standard. But it is not so easy to trace its origin. It appears to be in informal characterizations of analyticity in the Vienna Circle. . . . But the matter deserves investigation.

Actually, one does not have to seek very far. The notion can be found in Carl Gustav Hempel’s 1945 paper ‘On the Nature of Mathematical Truth’.124 A year later A.J. Ayer used it in the new Introduction to his famous manifesto of Logical Positivism: ‘A proposition is analytic if it is true solely in virtue of the meaning of its constituent symbols.’125 (As it stands, this is a confusing mixture of the propositional and the sentential versions of the autarky conception: if a proposition is ‘what is expressed by sentences which are literally meaningful’,126 it can hardly consist of symbols. Furthermore, since the truth ‘If the sun is larger than the moon, then the moon is smaller than the sun’ consists of the very same constituents as the falsehood ‘If the sun is larger than the moon, then the sun is smaller than the moon’, Ayer’s formula should either be enriched by a reference to structure or simplified along the lines of (Df. Aα).) It is highly doubtful whether anything falls under this notion.127 Assuming for the sake of the argument that sentences can reasonably be called true, why is the German sentence ‘Sokrates war weise’ true? Because it means that Socrates was wise, and Socrates was wise. Even so empirical a sentence owes its truth not only to Socrates’
being wise. Why is ‘Wer weise ist, ist weise’ in the mouth of a German true? Because it means (it is correctly used to say quite literally) that whoever is wise is wise, and whoever is wise is wise. Even so unempirical a sentence owes its truth not only to its meaning. Generally, the truth of an L-sentence S according to which things are thus-and-so always depends on both conjuncts, on S’s meaning in L what it does and on things being thus-and-so. Therefore the truth of S never solely depends on the meaning of S.

The propositional variant of the autarky conception of analyticity is even more quickly shown to be inadequate. Why is the proposition that p true? Whatever you insert for ‘p’, the plain answer is, ‘Because p’. And this is the answer Bolzano actually gives. In any case, he is obliged to reject the autarky account, since the truth of a logico-analytic proposition is always partly due to the existence of something that falls under its subject-notion.

In the end, one begins to wonder whether Bolzano’s agreement with Kant comes to much more than this: both philosophers apply the label ‘analytic’ to (some) tautological and to (some) manifestly or covertly resolving propositions. Bolzano reveals the motivation for his own way of drawing the line between the analytic and the synthetic when he writes:

(B-18) Generally it seems to me that all these explanations [given by Kant and other philosophers] do not emphasize sufficiently what makes that kind of propositions [the analytic ones] important. I believe that this importance lies in the fact that their truth or falsity does not depend upon each of the notions of which they are composed but remains the same whatever variation some of those notions are subjected to, provided only that the objectuality of the proposition is not destroyed. This is the reason why I took the liberty of giving the above definition.

Überhaupt däucht es mir, daß alle diese Erklärungen das, was jene Art von Sätzen eigentlich wichtig macht, nicht genug hervorheben. Dieses bestehet, wie ich glaube, darin, daß ihre Wahrheit oder Falschheit nicht von den einzelnen Vorstellungen, aus denen sie bestehen, abhängt, sondern dieselbe verbleibt, was für Veränderungen man auch mit einigen derselben vornimmt, vorausgesetzt, daß man nur nicht die Gegenständlichkeit des Satzes selbst zerstöret. Aus diesem Grunde erlaubte ich mir die obige Erklärung.

(WL II 88, Note 4)
Some truths are such that, subject to a certain proviso, their truth is *indifferent* to at least one of the notions (or to all of the non-logical notions) they contain: that is the feature a truth must have if it is to deserve the Bolzanian epithet ‘analytic’ (or ‘logically analytic’). Bolzano’s explanation of how ‘analytic’ in his mouth is to be understood and Kant’s explanation(s) of how he wants this word to be understood are explanations of different concepts (with different extensions). Unlike ‘true’ and ‘necessary’, the word ‘analytic’ is a philosopher’s term of art. Memories of doctrines associated with this term (be they Kantian, Fregean, Carnapian, or whatever) should not be mistaken for pre-theoretical ‘intuitions’ concerning analyticity. There simply are no such intuitions one could appeal to.

As for the doctrines, it is instructive to ask what the philosophers I assembled in this section would, or should, say about the following old chestnuts that have recently been dubbed ‘Carnap-analytic’:

(P38) [Nothing is longer than itself]
(P39) [Whatever is red is extended]
(P40) [Whatever is red all over is not green all over].

Locke, like everybody else, would call them trifling. Kant’s official account of analyticity does not allow him to classify them as analytic. If he were to invoke the autarky conception, he would at least have a semblance of a reason for so classifying them. Insofar as the Logical Positivists appealed to the autarky account of analyticity, their famous evacuation of the synthetic a priori was very premature. Frege should characterize (P38–40) as synthetic a priori, for seen in the light of *Grundlagen*, section 3, they appear as general non-logical laws that neither need nor admit of proof. (Thus they sit in the same boat in which Frege placed the axioms of Euclidean geometry.) As for Bolzano, the answer is crystal-clear: our ‘Carnap-analytic’ propositions are synthetic (a priori).

**W.V. Quine on (logical truth, Ajdukiewicz and Bolzano)**

In the 1950s Quine recapitulated the conception of logical truth which he had spelt out nearly two decades earlier in his paper ‘Truth by Convention’, and he added an acknowledgement:

(Q-1) Without thought of any epistemological doctrine, we may mark out the intended scope of the term ‘logical truth’, within that of the broader term ‘truth’, in the following way. First we suppose
indicated, by enumeration if not otherwise, what words are to be called logical words; typical ones are ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if’, ‘then’, ‘and’, ‘all’, ‘every’, ‘only’, ‘some’. The logical truths, then, are those true sentences which involve only logical words essentially. What this means is that any other words, though they may also occur in a logical truth (as witness ‘Brutus’, ‘kill’ and ‘Caesar’ in ‘Brutus killed or did not kill Caesar’), can be varied at will without engendering falsity. [Footnote:] Substantially this formulation is traced back a century and a quarter, by Bar-Hillel, to Bolzano.

(‘Carnap and Logical Truth’ [1954], 109–10)  

Some years later Quine reported another historical finding:

(Q-2) [M]y much-cited definition of logical truth [in ‘Truth by Convention’] was meant only as an improved exposition of a long-current idea. So I was not taken aback at Bar-Hillel’s finding the idea in Bolzano; I was, though, at recently discovering an anticipation of my specific exposition, in Ajdukiewicz.

(Word and Object [1960], 65)  

In the meantime Dagfinn Føllesdal has ratified this Bohemian–Polish–American alliance:

(F) One hundred and fifty years ago, Bolzano was the first to have the idea of demarcating logic the way Quine does with the help of a set of logical particles which are held constant, while the other non-logical expressions are freely substituted for each other. However, Bolzano’s idea received little attention until it was rediscovered afresh in the mid-thirties by Quine and Ajdukiewicz independently of one another.

(‘Comments on Quine’ [1980], 29)  

Later on I shall try to determine whether these three philosophers are really that closely allied. But before we embark on that investigation, let us examine Quine’s demarcation of logical truths.

Some of the questions (Q-1) invites have been answered in advance by the more careful exposition in ‘Truth by Convention’. In ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’ Quine contents himself with conveying the spirit of that account. You will notice that we confronted (counterparts of) most of the shortcomings of (Q-1) in our discussion of Bolzano’s method of variation.  

(i) Talk of varying at will has to be taken with
Analyticity and logical truth: from Bolzano to Quine

a pinch of salt. We’d better not supplant ‘senators’ in ‘All Roman senators are senators’ by ‘although’, say, and we’d better not replace it by one noun at its first occurrence and by another noun at its second occurrence. The variation must preserve the grammaticality of the sentence, and it has to be uniform. (ii) If you replace the adjective in ‘All Roman senators are senators’ by the adjective ‘putative’ you turn a truth into a falsehood, but Quine certainly wants to classify the original sentence as a logical truth. So the range of appropriate substitutes is not adequately demarcated by surface-grammatical categories such as ‘adjective’. An expression $E^*$ is a permissible substitute for an expression $E$ only if it is interchangeable with $E \text{ salva congruitate}$, i.e. without detriment to grammaticality, in all sentences in which $E$’s occurrence is not just an orthographical accident (like that of ‘stab’, ‘tab’, ‘table’ and ‘able’ in ‘stable’). Now the troublesome substitution is ruled out, for you will change the sentence ‘Brutus was Roman’ to ungrammatical garbage if you put ‘putative’ for ‘Roman’. (iii) In (Q-1) Quine talks only of occurrences of words. But of course, he also wants to say of the phrase ‘Roman senators’ that it does not occur essentially in ‘All Roman senators are Roman senators’, and of the sentence ‘Caesar is dead’ that it does not occur essentially in ‘If Caesar is dead then Caesar is dead’, and surely ‘If . . . then . . . ’, though strangely split in (Q-1), is a logical expression. (iv) An expression may not occur essentially in a sentence even though it cannot be freely replaced \textit{salva veritate}, e.g. the expression ‘Roman senator’ in ‘All Roman senators are senators’: it fails of essential occurrence in this sentence because one of its parts occurs non-essentially therein. (v) In a footnote to (Q-1) Quine himself points out that ‘the formulation . . . fails of its purpose unless the phrase “can be varied at will” . . . is understood to provide for varying words not only singly but also two or more at a time’. The sentence that was used to express proposition (P25) above, i.e. ‘Nothing that is blue is a witch, or something that is coloured is a witch’ serves to illustrate this point, too.

Reflecting on a sentence like

(S13) ‘If it is raining or snowing, then it is raining or snowing’,

one begins to wonder whether a non-logical expression is supposed to be (A) an expression which is not a logical expression, or rather (B) an expression which neither is nor contains a logical expression. If we opt for (B) then the disjunction is what occurs non-essentially in (S13), and our sentence has exactly one logical form, sc. ‘If p then p’. If we
opt for (A) then not only the disjunction but also the disjuncts occur non-essentially, and (S13) also exemplifies the form ‘If p or q, then p or q’. Quine prefers option (A).\textsuperscript{140} So for him there is no such thing as the logical form of a sentence – just as for Bolzano there is no such thing as the form of a proposition.\textsuperscript{141} The opposite view is ‘encouraged’, Strawson once conjectured, ‘by misleading analogies; e.g., with the form of a sonnett (a sonnett cannot be both Shakespearean and Petrarchan in form), or with the shape of a vase’.\textsuperscript{142}

Following Russell’s footsteps, several philosophers have raised what I take to be the most serious objection against Quine’s demarcation of logical truths.\textsuperscript{143} If ‘=’ is a logical word (or rather, a logical sign), as Quine assumes,\textsuperscript{144} the following truth

\[(S14) \; \exists x \exists y \neg (x = y)\]

involves nothing but logical signs. Hence it does not contain any non-logical sign essentially. So according to (Q-1), it must be classified as logically true – and the negation of (S14) as logically false. But is it logically true that there are at least two objects? What may look like a trap hidden in (Q-1) comes to the foreground when Quine says:\textsuperscript{145}

\[(Q-3) \; \text{All true statements which (like } \forall x (x = x)\text{) contain only logical signs are naturally to be classified as logically true.}\]

(\textsuperscript{\textit{‘The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic’ [1947], 267}})

The consequences of this classification are some very unnatural verdicts that do not result from Bolzano’s conception of logico-analytic truth. But of course, if we were to require that logically determinate sentences contain at least one non-logical sign, Quine would have to face the same kind of irritating consequence we confronted Bolzano with:\textsuperscript{146} The disjunction of (S14) and its negation, for example, could no longer be classified as logically true.

Once again, the problem would disappear if one were to take only connectives and (first-order) quantifiers with their variables to be logical constants.\textsuperscript{147} Suppose the identity sign is excluded from the catalogue of logical constants. Then the disjunction of (S14) and its negation contains just one non-logical sign and that sign can be varied \textit{salva veritate}, so the disjunction turns out to be a logical truth after all. To be sure, the identity sign is every bit as topic-neutral as are ‘not’ and ‘some’, but it is a predicate, and that poses a threat to any conception of logical truth in terms of structure. As soon as ‘=’ is added to the logical vocabulary, truths and falsehoods can be formulated in the language
of our calculus, and obviously ‘\∀ x (x = x)’ is not a sentence whose grammatical structure is such that all sentences with that structure are true. Of course, Quine did not overlook the threat for long, and he took refuge in simulating identity for a given language by exhausting the lexicon of its predicates. This strategy has a consequence that I find unpalatable: the identity sign needs to be re-interpreted whenever a new predicate is added to the language for which it has been simulated, whereas the remainder of the logical vocabulary remains entirely unaffected by any such addition.

Sometimes Quine gives his definition of logical truth in two stages, mediated by the notion of a logically valid schema or form:

\[ (Q-4) \text{ Given [the notion of truth and the notion of logical vocabulary] the business of formal logic is describable as that of finding statement forms which are logical, in the sense of containing no constants beyond the logical vocabulary, and (extensionally) valid, in the sense that all statements exemplifying the form in question are true. Statements exemplifying such forms may be called logically true.} \]

(‘Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory’ [1953], 140–1)

First we define a grammatical form as logically valid if all sentences of that form are true. Next we define a sentence as logically true if it has a logically valid grammatical form.

(‘Grammar, Truth, and Logic’ [1980], 17)

Now consider the following ‘forms’:

1. ‘\∃ x (Fx v \neg Fx)’
2. ‘\∀ x Fx \rightarrow \exists x Fx’.

They contain no constants beyond the logical vocabulary, and, as a matter of fact, all sentences exemplifying these forms, such as

1. ‘\exists x (x is coloured v \neg x is coloured)’
2. ‘\forall x (x=x) \rightarrow \exists x (x=x)’,

are true. But are (1*) and (2*) logically true? With respect to the empty domain, (1*) is false, and so is (2*), since with respect to that domain its antecedent is true while its consequent is false. Of course, Quine has heard this objection before, from Russell and others. Alluding to (R) he replies:
(Q-5) It has frequently been claimed that though the schemata (1) and (2) are demonstrable in quantification theory, the statements of the forms which these schemata depict are not logically true. For, it is argued, such statements depend for their truth upon there being something in the universe; and that there is something is, though true, not logically true.

The argument is right in its first premiss: the described statements do indeed depend for their truth upon there being something. But the rest of the argument turns on an obscure standard of logical truth, for clearly any statements of the forms (1) and (2) are logically true according to the definition of logical truth given above.

(‘Meaning and Existential Inference’ [1953], 160)

As it stands, this reply is fairly weak. The opponent is trying to undermine a certain definition of logical truth. So his objection cannot be defused simply by appealing to this very definition. The opponent insists that whether something is logically true should not depend on the truth of any existence-assumptions, and he points out that neither (1*) nor (2*) complies with this demand, though the conditional which has (1*) as antecedent and (2*) as consequent does. ‘If this intuitively appealing demand conflicts with Quine’s account of logical truth,’ he will exclaim, ‘so much the worse for that account.’

Let us now return to (Q-2). Three years before the publication of his much-cited definition of logical truth, Quine had got to know Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz personally in Warsaw. Ajdukiewicz’s 1934 paper ‘Sprache und Sinn (Language and Meaning)’ is the place where we must look for the ‘anticipation’ Quine is talking about. What is pertinent in that paper is the idea of axiomatic, and deductive, ‘meaning-rules (Sinnregeln).’ A meaning-rule for a language L is axiomatic just in case it demands of L-speakers to be ready to accept or ‘acknowledge (anerkennen)’ certain sentences ‘without any further ado (ohne weiteres).’ Thus, for example,

(A) anyone who connects the words ‘each’ and ‘is (an)’ with the meaning they have in English is expected to acknowledge without further ado every sentence of the form ‘Each A is an A’.

(‘Sprache und Sinn’ [1934], 157)

If somebody were to reject a sentence of that form, . . . this would be taken to be an infallible sign that the person in ques-
tion does not connect with those words the meaning they have in English.

(‘Die wissenschaftliche Weltperspektive’ [1935], 198)

(Such meaning-rules are called ‘axiomatic’ because they ‘determine the sentences which have the status of axioms within the language’.154) Now a meaning-rule may be ‘essential (wesentlich)’ for an expression, or it may be ‘inessential’. Take the sentence (S), ‘Each foal is a foal’. Our axiomatic meaning-rule is inessential for the expression ‘foal’, since it demands immediate assent for (S) as well as for all sentences which differ from (S) only by the fact that ‘foal’ is uniformly replaced by another expression of ‘the same logical type’. Our axiomatic meaning-rule is essential, on the other hand, for the expression ‘each’, for if we replace ‘each’ by another expression of the same logical type, e.g. by ‘no’, we do not obtain a sentence which every speaker of English is obliged to acknowledge without further ado.155

Ajdukiewicz always speaks of ‘acknowledgement to be granted without any further ado’. Hence his conception cannot cover all logical truths but only those which are (as he himself puts it) ‘self-evident’. Non-trivial logical truths can only be encompassed with the help of his conception of deductive meaning-rules. Such rules demand of a speaker of a language to be ready to accept certain sentences as soon as she has accepted certain other sentences. Thus everybody who connects with the words ‘or’ and ‘not’ the meaning they have in English is obliged to accept the second part of a disjunction when she has accepted the disjunction and the negation of the first disjunct.

Now acknowledgement without any further ado is certainly not only to be granted to logical truths. The sentences ‘Nobody is his or her own father’ and ‘Whatever is red is coloured’ also demand immediate assent as soon as they are understood, but neither of them expresses, or is, a logical truth by Bolzanian, or by Quinean, lights.156 (For Bolzano, they express synthetic truths.) So Ajdukiewicz’s conception is wider than its alleged counterparts in Bolzano and Quine. Furthermore, where the Bohemian and the American philosopher speak of truth, their Polish colleague speaks of acknowledgement or acceptance as true, and he takes this to be very important: in 1953 Ajdukiewicz maintained about his papers of the 1930s that he had never claimed ‘that the sentences to be acknowledged according to the axiomatic meaning-rules of a language are true’.157 The notion of acknowledgement, or of acceptance as true, is an epistemic notion. So Ajdukiewicz’s conception of the class of sentences governed by axiomatic (and deductive) meaning-rules is an epistemic conception. Hence it is very
far from Bolzano’s account of logically analytic truth, and it is rather surprising that Quine sees in it an anticipation of his own account of logical truth. Recall the beginning of quotation (Q-1): ‘Without thought of any epistemological doctrine, we may mark out the intended scope of the term “logical truth” within that of the broader term “truth”.’

Let us finally turn to the question whether Quine’s idea of logical truth is really as close to Bolzano’s conception of logico-analytic truth, as Bar-Hillel, Føllesdal and Quine himself think it is. A major difference strikes the eye as soon as one recalls the phenomenon of hidden analyticity. By Quinean lights, ‘A foal is a young horse’ is not a logical truth. For Bolzano it is logically analytic that a foal is a young horse: after all, the entities on which the Bolzian operation of variation is performed are notions, and the notion of a foal is the notion of a young horse. At bottom this difference boils down to the fact that Bolzano defines logical analyticity not for sentences but for propositions.158 (As is well known, Quine regards the latter entities, for reasons which I find less than convincing, as ‘creatures of darkness’, as ‘entia non grata’.) Not surprisingly Quine’s logical particles are expressions (connectives, quantifiers and the identity predicate), whereas Bolzano’s logical particles are notions. It is not even true that Bolzian logical concepts are just those concepts which are expressed by Quinean logical particles. Bolzano’s canonical paraphrase of Quine’s paradigm of a logical truth,

(S15) ‘Brutus killed or did not kill Caesar’,

would look somewhat like this:159

(S15*) ‘The notion of a true proposition that is part of the collection

\{[Brutus killed Caesar], [[Brutus killed Caesar] is false]\}

has objectuality’.

So the Bolzian logical concepts that occur in the proposition expressed are [notion], [proposition], [collection], [true], [false], [has] and [objectuality]. No entry in Quine’s list of logical particles expresses any of these concepts. These disanalogies should not be swept under the carpet when one compares Bolzano’s account of logical analyticity and Quine’s definition of logical truth.

But, of course, there is a striking similarity between both explanations. Only we should describe it more carefully. Michael Dummett comes close to it when he writes:
Analyticity and logical truth: from Bolzano to Quine 227

(D) [Bolzano gave a] non-epistemic definition of ‘analytic’. Bolzano’s classification was of propositions . . ., not of sentences. This means that the work to be done by definitions, at the level of linguistic expression, has, as it were, already taken place. . . . If we transpose from the mode of sentences and their component words to that of propositions and their component ideas, he in effect used the notion expressed by Quine as ‘essential occurrence’. An analytic truth in the wider sense was for him a true proposition containing at least one idea inessentially: no admissible replacement of that idea by another would deprive the proposition of truth. An analytic truth in the narrower sense was one in which all but the logical concepts occur inessentially.

(Quine – Philosophy of Mathematics [1991], 29)

Exegetically, this is not yet quite right, for it infects Bolzano’s account of logico-analytic truth with Quine’s virus. Suppose the identity sign is a logical particle. Then the proposition expressed by (S14), ‘∃x ∃y ¬ (x = y)’, contains only logical concepts. Hence it trivially satisfies the condition that no non-logical concept occurs essentially in it. So Dummett’s Bolzano has to classify the truth that there are at least two objects as analytic in the narrow sense. But the real Bolzano takes it to be synthetic. Furthermore, in the section ‘Logical analyticity’ we saw that truths like (P20), [There is at least one true proposition], contain only logical concepts – on Bolzano’s acceptation of the term. Hence they contain no non-logical concept essentially. So under Dummett’s reading, Bolzano has to regard such truths as logico-analytic. But he actually takes them to be synthetic. We can bring the Quinean formulation of Bolzano’s view into line with (Df. LA2) by saying: a proposition x is a logico-analytic truth just in case x is true, x contains at least one non-logical notion, and no non-logical notion occurs essentially in x. Due to the second conjunct of the definiens, this definition is protected against the virus, and it inherits the limitation of (Df. LA2).

We can stick to Dummett’s characterization, however, if we revise Bolzano’s (and Quine’s) letter and withhold the title ‘logical concept’ from all concepts of formal ontology and from all meta-logical concepts. This is the strategy I favour. A very restrictive conception of logical analyticity can be characterized like this: logical concepts are expressed by the truth-functional connectives and by the quantifiers of first-order predicate logic. Period. The notion of identity is handed over to formal ontology. (In order to respect well-grounded reservations concerning the existence assumptions of neo-classical predicate logic,
reservations which we saw Bolzano’s theory to respect, we should opt for some kind of free first-order predicate logic.) Encouraged by the spirit of tolerance in Bolzano’s remark (B-7), we can then introduce less Spartan conceptions of logical analyticity, e.g. by bestowing the title ‘logical concept’ also on modal notions.

I conclude with a note of warning and a word of consolation. The note of warning is this: let us not be beguiled into thinking that Quin- ean problems with synonymy simply disappear when we do things in the Bolzanian way. (I do not mean to suggest that Dummett is under any illusions on this point.) The starting-point of Quine’s famous attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction is a de-epistemologized (and tidied up) variant of Frege’s explanation of ‘analytic’:\textsuperscript{160}

\begin{align*}
\text{(Df. } A_{\text{FREGE}^*} \text{)} \quad x \text{ is analytic} & \iff \\
& (a) \ x \text{ is logically true, or} \\
& (b) \ x \text{ can be transformed into a logical truth by} \\
& \text{substitution of synonyms for synonyms.}
\end{align*}

So according to \text{FREGE}^* the general notion of analyticity is supposed to be definable on the basis of the narrower notion of logical truth and that of synonymy. As we all know, Quine throws his hands up in despair when it comes to explaining the notion of synonymy:\textsuperscript{161} By contrast, both the broader and the narrower concept of analyticity in Bolzano are explained by invoking only the concepts of truth and falsity and that of uniform substitution. Since analyticity is taken to be a property of propositions, rather than of the sentences expressing them, there is no need to make any appeal to the concept of synonymy, or to that of definitions (of linguistic expressions), in these \textit{explanations}. But this is only one side of the coin. When we want to find out whether a sentence expresses a logico-analytic truth in Bolzano’s sense, we must reckon with the possibility that this sentence does not show on its syntactic sleeves whether it expresses an analytic proposition or not. As soon as we make pretensions at disclosing hidden analyticity, we have to rely on our ability to recognize synonyms for what they are. And so I did when claiming repeatedly that the notion of a foal is the same as the notion of a young horse.

The word of consolation is Strawson’s \textit{Tu quoque}:\textsuperscript{162} it is by no means clear that logical truth, as understood in Quine’s quasi-Bolzanian definition, can be accounted for without appealing to (sameness of) meaning. We want to say of the word ‘wise’ in

(S16) ‘Whoever is wise is wise’
that its occurrences are not essential: that they could be supplanted by occurrences of any other one (grammatically admissible) expression without engendering falsity. But the supplanting word could be ambiguous, as in

(S17) ‘Whoever is sick is sick’.

In one occurrence the word ‘sick’ might be used to signify a condition of body (being ill, for short), in the other to signify a condition of mind (being depressed, for short), and in that case (S17) would not be used to express a truth, for, as a matter of fact, some are ill and yet high in spirits. So apparently we have to suppose that the word ‘sick’ is used in the same sense at both occurrences. Of course, sameness of extension at both occurrences would also prevent falsity, but talk of extension at an occurrence can hardly be made intelligible without appeal to intended readings of (S17).

It is worth adding that the same kind of argument can be run for syntactic ambiguity. We want to say that the sentence which occurs twice in

(S18) ‘If snow is white then snow is white’

could be supplanted by occurrences of any one sentence without engendering falsity. Now consider

(S19) ‘If old men and women are having a stroll in the park then old men and women are having a stroll in the park’.

If in an utterance of (S19) ‘old’ is given narrow scope in the antecedent and wide scope in the consequent, something false is being said. So apparently we have to suppose that the embedded sentence is used in the same sense at both occurrences. Of course, sameness of truth-value at both occurrences would also prevent falsity, but talk of truth-value at an occurrence can hardly be made intelligible without appeal to intended readings of (S19).

When Quine replied to Strawson’s argument from lexical ambiguity, he conceded all this and gave up ‘defining logical truth along the old semantical lines’. So, there is a price to be paid for avoiding any dependence on the notion of (sameness of) meaning. Quine now defines logical truth for regimented languages in which all logically demonstrable sentences, all instances of derivable schemata, are true (without relativization to anything but the regimented language): for such
languages, he says, ‘logical demonstrability is logical truth’. (Our sentences (S17) and (S19) are logically demonstrable, and they are false for some disambiguations, hence Quine’s new definition of logical truth does not apply to English as a whole.) But in a well-behaved fragment of English to which the definition does apply (S16) and (S18), being logically demonstrable, are logically true. So Strawson seems to be answered: the revised definition of logical truth does not invoke the notion of (sameness of) meaning, and it does not suffer from the vicissitudes of equivocation. It is not meant to be an objection to this account of logical truth in terms of logical demonstrability when I observe that it is no longer in the spirit of Bolzano’s account.

But I do have an objection, too. Suppose there were no illness without depression, and vice versa. Then one would always hit the truth when uttering our sentence (S17). Now imagine a language L in which all lexically ambiguous terms behave as obligingly as ‘sick’ does under the circumstances just described. Lexical ambiguity would prevent no logically demonstrable sentence of L from being true. Nevertheless, the Strawson effect recurs: if in an utterance of (S17) one occurrence of ‘sick’ is used to signify being ill and the other to signify being depressed, then what is said isn’t logically true, no matter whether it is true.¹⁶⁴ Again, the argument can be replicated for syntactic ambiguity. ‘Visiting relatives can be boring’ is true for both disambiguations, but if in an utterance of

(S20) ‘If visiting relatives can be boring then visiting relatives can be boring’

the antecedent is used to say that a certain activity can be boring while the consequent is used to say that certain people can be boring, then what is said isn’t logically true even though it is true.

The point is not that what is said in such utterances of (S17) or (S20) would at best be, or is only, contingently true. Our reluctance in the former case would be the same if every ambiguous term in a language L* were such that its readings are not only extensionally, but also intensionally equivalent. In L* the adjective ‘volpe’, let us suppose, has two readings: HAS A CERTAIN VOLUME and HAS A CERTAIN SHAPE, and similarly for every other ambiguous term in L*: under each disambiguation it applies to the same objects with respect to every possible world. All the same, if in an utterance of ‘Whatever is volpe is volpe’ in my fictional language L* one occurrence of ‘volpe’ is used to ascribe possession of a volume and the other is used to ascribe possession of a shape, then what is said isn’t logically true even though it
is necessarily true. None of this is a problem from Bolzano’s (and Strawson’s) point of view. Only some utterances of (S17), (S19) and (S20) express logico-analytic truths, and if there were speakers of L* the same would hold for some utterances of ‘Whatever is volpe is volpe’. So our struggle with the notion of logical truth gives us some incentive for being friendly to propositions.

Notes

* Earlier and much shorter versions of this chapter were presented to the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague in October 2003, in a colloquium at the Institut d’Histoire de la Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques in Paris in March 2004 and as a Plenary Lecture at the International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg in August 2004. I am very grateful to Edgar Morscher who provided me with generously detailed and pointed written comments that have prompted several much needed clarifications and revisions. I also want to thank Dagfinn Føllesdal, Mark Siebel and Peter Simons for searching questions and constructive suggestions.

1 In Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, deren Studium er in seinem 18. Jahr begann, sprach ihn sogleich die Unterscheidung zwischen . . . analytischen und synthetischen Urteilen . . . sehr an, obgleich er sich in die von Kant gegebene Erklärung . . . derselben nie zu finden vermochte (Bolzano (6) 68, talking of himself in the third person, as he often did in order to fool Metternich’s censors who had a sharp eye on him). In this chapter translations from German are always my own.

2 Moore 667.

3 Cf. Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre (henceforth: WL, quoted by volume and page number) IV 243–5, 488–90, 542–5, 547. The manuscript of WL was published only seven years after Bolzano had begun to search for a publisher (outside the borders of the Austrian Empire). The book was as unsuccessful as can be. It was only several decades after Bolzano’s death that some philosophers in Vienna, Halle and Lemberg recognized some of the gold mines it contains. See Künne (2) and (5).

4 Bolzano’s views on propositions are examined, and compared with Frege’s, in Künne (3).

5 WL I 216, II 18. My translation of ‘Vorstellung an sich’ as ‘notion’ (rather than ‘idea in itself’) needs to be protected against a possible misunderstanding. In the context of this chapter this term must not be understood as just another word for ‘concept’, for Bolzano distinguishes within the class of notions ‘intuitions (Anschauungen an sich)’ from pure ‘concepts (Begriffe an sich)’. The former are atomic notions under which exactly one object falls, the latter are notions which neither are nor contain any intuitions (WL I 325–31).

6 In Künne (8) 3–6, 94–112, 200–1, Bolzano’s conception of truth is compared with Aristotle’s view, with object-based correspondence theories, and with Tarski’s account.

7 The same definition can be found in Bolzano (8) 105. (Nowadays objects fall under a concept. I don’t know how it is with you, but if I were given the
choice between standing and falling under a concept I’d very much prefer the former.)

8 WL II 7–17.
9 WL I 248–50, II 264, 400.
10 WL II 26–7; cf. II 263.
11 Cf. inter alia WL II 114, No. 3.
12 Cf. Simons (5) 16, Morscher (4) 60.
13 ‘Each proposition is either true or false (Jeder Satz ist entweder wahr oder falsch)’ (WL II 33).
14 In dem Begriﬀe, den ich mit dem Worte Wahrheit verbinde, ist der Begriﬀ eines Erkenntnisses keineswegs schon als Bestandtheil enthalten (Bolzano (4) 178).
15 See WL I 113 (quoted and translated in Künne (8) 22).

Bolzano was by no means certain that every sentence can be squeezed into this Procrustean bed (WL II 9–10). In Bolzano (10) 48–9, he frankly admits: ‘B. himself does not dare to put forward this opinion as deﬁnitely settled, for he does not know how to argue for it otherwise than by an induction which in the nature of the case is bound to be incomplete: . . . by trying to show that every sentence of an apparently deviant form can, nay must be reduced to the form “A has b”, if what is said is to be properly understood. Whether the reader will be satisﬁed with such a reduction in all cases, we cannot say; certainly such a procedure cannot be regarded as a complete proof (B. getrauet sich selbst nicht, diese Ansicht als eine ganz entschiedene geltend zu machen; denn er weiß sie nicht anders als durch eine ihrer Natur nach nur unvollständige Induction zu erweisen; indem er . . . überall, wo eine scheinbar abweichende Form von Sätzen vorkommt, zu zeigen sucht, daß man auch diesen Ausdruck auf die Form: A hat b zurückführen könne, ja müsse, wenn recht verständlich werden soll, was man hier eigentlich sage. Ob nun die Leser mit dieser Zurückführung überall zufrieden seyn werden, wissen wir nicht zu sagen: gewiß ist nur, daß das Ganze nie als ein vollständiger Beweis angesehen werden könne.’ Chapters 2 and 5 of WL II are largely devoted to attempts at showing that the reduction programme is feasible. For critical discussion see Textor (1).

17 A ‘collection (Inbegriff)’, Bolzano explains, is ‘something that is composite (Etwas, das Zusammengesetztheit hat)’, ‘a whole consisting of certain parts (ein aus gewissen Teilen bestehendes Ganze)’: WL I 393–4; Bolzano (12) 2. Thus a flock of sheep we see on a meadow, as well as each single sheep, is a collection in the Bolzanian sense. (Neither is a set in the modern acceptation of this term.)

18 WL II 77–82.
19 The idea of propositional variation occurs already in WL I 299–300, 314.
20 Cf. Quine (8) 165, 168–9, 194.
21 The inclusion of P itself in the class of variants of P is clearly demanded by the example Bolzano gives in WL II 80–1. The consequences of excluding it are carefully considered in Mark Siebel (1) 167–75.
22 Alberto Coffa reads this constraint as insisting on ‘grammatical admissibility’ (Coffa 34, 378–9). This is a serious misunderstanding: only linguistic objects can misbehave grammatically, and ‘The King of Switzerland is rich’, though grammatically impeccable, does not comply with Bolzano’s constraint.
23 \(WL\) I 206, 447, II 79–80. Unlike Frege [see his (4) 44] Bolzano does not take (a substitution-instance of) ‘A is not not B’ to express the same proposition as ‘A is B’: after all, only the proposition expressed by the more verbose sentence contains the concept of negation. Cf. Künne (3) and (8) 45–7.

24 Brentano’s pupil Kasimierz Twardowski was the founding-father of analytical philosophy in Poland. In his teaching in Lemberg Bolzano must have played a prominent role (cf. Künne (5) 337–9). Łukasiewicz was the first of Twardowski’s distinguished disciples to obtain a PhD under his supervision. Not much work seems to have been done on Łukasiewicz’s theory of probability. But cf. Peter Simons (2), sect. 3, and the papers by Childers and Majer and by Placek in Kijania-Placek and Wolenski. Not even the first of these studies so much as even mentions the Bolzano–Łukasiewicz connection.

25 In his booklet on probability Łukasiewicz uses ‘Aussage’, ‘Urteil’ and ‘Satz’ as equivalents: (2) 56–7, 58, 60, 74. My assumption that he means declarative sentences is supported by what he writes in a German paper published three years earlier: ‘By “Aussage” I mean a sequence of words or other perceptible signs the meaning of which consists in their affirming or denying of an object that it has a certain property. (Unter “Aussage” verstehe ich eine Reihe von Worten oder anderen sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Zeichen, deren Bedeutung darin besteht, daß sie einem Gegenstand irgendein Merkmal zu oder absprechen.)’ He continues: ‘Aussagen’ are either true or false, but ‘acts of belief as psychic functions can no more be true or false in the primary sense than sensations, emotions, and similar things (Glaubensakte als psychische Funktionen, [können] ebensowenig wie Empfindungen, Gefühle u. dgl. im primären Sinne wahr oder falsch sein)’ (Łukasiewicz (1) 60; 63).

26 Łukasiewicz (2) 2, et passim.


29 A similar convention is adopted in Quine (11) 38, 48ff.


31 On p. 58 of Łukasiewicz (2) he pays homage to his teacher: ‘I owe the reference to Bolzano to Prof. Twardowski, for although I was acquainted with Bolzano’s main work already for a long time, up to now I never paid any attention to the discussion of the concept of “validity” contained therein. (Den Hinweis auf Bolzano verdanke ich Herrn Prof. Twardowski; obgleich mir nämlich das Hauptwerk Bolzano’s schon lange bekannt war, habe ich vordem den darin enthaltenen Ausführungen über den Begriff der “Gültigkeit” eines Satzes keine Beachtung geschenkt.)’

32 \(WL\) II 392, 516. A ‘Wissenschaft in der objectiven Bedeutung (science in the objective sense)’ (\(WL\) IV 6), or a ‘Religion in der objectiven Bedeutung des Wortes’ (Bolzano (5) I 60–1), is a collection (Inbegriff) of propositions.

33 Cf. Siebel (1) 153–83.

34 Łukasiewicz (2) 56. He introduced the term ‘Zweiwertigkeitssatz’ in this manner in (3) 108.

35 Łukasiewicz himself reports that he spelt out the conception of a three-valued logic only in summer 1917: Łukasiewicz (4) 86.

36 Only a truth can be universally valid or ‘true as regards its entire kind (seiner ganzen Art . . . nach wahr)’ (\(WL\) II 82). All variants of the falsehood [The largest prime is identical with itself] in which [the largest prime] is replaced
by a non-empty subject-notion are true, but one would hardly want to call that proposition, or any other falsehood, universally valid. See previous section ‘Degrees of validity’, n. 21.

37 As for the modern use of ‘valid’, compare (Q–4) in section ‘W.V Quine on’.

38 A *proposition* is objectual just in case its subject-notion is not empty (WL II 77, 331).

39 Cf. WL II 331, III 450, IV 115. What precedes the ‘i.e. (d.h.)’ in the antecedent of the first sentence of (B–4) presupposes that the truth-value of the proposition that is to be varied has to be taken into account when the proposition is assessed for validity: ‘without interfering with (stören) its truth or falsity’. Unfortunately this point is not explicitly preserved in the continuation of the sentence, as Siebel observes in (1) 171, but in the final sentence, in what follows the second ‘i.e. (d.h.)’, the point is repeated.

40 WL IV 115–16. Applying the conceptual machinery of WL II 113–14 we can say: (P5) is deducible (ableitbar) from (P4) with respect to the notion [In . . . the sum of its angles equals two rights].

41 The entries on the right-hand side comment on the proposition denoted to its left, declaring it to be universally valid (‘uv’) with respect to (‘.’) the notion expressed by the bracketed term(s).

42 On Bergmann who was to become the founding-father of philosophy in Israel cf. Künne (2) 56–66, 78–9.

43 Bergmann 75–6. (Notice that ‘three’ and ‘3’ express the same notion. I had to invent an English word in order to mimic the structure of Bergmann’s example.) In Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1) 10 the same example is used to make the same point, and in Bar-Hillel’s next paper the source becomes visible: ‘This article has been written as an outcome of conversations with Professor Hugo Bergman of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and a joint reading of the relevant passages of Bolzano’s WL. It is to Professor Bergman that I owe the general ideas on which this paper is based’ (Bar-Hillel (2) 33).

44 Compare Berg’s favourite type of example in this connection: the empirical contingent proposition [Socrates is snub-nosed, and Socrates is wise or not wise] is universally valid with respect to the notion [wise], hence analytic. Berg recognizes that Bolzano himself would hardly have minded this consequence of (Df. A), but he finds it so ‘disturbing’ that he immediately turns to the narrower notion of analyticity (to be introduced in the following section ‘Logical analyticity’): see Berg 101, or his Introduction to BGA 1, 12/1, 18. Incidentally, if we put the synthetic proposition [Socrates is snub-nosed] beside Berg’s conjunction, we have a pair of propositions which can serve to illustrate other consequences of (Df. A) that were registered above.

45 (P8) is deducible (ableitbar) from (P7) with respect to the notion [Roman Catholic]. Cf. WL II 399. Hence it is not the case that ‘analytic propositions . . . are excluded from the role of a premise [in a deduction]’ (Joëlle Proust 92). Cofta got it right: ‘Bolzano’s analytic is not closed with respect to his logical consequence’ (Cofta 379, n. 10). (In the rest of that footnote he seems to have forgotten that in Bolzano ‘analytic’ does not mean logically analytic.)

46 WL II 84, Nr. 3.

47 Leibniz calls them ‘completely identical (identiques, qui le sont entierement)’ (Nouveaux essais IV, 8, 5 (p. 429)); in Kant they are called ‘tautologische Sätze’ (see note below).
48 Cf. *WL* II 331–2. They differ from Kant’s paradigms in that the predicate-notion of (P11), say, is openly rather than ‘covertly (versteckter Weise)’ contained in the subject-notion (Kant, *KrV* B 10). For more on hiddenness and Kant see the following two sections. Leibniz calls propositions of the types exemplified by (P10–11) ‘semi-identicals (identiques à demi)’ (loc. cit.).

49 Cf. Kant, *KrV* B 11. In Bolzano (1) 80ff., 136 the class of analytic propositions is circumscribed by the strange formula ‘(A cum B) is a species of A’. In his (2) 18–19, 34, Bolzano replaces ‘A cum B’ by ‘A quod B est’. Cf. also his (3) 148, (5) I 158. Some traces of the older use of ‘analytic’ as covering only resolving propositions have survived in *WL*. As regards the first volume, this is not surprising: as long as Bolzano has not yet introduced his own conception, he must rely on a reading of ‘analytic’ he can assume his readers to be familiar with, i.e. the Kantian account in terms of conceptual containment (*WL* I 52, 192, 288–9). But even in a Note to sect. 148, a proposition like (P10) is described as ‘an example for identical (or rather analytic) propositions [Beispiel identischer oder vielmehr analytischer Sätze]’; II 85, my emphasis. In 1912 Bertrand Russell explains ‘analytic’ by means of examples that have the structure of (P10): ‘If I say, “A bald man is a man”, “A plane figure is a figure,” . . . I make a purely analytic judgement: the subject spoken about is given as having at least two properties, of which one is singled out to be asserted of it. . . . They are called “analytic” because the predicate is obtained by merely analysing the subject’ (Russell (1) 46). Roderick Chisholm proceeds along the same lines: Chisholm 84 (= 2nd edn 55, 3rd edn 32–3).

50 Bolzano (8) 95: daß der sprachliche Ausdruck die Bestandtheile eines Satzes nicht immer richtig angibt; . . . ‘runder Hut’ und ‘gemalter Fisch’ sind 2 gleichtartige Zusammensetzungen; . . . doch dürfen die Begriffe nicht auf gleiche Weise zusammengesetzt werden. The different roles of the adjective that are salient in such examples are also emphasized in Bolzano (3) 143, *WL* I, 92, 121, 138, 257–8, II 213. In the Brentano school they were distinguished as ‘determining’ and ‘modifying’ uses. For references to Brentano, Kerry, Marty, Twardowski and Husserl see Künne (2) 34–5. Alberto Coffa can certainly not be accused of underestimating the importance of Bolzano in what he calls ‘The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap’, so one is surprised to hear him, of all people, say that ‘the central idea of logical analysis, the realization that language is an extraordinarily misleading guide to content, was still in the future’. Of course, it is hard to say when misleadingness becomes extraordinary, so this may have a reading under which it is correct. But the (two) data Coffa presents as evidence for his contention are not at all convincing. Here is the one which may have persuaded most of his readers that he has a point here: ‘[The numerals] “35” and “53” were said by [Bolzano] to express [notions] whose constituents are identical . . ., and to differ only in “the way in which these parts are connected”’ [*WL* I 244] (Coffa 39–40, 379 n. 15). This is based on (a misprint in?) the English translation Coffa used. In the German text you find ‘35’ and ‘53’, and it is not at all bizarre to assume that the notions expressed by these two singular terms both consist of the three notions that are expressed by the numerals ‘3’ and ‘5’ and by the functor ‘to the power of’. (In the passage misquoted by Coffa, Bolzano makes the same point with a pair of general terms,
Bolzano does not say in (B–5), as Siebel (1) 172 suggests, that all propositions of the form ‘A is A’ that are true are analytic, and he applies the term ‘tautologous’ to all propositions of that form, no matter whether they are true or not: ‘Those propositions . . . that are covered by the form [A is A] are commonly called identical or tautological propositions (Die Sätze . . ., die unter der Form: A ist A, . . . enthalten sind, pflegt man mit einem eigenen Namen identische, auch tautologische Sätze zu nennen)’ (WL II 84). This was indeed common usage. ‘ταυτολογία’, Quintilian explains, is ‘the repetition of the same word or phrase (eiusdem verbi aut sermonis iteratio)’ (VIII 3, 50). It was also common to presume that all propositions of that repetitive kind are true: ‘Non-derivative truths of reason (les verités primitives de raison)’, Leibniz says, ‘are the ones to which I give the general name identical truths, because it seems that they only repeat the same thing without telling us anything, . . . for example: A is A; . . . What I have written I have written; . . .’ (Nouveaux essais IV.2.1 (p. 361)). (It is worth keeping the last example in mind, since Bolzano will give it a special treatment: see following section.) In Kant we find the same presumption, since he takes all tautologies to be analytic, which implies (on his acceptance of this term) that they are true: ‘The identity of concepts in analytic judgements can be either explicit or implicit. In the former case analytic propositions are tautological. . . . Tautological propositions are of no avail or use. Such is, for example, the tautological proposition: Man is man’ (Kant’s Logic, compiled by Jäsche, sect. 37). Bolzano should be ready to deny that presumption. Tautological propositions are identified by their repetitive form, the proposition that witches are witches does have such a form, so some tautological propositions, having an empty subject-notion, are not true, let alone logically true.

As can be seen from WL III 178 and from two passages in books of his most gifted pupils: Prihonsky 91–2; Zimmermann 147.

I use this rather cacophonous abstract noun to refer to the property of being human. (‘Humanity’, in one of its uses, denotes the property of being humane, which some humans unfortunately lack.)

This fits Bolzano’s contention, in WL II 86, Note 2, that a proposition is tautological ‘if its subject-notion is a concretum and its predicate notion is the corresponding abstractum (wenn seine Unterlage das Concretum, und der Aussageheil das ihm entsprechende Abstractum ist)’. In WL I 259–60 he had explained this terminology as follows: ‘The notion [something which has (the property) b] I call a concretum. The notion [b] which is contained therein may therefore be classified as its abstractum, or as the notion which is abstracted from it (/Die Vorstellung] eines Etwas, das (die Beschaffenheit) b hat, . . . nenne ich . . . ein Concretum. Die hier vorkommende Vorstellung b dagegen . . . mag in der Rücksicht, daß sie als ein Bestandtheil in jener concreten erscheint, das Abstractum derselben, oder die von ihr abgezogene Vorstellung heissen).’

Cf. WL II 334.

Bar-Hillel (1) 23.

Berg 99.


This attitude is rather close to Tarski’s concerning the difference between
logical and extra-logical terms: ‘No objective grounds are known to me which permit us to draw a sharp boundary between the two groups of terms (Mir sind keine objektiven Gründe bekannt, die eine scharfe Grenze zwischen beiden Gruppen von Termini zu ziehen gestatten’) (Tarski [1936], 10). On Tarski’s later position see Peter Simons (3). When Georg Henrik von Wright declares a conception of logical truth in the spirit of (Df. LA) ‘far from clear’, what he deplores is not the lack of a sharp boundary between logical and non-logical terms/concepts but rather the fact that ‘it does not give us any means of determining whether a given sentence expresses a logical truth or not’ (von Wright (2) 6). But a conception of logical truth that does not provide us with a decision procedure (such as the Wittgenstein-Post truth-table test for propositional logic) may very well be crystal-clear.

Taking ‘logic’ in the sense of what Bolzano calls ‘Theory of Elements (Elementarlehre)’ or ‘pure logic (reine Logik)’, i.e. the theory of deducibility, of the relata of this relation, sc. propositions, and of their components, sc. notions (Wl I 58–9, 67, 213–14). This excludes the theories of knowledge (Erkenntnistheorie), of knowledge acquisition (Heuristik), and of knowledge representation in textbooks (oddly enough called Eigentliche [proper] Wissenschaftslehre), which are treated in volumes III and IV of Wl. These theories are also covered by the term ‘logic’ as used in the baroque subtitle of the book: ‘Attempt at a Detailed and in the main Novel Exposition of Logic, With Constant Attention to Earlier Authors (Versuch einer ausführlichen und größtentheils neuen Darstellung der Logik mit steter Rücksicht auf deren bisherige Bearbeiter)’. The latter use of ‘logic’ which we tend to find excessive had actually become the common coin during the Renaissance, and it can also be found in Leibniz and Wolff. So Hilary Putnam disregards several centuries when he claims that ‘today the scope of logic is defined much more broadly than it ever was in the past’ (Putnam 3). (He would have been right, of course, if he had made the less sweeping statement that neo-classical predicate logic has a much larger scope than Aristotle’s syllogistic.)

Cf. Wl II 84, 392, III 240. As to the nomenclature used for †, compare Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Vol. I, sect.s 67–8; Vol. II/1, 3rd Investigation, Introduction, and sect. 11. Contrary to what Textor (2) 452 contends, Bolzano does regard the concepts of formal ontology as logical concepts.

For (¬) compare Wl II 63, 269, 419, Bolzano (10) 52–3; for (v) cf. Wl II 204–5, 228; and for (∃) cf. Wl II 52–4. Bolzano’s interpretation of existential sentences was anticipated in Kant’s 1763 essay ‘Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes’: see Morscher (3) 234–5, and the references given there.

In Bolzano (11) 62 he explicitly exempts the concept expressed by ‘has’ (in his canonical rephrasal of ‘a is F’ by ‘a has F-ness’) from variation.

See Morscher (5) 2.

The restriction to first-order logic is needed, for otherwise, as pointed out in Morscher (5) 2, statements like ‘∃x∃y∃F (Fx ∨ ¬ Fy) ∨ ¬∃x∃y∃F (Fx ∨ ¬ Fy)’ would conjure up the same trouble.

Cf. Wl I 48–9. Bolzano conceives of truths of pure logic in the way Richard Cartwright recommends: cf. his criticisms of Russell (2) 184, 237–41 and Putnam 1–34 who confuse (P17), for example, with the statement that whatever property x may be there is no object y such that y has x and does not have x.
Morscher has shown that what he calls ‘the standard interpretation’ of Bolzano’s account of logical analyticity is committed to classifying truths like (P18–20) as logically analytic, although they are clearly synthetic by Bolzano’s lights (Morscher (2) 200–2). His own proposal avoids this fatal consequence (as well as various technical difficulties the standard reading seems hardly able to cope with). I agree with Morscher that this consequence is a lethal blow to the ‘standard’ interpretation. But unlike my reading his account makes the members of my (*†)-sexet as well as (P15) come out as logically analytic. Although this is rather attractive in itself, I find it hard to reconcile with the wording of (B–5). For Morscher’s own neo-Bolzanian account of logical truth see his (2), (4) 78–80, and (5). (He carefully refrains from ascribing ‘the standard interpretation’ to Jan Berg, its most resourceful advocate among Bolzano scholars. In the final section, sub (D), we shall meet this reading in a Quinean dress.)

This objection against (B–10) was first raised in Textor (2) 448–50. He somewhat overestimates the force of the objection, though, since he seems to ignore the order of explanation in Bolzano’s text. I very much doubt that ‘Bolzano fait une distinction entre les vérités logiques et les vérités [simplement] analytiques, parce que les premières ont une particularité épistémique’ (445, my italics; cf. 448) or that Bolzano wants to define a concept of logical truth that is ‘épistémiquement chargé’ (450).

WL III 178 shows that Bolzano knows all this: ‘[selbst wenn wir einen Satz der Form ‘A, welches B ist, ist B’ äußern,] können wir nicht eher gewiß seyn, daß wir in ihm eine Wahrheit aussprechen, als bis wir uns überzeugen, daß die Vorstellung eines A, welches B ist auch einen Gegenstand habe (even if we utter a sentence of the form ‘A which is B is B’ we cannot be certain that we expressed a truth before we have made sure that the notion of an A that is B is not empty).’

The observation is due to John Etchemendy, 29, 163 n. 4, and it was taken up by Textor in his (2) 446–7.

Appositions make for a problem here. One would like [Prague] and [the capital of Bohemia] to be interchangeable, but substituting ‘Prague’ for ‘the capital of Bohemia’, or vice versa, in (S) ‘Prague, the capital of Bohemia, is a beautiful town’ results in a stammer rather than in a well-formed sentence. This problem can be solved if (S) is short for (S*) ‘Prague which is the capital of Bohemia is a beautiful town’, and we try for interchangeability *salva congruitate* in (S*).

On internal negation see WL II 16, 44–50, Bolzano (10) 52; on external negation see note 62 to (¬) above.

Once again, Etchemendy made the point (40, 165 n. 13), and it was taken up in Textor (1) 199–201.

As Jan Berg insisted already in his first writings on Bolzano (see Berg 93).

The point is due to an objection Benson Mates and John R. Myhill raised against Quine’s definition of ‘logically true’: see Quine (7) 110 n.; and
Morscher (3) 157–8. They all use the same example, namely ‘If some men are angels some animals are angels’. For three reasons I have replaced it by my own. Bolzano, for one, does not grant the non-existence of angels. Second, and more seriously, it should not even look as if Mates’s point about variation were dependent on an answer to the delicate question how ordinary language conditionals are to be understood. Third, if [man] = [rational animal], the proposition expressed by the ‘angel’ sentence is a logical truth, after all. See the next section on hidden (logical) analyticity. (We shall scrutinize Quine’s account of logical truth in the final section of this chapter.)

The freedom of the kinds of ‘free logic’ we are now concerned with consists in their being free of existence-assumptions with respect to individual constants: we are allowed to replace a natural-language singular term $t$ by a name-letter even if there is no object which is denoted by $t$.

Adherents of ‘negative free logic’ take ‘Vulcan is Vulcan’ to be as false as ‘Vulcan is a planet’. By contrast, friends of ‘positive free logic’ regard the former as true and the latter as false, and advocates of ‘neutral free logic’ take both to fall into a truth-value gap.

As Aristotle did in Categories 10: 13 b 12–19.

Bolzano’s non-equivalence constraint is also observed, because the subject-notion of (P27*) is not co-extensive with its counterpart in (P26), canonically rephrased, i.e. with the notion [identical with Mercury]. But when we check for universal (in)validity this constraint is not pertinent.

Another example that Bolzano picks up from Leibniz (Nouveaux essais IV, 8, 5 (p. 429)) is misleading. Somebody might use the sentence ‘A wise man is still a man’ in order to convey that even a wise man is fallible. What is conveyed is not a resolving proposition, to be sure. But, as Bar-Hillel (1) 15 points out, it is not synthetic: since no man is infallible, it is universally valid with respect to [wise]. Proust’s reply (103, 270 n.) is not at all convincing. She is right in claiming that, if Bolzano’s belief that God is omniscient is correct, the proposition conveyed is not universally valid with respect to [wise man], but how is that supposed to show that it is not analytic (universally valid in at least one respect)?

See WL III 71, 79, 375 on interpreting utterances that are prima facie bizarre.

Cf. WL III 67.

Cf. WL IV 117.

Wedberg 64.

WL II 85, Note 1.

. . . keineswegs nur verschiedene Ausdrücke eines und ebendesselben, sondern zweier wirklich verschiedener Sätze . . ., weil sie verschiedene Subjecte sowohl als Prädicate haben (WL II 140–1). Cf. WL II 98. Actually, Bolzano’s examples there are pairs of the form {‘a killed b’, ‘b was killed by a’} and {‘a is a parent of b’, ‘b is a child of a’}.

Leibniz nicely renders this as propositions frivoles, and he reports that ‘even the scholastics call them (propositiones) nugatoriae’ (Nouveaux essais IV, 8 (p. 428)).

Bolzano discreetly corrects Locke’s definitions. According to Locke,
‘identical propositions’ are those in which ‘the same Term importing the same Idea, is affirmed of itself’ (Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, IV.8.3). This is mildly confusing. Taken literally, it holds only of metalinguistic propositions, e.g. the proposition that ‘noun’ is a noun. As for resolving propositions, Locke characterizes them, again less than perspicuously, as those in which ‘a part of the Complex Idea is predicated of the Name [sic] of the whole’ (Locke, *Essay* IV.8.4).

95 ‘Such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms’ (Locke, *Essay* IV.8.4).


97 Locke, *Essay* IV.7.4; IV.8.1. British philosophers tend to be rather harsh on such propositions. Locke ridiculed (utterances of) identical propositions: ‘What is this more than trifling with words? It is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other’ (IV.8.2). Russell said about the resolving propositions he used to explain the notion of analyticity: ‘Such propositions as the above are trivial and would never be enunciated in real life except by an orator preparing the way for a piece of sophistry’ (Russell (1) 46).

98 Locke, *Essay* IV.8.3.

99 Frege (2) sect. 91, as against ‘Kant’s underestimation of analytic judgements (*Unterschätzung der analytischen Urtheile*)'; Frege (2) XIII (title of sect. 88), cf. sect.s 17, 88; Frege (1); Dummett (2) 36–42.

100 Locke, *Essay* IV.2.1. (Wolfram 91–5 shows that Locke wanted them to be classified as trifling.) Leibniz calls such truths ‘propositions disparates’ (*Nouveaux essais* IV, 2, 1 (p. 362)).

101 Cf. the first section above on the concept of truth, or *WL* II 341, 389–90, on the ground-consequence relation (*Abfolge*) as an objective relation between propositions, or Bolzano (9) 312 on his attempt at ‘fixing an objective difference (i.e. a difference that is quite independent of our acquisition of knowledge) between necessary and contingent truths (*zwischen dem, was man nothwendige und . . . bloß zufällige Wahrheiten nennt, . . . einen objectiven (von unserer Erkenntnifs ganz unabhängigen) Unterschied festzusetzen)*'.

102 Frege (2) sect. 3. Cf. the divergent readings of this sect. in Dummett (2) 23–30 and Burge (1) 12–21.


104 The first complaint was repeated in Quine (4) 21. (P35) could also be used for showing that Locke’s characterization of resolving propositions ‘permits an interpretation under which it covers too much’: see note 93 above. When Bolzano calls Locke’s explanation ‘almost more perspicuous than Kant’s’, his reason can only be that it is free of ‘figurative modes of speech’.

105 See Künne (6) sect. 2, on the ‘Port-Royal Constraint’. In the continuation of (B–16) Bolzano seems to concede this point, and in Prihonsky 35 we find the same concession.


107 Cf. Kant’s Logic (compiled by Jäsche), sect. 37.

108 See Prihonsky 35.
109 See *KrV* B 189–93; *Prolegomena*, sect. 2.b). This characterization is not discussed in sect. 148 of *WL*, it is used by Russell in (1) 46 and by Strawson in (1) 21, and it is criticized by Quine in (4) 20 and (5) sect.s I and II. (For Quine’s criticism see the final section below.)

110 *KrV* 190.

111 [J]eder Vernünftige [muß] gestehen . . ., daß ein jeder Existenzialsatz synthetisch sei (Kant, *KrV* B 626). Note that on Kant’s official explanation, this is trivial if ‘exist’ isn’t a predicate.

112 Sometimes even Bolzano himself (see *WL* II 64ff.), and his pupil Prihon-sky (147–8) forget this terminological divergence.

113 All points that follow in this paragraph were already made by Morscher in (2) 159–62 and (3) 202. Incidentally, Kant’s thesis is also implausible under the assumption that analytic truths are true solely in virtue of their content or meaning. If anything falls under this concept of analyticity at all, then it is hard to see why existential statements like ‘There is a month between June and August’ and ‘There are more than two sharp keys in the circle of fifths’ should not have a good claim to the title.

114 *WL* II 375. (Here, as in many other places, Bolzano uses the word ‘Etwas’ as a general term that is synonymous with ‘Gegenstand’: see *WL* I 459.) Frege also allows for analytic existential statements: cf. Dummett (1) 502.

115 This observation is also due to Morscher: see his (4) 61. It refutes the emphatic claim to the contrary in Textor (1) 199.

116 See also Russell (2) 240; and von Wright (1) 43.

117 As is duly registered by Morscher, a Polish logician was one of the pioneers: Stanislaw Jaskowski (1934). Morscher (1) 162 n., (4) 61 shares Russell’s and von Wright’s worries; Quine does not, as we shall see in the next section.

118 See also Russell (2) 240; and von Wright (1) 43.

119 Pap 29; compare Husserl, 6th Investigation, sect. 66.

120 Here I follow Tyler Burge who calls this account the *vacuousness* conception of analyticity: Burge (2) 200–1, cf. 206. (Since propositions are (possible) contents, I have slightly altered Burge’s characterization of the propositional version which runs as follows: A proposition is true iff it is ‘true solely in virtue of its conceptual content’.) As for Kant, Burge refers to *KrV* B 76–86 where no *explicit* statement to the effect that the propositions of logic are analytic is to be found. Coffa’s central contention about Kant is that he confused the conceptual containment account of analyticity and the autarky account (Coffa 16).

121 Strictly speaking, Quine is wrong in ascribing the *sentential* version of the latter to Kant when he says: ‘Kant’s intent . . . can be restated thus: a statement [declarative sentence] is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of facts’ (Quine (4) 21). But the distance between the two versions isn’t that large, for ‘meanings are what concepts became when they were wedded to the word’ (Coffa 8, nicely correcting a misguided Quinean aphorism which has ‘essence’ instead of ‘concept’: Quine (4) 22).

122 (P18–20), as opposed to (P21) and its ilk.

123 Parsons 310.

124 Hempel 224.

125 Ayer 21.

126 Ayer 11.
The autarky account of analyticity coincides with what Paul Boghossian, less tellingly, refers to as ‘the metaphysical concept of analyticity’. (It is the very concept that is expressed by ‘broadly analytic’ as defined in Pap 127–9, 423.) Contemporary defenders of ‘the metasemantical account’ (Christopher Peacocke), or ‘the analytic theory’ (Boghossian), of a priori justification are agreed that the autarky conception is vacuous: see Peacocke 187; Boghossian 334–7 and Burge 206–10. In what follows I echo their central Quine-inspired argument. Essentially the same move can also be found, much earlier, in Chisholm 83 (= 2nd edn 54, 3rd edn 38).

Cf. Quine (7) 108.

WL II 362. Unlike Frege (see his (3) 61) Bolzano does not take (a substitution-instance of) ‘A is B’ to express the same proposition as ‘It is true that A is B’: after all, only the proposition expressed by the more verbose sentence contains the concept of truth. Cf. Künne (8) 45–6, 150–6. Recall the comments on (P22–23) in the section ‘Logical analyticity’ above.

Cf. Prihonsky 35–6. In talking of the truth-value’s remaining the same, Bolzano implies that the truth-value of the proposition that is to be varied has to be taken into account in the evaluation (cf. the section ‘Analyticity (in the broader sense)’, note 39 to (B–4) above). The phrasing of the non-emptiness constraint that follows is slightly misleading: you cannot destroy the objectuality of the proposition [Vulcan is identical with itself]. See section ‘Degress of validity’ and note 21 and ‘Analyticity (in the broader sense)’, note 36 above.

In Boghossian 338–9, in memory of Carnap’s paper ‘Meaning Postulates’, one presumes. See Carnap 227 for my first example.

(P39–40) played a central role in Moritz Schlick’s thoroughly confused attack on Husserl’s views on analyticity and apriority: for references and discussion cf. Künne (1) and Simons (1).

Quine (1) 80–1; cf. (2) 1–4.

Cf. Bar-Hillel (1) 6. For the most famous variation on the theme of (Q–1) see Quine (4) 22–3.

Problems (ii) and (iii) do not arise for Bolzano.

Compare Quine (11) 18, who is more worried than I am by the need for excluding orthographical accidents. As Lesniewski, Ajdukiewicz, Tarski and Bar-Hillel did before him, Quine gives credit to Husserl for the idea of interchangeability salva congruitate: see Husserl, 4th Investigation, esp. sect. 10. One should not overlook, though, that what is tested for interchangeability in Husserl are meanings (Bedeutungen), not expressions, and what remains unaffected, if all goes well, is propositionhood, not sentencehood.

Quine (7) 110 n.

Cf. Arthur Pap 137 for the example, and Føllesdal 34–5 for the argument that follows.

Cf., for example, Quine (13) 17. See also Quine (8) 160 on the maxim of shallow analysis (‘in the immortal words of Adolf Meyer, where it doesn’t itch don’t scratch’).

Recall my comments on (B–3) in the first section.

Strawson (1) 54.

Pap 131–2; Stewart Shapiro 338; and (independently) Morscher (4) 67–71, (5).
Compare the continuation of (Q–1) in Quine (7) and notice the entry ‘only’ in (Q–1): ‘Romeo loved only Juliet’ is tantamount to ‘Romeo loved Juliet & –∃x (Romeo loved x & – (x = Juliet))’.

(Q–3) was dug up by Morscher.

I am alluding to (P9†), (P11*) and (P15) in the section ‘Logical analyticity’ above.

Cf. my comments on (P15) in the section ‘Logical analyticity’ above.

Cf. Quine (11) 60–4, summarized in (13) 27–8. Here is the idea: if the lexicon for a language L contains just two monadic predicates ‘F’ and ‘G’ and one dyadic predicate ‘R’, then the L-simulacrum of ‘a = b’ is ‘Fa ↔ Fb & Ga ↔ Gb & ∀x (aRx ↔ bRx & xRa ↔ xRb)’. Because of his misgivings concerning second-order quantification ‘a = b : ↔ ∀φ (φa ↔ φb)’ is not available to Quine.

Quine’s ‘forms of statements’, that is, forms of declarative sentences, are counterparts to Bolzano’s ‘forms of propositions’: see (B–3) in the section ‘Degrees of validity’ above.

In the continuation of (Q–5) Quine suggests that his opponent has to rely on a conception of logical truth according to which x is logically true just in case x is true solely in virtue of the meanings of the logical components of x. His opponent would thereby subsume logical truths under (the sentential variant of) the autarky concept of analyticity, i.e., under the notion of truth solely in virtue of meaning. At this point Quine reminds his readers of his earlier attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction thus conceived: ‘Therewith the notion of analyticity is pushed into yet deeper obscurity than seemed to envelope it on last consideration; for it seemed at that time that one class of statements that could clearly be included under the head of analytic statements was the class of the logical truths in the sense of the mentioned definition.’ In the 1953 paper quoted in (Q–4), Quine criticizes Strawson (1) for trying to give an account of logical truth in which ‘analytic’ plays the role which ‘true’ plays in the account(s) Quine prefers. Presumably a philosopher who takes logical truth to be a case of truth solely in virtue of meaning would indeed deny that (1*) and by (2*) are logically true. But it is hard to see that opposition to Quine from the quarter of universally free logic has to rely on the autarky conception of analyticity.

Quine (14) 101–4.

Ajdukiewicz (1), published in Erkenntnis, is referred to in Quine (8) 277; the key ideas of that paper are usefully summarized in Ajdukiewicz (2). In 1934 Ajdukiewicz was still professor in Lemberg. He had also obtained his PhD under Twardowski’s supervision, and as a student of Twardowski he must have come across Bolzano’s ideas. When he studied in 1913 in Göttingen, Husserl, too, might very well have drawn his attention to Bolzano. Giedymin reports that in the 1930s Ajdukiewicz ‘emphasized strongly . . . the indebtedness of his philosophy of language to some ideas of Bolzano and Husserl’ [Introduction to Ajdukiewicz (4)]. In sect. 2 of Ajdukiewicz (1), Husserl’s First Logical Investigation is appealed to, but there is not a single reference to Bolzano in (1) or (2).

It is explained in sect.s 5 and 6 of Ajdukiewicz (1), and in his (2).

Ajdukiewicz (2) 199.

Ajdukiewicz (1) 159.
This is relevant for the worry voiced in passing in Wolenski 93. Ajdukiewicz (3) 162.

This also makes for a major difference between Bolzano’s conception of formale Ableitbarkeit (formal deducibility) and Tarski’s conception of logical consequence, as is shown in Siebel (1) 205–6 and (2) 593–4 against ever so many well-intentioned but misguided assimilations. Even though ‘There is a horse in the stable’ does not follow logically (in the Tarskian sense) from ‘There is a foal in the stable’, the proposition expressed by the former sentence is formally deducible (in the Bolzanian sense) from the proposition expressed by the latter sentence.

Recall (¬), (v) and (∃) in section ‘Logical analyticity’ above.

This is what Boghossian (brushing exegetical worries aside) calls ‘Frege-analyticity’: Boghossian 337, 363 n. 13.

Quine (4), sect.s 1–3. A philosopher who maintains that an analytic truth is a truth whose denial is self-contradictory needs a broad notion of self-contradictoryness that covers ‘Some foals are not horses’ and its ilk. So he might spell out his account as follows: ‘For all x, x is analytic iff (the negation of x is logically false, or the negation of x can be transformed into a logical falsehood by substitution of synonyms for synonyms)’. But then Quine is vindicated: this account does indeed stand in exactly the same need of clarification as the definition offered by FREGE*.

Strawson (2).

More than a decade later, in Quine (10) 323–5. (For a tacit correction of a remark on the completeness theorem on p. 325 see Quine (11) 57–8.) When Boghossian emphatically repeats Strawson’s objection he seems to be unaware that Quine had replied to it (Boghossian 344).

Up to this point, the variation on Strawson’s theme is adopted from Dale Gottlieb 338.

Bibliography

Ajdukiewicz, K.:


Bar-Hillel, Y.:

(1) ‘Bolzano’s Definition of Analytic Propositions’ [1950]: 3–28,
(2) ‘Bolzano’s Propositional Logic’ [1952], 33–68,


(5) Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft, Sulzbach 1834. In BGA 1, 6-8 (1994ff.).


(9) Athanasia, 2nd edn, Sulzbach 1838.


Dummett, M.:  


Frege, G.:  


Künne, W.:  
(7) ‘Bernard Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre and Polish Analytical Philosophy


Łukasiewicz, J.: 
(2) Die logischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung, Krakau 1913.


Morscher, E.: 


Quine, W. V. O.:  
(1) ‘Truth by Convention’ [1936], in his (10).
(4) ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ [1951], in his (9): 20–47.
(5) ‘Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory’ [1953], in his (12): 137–58.


Russell, B.:  


Siebel, M.:  

Simons, P.:  
Strawson, P.F.:


Textor, M.:


Wright, G.H. von:
(2) ‘Form and Content in Logic’ [1949], in his (3): 1–21.

Kant’s philosophy very often serves as a standard of comparison when we try to characterize a philosophical position. One of the common features shared by many if not most philosophers belonging to the so-called Austrian tradition is allegedly their critical attitude toward Kant’s philosophy. Several commentators have even characterized Austrian philosophy as being anti-Kantian in witness whereof a long list of publications can be presented, starting with the *New Anti-Kant* by Bernard Bolzano’s pupil Franz Příhonský (1850). There are, however, different and even divergent ways of being anti-Kantian. This is not surprising if we take into account the sheer multiplicity of topics included in Kant’s philosophy. This multiplicity makes it quite unlikely that a single opposing view will take in all of them. Let us therefore focus on one single but central topic of Kant’s philosophy: the problem of the synthetic a priori. In this chapter I will try to show that the divergent Austrian ways of being anti-Kantian do not vanish even when we focus on this single topic. To illustrate this view, I will take as my examples Bernard Bolzano and Rudolf Carnap, who both belong – for different reasons – to the so-called Austrian tradition in philosophy. Both are fully conversant with Kant’s work, and both have a critical attitude toward it and are in this sense anti-Kantian. This is also true when it comes to the question of the synthetic a priori: both refute strongly Kant’s treatment of the synthetic a priori. However, whereas Carnap denies synthetic sentences a priori altogether, Bolzano does not deny their existence but only the way in which Kant justifies their truth. What is even more important is that Bolzano not only – contrary to Carnap – accepts Kant’s synthetic a priori, but even extends it to the realm of logic. In clear opposition to Kant and Carnap, who take all logical truths to be analytic, there are synthetic truths for Bolzano even in the area of logic. I will try to argue for this claim in the following sections.
Kant’s definition of analyticity

‘For a proposition is self-evident when the predicate forms part of what the subject means; thus it is self-evident that man is an animal, since being an animal is part of the meaning of man’ (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 1, edition 1964, 7). Replacing the definiendum ‘self-evident’ in this definition by ‘analytic’ will result in Kant’s famous definition, which he states explicitly for all and only those judgements that have subject–predicate form and are affirmative: ‘Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgment analytic, in the other synthetic’ (Kant 1781, B10, English edition, 48). Or as explained elsewhere: ‘Analytical judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has been already actually thought in the concept of the subject, though not so distinctly or with the same (full) consciousness’ (Kant 1787, § 2a, English edition, 14).

Most or even all Austrian philosophers from Bernard Bolzano to Rudolf Carnap agreed in their general appraisal of Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements as being an important contribution to the development of modern epistemology. This conformity among the Austrian philosophers is still maintained when it comes to diagnosing several defects in Kant’s definition of analyticity (cf. next section), but it disappears as soon as the proposed repairs of these defects and the proposed improvements of Kant’s definition are put forth (the section after next).

Defects in Kant’s definition of analyticity

According to Quine, Kant’s definition of analyticity suffers from two shortcomings: ‘it limits itself to statements of subject–predicate form, and it appeals to a notion of containment which is left at a metaphorical level’ (Quine 1951, 21). This twofold criticism was anticipated in a much more concrete form already by Bernard Bolzano. He accuses Kant’s definition of being too narrow on the one hand and at the same time too wide on the other.

Kant’s definition of analyticity is too narrow

Kant himself was fully aware of the fact that his definition was not only – as Quine noticed – restricted to statements in subject–predicate form but that in addition it is applicable merely to affirmative statements (as
he explicitly noted). Under the title ‘affirmative statement (or judgement)’ Kant obviously subsumed universal affirmative statements of the form

(1) All $A$s are $B$s

as well as singular affirmative statements of the form

(2) The $A$ is a $B$.

Whereas Kant’s definition of analyticity is applicable to affirmative statements of kind (1) and (2), it obviously is not applicable to particular affirmative statements of the form

(3) Some $A$s are $B$s.

Why did Kant restrict the range of his definition of analyticity to affirmative statements without excluding explicitly from it particular affirmative statements? There is a simple explanation for this fact: Kant took particular statements of the form (3) to be existential statements of the form

(4) There are (or exist) $A$s which are $B$s.

Existential statements of the form

(5) There are (or exist) $A$s

however, are understood by Kant in the sense of

(6) The concept of an $A$ is non-empty

whereby the property of non-emptiness is attributed not to $A$ itself but to the concept of an $A$ (Kant 1763, 4, English translation, 57). According to this view, particular statements of the kind (3) will turn into statements of the form

(7) The concept of an $A$ which is a $B$ is non-empty.

Particular statements of type (3) thereby turn out to be of the form (2) and need not therefore be excluded from the range of applicability of Kant’s definition of analyticity. But now we have to face another
problem: all existential statements and consequently also all particular
affirmative statements are synthetic according to Kant. What, however,
about statements of the form

(8) The non-empty concept of an $A$ (which is a $B$) is non-empty.

Sentences of the form (8) are analytic, but they do not count as
existential statements for Kant nor are they translations of particular
statements since they are neither of the form (6) nor of the form (7).

This should clear up the range of statements to which Kant wanted
to see his definition of analyticity primarily applied. And he did not
hesitate to add that it will be easy to extend this definition subsequently
to negative statements (Kant 1781, B10, English edition, 48). The limi-
tation of Kant’s definition of analyticity to statements in subject–
predicate form thus turns out in his own framework to be much less
devastating than Quine’s criticism suggests.

This is true even more for Bernard Bolzano, who held the view
that all statements, including truth-functional compounds as well as
(existentially and universally) generalized statements, can be translated
without any change in cognitive meaning into statements of the sub-
ject–predicate form ’$A$ is $B$’ (or ’$A$ has the property $b$’). Nevertheless,
Bolzano accuses Kant’s definition of being too narrow even if its range
of application were restricted to affirmative statements in the subject–
predicate form of our category (1) above. Bolzano (1837, vol. 2, 88)
presents the following example of an analytic sentence of form (1)
which is not analytic according to Kant’s definition because its predi-
cate concept is not contained in its subject concept:

(9) Everything is $B$ or non-$B$

or

(10) All $A$s are ($B$s or non-$B$s).

Thereby, (9) and (10) must of course clearly be separated from the
following synthetic statements:

(11) Everything is $B$, or everything is non-$B$

or

(12) All $A$s are $B$s, or all $A$s are non-$B$s.
Kant’s definition of analyticity is too wide

Whereas examples like (9) and (10) serve the purpose of proving that Kant’s definition of analyticity (even within the limits of affirmative statements in subject–predicate form of type (1)) is too narrow, Bolzano claims that Kant’s definition is (within the same limits) also too wide. For this purpose Bolzano (1837, vol. 2, 87f.; English translation, 201) presents the following two examples of statements of form (1) and form (2):

(13) All triangles similar to an isosceles one are isosceles
(14) The father of the King of Macedon was King of Macedon.

The subject term of statements of form (2) like (14) is a definite description. In order to avoid a discussion on definite descriptions, let us focus on counter-examples of type (13); and in order to avoid a discussion of the status of mathematical concepts like those contained in example (13), let us take the following example inspired by Bolzano’s examples (13) and (14) as our standard example of reference:

(15) All daughters of queens are queens.

The statement (15) has the subject–predicate form (1) and fulfils Kant’s criterion of analyticity but is certainly not analytic, whereas

(16) All daughters of queens are daughters

is analytic. The point is that for a statement to be analytic it is not enough that its predicate concept is contained in its subject concept; the analyticity of a statement depends also on how its predicate concept is contained in its subject concept. Taken literally, therefore, Kant’s definition is too wide. However, Bolzano (as well as Quine) couches this objection against Kant’s definition in a more benevolent formulation by criticizing Kant for using the word ‘containing’ in his definition of analyticity in a metaphorical way without explaining exactly what is meant thereby (Bolzano 1837, vol. 2, 87; Quine 1951, 21).
How to repair Kant’s definition of analyticity

Bolzano’s definition of analyticity

In his definition of analyticity Bolzano makes essential use of his so-called method of variation. In his own view this method was his main contribution to the development of formal logic. The basic idea of this method consists in taking certain parts of a sentence to be variable and checking what happens to the truth-value of the sentence when those parts of it are replaced by appropriate but different items. When Bolzano spoke in this context of sentences and their parts, he had sentences-in-themselves and – as their parts – ideas-in-themselves in mind. Since sentences-in-themselves and ideas-in-themselves are Bolzano’s own creations and are not to everybody’s taste, in what follows I will transfer his definition of analyticity from the level of sentences-in-themselves and ideas-in-themselves to the level of their linguistic representations. In order to keep with Bolzano’s unlimited universe of sentences-in-themselves and ideas-in-themselves, the object language L for whose sentences we will represent Bolzano’s view of analyticity must contain names for everything (i.e. names for every individual, every property, every relation, etc.). This requirement must be kept in mind in what follows. Let us assume that we can separate the logical vocabulary LV from the extra-logical or descriptive vocabulary DV of our Language L where DV contains expressions of different syntactical categories (like, e.g., singular names, predicates of different kind, and even complete but unanalysed sentences).  

By means of Bolzano’s operation of variation a sentence $S$ of L is transformed into another sentence $S^* = S(B_1, \ldots, B_n/A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ of L such that $S^*$ is the result of simultaneously and uniformly replacing the pairwise different expressions $A_1, \ldots, A_n \in DV$ by the expressions $B_1, \ldots, B_n$ where for each $i (1 \leq i \leq n)$, $B_i$ belongs to the same syntactical category as $A_i$. (The $B_i$s, unlike the $A_i$s, need not necessarily be pairwise different nor be members of DV.) By a Bolzanian sentence form of L (or a B-form, for short) we understand a set of sentences $S^*$ of L such that there is a sentence $S$ and there are pairwise different expressions $A_1, \ldots, A_n \in DV$ and syntactically corresponding (but not necessarily pairwise different) expressions $B_1, \ldots$ and $B_n$, and $S^* = S(B_1, \ldots, B_n/A_1, \ldots, A_n)$. This definition would result in $\{S\}$ being a sentence form of L for each sentence $S$ of L since we can always choose as our $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ expressions of DV which do not occur in $S$ (or, what comes to the same, we can choose as our $B_1, \ldots, B_n$ the original expressions $A_1, \ldots, A_n$.
themselves). In order to avoid such degenerate cases of sentence forms which Bolzano himself does not allow, we will require of Bolzano’s operation of variation $S(B_1, \ldots, B_n, A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ that at least one of the expressions $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ occur in $S$.\(^2\)

A B-form of L is *universally valid* iff all of its members are true, and it is *universally contravalid* iff all of its members are false.

A B-form of L is *purely logical* iff no extra-logical expression of L (i.e. no member of DV) occurs in each member of the B-form in question, i.e. iff it is only logical expressions or members of LV which occur in every member of the B-form.

Disregarding Bolzano’s concept of relative analyticity (i.e. analyticity relative to a sequence $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ of members of DV) as well as the existential presupposition which is peculiar to his logic, we will arrive at the following definition:

A sentence $S$ of L is *B-analytic* iff $S$ is a member of a (i.e. at least one) B-form of L which is purely logical and in addition either universally valid or universally contravalid;

or more formally:

A sentence $S$ of L is *B-analytic* iff there is at least one $F$ such that: (i) $F$ is a B-form of L, and (ii) $F$ is purely logical, and (iii) $F$ is universally valid or $F$ is universally contravalid.\(^3\)

Furthermore:

A sentence $S$ of L is *B-synthetic* iff $S$ is not *B-analytic*.

This definition obviously catches Kant’s concept of analyticity more appropriately than his own definition and blocks all the objections raised against Kant’s definition by Bolzano (cf. section ‘Defects in Kant’s definition of analyticity’ above). Bolzano makes a point, however, of deviating from Kant’s terminology by not restricting the realm of analyticity to members of universally valid sentence forms and instead also including all the members of universally contravalid sentence forms. This mere verbal disagreement can easily be avoided by identifying the class of sentences which are analytic according to Kant’s intention with those sentences which are members of a purely logical and universally valid sentence form of L. Assimilating Bolzano’s
terminology to that of Kant (and also of Carnap) will result in the following definitions of Bolzano’s concepts in BK-terminology:

A sentence $S$ of $L$ is $BK$-analytic iff $S$ is a member of a B-form of $L$ which is both purely logical and universally valid.

Furthermore:

A sentence $S$ of $L$ is $BK$-contradictory iff $S$ is a member of a B-form of $L$ which is both purely logical and universally contravalid.

A sentence $S$ of $L$ is $BK$-determinate iff $S$ is BK-analytic or BK-contradictory, i.e. iff $S$ is B-analytic.

A sentence $S$ of $L$ is $BK$-indeterminate iff $S$ is not BK-determinate, i.e. iff $S$ is B-synthetic.

**Carnap’s definition of analyticity**

Concerning analyticity, Carnap adopts Kant’s terminology by identifying analytic sentences with those sentences which are universally valid as opposed to contradictory or universally contravalid sentences. When it comes to the ‘spirit’ of analyticity as expressed in its definition, however, Carnap is much closer to Bolzano than to Kant. For simplicity, let us take Quine’s sketch of Carnap’s view of analyticity (cf., e.g., Quine 1963, 387, reprint 1976, 110) which in our framework reads as follows:

Let $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ be all the parts of a sentence $S$ of $L$ which belong to $DV$; then:

$S$ is $C$-analytic iff for all expressions $B_1, \ldots, B_n$ of $L$ where $B_i$ belongs to the same syntactical category as $A_i$, $S(B_1, \ldots, B_n/A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ is true.

Furthermore:

$S$ is $C$-contradictory iff the negation of $S$ is C-analytic.

$S$ is $C$-determinate iff $S$ is C-analytic or C-contradictory.

$S$ is $C$-indeterminate iff $S$ is not C-determinate.

The logical form of a sentence $S$ is sometimes understood as the set of all sentences $S^* = S(B_1, \ldots, B_n/A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ which result from $S$ by simultaneous and uniform replacement of all of its extra-logical parts.
A₁, . . . , Aₙ by arbitrary expressions B₁, . . . , Bₙ whose syntactical categories are in agreement with those of A₁, . . . , Aₙ. Using this concept of logical form (i.e. the C-form of S, for short), we can also express the definition of C-analyticity in the following way:

S is **C-analytic** iff all the members of the logical form of S (i.e. of the C-form of S) are true.

In a certain sense, therefore, for both Carnap and Bolzano a sentence S is analytic (C-analytic or BK-analytic, respectively) iff S is true due to its logical form alone. ‘Logical form’, however, is thereby understood in two completely different ways: as B-form by Bolzano and as C-form by Carnap. Both B-form and C-form as defined here, are sets of sentences of L. Whereas we always speak of a B-form (and we can speak of it even without reference to a particular sentence of L), a C-form is always the C-form of a particular sentence of L. We therefore have two quite different ideas of logical form underlying C-analyticity and B- or BK-analyticity, respectively. We can describe the difference between the two views of logical form in the following, rather metaphoric way: the C-form of a sentence is carved out of the sentence itself like a sculpture; it is – like a skeleton – what remains after we have deprived the sentence of all of its content or ‘flesh’. If S is already a purely logical sentence there is nothing left to be carved out of it or of which to deprive it; a purely logical sentence S is therefore in a way its own C-form, or to be more precise: if S is a purely logical sentence, then the C-form of S is the unit set \{S\}.

B-forms are also identified with sets of sentences. In contrast to the C-form of a sentence S, however, a sentence does not have a unique B-form; a B-form of a sentence S is rather a kind of mould in which S can be embedded. No B-form is a unit set, i.e. every B-form contains more than only one member. Every sentence has at least one B-form, since the set of all sentences is a B-form of every sentence. Most sentences have more than one B-form, some of which are universally valid and others which are not. This is also true of purely logical sentences: a purely logical sentence like ‘There is something, or it is not the case that there is something’ has a B-form which is neither universally valid nor universally contravalid – the set of all sentences; but it also has a B-form which is universally valid, and the sentence itself is therefore BK-analytic. On the other hand there is no universally valid B-form nor a universally contravalid B-form of which ‘There is something’ is a member, and this sentence is therefore B-synthetic or BK-indeterminate.
The difference between Bolzano’s and Carnap’s definition of analyticity

The difference between C-analyticity and BK-analyticity emerges only when $S$ is a purely logical sentence, i.e. a sentence consisting exclusively of members of LW and not containing any member of DV. Cases in point are sentences like ‘There is something’, ‘There are at least $n$ things’, ‘There are at most $n$ things’ (for any natural number $n$), etc. Since in such sentences no member of DV occurs and therefore none of $A_1$, . . . , $A_n$ belongs to DV, $S(B_1, . . . , B_n/A_1, . . . , A_n)$ is identical with $S$ as long as we do not require – as Bolzano does – that at least one of the $A_1$, . . . , $A_n$ occur in $S$. The C-form of $S$ is therefore in this case simply the unit set $\{S\}$. As a result, whether or not $S$ is C-analytic depends in this case only on $S$ itself: if $S$ is true, it is also C-analytic, and if it is false, it is C-contradictory. Consequently, every purely logical sentence is C-determinate. By way of contrast, $\{S\}$ is never a B-form of $S$, not even when $S$ is purely logical; purely logical sentences therefore can but need not be BK-determinate, i.e. B-analytic. There are purely logical sentences which are BK-indeterminate or B-synthetic, respectively, cases in point being the numerical sentences already mentioned.

The philosophical impact of the difference: the synthetic a priori

Despite the conformity in Bolzano’s and Carnap’s critical attitude toward Kant’s definition of analyticity and also toward the way of repairing it, our analysis brought to light a nice distinction between them. The question, however, is this: is it perhaps a distinction without a difference, a mere matter of chance due to incidental differences in the definition of analyticity? By no means: small as the distinction may be, it nevertheless mirrors a substantial if not fundamental difference in the philosophical positions of Bolzano and Carnap.

C-analyticity and Carnap’s programme of logical empiricism

The implications of Carnap’s definition of C-analyticity as elaborated in the previous section are – from a philosophical point of view – not mere products of chance but fit perfectly with his logical empiricism. According to the programme of logical empiricism all human knowledge is based on either reason or experience and it is therefore either logical or empirical in nature. If a truth is analytic no experience is needed for its justification and it is therefore a priori. If a truth is
synthetic, however, it contains information about our world and is therefore – due to its connection to our world – in need of justification by experience and this makes it empirical. There is no room left in between for synthetic a priori truths. The same holds – in an inverse way – also for false sentences.

What about purely logical sentences, i.e. sentences in which no expression occurs but which belong to the extra-logical vocabulary DV? Such a sentence obviously cannot have any connection to anything in our world and its truth-value therefore cannot depend on matters of fact. Accordingly, if it is true it must be C-analytic, and if false it must be C-contradictory, i.e. it is C-determinate. What is it that makes such a sentence true and therefore C-analytic or false and therefore C-contradictory? This can only be the logical axioms and definitions due to which half of these purely logical sentences are true and therefore C-analytic and the other half false and therefore C-contradictory. It is no wonder that the axiom of infinity appears among Carnap’s logical axioms.

Carnap’s logical empiricism has emptied Kant’s synthetic a priori box of all its sentences. Due to Carnap’s logicism, all mathematical sentences are C-determinate. Due to Carnap’s empiricism, all synthetic or C-indeterminate sentences are empirical. If there should be any sentence left in Kant’s synthetic a priori box, it would be condemned to being metaphysical and thereby meaningless.

Carnap’s definition of C-analyticity fits perfectly with his philosophical programme, and he even needs it to complete this programme. The programme itself and the conclusions drawn from it could not be more anti-Kantian than they are.

**B-analyticity and Bolzano’s philosophical programme**

Bolzano never had a problem with the existence of synthetic a priori truths. He strongly attacks Kant’s definition of what a synthetic a priori statement is and his explication of how to justify them, but not – unlike Carnap – his claim that there are some. Doing metaphysics in a more or less traditional way (like, say, Leibniz), he is in urgent need of synthetic sentences a priori. It therefore does not come as a surprise that he comes to like synthetic sentences a priori in the natural sciences and in mathematics as well. Why should he then not go one step further and also allow purely logical sentences to be synthetic as well as a priori?
Conclusions

All things considered, Bolzano’s and Carnap’s approach to analyticity fits quite well with their philosophical views. Everything seems to turn out as expected. Nevertheless, there is a conclusion to be drawn which seems at least to be remarkable and a conclusion which may even come as a surprise.

_A remarkable conclusion_

We started with the common view that a characteristic feature of the so-called Austrian tradition of philosophy to which both Bolzano and Carnap belong is its anti-Kantian attitude. It is true that both Bolzano and Carnap take up Kant’s definition of analyticity, criticize it and try to repair it. The kind of repair they propose is quite similar so that sometimes commentators claim that they coincide in their solution. Nevertheless, as small as the difference between their definitions of analyticity may be taken to be, they certainly draw quite different and even opposite conclusions from it. It is therefore – to say the least – a misunderstanding to speak here of a view shared by Bolzano and Carnap or perhaps even of a common feature of Austrian philosophy in general.

_A surprising conclusion_

What is even more remarkable and may come as a surprise is the fact that when it comes to the fundamental Kantian problem of the synthetic a priori, Bolzano makes common cause with Kant – and against Carnap. Purely logical sentences like ‘There is something’, ‘There are at least two things’, . . . , ‘There is at most one thing’, ‘There are at most two things’, . . . are BK-indeterminate according to Bolzano, some of them (like the first one) true, and others false. Nevertheless, they are a priori: we do not need experience to justify them.

In contrast to Carnap, Bolzano does not empty Kant’s synthetic a priori box: he also does not restrict it, but in fact goes beyond Kant, whose realm of the synthetic a priori he even extends by including parts of logic within it. Thus – and this certainly comes as a surprise – concerning the fundamental problem of the synthetic a priori, Bolzano turns out to be ultimately not anti-Kantian at all, but – quite the contrary – even more Kantian than Kant himself, i.e. a Super-Kant, so to speak.
Notes

1 Bolzano was completely aware of the fact that there is no clear-cut distinction between LV and DV and that this distinction is rather shaky (cf. Bolzano 1837, vol. 2, 84). Almost a hundred years later Tarski made exactly the same point (cf. Tarski 1936, English translation, 418ff.). I will not go more deeply into this question here; cf. Morscher 2003, 74ff.

2 According to our definition a B-form of L is identified with a set of sentences of L. We can represent such a set of sentences by a single formula (or formula-like expression) F whereby F results from S by simultaneously and uniformly replacing each extra-logical expression occurring in S by an appropriate variable of the same syntactical category, e.g. a singular term by an individual variable, a predicate by a predicate variable, a complete sentence by a sentential variable, etc. The original relation of being a member of a B-form (understood as a set of sentences) will thereby be transformed into the relation of being a substitution instance of formula F. Very often the formula (or formula-like expression) F itself is identified with the sentence form.


4 Cf. Quine 1947, 43: ‘All true statements which (like ‘(x)(x = x)’) contain only logical signs are naturally to be classified as logically true.’

5 The sentence ‘There is something’ is purely logical for Bolzano and therefore a priori, but not B-analytic and therefore B-synthetic. It is a ‘basic truth’ for Bolzano (1837, vol. 2, 375). Also, the sentence ‘There are infinitely many objects’ is a synthetic a priori truth according to Bolzano (cf. Morscher 2003, 62ff.). It is also worth noting that, as early as in 1913 in a letter to Russell, Wittgenstein wrote that such sentences are sentences of physics, i.e. empirical sentences: ‘Ein Satz wie ‘(∃x) • x = x’ z.B. ist eigentlich ein Satz der Physik. Der Satz ‘(x) : x = x • ⊃ • (∃x) • y = y’ ist ein Satz der Logik; es ist nun Sache der Physik zu sagen, ob es ein Ding gibt. Dasselbe gilt vom infinit[ity] ax[iom]; ob es ℵ₀ Dinge gibt, das zu bestimmen ist Sache der Erfahrung (und die kann es nicht entscheiden)’ (Wittgenstein 1980, 44).

6 Cf. Carnap 1937, 179 (‘Theorem 50.1. Every logical sentence is determinate; every indeterminate sentence is descriptive.’), and 184 (‘Theorem 52.3. Every logical sentence is L-determinate; there are no synthetic logical sentences.’). That this is not a mere logical sophistry but a substantial thesis of Carnap’s entire philosophical programme is exhibited (among other places) in Carnap 1935, 32.

7 With the intrusion of the synthetic a priori into the realm of logic one of the fundamental dogmas of logical empiricism has fallen. Bolzano had overcome this dogma long before Quine and – more surprisingly – even before logical empiricism had come into being.

Bibliography


The great divide within Austrian philosophy


9 Bolzano’s political philosophy

Rolf George and Paul Rusnock

I

In October 1881 a group of Czech-Bohemian politicians, professors, scholars, artists and many students gathered in Prague to honour Bernard Bolzano on the centenary of his birth. The principal speaker, Dr Durdik, summed up his long speech about the ‘metaphysician, theologian, mathematician, preacher and writer’ as follows:

He was a German but also a whole man . . . and this raised him above all racial hatred. In the best sense of that word he was a citizen of the world. . . . From this vantage point he looked upon the relation between the two nationalities of Bohemia much like Goethe. From this vantage point this man demanded justice for the Bohemians as long as 70 years ago with such energy that even now we cannot express it more eloquently. For justice lay at the core of everything he strove for in his political life. . . . Introduce institutions as you like, but always act with justice [applause]. He clearly stated his view about the two peoples that inhabit our country, seeking the ideal solution for them in harmony and concord. . . . Even today there are occasional individuals who seek to prove that our language and our brains are not suitable for higher learning. It is a bitter burden, but we shall not be provoked. . . . Therefore in this year 1881 it is all the more desirable that Bolzano’s opinions about the relation between the two peoples of Bohemia be restored. . . . His example and his writings will always speak to us. Take them to hand and read. . . . Honour the memory of this man and in him the spirit of humanity, of nobility, of light and peace! [Enthusiastic applause that does not want to end].¹

¹ ‘Take them to hand and read’ [tolle lege] is a reference, well understood
by Durdik’s audience, leading to St Augustine’s deliverance, *Confessions* viii, 12, and thence to Romans 13: 12: ‘The night is far spent, the day is at hand: let us therefore cast off the works of darkness, and let us put on the armour of light.’

Durdik’s speech, one of many commemorative events in Prague over the years, focused on Bolzano’s contributions to Bohemia’s political landscape, on his political wisdom, on his unfaltering commitment to the common good. Even during the dark days of Soviet occupation after the Prague Spring of 1968, flowers and candles on Bolzano’s grave were not an unusual sight.

II

Bolzano’s major work on political philosophy is a book called *On the Best State*, which was written around 1830.\(^2\) As its title suggests, the work is concerned not with suggestions for reforms of existing institutions, but rather the elaboration of an ideal, namely, an organisation of civil society that maximises the well being of its members. The approach of this work has earned Bolzano the reputation of a utopian in political philosophy, someone unconcerned with the practical, the here and now, devoted instead to the passive contemplation of the unattainable. This impression might easily be confirmed by the knowledge that he never sought to publish his book, and towards the end of his life actually resisted the attempts of others to publish it for him.

But this view of Bolzano the political philosopher is completely mistaken. Indeed, it would be difficult to find an example of a philosopher who had a greater impact on the political culture of his country. An examination of the exhortations (*Erbauungsreden*) Bolzano read weekly to the university students and educated public of Prague shows him to have been one of the most prominent advocates for reform of the time. There we find him advancing quite detailed criticisms and practical suggestions on political and social matters, arguing for religious tolerance, including full civil rights for Jews, for improvements in the conditions of women and the Czech-speaking majority in Bohemia, and for dramatic changes in contemporary institutions, among them radical reforms in the laws governing property and the abolition of hereditary privileges and offices. There too we find him training a generation of reformers. Nor did Bolzano hide the contents of his political philosophy from those he thought capable of appropriately dealing with them, for most of the ideas presented in *On the Best State* were first aired in his exhortations – but to an audience he knew to be trustworthy.
The best state is considered not in order to avoid practical attempts at reform, but to give them a theoretical underpinning and clearer direction. It is worth noting, too, that after a little over 150 years, a great many ideas very like Bolzano’s have been implemented somewhere or other – for better and for worse.

A few further remarks about the Erbauungsreden are in order. Bolzano was ordained a priest in 1804, accepted the appointment to a newly established chair of religious instruction at the Charles University in Prague, and was installed in April 1805. He had won the competition for chairs in both mathematics and religion, but chose the latter because of his desire to contribute to the reform of society. The chairs in religion had been introduced in the course of the Austrian Catholic Restoration to provide religious instruction for non-theologians, and to reverse deistic and atheistic tendencies among the lay students, assumed to be a consequence of the French Revolution and the enlightened reforms introduced by the Emperor Joseph II (†1790). Accordingly, Bolzano was expected not only to give government-approved interpretations of religious dogma in his lectures, which he was to base upon a book by the Emperor’s confessor Jakob Frint, but also to deliver weekly exhortations, to hear confession, etc. Although by no means a revolutionary, it was clear from the start that Bolzano did not measure up to the expectations attached to his post, and as a consequence he was, predictably, in trouble with the authorities from the time he took up his duties until his dismissal in 1819. The Erbauungsreden, of which one volume was published in 1813, were tangible proof of Bolzano’s unsuitable opinions, and quickly became a focal point of the conflict. These weekly sermons became immensely popular, often drawing as many as 1,000 listeners, and were a central part of a movement, sometimes called the ‘Bohemian Enlightenment’, which combined a rationally reconstructed Catholic faith with a programme for social and political reform. It was partly this popularity, partly the general ferment fostered by the Napoleonic wars, that kept him in this position for such a long time.

It has been suggested, even by knowledgeable historians like Ernest Gellner, that Bolzano was too good a logician to be a true Catholic, and that his deviations from orthodoxy were the reason he was so strongly opposed in Vienna and Rome. Though this chapter is not the place for a detailed discussion of Bolzano’s philosophy of religion, it seems to us that this view is untenable, and that it would be more accurate to say that his troubles were due to his too strict adherence to the principles of Catholicism. It is true that he maintained that nothing in conflict with reason could belong to the content of the Catholic religion. It is also
true that, while admitting the necessity of a hierarchy and associated structures of authority within the church for certain purposes, he maintained that there is no hierarchy where the content of revelation is concerned: what counts as revelation for Catholics is determined, he held, not by the Pope alone, nor by councils of bishops, etc., but by the universal consent of the church. It is true that he did not believe either the Pope or councils of bishops to be infallible. It is true that he argued against the requirement of celibacy for priests. It is true that he was a tireless critic of corruption, fraud and hypocrisy within the church. Finally, it is true that he held fairly radical views on private property and the organisation of the state:

In no way can you justify your wealth, you rich man, by claiming that the money heaped in your coffers is your property, your legitimately acquired property! No – instead you should know that if it is through your wealth that others are impoverished, then the state whose imperfect constitution has made it possible for you to amass such great wealth, this very same state has the right (has the duty, I should say) to take your wealth from you by force, and to return it to those from whom you have taken it by means far more cunning than theft! What I have just said, my friends, will forever remain true, no matter what words may flow from the mouths of foolish or corrupt jurists. It will remain forever true, even if those who say it are threatened with imprisonment and death! Sooner or later there will come a time when all of this is generally recognised! Happy us if we already follow these precepts and do not wait until wiser constitutions will force us to return our surplus. Rather let us do so of our own free will.4

There is no denying that such teachings were bound to be unpopular with many powerful people. But all of them fall well within the bounds of orthodoxy. While there is a longstanding dispute among Catholics over whether the Pope, or certain councils, or only the whole church, is competent to decide whether a certain proposition belongs to the content of the Catholic religion, Bolzano’s position has always been well represented. Certainly there is nothing unchristian about criticising the behaviour of church personnel, or in rejecting the pretensions of religious authorities, as a glance at Matthew 23 confirms.5 Nor were Bolzano’s views on property out of line, unless the injunction to ‘Sell all you have and give to the poor’ is to be dismissed as a misprint.6 But as one can scarcely imagine more unchristian institutions than those of Bohemia at that time (and this applies in large part also to the

Bolzano’s political philosophy 267
institutions of the Catholic Church) and more unchristian behaviour than that of many people in positions of power, it is not surprising that Bolzano’s forthrightness in pointing out the contrast between professed belief and behaviour did not meet with approval from the higher-ups.

* 

Bolzano was dismissed in a purge of unreliable elements, freethinkers, nationalists and progressives in Germany and Austria after the assassination in March 1819 of the conservative playwright and diplomat Kotzebue. Charges of heterodoxy and political unreliability had been placed much earlier, and personal grievances also seem to have played a role.7 As early as 1806, Frint had complained that his prescribed textbook did not sell well in Prague, and later Bolzano was expressly asked to justify himself for lecturing from his own notes rather than Frint’s book. Eventually presentations were made to the Emperor, and objectionable passages were excerpted from Bolzano’s writings. Some of the most offensive remarks came from a sermon preached on the Sunday after Epiphany (13 January) 1811, and published in 1813:

> Each century furnishes us with new proofs of how harmful war is; of the abuses which certain social institutions inevitably lead to; under which constitutions the people are better off. And should it be impossible for our God to make us all wiser through this, to finally open our eyes, so that we will recognize with wonder how easily we might have had things better all along? O! he can certainly do that, our God; he will certainly make it happen. There will come a time – I say this with complete confidence – there will come a time when war – that absurd attempt to prove one’s right by force – will be looked upon with the same disgust that duelling is now! There will come a time when all the thousandfold divisions and distinctions of rank between people, which bring about so much evil, will be put back within their proper bounds, so that each will deal with his neighbours as a brother with his brother! There will come a time when constitutions will be introduced which are not open to the horrible abuses which our present one is; a time when people will be educated according to nature and when they will not be glorified for greatly distancing themselves from her, when no one will think himself deserving of honour and respect because he, a single person, has taken for himself as much as would be sufficient to satisfy the needs of a thousand!8

The reaction to Bolzano in some quarters may fairly be called hysterical.
One of his detractors described him to the Pope, for instance, as nothing less than the chief pseudo-prophet of his time. Another (anonymous) report on Bolzano’s religious views ran as follows:

Anyone fooled (if such a thing were possible) by Bolzano’s many seemingly Catholic statements, by his vague and indeterminate definitions, by his assurances that he was Catholic, that he believed Catholic teachings to be the most perfect, etc., would certainly be freed from this illusion as soon as he saw how Bolzano applied his concepts and principles in his Exhortations, which one may consider the practical part of his theory. To judge from these Exhortations . . . it would hardly be possible to find another heretic in the entire history of the Church who maintained so many Catholic formulations while at the same time departing in so many essential points from the Catholic Church.

Count Saurau, then chancellor, pointed out that Bolzano’s ‘innovations’ could not be justified. In German universities, he pointed out, where professors must live on students’ fees, new doctrines are an economic necessity; but in Austria professors are paid by the state ‘so that they must teach propositions that are approved by the church and the civil administration. It is a dangerous error for a professor to think that he can instruct the youth entrusted to his care according to the drift of his individual convictions or according to his own views.’

An imperial decree dismissing Bolzano was issued on 24 December 1819. It forbade him to teach or preach in public; ecclesiastic charges against him were laid. Hearing of his dismissal, he at once shifted his attention from the religious lecture he was preparing to a mathematical theorem he had been working on. When the resulting proceedings finally came to a conclusion in 1825, all charges being dismissed, Bolzano did not retract any of his claims, but expressed regret about harm that could have resulted from their being misunderstood.

III

Bolzano’s contributions to the development of infinitesimal analysis are now well acknowledged; his place in the pantheon of that branch of mathematics is secure. His logical theories, revived through the attention of Brentano’s students, have also been much studied and commented upon. Less attention has been paid to his metaphysics and almost none, until recently, to his ethical and political activity and theory – this despite the central importance Bolzano assigned to
these studies, and despite their previous broad popularity, leading to the publication and reprinting, during the earlier part of the nineteenth century, of several dozen volumes and essays. Moral concerns also motivated the writing of his logic, and even entered into its very content.

The principle of utility was the cornerstone of Bolzano’s philosophy of religion, of his political philosophy and ethics as well as of his logic, as he repeatedly claimed. ‘I am of the opinion that the supreme moral law demands nothing but the advancement of the common good.’ He had adopted three maxims: ‘Advance the common good,’ ‘It behooves us to be happy and to make happy’ and ‘I must progress’.12 His utilitarian convictions were coupled with unwavering commitment to personal sacrifice. When he was eventually dismissed from office with a pension of only 300 Gulden, he found comfort in the computation that this would be his share if all goods were equally divided. More to the point, he rigorously measured all activities, including religious pursuits, against the standard of public utility. Religion he claimed to be ‘the sum of such doctrines or opinions that have an either detrimental or beneficial influence upon the virtue and happiness of a person’.13 A proposition is of a religious nature if its consideration ‘not only moves us in our heart to declare either for or against it, but if through the acceptance or rejection of this proposition our virtue or happiness is altered’.14 By virtue, Bolzano means ‘the persistent striving to make the sum of pain in this world as small as possible, and to enlarge the sum of well being as much as possible’.15

Bolzano firmly believed in the possibility, though not indeed the universal reality, of human progress. In the homily to his students on Epiphany (6 January) 1811, he calls it a ‘great truth’ that ‘inspired and wholly imbued the holy bard’ (Isaiah), on whose text his sermon was based: ‘Arise, shine, for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee.’16 He thought it ‘highly probable’ that from the early days humanity had much advanced in three important respects: wisdom (that is, science in aid of virtue and happiness), virtue and true happiness. There has been progress, he asserts:

In humanity as a whole there is visible over the centuries, and going to infinity, a progress not limited to certain arts and sciences, but a progress extending to the three most important matters: true practical wisdom, virtue and happiness.17

Nonetheless, he observed, many countries and peoples, instead of progressing, have regressed for years and sometimes even centuries.
Unfortunately, my friends, experience teaches us that we need not travel to distant countries to be persuaded of this . . . For several decades in our own beloved fatherland, instead of becoming wiser, better, and happier we have been moving backward in all these respects and the enlightenment that only recently began to dawn has been darkened again.18

Bolzano here reflects on the recent history of the Austrian Empire. Joseph II, who ruled from 1765 to 1790, introduced many ‘enlightened’ reforms. The ‘Robort’ Patent of 1771 greatly reduced the power of the manor: henceforth peasants could marry, travel and educate themselves and their children without their landlord’s permission. But they still were not allowed to own land, a privilege reserved for the nobility. To farm a plot of land, they had to enter into long-term dependencies and pay rent in labour, money or produce. Peasants in this state were still often called serfs, for example by John Stuart Mill:

In Austria . . . the labour of a serf is equal to only one-third of that of a free hired labourer. This calculation, made in an able work on agriculture (with some extracts from which I have been favoured), is applied to the practical purpose of deciding on the number of labourers necessary to cultivate an estate of a given magnitude. So palpable, indeed, are the ill effects of labour rents on the industry of the agricultural population, that in Austria itself, where proposals of changes of any kind do not readily make their way, schemes and plans for the commutation of labour rents are as popular as in the more stirring German provinces of the north.20

The agricultural reforms of Joseph II did not lift the common man out of abject need. The inefficiency of the ‘labour rent’ system so much impaired agricultural production that severe food shortages and wrenching famines could be expected every decade. A good first step, Joseph’s tenancy reform was not followed by others until much later. Only after 1848, the year of Revolution, Bolzano’s death, Mill’s Principles and the Communist Manifesto, was the peasantry allowed to own land.

Joseph’s other progressive reforms, of the justice system, of civil administration, of emancipation and religious tolerance, many of them aimed to curb the dominion of church and nobility, were under sustained and largely successful attack throughout Bolzano’s lifetime. Bohemia was then marked by all manner of oppression: of the peasant class, of the Czech majority (usually the same lot), of those deviating
from Viennese orthodoxy. His courage and fervour in lecturing to the large number of students that assembled to hear his homilies must inspire the greatest respect. He knew that he was addressing the future elite of Bohemia, her administrators and clergy, the propertied class. He expected that more enlightened thought, ‘better concepts’, once adopted by them, would in time spread into the lowest huts. But he also knew that his unorthodox views would arouse much hostility in Vienna.

Matthew 9: 35–38 is the text for Bolzano’s homily on the second Sunday after Easter 1817. Jesus, observing the misery of a harassed and helpless people, says ‘The harvest is truly plenteous, but the labourers are few.’ He then admonishes his disciples to go out and teach. Bolzano takes literally the description of the people as physically, not spiritually distressed, and Jesus’ admonition as an appeal to education, ‘teaching, instruction, the dissemination of better concepts’. At the time of the sermon, Bohemia was experiencing a plight so harrowing that ‘one must wonder why people brought to such despair do not use force to seize from the storehouses what they need for their survival’.

I am of the opinion that we cannot do better than to follow the example of Jesus and even now seek the true cause of all calamities that afflict us in ignorance and prejudice or, in other words, in a lack of enlightenment. I do not want this interpreted as saying that I believe in no other cause of our suffering. I want to say only that it is most advisable to accustom ourselves as well as others to tracing everything back to this one cause.

He then gives several reasons for this policy: he denies the establishment view that it is enlightenment itself that lies at the root of the current suffering, rejecting at the same time a naive trust in progress. Many a new opinion was acquired at the cost of giving up an older and wiser one, like the belief in immortality, in the just compensation of virtue and the punishment of villainy.

But at the present low level of knowledge one cannot with assurance say what is most needed, nor how to convey one’s insights to others. It follows that the most urgent task is to improve education and remedy error and ignorance. Further, one should think of evil in the world as usually the effect of folly rather than malice, since the alternative is to sink into a misanthropic funk. And finally, it is actually within our power to improve education: ‘We expect deliverance for our aggrieved fatherland as for the whole earth only in the battle against error and the spreading of deeper insight.’

272 Rolf George and Paul Rusnock
Elsewhere, he describes enlightenment as:

the appropriate development of the power of judgement in each individual citizen, as well as a certain stock of useful knowledge, especially healthy, correct concepts of everything having to do with virtue and happiness, attention directed towards the common best, direction and instruction in correctly judging whether something is beneficial or harmful for the common best; knowledge of the rights a people possess, and the ability to tell the difference between wise and unwise measures; eagerness to follow the former and hatred and opposition directed towards the adoption of the latter. Enlightenment so understood, my friends, can have nothing but the most blessed consequences, and it is certain that there is no better way to promote the happiness and well-being of a people than by promoting such enlightenment to the full extent of one’s powers.26

Reform was to be accomplished *only* through education. Rebellion should never be allowed, an unjust law removed only through the common conviction that it is detrimental.27 Yet in the same sermon he points out that the duty to obey superiors or a law is rooted only in the benefit humanity in general derives from this. It follows that there can and will be cases in which disobedience becomes a duty.28 He then gives detailed instructions on how best to engage in civil disobedience when this becomes imperative.

Bolzano was confident that the education of the masses could in the end be set in motion through the action of only a few who are united in the will to improvement. The title of his sermon on the twenty-seventh Sunday after Pentecost of 1816 is ‘The united effort of only a few men can at all times create a better shape of things’.29 Scripture, experience and reason concur in assuring us of this truth.30 Indeed, the very audience of his sermons were to be the vanguard of this change in his own land.

Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1837 was conceived as an instrument for achieving this progress. The small group from which reform will emanate are to be imbued with sound logical principles. As with any other project, in the presentation of logic one must proceed in such a way that: ‘in addition to the original purpose [i.e. of displaying the principles of logic] as much good and as many of the ends of the moral law are realized as can be combined with that purpose.’31

The purpose of the *Wissenschaftslehre* was not merely to set out the doctrines of pure logic, but to determine and elucidate the division
of all areas of knowledge into special sciences, and the manner of
displaying these sciences in special treatises. Just as few men can urge
reforms that spread in time to all citizens, so this one book, if properly
received, should reform the way all sciences are most usefully presented.
In short, the point of it was to give the right instructions to a few
dedicated men for the improvement of the whole society. In this, logic is
a necessity, since the most important, and indeed necessary, condition
for progress is the improvement of rational thought, ‘the ability to judge
and infer’.32

For Bolzano, a major tenet of enlightenment is equality. Everyone
must be introduced to the basic truth that the ultimate ground of all
duty lies in the welfare of the whole; universal knowledge of it will have
the most beneficent consequences.33 He rejects the pervasive and refined
distinctions of rank for which the Empire was notorious, the view that
wealth brings honour, that extravagance has merit. Officials should be
honoured only for their performance, never for rank or position.34 He
wants to better the lot of the countless oppressed citizens, ‘who seem to
have been admitted into civil society only in order to work for others
and witness their luxury, but are allowed no pleasures of their own’.35
Everyone should work for the common good, and not merely for the
pleasure of another. The state is fully entitled to coerce those who
continue to exploit others, if necessary, by denying them the necessities
of life.36 Appallingly, it has so far been a principle of government that
some persons are here only for the comfort and pleasure of others, and
that, in particular, ‘the entire female sex is viewed as a mere utensil
created by God for the satisfaction of carnal appetites’.37

The equality of women is the subject of the homily ‘Of the Mission
and Dignity of the Female Sex’,38 again drawing on his interpretation
of Scripture. Jesus taught that women are the equals of men in wisdom,
virtue and happiness, the three characteristics that matter most. They
must therefore be accorded the same civic rights. And since in heaven all
distinctions of gender will be removed it was His will that in this world,
too, both sexes should have the same claims and rights. The sermon
continues

It would be better for you, O you oppressed woman-kind, if in our
principles, customs, habits and civic institutions we acted in
harmony with the precepts of Jesus. Then you would not be barred
from all serious learning and higher knowledge that men now keep
only for themselves; then no one would fancy that everything
possible was done for your education as long as you are given
some useless elocution training and are taught skills of a sort that
entertain fools and annoy the wise; then we would not read in acclaimed writings that there can be no virtue in the female sex, that here all apparent virtue is only weakness, instinct or the effect of vanity; then men would not seize all rights and claims to earthly goods; then you would not be the afflicted part and without protection, whose lamentation no one hears, destined to live in pain and merely to serve the lust of others; then you would not tremble all days of your youth for fear that an evil fellow might fall on you in a weak and unarmed moment and rob you of all your happiness, then go unpunished while bringing upon your head the ridicule and derision of the whole town; nor would you have to fear being neglected in old age, after giving life and education to many a useful citizen.

My friends, if custom has not made you wholly insensitive to the follies and crimes our sex has committed, if you feel the great injustice that down to the present day one half of humanity has visited upon the other, then I beseech you to oppose this atrocity by spreading the truth that the female gender is as receptive to wisdom, virtue and happiness as the male and should therefore have the same rights and entitlements.39

In the best state, these indignities would no longer exist. Marriage would be a free contract, women no longer given into marriage against their will. Yet in each household, ‘to preserve good order’, the man would be the head.40 The main, if not the only, purpose of marriage is procreation. All this must be seen against the extremely poor economic circumstances of the time. The classical problem of economics – how to distribute far too little among far too many – was very much the order of the day. Lack of adequate food, housing and hygiene led in the familiar, direct way to very low levels of life expectancy. Children died like flies, and their parents did not fare much better. In Bolzano’s own middle-class family, to take an example by no means untypical, twelve children were born to his mother, but only two survived past adolescence. Bolzano, for his part, did not expect, nor was he expected, to survive long. His health was very fragile, he coughed up blood and was subject to violent, debilitating headaches and fevers throughout his life. Things were still worse among the poor. Many children were simply abandoned (Bolzano quotes an estimate of over two thousand abandoned children in Prague in a late essay),41 destined for the most part, as he observes, either to die of starvation or disease or to end their lives in jail or on the gallows.42 A measure of how bad things were is given through the horizon of possibility in Bolzano’s account: even in his best
states, where adequate nutrition, hygiene and health care would be provided for all, he assumes that low life expectancy and astonishingly high levels of child mortality would still be present, as if they were an unalterable part of the human biological heritage (a point we shall return to in a moment).

Against this bleak background, Bolzano remained optimistic. No stranger to the conclusions of Malthus – apparently, Bolzano often discussed the question of overpopulation with his brother⁴³ – he nevertheless thought them incorrect. In his opinion, it was not want of land, raw materials or labour relative to the size of the population which led to such widespread misery, but rather the degenerate institutions which structured most societies and, of course, lack of education.

How weak is our body, and to how many diseases is it subject, not because some inalterable law of nature demands it, but rather because we are born to weak parents, are poorly treated in our childhood, sometimes spoiled, then again completely neglected, because neither the food we eat, nor the activities we pursue, nor our clothing and housing accords with the rules of health. Can it really be doubted that a rational improvement of all these conditions of our health and strength can have beneficial effects? How many thousands of our brothers and sisters – O! even at the very moment I write this – go without the means for satisfying their most basic human needs, perish in their need, not because the great earth isn’t rich enough in goods to supply all her children with abundance, but only because counterproductive institutions in the state allow these goods to be divided among us in such an unequal way, and because most of the earth’s surface remains virtually uncultivated.⁴⁴

Bolzano speaks here of abundance, but in his best state the affluent society does not even appear on the horizon. The superfluity, it seems, will be rather small. Improvements brought about by saner institutions will not in his opinion make much of a dent on levels of infant mortality or increase life expectancy to any appreciable degree. People of a younger age – he writes tellingly at one place – always form a majority in a state.⁴⁵ The only reason why families would seek to reduce their fecundity,⁴⁶ he remarks elsewhere, is from fear of falling into abject poverty from having too many children – something which, by the way, would not be permitted to occur in the best state. A talented mathematician, he must have assumed, tacitly or not, that a very low life expectancy would always be with us – else the population would
soon outstrip, if not agricultural output as Malthus suggested, at least available space: people would have to be stacked like cordwood. No, clearly for Bolzano the demographic transition which has occurred in the industrial west (and indeed was already underway during his lifetime, though by no means easy to detect) was not even imaginable at the time he wrote. This has important consequences for the way which he conceived the political institutions of the best state, as well as the condition of women. In recent times, two factors – higher survival rates for children and safe, effective birth control – have made radical changes in the lives of women possible in many countries. Why spend one’s life bearing children most of whom die in infancy if this can be avoided – for it seems obvious that this time could be much better, and more happily spent? On Bolzano’s principles, the question should at least be asked, provided that the possibility is recognised as a live one, but clearly, Bolzano did not think it was. Thus the ‘specific affictions of this sex’ would survive in even the best states. Bolzano is surely an optimist, but clearly one whose optimism was considerably tempered by the conditions of his day.

IV

On the Best State was never meant to be a manual for government, a blueprint for the ideal society. It is, rather, an account of what he considers the institutions which would be found in the best states. Although he had, as he says, examined his opinions carefully from many different angles, he by no means expected anyone else to accept them immediately. He decided to write them down not in the expectation, and not even with the wish, that in a country where his thought became known one would immediately tear down its existing constitution and erect a new structure according to his plan. Such an undertaking he must rather declare in advance to be rash, and because of the disastrous consequences which it might entail, to be criminal.47

He allows that he could be mistaken in his opinions; but even were he right, the institutions of the best state cannot be introduced all at once, but rather only gradually, over time and with great care: to ensure, for instance, that the transition is managed in an orderly way, that it is not subject to violent reversals, and that no one’s rights are trampled upon in the process. Such radical changes as he proposes can only be successfully introduced, he thinks, with the consensus of the wisest and the
best in a state; or better still, with the universal or near universal con-
sent of a public who must first be educated. Bolzano would no doubt
have been quite happy to apply Mill’s judgement to his own work:

an entire revolution of the social fabric, such as is contemplated by
socialism, establishing the economic constitution of society upon
an entirely new basis, other than that of private property and com-
petition, however valuable as an ideal, and even as a prophecy of
ultimate possibilities, is not available as a present resource, since it
requires from those who are to carry on the new order of things
qualities both moral and intellectual, which require to be tested in
all, and to be created in most; and this cannot be done by an Act of
Parliament, but must be, on the most favourable supposition, a
work of considerable time.48

Thus it is quite understandable that Bolzano had no wish to see his
views brought forward in the midst of the tumult of 1848: the very last
thing he wanted was to have his ideas clumsily taken up by a bunch of
hotheads. Hence the pattern of ‘publication’ of his treatise: circulated
quite widely in manuscript copies, but only to selected, trustworthy
recipients, very much in line with the Samizdat system used more
recently in Bohemia.

**General organisation, constitution**

Citizenship in the best state is a matter of voluntary adhesion: anyone
who indicates an adequate knowledge of the laws of the state and
shows genuine promise of respecting them may request to become a
citizen, and this request will generally be granted. Children of citizens
are themselves citizens until the age of majority, at which time they too
must decide whether or not they wish to belong to the state, and if
they do, must publicly declare their intention.49 The best state is a
republic with no head of state or chief executive. There are no heredi-
tary rights either of wealth or political function. Well aware of the
possibility of conquest by hostile powers, Bolzano thinks that a viable
state must above all be able to defend itself. Accordingly, military
service is universal, all able-bodied citizens being trained in the use of
arms.50

It might come as a surprise to those unfamiliar with him that
Bolzano, a priest who argued that the Catholic was the most perfect of
all existing religions, holds that the best state does not have a state
religion. In partial explanation of this opinion, he says this:
The principle that the state should adhere to a rational religion is very true indeed. But little is won by proposing it, since the decision which religion is rational, or the most rational of all is a matter of much controversy.\textsuperscript{51}

Thus tolerance is general, unless religious practice conflicts with the law. Where it does, the fact that the transgression was based on religious belief is ground for milder punishment. In line with this general freedom of religion, church personnel are to be employed and paid by the members of their respective religions, not, as was the case throughout Europe, by the state.\textsuperscript{52}

The state should not be indifferent to religious belief (it would do well to suppress a religion that practised child sacrifice, for instance), but must recognise that compulsion of belief is neither efficacious nor desirable. When the state acts, it must do so with sensitivity, and under the principle that it is better to do too little in this area than too much. If it seeks to eradicate superstitions or otherwise harmful religious beliefs, it does so through enlightenment. Similarly with the spreading of beneficial religious doctrines. There is no heavy hand here.\textsuperscript{53}

Freedom of expression is subject to some important limits. The state is the sole publisher of books, and publication is subject to state censorship. It should be noted, however, that censorship can only be imposed on certain well-defined, limited grounds (among these, interestingly enough, are a book’s not being worth reading or treating contentious matters with inflamed rhetoric instead of in a measured way). It should also be noted that a book can only be refused if the censors are unanimous in their rejection.\textsuperscript{54} This is a frequent pattern in Bolzano’s proposed institutions – many of them have very strong powers, but powers which can only be exercised if extremely strong tests are met.

Democracy is for the most part direct: measures are voted on by all citizens who have sufficient knowledge of what is at issue (Bolzano thinks universal education will increase this number greatly) and who have an interest in the outcome (regulations required to implement laws can be determined by the administration without being put to a vote). The idea is that a vote is a kind of crude measure of the aggregate effect of a piece of legislation; if all interested parties vote according to their interest, one obtains a measure of how many will profit, how many will suffer. If proposed legislation has effects upon those who cannot vote – for instance, because they haven’t yet been born – the state appoints a number of people to consider the issue from their point of view. The results of their reflection are then published throughout the state, so that a better decision can be made. Women, as one would expect, have
full voting rights. Special provision is made for married couples, however. If they can reach agreement among themselves, they have a vote, and indeed their vote counts for two single ones. If, however, they cannot agree, they get no vote. This is, one will remark, what would happen in any case were they to vote independently – Bolzano’s proposed measure, however, compels married people to attempt to arrive at a consensus among themselves beforehand.\(^{55}\)

In the best state direct democracy is not absolute, however, and this for two reasons. First, because the measure yielded is, as remarked, often a crude one. Second, because (due to the assumed low life expectancy) young people always make up the majority in a state, and are more often swayed towards poor decisions by their passions and lack of experience than are the older citizens. Bolzano thus proposes a check on direct democracy in the form of a council of elders.\(^{56}\) This is, as he describes it:

> a number of people of both sexes who are elected to this honour every three years in the communities in which they live by a majority of votes. [. . .] Only people who are more than, roughly, sixty should be chosen for this office, and among them only those who have through repeated tests given evidence of their uprightness as well as their insight, and who have shown themselves to be resistant to strong temptations. [. . .] People under sixty years of age who have given extraordinary proofs of their uprightness and extensive knowledge can be chosen for this office, but in no case should anyone under forty be chosen.\(^{57}\)

The powers of the council of elders are extremely strong, but require near unanimity in order to be exercised. A majority in the ratio of 9–1 is sufficient to overturn any legislation passed by general plebiscite, while a stronger majority is required to pass measures even against the result of a general plebiscite.

Executive posts in the best state are filled through elections. Only the local executives are directly elected by their constituents. Higher-level executives are elected by those occupying the lower levels from their own ranks. The idea, evident here and indeed throughout Bolzano’s institutions, is that judgements of character are best made by those who know the people in question. At the community level all know each other, and thus the local administrators (or the members of the council of elders) can be chosen on the basis of well-grounded judgements of character. For the higher levels, since it is not possible for many people to be so widely known, the local administrators, who do get to know
each other in the course of carrying out their duties, are in a better position to judge.\textsuperscript{58} The basis in personal acquaintance is crucial in Bolzano’s institutions – from it derives, notably, the moral authority of the council of elders, without which rebellion and disregard of the law would be far more likely.\textsuperscript{59}

Some judicial functions are assumed by the administration (for example, decisions made at lower levels may be appealed at higher levels), others by special judicial personnel. Criminal justice is structured in a way opposite to our practice: the judges are enjoined to make determinations of facts, of guilt and innocence, while juries are called upon to assign punishment within limits prescribed by law.\textsuperscript{60} With judges, as with administrators, Bolzano thinks it best that no one makes these activities his sole occupation.

Civil law cases are, if possible, adjudicated by an arbiter chosen by the parties. Criminal courts can mete out all manner of punishment, including prison, public humiliation, occasional corporeal punishment and the death penalty for premeditated murder. There will be no public executions; a ‘machine in a dark dungeon’ will kill the criminal. Confessions are not needed to convict. If they were required, torture would soon be introduced.\textsuperscript{61}

In addition to civil and criminal courts there will be annual findings by censors elected by the community concerning the behaviour of all citizens over the age of 15, whether they have industriously contributed to the common good, kept their noses clean, etc. Mothers will be praised if they have borne and raised many children, and especially if their sons are persons of merit.\textsuperscript{62}

\textit{Social institutions}

Perhaps the most striking part of Bolzano’s best state is the system of social institutions. He proposes universal public schooling for boys and girls, including health and sex education. There are publicly funded universities for a certain number of students.\textsuperscript{63} There will be holiday schools for the general population (used to transmit information on health, industrial techniques, etc.), and public libraries in every community, public art museums, concerts, etc.\textsuperscript{64} The state also maintains a network of trails, furnished with inns, and subsidises walking tours.\textsuperscript{65} Medical care is socialised: each community has at least one doctor whose primary responsibility is to look after public health (living and working conditions, safety of food and water supply, etc.), but who is also responsible for acute care. Based on calculations of utility, older doctors are to deal with the most dangerous cases (so much for senior-
ity). Hospitals and training and research facilities are also state-funded. The state, as discussed below, is also to provide housing for all its citizens.

All costs of raising children are borne by the state. This is done for the following reasons: (1) the distribution of children among citizens is far from uniform – some people have none, others a few, still others many; yet (2) everyone in society benefits from the rearing of children. Bolzano’s arguments are still highly relevant, and worth quoting at length:

One could of course object that it is not fair to demand from people who have no children or perhaps even remain single that they should contribute to the maintenance of other people’s children. Another objection might be that when children learn how little they cost their parents they would love them less. But these are trivial objections. What possible injustice could there be in obliging the childless to turn over part of what they can spare precisely because they themselves are childless to those that are blessed with children? Will not the efforts of these same children, once they are adults, be a benefit to those people? Can they not reasonably hope to be honoured as if they were their very parents? Must not every human being hope, in his old age, not to remain behind lonely and as the last person in God’s creation? Must he not wish to be surrounded by younger, more robust persons who nourish and tend to him and support him in his last agony? Those who have no children of their own can expect this important service only from the children of others. It is only proper, therefore, that they should help to raise them. If this means nothing to you, you uncaring lot, tell us what you would do if the families with children, or who expect them later (and they are by far in the majority), unite to extinguish you from the face of the earth because you are pitiless, you small minded lot, and do not want to give up, as long as you live, anything that is yours? Finally, I fear nothing from the concern that these arrangements would diminish the love of children for their parents. The love of children for their parents does not stem from the calculation, which becomes possible only in later years, of how much they have cost their parents. It arises from altogether different conditions, conditions that will not be changed in the least by the way in which I picture the relation between parents and children in the best state. It will not change when adolescent children learn how much the state has contributed to their sustenance. They will understand that they owe infinitely more to their parents’ love.
Although the state bears the costs, families, to whom the care of children naturally falls, retain the responsibilities of childrearing save in exceptional cases of abuse, parental neglect, death of one or both parents, etc. – even in such cases, however, the state seeks to place the children in other families. There are no orphanages, at most temporary shelters.

The state also undertakes to provide social security, incomes for those who are unable to earn enough for their needs due to age, disability, sickness, etc. In addition, the state will provide insurance for a variety of natural disasters and misfortunes. It should be noted that Bolzano saw the necessity of keeping a tight rein on these schemes – those who are unduly careless with insured property, for example, would be subject to punishment.\textsuperscript{68} One might wonder why all this activity is to be entrusted to the state, especially since Bolzano was aware of some private insurance schemes. It seems reasonable to speculate that the fragility and limited size of the schemes Bolzano knew of led him to believe that only the public sector could successfully do what is required.

Finally, it is the state which supports most of the activity in the arts, and which is the sole support for scholarly activity (living expenses, laboratories, books, etc.).\textsuperscript{69} The state is tolerant with scholars, especially in view of the fact that – in contrast to physical labourers – it is often difficult to determine whether or not they are truly working.\textsuperscript{70} But the tolerance is not permanent – there is no absolute right of tenure here. With only rare exceptions, neither artists nor scholars, he thinks, should devote all of their time to these activities. Poets and musicians should not, as a rule, give up their day jobs. Scholars, if only for the sake of their health, should spend part of each day doing some sort of physical labour. Similarly, no one should spend the whole of his or her life in physical labour. Those who go down the mines, for example, would do so only for a limited term, in the interests of their health and leaving room for other occupations which contribute to the improvement of the mind, etc.\textsuperscript{71}

Only certain cultural events are supported: poems are learned and recited, but only if they improve virtue. The creation of new works of art is encouraged only if there is reason to suppose that they are at least as good or better than what is already available. There will be no theatres:

One does not allow whole groups of people to occupy themselves with the imitation of various opinions and emotions, and to seek honour in the art of seeming something other than what they really are.\textsuperscript{72}
Card games are allowed, but not to excess, and there will of course be no smoking, no lotteries, and public drunkenness is punishable.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{Economic institutions}

Property rights, like all other institutions of Bolzano’s best state, exist only insofar as they serve to further the maximisation of virtue, wisdom and happiness in the state. There is no automatic right of ownership either for the discoverer of the manufacturer of a thing. Bolzano observes that although absolute property rights are often spoken of, limitations are almost always present – for example, the state may levy taxes on property, force someone to sell a certain parcel of land in order that a road may be built, or requisition ships, etc. in times of war. With some plausibility, he interprets these limitations as indicating that, at least in practice, property rights have, however imperfectly, generally been subject to considerations of utility. In the best state, this is recognised more explicitly. Sometimes there are property rights of the familiar kind, but more often limited, related rights (e.g. the sort of property rights one has when borrowing a book from a public library). At the limit, each designation of something as a person’s property should be subject to the test of maximising the general well-being, as judged by the community and its administrators.\textsuperscript{74}

Many of the now common property rights do not exist under such a scheme. An object useful to only one citizen must become his property. It follows that each citizen owns his own body, for each can use his own body for the common good better than anyone else.\textsuperscript{75} It is sometimes argued that certain libertarian conclusions can be drawn from the ownership of one’s own body, for example that utilitarianism is false, and that the only obligation to others is to stay off their backs. We think, on the contrary, that Bolzano’s view is perfectly consistent, and that not much can be deduced from the mere assumption that we own our bodies.

There are further property rules: an object without use to a person cannot be his property. Finding an ownerless object does not confer property rights, neither does making a thing useful by mixing one’s labour with it. Rare and precious, but otherwise useless, things cannot be the property of any individual but will fall to the community. One can give up property rights, but cannot simply transfer them to another, nor can one indiscriminately lend a thing, or money, to others. Just as property cannot be given away in life, so also not in death. Upon death it falls to the state, not to children or other heirs. Certain objects, books and paintings that can be enjoyed by many without losing their value
cannot be the property of individuals. Bolzano then discusses in refined
detail under headings and subheadings the value of labour.76

These intractable and absurdly expensive rules are to be explained,
perhaps, by noting that at the time there simply weren’t very many
goods which could serve as property; thus it may well have seemed
reasonable to expect that these few things could be wisely allocated in
the way suggested. (One of the cases Bolzano considers is whether
a man who has gone blind should receive compensation when his
monocle is given to someone who can use it.) A rather large caution,
however, is added to this provision, one which would certainly be felt
much more strongly today:

The state’s authorized intervention in determining the citizens’
property and its exchange is limited only by the concern that it
should not go so far as to aggravate the citizens who find the attain-
ment of their self-interested goals hampered by this intervention to
a point where the peace and order of the whole is endangered.77

Bolzano is especially critical of existing arrangements concerning hous-
ing, which allow landlords to gouge their tenants. He begins by noting
that, generally speaking, a house accommodating five to six families
brings in enough rent to support its owner’s family even after all
expenses for upkeep, etc. have been paid. He comments:

How unfair! Without doing any work at all, one family is allowed
to live off five others, that is, lays claim to a sixth of their income!
Can anyone deny that this is an atrocious practice, hardly better
than that of the Robot system?78

He proposes instead that houses should be the property of the state,
and that those who live in them should be charged fair rents, namely,
what is required for their maintenance and for the formation of a
capital fund for rebuilding when necessary.79

Absolute equality in terms of wealth is neither possible nor, were it
so, would it be desirable. In the best state, greater wealth will be
obtained not so often by chance (e.g. by accidents of birth, or by lotter-
ies), as by diligence, frugality and efficiency; a certain inequality in
wealth is thus not only to be tolerated, but a good thing, since it serves
as a further incentive to cultivate these virtues. But inequalities
of wealth are to be kept within limits. Bolzano suggests that no one
should have personal wealth of more than 100 times the average, in the
interests of limiting possibilities for corruption and the exercise of
Taxes are to be levied in accordance with the following principles: they should be designed to affect mainly those of above-average wealth; they should not be so steep as to enforce absolute equality; and, in doubtful cases, one should rather tax too little than too much. No absolute limit is set on taxation: ‘A high rate of taxation must not be thought to be evil as such; it becomes so only when this income is improperly applied.’

There are sales taxes, notably, on luxury goods, and generally taxes are higher the more dispensable a thing is. One of the most important sources of income for the state is the inheritance tax, which is 100 per cent, but does not apply to items of only personal value. Political resistance to such inheritance taxes is to be lessened by ensuring that the state seeks above all to provide for the costs of raising children – the principal reason parents wish to pass their wealth on to their children. Bolzano is careful to note that adequate provision for children must be assured before 100 per cent inheritance taxes are introduced.

The best state will not forgo the use of money. Precious metal for will be used for international trade, paper money for internal transactions. Bolzano envisions a consumer price index, based on ‘a list of the most common necessities for each district’. Obligations will be based on the value of the currency when the contract was signed, not when the goods are delivered.

V

In the foreword to On the Best State, Bolzano tells us that, in his view, the book was ‘the best, most important legacy he could leave to mankind’. At the same time, he reminds us that his aim was not a perfected and complete political theory, but only to produce a worthwhile, usable contribution to the field. With this in mind, how do things stand with Bolzano’s little book?

As always with Bolzano, many of the things he says can easily lead us to confuse him with one of our contemporaries – his arguments in favour of publicly funded health care, social security and the like could have easily found a place in the political discussions of the twentieth century or even in some places today. Once under this impression, we are astounded to find him saying some of the other things he says. The wholesale assignment of economic functions to the state, for instance, appears so unworkable as to be plainly bizarre, and when, in the light of subsequent developments, we see the powers he seems willing to grant
to the state, it is enough to make our blood run cold. This is just something one has to get used to with Bolzano. He often saw very far indeed and quite clearly, generally much farther and more clearly than his contemporaries, but like the rest of us did not see everything.

Clearly, Bolzano lacked a good deal of important information when he wrote. He seems to have had no inkling of the demographic transition that was taking place during his lifetime. His state is designed around a population distribution heavily weighted towards the young – a pattern typical of third-world countries today, but one that is no longer found in many modern societies. His institutions are also designed for small societies, where personal acquaintance can be relied upon to determine the best people for various jobs. It is far from obvious how such institutions might be scaled-up for societies as large and anonymous as those found today. Despite a few clever ideas, for example a system of automatic inflation adjustments for intragovernmental transfers, his grasp of economic theory seems to have been quite poor. Conspicuous by its absence in his discussions is an institution which was to become increasingly prominent during the nineteenth century, namely, the joint-stock corporation. Because of this, he tends to assign far more responsibilities exclusively to the state than would be considered reasonable today. In marked contrast to many later political philosophers, however, he comes to endorse socialist institutions not as a countervailing response to industrial capitalism, but rather in large part to take on many of its beneficial functions, notably, to distribute risk, pool resources and increase production. We shouldn’t be surprised at the gaps in Bolzano’s understanding here – industrial capitalism clearly didn’t exist in Bohemia when he could observe it. It was with the image of peasants spending an entire day to bring a few eggs to market that he wrote that the state should take over all transportation of goods – the free market, clearly, was not providing what was needed, and no other alternative seemed to be available.

This being said, the number of reasonable, practical suggestions Bolzano makes is remarkable. That social security, health care, education, should be looked upon as public goods that it is reasonable for the state to provide is now widely accepted, and has played an important role in the well-being of the citizens of many countries. Other of his suggestions, though not as widely adopted, are still very much worth consideration. Among the most important of these for many developed societies today, it seems to us, is his claim that the raising of children should be considered a public good, and financed by the state. Although this is recognised to some extent in many countries, the shocking levels of child poverty in some very wealthy countries (includ-
ing ours, Canada) shows us that Bolzano still has a point. Also interesting is the suggestion that people who are not able to vote on proposed measures – including children and future generations – should nevertheless have their point of view represented in legislative debates. One might consider, for example, appointing as members of a legislature advocates for children or future generations, etc. Bolzano’s conception of a Council of Elders as a solution for structural imbalances in judgement due to demographic factors suggests that it might be a good thing to consider demographics when creating legislative regimes. In many countries today, it might be argued, distributions of the voting population weighted towards the top may have effects just as damaging to the long-term well-being of their citizens as those caused by heavy concentrations of youth, since each age has characteristics that can lead to distortions of judgement. If the young are typically more impetuous, the old may be unduly resistant to change, and so on. Finally, it should not be forgotten that Bolzano’s book envisions a time when the best state would embrace all the people of the world. When we consider the injustices, the obscenely unequal distribution of wealth in the world today, and the dependence of wealth, opportunity, even human rights on accidents of birth, Bolzano’s project remains very timely indeed.

* 

While the worked out doctrines of On the Best State still have certain points of interest, it is difficult to agree with Bolzano’s estimate of the work as his greatest legacy. Certainly his contemporaries – most of whom knew nothing of the book – thought that his most important contributions lay elsewhere, namely, in his successful efforts to educate the people of Bohemia. Due to the organisation of higher education in Bohemia, Bolzano had as students many of the people who would go on to occupy positions of authority in the country. Though he wrote and taught in German, he was a very important figure in the Czech national rebirth. He communicated not only the concepts of justice, of the essential equality of all people, the insignificance of differences of language and of rank, but also the skills of political action and democratic decision-making. Though he himself had quite definite views on the shape of the best state, he constantly reminded his contemporaries that politics is a collective activity, requiring the construction of a consensus among the wisest and the best. The faults of one person’s thinking – be they due to features of his personality, the limits of his knowledge in some area or other, or other factors – need to be balanced by the strengths of others’. Even then, he reminds us, it is best to proceed slowly in political reform, for even the most solid consensus may be mistaken. There can be no doubt that his efforts contributed
materially to the development of a healthy, largely tolerant and democratic political culture in Bohemia – something of an anomaly in Central Europe. ‘The most beautiful and durable monument he leaves us,’ Karel Havlíček wrote on the occasion of Bolzano’s death, ‘is the free movement of thought in our country, which was in large measure the fruit of the seed that he spread.’

Notes


3 Cf. the chapter on the Czech national revival in Ernst Gellner, *Encounters With Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, p. 136: ‘Early in the nineteenth century, there was a philosopher priest-professor in Prague, Bolzano, of part-Italian, part-Austrian origin, a great figure now recognised in the west as a precursor of modern philosophy of mathematics and science, and an indirect ancestor of Wittgenstein. But he was also of great importance locally, for he loved theology and mankind as well as mathematics. This other love led him to favour a non-ethnic Bohemian patriotism which would be kind to the then under-privileged Czechs (almost by definition, for those who at that time rose socially became Germanised), and a theology which in effect treated true Catholicism as a coded Enlightenment, a tolerant love of humanity rather than a claim to exclusive Revelation. (No wonder that Bolzano had his troubles with the Church authorities.)’ Against this it should be noted that Bolzano (in the *Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft* and elsewhere) argues at great length for the insufficiency of natural religion, the indispensability of revelation and for Catholicism as a genuine revealed religion.


5 Matthew 23, 2–12: ‘The doctors of the law and the Pharisees sit in the chair of Moses; therefore do what they tell you; pay attention to their words. But do not follow their practice; for they say one thing and do another. They make up heavy packs and pile them on men’s shoulders, but will not raise a finger to lift the load themselves. Whatever they do is done for show. They go about with broad phylacteries and with large tassels on their robes; they like to have places of honour at feasts and the chief seats in synagogues, to be greeted respectfully in the street, and to be addressed as “rabbi”.

6 Bolzano reflects an old tradition. St John Chrysostom (347–407) sold the costly plate and ornaments of his Episcopal palace for the benefit of the poor and the hospitals: ‘This also is theft,’ he wrote, ‘not to share one’s possessions. Perhaps this statement seems surprising to you, but do not be
surprised. I shall bring you testimony from the divine Scriptures, saying that not only the theft of others’ goods but also the failure to share one’s own goods is theft and swindle and defraudation.’ St John Chrysostom, On Wealth and Poverty, tr. Catharine P. Roth, Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Press, 1984, p. 49.


9 E. Winter, Der Bolzanoprozess, p. 212.


11 Winter, Bolzanoprozess, p. 35f. It is instructive in this connection to consider the following remarks, taken from an inspirational speech the Emperor Francis II delivered to the assembled professors of the Laibach Gymnasium in 1821: ‘Hold to the old, for it is good, and our ancestors found it to be good, so why should not we? There are now new ideas going about, which I never can nor will approve. Avoid these, and keep to what is positive. For I need no savants, but worthy citizens. To form the youth into such citizens is your task. He who serves me must teach what I order. He who cannot do so, or who comes with new ideas, can go, or I shall remove him.’ Quoted after R.W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965, p. 165. See also C. Sealsfield, Austria as it is, or, Sketches of Continental Courts by an Eye-witness, London: Hurst, Chance & Co., 1828, esp. pp. 75–7, where Bolzano is discussed.


17 Erbauungsreden I, Prague-Vienna: Wenzel Heß, 1849, p. 79. This view has been expressed many times. Most noted is Dr Martin Luther King’s ‘The arch of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice’, in The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., New York: Harper Collins, 1986, p. 245.
18 Erbauungsreden I, p. 72f.
19 ‘Robota’ is the Czech word for the unpaid labour peasants were required by law to perform for their landlords.
20 J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Book 2, Ch. 5: On Slavery.
21 On 6 and 7 January 1816 he preached a sermon on ‘Right conduct toward the enemies of enlightenment’ (Erbauungsreden IV, No. 28/29, pp. 196–209), where he bemoans the promotion of ignorance as a necessary condition for exploitation, and notes ‘woefully that all countries of Europe are now declining’ (209), that is, promote ignorance, oppose enlightenment.
22 Erbauungsreden I, p. 3.
24 Erbauungsreden I, p. 4.
26 Erbauungsreden I, p. 62.
27 Erbauungsreden I, p. 63 (Palmsonntag 1812 [22 March]).
28 Erbauungsreden I, p. 58.
29 Erbauungsreden I, p.73.
30 Erbauungsreden I, p.75.
33 Erbauungsreden I, p. 219.
34 Erbauungsreden I, p. 39.
35 Erbauungsreden I, p. 131.
36 Erbauungsreden I, p. 195
37 Erbauungsreden I, p. 171.
39 Erbauungsreden IV, p. 177f.
40 Erbauungsreden IV, p. 179.
42 Ibid., p. 164.
44 On the Best State, Introduction (BBGA IIA 14, pp. 25–6).
45 On the Best State, Chapter 2.
46 We cannot call the collection of crude, often ineffective, and frequently fatal methods then employed (swallowing large quantities of match-heads was apparently a popular method of terminating pregnancies) – and of which Bolzano evidently had some limited knowledge – birth control.
47 On the Best State, Foreword (BBGA IIA 14, p. 21).
49 On the Best State, Chapter 1.
50 Bolzano does not mention explicitly whether women are to be included in
the militia, though some of the things he says suggest that he assumed they would not be.

51 *On the Best State*, Chapter 7 (BBGA IIA 14, p. 62).


54 *On the Best State*, Chapter 16.
55 *On the Best State*, Chapter 2; the provision for married couples is suggested in Chapter 21.
56 ‘*Rath der Geprüften*, literally, ‘council of the proven’.
57 *On the Best State*, Chapter 2.
58 *On the Best State*, Chapter 2.
59 *On the Best State*, Chapter 4.
60 *On the Best State*, Chapter 27.
61 *On the Best State*, Chapters 25, 27.
62 *On the Best State*, Chapter 27.

As was the case with military service, Bolzano does not explicitly mention whether women are to attend universities, though the remarks in the sermons quoted above suggest that they would.

63 *On the Best State*, Chapter 8.
64 *On the Best State*, Chapter 23.
69 *On the Best State*, Chapter 12. We are unable to detect even the slightest trace of irony in this observation.
70 *On the Best State*, Chapter 12.
72 *On the Best State*, Chapter 24.
73 *On the Best State*, Chapter 10.
74 *On the Best State*, Chapter 10 (BBGA IIA 14, p. 74).
75 *On the Best State*, Chapter 10.
76 *On the Best State*, Chapter 10 (BBGA IIA 14, p. 87).
78 Ibid.
80 *On the Best State*, Chapter 26 (BBGA IIA 14, p. 125).
82 *On the Best State*, Chapter 11 (BBGA IIA 14, p. 90).
83 *Narodni Noviny*, 22 December 1848.
10 Austrian aesthetics

Maria E. Reicher

Introduction
Thinking of problems of aesthetics has a long and strong tradition in Austrian philosophy. It starts with Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848); it is famously represented by the critic and musicologist Eduard Hanslick (1825–1904); and it is continued within the school of Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), in particular by Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932) and Stephan Witasek (1870–1915).

Nowadays the aesthetic writings of Bolzano, Ehrenfels and Witasek are hardly known, particularly not in the Anglo-Saxon world. Austrian aesthetics is certainly less known than Austrian contributions to other philosophical disciplines, like ontology, epistemology or philosophy of science. One of the aims of this chapter is to show that this is both regrettable and unjustified for the following reasons: Austrian aestheticians have dealt with a number of problems (mainly concerning the foundations of aesthetics) that are still relevant; in terms of subtlety and depth as well as exactness and originality, in general, they easily stand comparison with today’s analytic aesthetics; and many of their views and arguments are still worthy of consideration.

Despite the widespread ignorance of what one might call ‘Austrian aesthetics’, Austrian philosophy in general has had a considerable influence on analytic aesthetics. There are two completely independent strands of such influence. The first concerns a particular problem within the ontology of art, namely the so-called ‘problem of fictitious objects’; a variety of theories of fictitious objects have been inspired by Alexius Meinong’s so-called ‘theory of objects’, according to which there are objects which do not exist. The second concerns the most fundamental problem of the philosophy of art, namely the problem of the definition of art: in the middle of the twentieth century, in the light of the developments in the representative arts of the past decades, it
was plain that the traditional attempts to define ‘art’ (art as representation, art as expression) had failed; and the search for a new, adequate definition seemed to be a hopeless enterprise. In this situation, Morris Weitz was the first who made use of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance in an extremely influential article (Weitz 1956/57) in order to resolve this problem. In this chapter, however, the focus is on a number of lesser known Austrian contributions to aesthetics. These contributions concern the following, partly interrelated, central problems of philosophical aesthetics:

i The problem of the definition of beauty (i.e. What is beauty? What does it mean to say of an object that it is beautiful?)

ii The problem of the ontological status of works of art (i.e. What kinds of objects are works of art?)

iii The problem of the objectivity of aesthetic values (i.e. Do we claim objective validity for aesthetic value judgements and, if so, is this claim justified?)

This chapter will consider the answers of Bolzano, Meinong, Witasek and Ehrenfels to these questions.

Bolzano’s definition of beauty

Bernard Bolzano’s reputation as an early forerunner of analytic philosophy is primarily based on his main work, the famous *Wissenschaftslehre* (Theory of Science). But his lesser known essays on problems of aesthetics justify this standing as well. Bolzano may not only be considered a forerunner of analytic philosophy in general, but also a forerunner of analytic aesthetics. In sharp contrast to the bulk of writings on aesthetics in Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century, Bolzano’s treatises on art and beauty show a clarity and precision that easily meets the highest standards of what is called ‘analytic philosophy’ today. Besides, Bolzano is an excellent writer; reading his texts is a constant pleasure.

Bolzano has published two quite extensive essays on questions of aesthetics: ‘Über den Begriff des Schönen’ (‘On the concept of the beautiful’, originally published 1843, henceforth referred to as ‘CB’) and ‘Über die Einteilung der schönen Künste’ (‘On the classification of the fine arts’, originally published 1849, henceforth referred to as ‘CFA’).

The task of the essay ‘On the concept of the beautiful’ is to find a
definition for the concept of beauty. In the preface to this treatise Bolzano states in a few sentences his views on what philosophical aesthetics should do and how it should be done:

That I have filled so many pages with the analysis of a single concept will necessitate an excuse in the eyes of some. I cannot state anything but that I found this concept to be of particular importance and that analysis of concepts is a business that commonly demands somewhat lengthy investigations, if it shouldn’t be just stated that one thinks of the concept as consisting of these parts, but rather shown to the reader in an at least fairly convincing way, which entails that one has to demonstrate that the previously suggested, other explanations have been more or less erroneous.\(^3\)

\((\text{CB, 3})\)

This passage shows clearly that Bolzano does not take philosophical aesthetics to be a discipline that demands less rigour than, say, epistemology and ontology. The task of philosophical aesthetics is, according to Bolzano, to clarify the basic concepts of aesthetic discourse by means of meticulous analysis. The two perhaps most prominent concepts of aesthetics are the concept of beauty and the concept of art. Consequently, Bolzano considers the clarification of these concepts to be the most important task of philosophical aesthetics.

In this context, Bolzano makes use of a distinction that he had already introduced in his *Wissenschaftslehre*, namely the distinction between what he calls ‘subjective concepts and propositions’ and ‘concepts and propositions in an objective sense’. Subjective concepts and propositions are something ‘in the consciousness’ of a thinking being. They are *private* in the sense that only the thinking being in whose consciousness the subjective concept is has direct access to it. Furthermore, they are *singular* in the following sense: If both you and I are thinking of beauty, *my* subjective concept of beauty is numerically distinct from *yours* (even if they are qualitatively the same). When you think of beauty right now and again ten minutes later, your subjective concept of beauty right now is not identical with your later subjective concept. The same holds for subjective propositions (which are also called ‘thoughts’ in Bolzano). Subjective concepts and propositions are that which is ‘in the head’ of a particular subject at a particular occasion. In contrast to this, objective concepts and propositions are not ‘in the head’ of anybody: they are unchangeable abstract objects, like Fregean concepts and Fregean thoughts. They are objective in the sense that they are in no way dependent on mental acts and that one and the
same objective concept and proposition may be grasped by different subjects at different occasions.

Bolzano applies the distinction between subjective and objective concepts to the concept of beauty, and he makes it clear that, of course, the object of analysis is the *objective* concept of beauty. Before he starts with the analysis of the concept of beauty, he makes some elucidatory methodological remarks on how a definition can be justified or argued. It is worthwhile to consider them briefly, not only because they contribute to a deeper comprehension of Bolzano’s results, but also because they concern problems of philosophical argument that lurk in the background of many debates even now. As Bolzano states, when we aim at a justification of a certain definition, the first thing to do is, of course, to show that the proposed definition gives the concept the proper extension, that is, to show that the definition is neither too wide nor too narrow. This, however, is not sufficient, because, as Bolzano stresses, there may be several concepts with the same extension. Therefore, there may be more than one definition of ‘beauty’ that gives the concept of beauty the proper extension. However, we should not give more than one definition for one and the same concept, because, as Bolzano states, if we postulate two incompatible definitions, we have not defined one concept but two (CB, 7f.).

But how can we decide between two definitions that give a concept the same extension? Or, more generally, what evidence can we have for the claim that a given definition is adequate, if the proper extension is not sufficient as a criterion of adequacy? Bolzano’s answer is that the only way to ensure the adequacy of a definition (beyond the question of the proper extension) is introspection. (He doesn’t use the term ‘introspection’, but it is obvious that this is what he means.) In other words, we have to investigate what is ‘in our heads’ when we use a certain term, and the definition should correspond to this.

However, Bolzano immediately notes the difficulty with this procedure of justification:

A person who is not used to this particular kind of attentiveness to himself, or perhaps not even has the will to it: such a person will always reply, and in a certain sense even truthfully reply, that he does not at all find in his own consciousness that which we suggest in our explanation, whatever we might say.

(CB, 10f.)

Bolzano remarks that it is an unpleasant situation that we have to rely on our consciousness when we need to justify an explication of a
concept. However, there is a further consideration that alleviates this discomfort, and this further consideration brings more pragmatic aspects into play: often, Bolzano claims, it is less important that a given definition corresponds to what we find in our consciousness than that the definition yields a concept that is functional, and a concept is functional if it proves fruitful within a theory (CB, 11).

Let us now turn to Bolzano’s definition of beauty. At first sight, it looks somewhat clumsy and perhaps not immediately plausible. But on closer examination it gains plausibility; at any rate, it draws attention to an important but largely neglected aspect of our pleasure in beautiful objects. According to Bolzano, a beautiful object is such that its examination gives pleasure to all those persons whose cognitive faculties are properly developed, for the reason that it is neither too easy nor does it cause the effort of distinct thinking to construct, after one has grasped some of its features, a concept of it that allows to guess its further features, which can be perceived only through further inspection, which leads them to an at least dark comprehension of the skill of their cognitive faculties.

(CB, 33)

In what follows, I will explain briefly the main lines of reasoning that lead Bolzano to this definition. The concept of pleasure figures prominently here. That beauty gives us a kind of pleasure is quite uncontentious. The question is: What is the source of this pleasure? Bolzano approaches this question with a more general question: What is the source of pleasure in general? Bolzano’s answer is that it gives us pleasure to employ or increase our own faculties (whatever these faculties are) (CB, § 9). The use of our faculties is for Bolzano the main source of pleasure.

This is not an implausible view. Think of the pleasure that human beings (though not only those) find in playing games of all sorts: of course, playing games may be fun for different reasons. But isn’t there a common element in the pleasure that we find in playing, and isn’t the source of this pleasure exactly that the playing enables us to use and possibly improve certain faculties (cognitive faculties or others) just for their own sake?

But in what sense can beautiful objects engage us in an activity which can improve our cognitive faculties? With regard to this question, Bolzano’s idea is that the beauty of an object lies in certain rule-governed relations between its elements. In other words, a beautiful object has a kind of intrinsic order. The task of the recipient is to find
out the rules behind this order. This does not mean, of course, that the task is to give an explicit formulation of a rule; but rather, that the task is to grasp the rule intuitively.

When we perceive an object, normally, we are not able to grasp all of the (relevant) features of the object at once. But as soon as we have grasped some of its features, we start having expectations with regard to the others. These expectations may be met or disappointed. A plausible case for this picture is listening to music: in order to grasp a melody, it is not sufficient to hear clearly and distinctly every note of the melody in the right order. Rather, we must have a memory of the notes we have already heard and expectations concerning how the series of notes will continue.

Making use of a term coined by Nicholas Wolterstorff, one might say that Bolzano’s view is particularly plausible for ‘occurrence works’ (see Wolterstorff 1980). Occurrence works are, for instance, musical works, drama, film and dance. Occurrence works are to be distinguished from ‘object works’. Object works are paintings, sculptures, works of architecture and the like. Occurrence works are temporal in the sense that there is no single moment where all the elements of the work are there for inspection. There is a temporal succession of these elements which does not hold for object works. There is no temporal succession of their elements; rather, the elements are all there in one single moment, once the work is finished.

When we perceive an occurrence work, we are not able to perceive all of its features at once, for the simple reason that there is no single moment in which all of the features of the work are there to be perceived. But what about object works? Bolzano argues convincingly that memory and expectations play a role for the perception of object works as well. As Bolzano points out, although all elements are there to be perceived at once in an object work, we do not actually perceive all of them at once (at least not if the object in question has a certain degree of complexity). Although a painting itself is not temporal (in the sense outlined above), the inspection of the painting is temporal. Therefore, Bolzano’s reconstruction of the process of the perception of a work of art as something that involves memory, expectations and hypotheses may be applied not only to temporal works of art, but also to architecture, sculpture and painting.

To sum up, in Bolzano’s view, the pleasure that we feel when we examine a beautiful object is a result of a successful use of a particular cognitive faculty, namely the faculty to grasp the principles that govern the relevant relations between the elements of the object. Thus, the source of the pleasure is not the object itself (or only in an indirect way)
but rather the process of examination. For Bolzano, beauty is nothing else than the *disposition to give rise to processes of examination* of the sort just described.

One must be careful not to conflate a dispositional theory of beauty like Bolzano’s with aesthetic *subjectivism*. According to subjectivism, ‘x is beautiful’ has to be understood as ‘I like x’. That is, according to subjectivism, to apply the predicate ‘beautiful’ to an object x is a somewhat misleading way to express that there is a particular relation between the speaker and x. To say ‘x is beautiful’ is allegedly misleading because it suggests that beauty is a feature of the thing itself, independent of its relation to the person who examines it. If the subjectivist story is right, then there is no inconsistency between (1) ‘x is beautiful’ and (2) ‘x is ugly’, given that (1) and (2) are uttered by different subjects (or even by the same subject at different occasions). For there is no inconsistency between ‘A likes x’ and ‘B doesn’t like x’, given that A is not identical with B (and there is neither an inconsistency between ‘A likes x at t₁’ and ‘A doesn’t like x at t₂’, given that t₁ is not identical with t₂).4

Bolzano explicitly rejects subjectivism. He argues that subjectivism runs counter to our experiences when we apply the predicate ‘beautiful’ to an object. In his critical examination of subjectivism, Bolzano makes use of the method of introspection delineated above. Bolzano rejects the subjectivist view because, he argues, it is simply not true that we always intend to express a relation between ourselves and an object when we utter a sentence of the form ‘x is beautiful’. Normally, when we make aesthetic judgements, our attention is directed to the object itself, not to our response to it. Usually, when we call an object ‘beautiful’, we claim a certain amount of objectivity, as is indicated by the fact that there is disagreement and debate about aesthetic judgements. This is just an empirical fact about our mental states and processes in particular situations, which an adequate definition of beauty should take into consideration.

Bolzano’s definition does justice to this fact: an object’s property of being such that ‘its examination gives pleasure to all those persons whose cognitive faculties are properly developed’ because it gives rise to an improvement of certain cognitive faculties is a property of the object itself, just as the property of appearing red to a human being under normal conditions is a property of the object itself.

However, Bolzano immediately notes an obvious objection to this explication: the examination of beautiful objects is by no means the only activity in which we make use of and may improve our cognitive faculties. Doing mathematics and philosophy also promotes the

---

*Austrian aesthetics* 299
development of our cognitive faculties (arguably even to a bigger extent than the examination of beautiful objects). Yet, normally we do not call works of mathematics and philosophy ‘beautiful’. Thus, there must be a difference between the pleasure that is raised by mathematics and philosophy and the pleasure raised by beautiful objects. According to Bolzano, the difference consists in the fact that doing mathematics and philosophy demands ‘the effort of distinct thinking’. In contrast, the examination of beautiful objects improves our ability to think ‘by means of dark presentations’ (CB, §10). Thinking by means of dark presentations is a kind of ‘intuitive’ gaining of knowledge, intuitive not in the sense that we make use of a mysterious faculty over and above those cognitive faculties that we also use when we think clearly and distinctly (among others, memory, imagination and reason), but just in the sense that we are not conscious of the various steps that lead us finally to a certain belief. It must be emphasised that intuition in this sense is in no way opposed to rationality. It is just that in the course of ‘intuitive thinking’ we are not (fully) aware of the processes going on in our consciousness.

One cannot overemphasise Bolzano’s fervent hostility to any kind of darkness and lack of clarity in philosophy. Philosophers ought to make explicit the various steps that lead them to their conclusions. However, Bolzano does not disdain intuitive thinking in general. He even concedes that in everyday life ‘thinking by means of dark presentations’ may be more important than clear and distinct thinking. (Bolzano has, despite his strong interests in mathematics and theoretical philosophy and his overall methodological rigour, an eye on practical purposes and usefulness.)

To sum up, it is the use and improvement of a particular skill (thinking by means of dark presentations) that gives rise to the pleasure that we feel when we examine beautiful objects and that makes us call them ‘beautiful’. Or so Bolzano tells us.

One may or may not agree with Bolzano’s definition of beauty. But even if one has reservations, one can appreciate the way Bolzano arrives at this definition and defends it against various objections as an excellent piece of philosophical analysis that provides many stimulating insights on its way. Part of his defence is a lengthy consideration of alternative definitions and theories of beauty, including an extensive and very critical discussion of Kant’s aesthetics. Among other things, Bolzano rejects Kant’s famous doctrine of disinterestedness, according to which beautiful things raise a pleasure without interest in us, where ‘interest in an object’ means ‘desire that the object exists’ (CB, § 37).
Although Bolzano picks Kant’s aesthetic to pieces, he also shows a certain amount of respect for the famous philosopher from Königsberg – but not so for Kant’s followers, the German Idealists, in particular not for Fichte and Hegel. Having presented and discarded an array of definitions of beauty that were discussed in German philosophy in the first half of the nineteenth century, he concludes:

But be it enough with these *unclear explications of the beautiful*, which one could call, since they do not conform to a single requirement which the mere common sense states for *explications, paradigms of ugliness*.

(CB, 118; italics are original)

**Bolzano’s ontology of art**

Under the somewhat dry heading ‘On the classification of the fine arts’ (the title of his second essay on questions of aesthetics), Bolzano develops an ontology of art works. What makes this treatise fascinating is that not only does Bolzano here anticipate subtle distinctions made some 80 years later by perhaps the most important ontologist of art, Roman Ingarden, and, again some decades later, by contemporary authors like Nicholas Wolterstorff, but also he discusses an array of questions that are fervently debated in aesthetics today. Rather, the wealth of insights combined with Bolzano’s magnificent clarity of style makes this paper an extremely worthwhile and always thought-provoking reading not only for historians of aesthetics but for everybody who is interested in the ontology of art.

One might label the ontology of art Bolzano advocates a ‘mentalist’ one. A mentalist ontology of art is the view that works of art (or at least some kinds of works of art) are something mental. In Bolzano’s terms: some works of art are mere complexes of thoughts.

Perhaps it should be emphasised again that Bolzano’s thoughts are, unlike Fregean thoughts, not objective abstract entities, but something in the consciousness of a particular conscious subject at a particular occasion.

Bolzano distinguishes two kinds of thoughts: (subjective) propositions (*Sätze*) and (subjective) presentations (*Vorstellungen*), the latter being cognitive acts without propositional structure. Apart from thoughts, Bolzano’s classification of mental phenomena contains sensations, desires and acts of will.

Bolzano states that neither sensations nor desires nor acts of will (nor complexes thereof) can be considered as works of art. However,
presentations as well as propositions can be works of art (CFA, § 11). Bolzano talks about ‘arts of mere presentation’ (CFA, § 12) and, more general, about ‘arts of thought’.

The work of art must be something real, but it does not need to be an object of the *external reality*, that is, not an object which can be perceived by the *external senses*. For also among those creations which taken in itself are merely episodes *inside* ourselves are some (. . .) which are generally considered as works of art, for which we even have theories of art since millennia (like the poetics and rhetoric of Aristotle).

(CFA, § 11)

Arts of mere presentation are by no means rare, according to Bolzano. He claims that an artist who creates a work of art which consists ‘in an object of external reality’ (i.e. a physical object) must always create in advance a ‘very detailed presentation of this object’ inside himself; and, as Bolzano sees it, ‘exactly in this, in the creation of these presentations consists, we don’t say the whole, but surely a large, sometimes indeed the largest part of his art’ (CFA, § 12).

The claim that the creation of a physical work of art is always preceded by the creation of an ‘inner presentation’ of it is one of the rare aspects of Bolzano’s aesthetics that seem to be doubtful for empirical reasons and surely cannot be held in general for works of art of the twentieth century. But it may be unfair to blame Bolzano for not having foreseen such developments as abstract expressionism, *objets trouvés* or aleatoric music.

But let us consider what Bolzano has to say about literature: literary works do not consist of presentations but of propositions. Incidentally, Bolzano gives a characterisation of *fiction* (in contrast to ‘serious’ discourse): a poet, he tells us, presents us propositions, but not with the intention that we should consider them as truths, but only for the purpose (. . .) that we shall yield to those feelings, sensations, desires and acts of will in our consciousness which these propositions can induce in us through their consideration, even if we leave it completely open whether they are true.

(CFA, § 13)

However, Bolzano’s concept of the literary work of art comprises much more than fiction. Apart from fiction, he distinguishes five ‘arts of mere thought’, including, among other things, the art of narrating, the art of
describing, the art of proving empirical truths, as well as philosophy and mathematics (CFA, § 15). It is worth noting that for Bolzano beauty is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for something being an artwork.

Bolzano does not confine his ontology of literature to the claim that literary works are works of mere thought. Instead, he also investigates their mereological structure. In general, Bolzano distinguishes simple arts and works of art from compound ones. Bolzano’s concept of a compound art or work of art is a very particular one. Most aestheticians would easily agree that a song, for instance, is a compound work, since it contains poetry as well as music. But in Bolzano’s sense even a pure literary work is compound, since we have to distinguish in literary works the thoughts expressed in them from the particular words used to express these thoughts.

In support of this claim, Bolzano states that usually we do not treat the translation of a poem as a new poem. According to Bolzano, the ‘invention of thoughts’ (as he puts it) is already an art of its own, independent of how these thoughts are expressed. Therefore, not only has one to distinguish in a literary work the element of thoughts from the element of words, one also has to consider the complex of thoughts that constitutes (in part) a literary work as a work of art in its own right (CFA, § 6).

The conviction that a complex of thoughts may be a work of art in its own right does not lead Bolzano to underestimate or even neglect the importance of the element of language. According to Bolzano, thinking is not necessarily bound to language, but it is an empirical fact that it is often difficult (perhaps even impossible) to form a thought clearly and distinctly, and even more difficult to recall it, without putting it into words. Apart from this, the creator of a work of thoughts needs language, naturally, in order to make his work accessible to others. Bolzano observes that ‘the invention of appropriate words for our thoughts (. . .) is not a very easy task’ (CFA, § 17). Whether certain words are appropriate for the expression of a given thought depends on their sound qualities as well as on their connotations which they have received through their use.

Thus, Bolzano distinguishes works of art which are ‘collections of thoughts’ (‘Gedankeninbegriffe’) from works of art which are ‘collections of words’ (‘Wortinbegriffe’). These ‘collections’ are not abstract entities, but either something mental or something physical. Bolzano explicitly distinguishes collections of words that belong to the external world (i.e. particular sounds or inscriptions) from collections of words that are mere presentations (CFA, § 17).
The distinction between collections of thoughts and collections of words as two distinct elements of literary works may be considered as anticipation of Roman Ingarden’s distinction between the element of meaning and the element of sounds within a literary work. (It must be emphasised, however, that Ingarden’s ontology of literary works is not mentalist and thus has to be distinguished sharply from Bolzano’s.)

Bolzano distinguishes the arts of thought from the ‘arts of the external sense’. Works of art of the external sense fall into one of two categories: they are either permanent or transitory. The distinction between permanent and transitory works is analogous to Nicholas Wolterstorff’s above-mentioned distinction between object works and occurrence works. Paintings and sculptures are permanent works of art of the external sense; musical works and works of drama are transitory (CFA, §18).

Bolzano introduces the term ‘tonic works’ (‘tonische Werke’) for all works that are made for the auditory sense. Not every tonic work is necessarily a work of music, in Bolzano’s lights. Only tonic works that have both rhythm and melody are works of music, according to Bolzano’s classification. At first sight, this might seem as an unnecessary restriction from the point of view of the twenty-first century. But at closer inspection, the distinction between tonic works that are music and tonic works that are not music makes good sense especially in the light of certain avantgardistic and experimental creations on the boundaries of music. Think, for example, of John Cage’s famous piece ‘4’33″’. A performance of this piece consists in the following event: a pianist enters the stage, opens the piano lid and does not produce a single note during the following four minutes and 33 seconds. After that, he closes the piano lid and leaves the stage. The end. The point of this piece is, as the composer explained, to draw the audience’s attention to the manifold sounds that surround the audience in a concert hall (apart from the sounds intentionally produced by the musicians). Obviously, it is difficult to classify ‘4’33″ as a work of music; on the other hand, it is a work that occupies (primarily) the auditory sense and thus can be properly classified as a tonic work in Bolzano’s sense.

Bolzano observes that, although works of music are necessarily transitory, there might be tonic works that are permanent. Such works would ‘consist only in a type of notes which would continue during the whole period while we are listening with the same volume, the same pitch and the same purity and would harmonise with the greatest exactness’ (CFA, § 21). Obviously, what Bolzano has in mind here is something like a ‘sound carpet’, which seems to be pretty close to certain avantgardistic experiments.
Bolzano is also aware of the fact that normally a composer does not fully determine the relevant qualities of the performances of his works; certain aesthetically relevant decisions are ‘left to the free and intentional activity of the performer’. Thus, the performing musician does not merely perform; more, to a certain extent, he continues the work of the composer (CFA, § 23). These observations might be considered as the core of an important idea that became prominent much later in the history of philosophy, namely the idea that a musical work has ‘places of indeterminacy’ (see Ingarden 1989) or, to use a term coined by Alexius Meinong (although in another context), that a musical work is an ‘incompletely determined’ object (see Meinong 1972).

Within Bolzano’s categorical framework, the question arises of whether musical (or, in general, tonic) works are simple or compound in the sense explicated above. In other words, is a musical work a pure work of the external sense, or is it composed of a work of the external sense and a work of thoughts?

It is clear that there might be simple tonic works, i.e. tonic works that are merely works of the auditory sense and do not contain any element of thought. But, in Bolzano’s opinion, most musical works are in fact compound works; that is, not only do they consist of a work of the external sense, but also of a work of thoughts.

Bolzano distinguishes two kinds of compound tonic works. The first kind is the one in which words are used. Bolzano calls this the ‘mediate way in which tonic arts and arts of thought may merge to the creation of a joint work of art’ (CFA, § 25). But Bolzano dedicates much more space to the investigation of what he calls the ‘immediate linkage’ between a tonic art with an art of mere thought. In a compound work that exemplifies such an immediate linkage, words do not occur. Nevertheless, the complete work of art contains a work of thought as its part; and this comes about through the fact that

the notes which enter our ear are chosen in such a way that ( . . . ) their impression nevertheless causes certain sequences of thoughts in us which can be considered as a sort of artwork of thoughts and have been intended by the artist.

(CFA, § 25)

Bolzano’s examples make it clear that he is not thinking of ‘programme music’, that is, instrumental music which is expressly designed to represent something (a scene, a landscape, a story). At least, these particular cases of music are not the only ones (and not even the primary ones) that Bolzano has in mind. He mentions as examples
that, when we hear the first notes of a melody which is customary with funerals, a funeral procession will occur to us, and that we will think of quarrel and confusion when the music seems to come off the time.

(CFA, § 25)

It is plain that what Bolzano has in mind here are not accidental, subjective associations, which are dependent on the specific personality of the hearer and her specific previous experiences. Rather, he has in mind the effects which a composer can predict because there are certain laws which are based on the nature of man and on the general circumstances under which we have grown up, due to which one can expect with a lot of certainty that certain notes and combinations of notes will cause these or other feelings and sequences of thoughts in us.

(CFA, § 25)

It is not too far-fetched to derive from this and similar remarks that Bolzano advocates something like a ‘communication theory’ of art: one of the major aims of the artist is (at least in those cases where the work of art contains a work of thoughts as a part) to cause certain feelings, thoughts and acts of will in the audience. In general, over and again Bolzano calls attention to the relevance of the artist’s intentions.

Bolzano also explicitly takes up a position in a dispute that nowadays causes a big stir in aesthetics: Are works of art (or, more exactly, the ‘meanings’ of works of art) constituted by the artists’ intentions (or by the artists’ intentions alone) or are they constituted (in part or as a whole) by the recipients? The two extreme positions in this debate are on the one hand the view that (the meaning of) a work of art is determined exclusively by its author and on the other hand the view that (the meaning of) a work of art is determined exclusively by the subjective interpretations of particular recipients. One might label these two positions the ‘author-centred’ and the ‘recipient-centred’ view, respectively.

Given the fact that for Bolzano a work of thoughts is a mental phenomenon, one would expect that he adopted a clear recipient-centred point of view. But, rather to the contrary, Bolzano’s standpoint is more on the author-centred side. However, he does not neglect the role of the recipient. For instance, he highlights the fact that it depends essentially on the hearer’s background which sequences of thoughts a given piece of music triggers in him. Nevertheless, Bolzano states that even if a work of thought is partly a result of the recipient’s effort to bring about
certain sequences of thoughts, it is always primarily the composer’s work:

The work of art of thoughts is here not really created by the artist, at least not by the artist alone, without the hearer’s involvement, but it always remains to be considered as a work of the former in that it is him who has induced us (and induced us intentionally) to it, in that he caused through his notes our chain of thoughts and gave it this specific direction.

(CFA, § 25)

Incidentally, Bolzano even goes a step further and counts not only intended but also unintended effects to the credit of the composer (CFA, § 25).

It would go too far to delineate in full Bolzano’s many distinctions concerning the ‘optical arts’ (that is, those arts that are made for the optical sense). I confine myself to mentioning only the most basic distinctions plus a particularly charming detail that illustrates very well Bolzano’s original and at the same time thorough way of thinking. Optical works may be divided into permanent and transitory ones. Examples of the former are paintings and sculptures, examples of the latter, for instance, dances and fireworks. But optical works may also be divided into (1) those in which only the \textit{colours} are relevant; (2) those in which only the \textit{shapes} are relevant; and (3) those in which both colours \textit{and} shapes are relevant. Examples of (2) are drawings; examples of (3) are most paintings; and examples of (1) are monochrome paintings. Of course, Bolzano never saw a monochrome painting (and he doesn’t use the term ‘monochrome’); but he mentions explicitly the possibility that an artist might present us just a single colour such that it seems to us ‘as if the colour would be indeed boundless’ (CFA, § 28).

Bolzano has certain reservations against accepting monochrome paintings as ‘real works of art’; but he pursues his almost visionary ‘aesthetic fiction’ further: there could be, Bolzano tells us, a kind of ‘eye music’ (\textit{Augenmusik}) which consists in a succession of colours that change in certain temporal intervals (CFA, § 29). Such ‘eye music’ was presented more than a century after Bolzano’s death on festivals of experimental short films. Note that at the end of Bolzano’s life cinematography was not yet invented!
In what follows, I shall outline the views of Meinong, Witasek and Ehrenfels with respect to one of the major problems concerning the foundations of aesthetics, one that could be called the subjectivism–objectivism problem. Before I start with this, however, I will briefly introduce the problem in a systematic way, thereby making use of a conceptual framework that is not taken from any of the above-mentioned authors, but that strikes me as a useful tool for describing their respective views.

There are two questions to be distinguished. The first is: What is the meaning of statements that are usually considered as ‘aesthetic judgements’? I will follow the tradition in using statements of the form ‘A is beautiful’ as paradigm cases of aesthetic judgements. Thus, we might put the question as follows: What is the meaning of judgements of the form ‘A is beautiful’? What do we intend to express with such judgements? In what follows, I refer to this as ‘the semantic question’.

In addition to the semantic question, there is an ontological question, namely: Are there genuine aesthetic properties and aesthetic facts in the world? Is there, for instance, a property of being beautiful, which cannot be reduced to a set of non-aesthetic properties (say, properties of colour and shape) nor to a merely relational property (say, the property of causing a feeling of pleasure in an observer)? Is there a state of affairs that A is beautiful in addition to the states of affairs that A has certain non-aesthetic properties and that A causes a feeling of pleasure in an observer?

Aesthetic theories are often labelled ‘relativist’, ‘subjectivist’, ‘absolutist’ or ‘objectivist’, depending on which position they take with regard to these questions. It is worth noting, however, that these terms (‘relativism’, ‘objectivism’, and so on) are systematically ambiguous, since they are applied both to semantic and ontological views. To make things clear, I distinguish here the following positions:

1. **Semantic subjectivism**: by means of an aesthetic judgement, we express the belief that there is a relation between the object of judgement and ourselves. ‘A is beautiful’ means something like ‘A pleases me’ or ‘A causes a particular feeling of pleasure in me’. Thus, the truth of ‘A is beautiful’ does not depend on the object alone but also (and primarily) on the (mental) state of the judging subject.

2. **Semantic objectivism**: by means of an aesthetic judgement, we
express the belief that the object of judgement has a certain intrinsic property. The truth of ‘A is beautiful’ does not depend in any way on the state of the judging subject, but on the object alone.

3 **Ontological subjectivism:** there are no genuine aesthetic properties and aesthetic facts in the world. The ‘truthmaker’ of ‘A is beautiful’ is the fact that A causes a feeling of pleasure in the judging subject.

4 **Ontological objectivism:** there are genuine aesthetic properties and aesthetic facts in the world. The truthmaker of ‘A is beautiful’ is the fact that A has the (intrinsic) property of being beautiful.

5 **Semantic relativism:** ‘A is beautiful’ is short for ‘A is beautiful for S’ (where ‘S’ stands for a particular subject, or perhaps for a group of subjects).

6 **Semantic absolutism:** ‘A is beautiful’ is complete as it is; it is not short for ‘A is beautiful for S’.

Ontological relativism and ontological absolutism collapse into ontological subjectivism and ontological objectivism, respectively.

Of course, this is not a complete overview of all possible and not even all actually existing views on the matter. For instance, it does not comprise non-cognitivist positions like emotivism, i.e. the view that judgements of the sort ‘A is beautiful’ are not genuine judgements but rather mere expressions of feelings like ‘Wow!’. Neither does it comprise certain kinds of naturalism, namely views according to which aesthetic predicates are mere abbreviations for more or less complex physical predicates. But emotivism and physicalism can be omitted here, since neither Meinong nor Witasek nor Ehrenfels embraced at any stage a non-cognitivist or physicalist view. These views became prominent only in the wake of logical positivism.

**Alexius Meinong’s theory of emotional presentation**

Alexius Meinong, a disciple of Brentano and founder of the ‘Graz school’, was an important figure in Austrian value theory. He dealt only incidentally with aesthetic values (or aesthetic value predicates, like ‘beautiful’); he was much more concerned about ethics. However, his general theory of values is applicable to aesthetic as well as to ethical values. (I will say a few words on what Meinong had to say on aesthetics at the end of this section.)

Meinong’s first essay on value theory appeared in 1894 and is entitled ‘Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie’ (‘Psychological-ethical investigations in value theory’, henceforth referred to as ‘IVT’). In this treatise, Meinong introduces the term ‘value feelings’.
Value feelings are those emotions that we experience when we appreciate or despise something, where we have a positive value feeling in the former case and a negative value feeling in the latter.

According to Meinong, value feelings are based on judgements, more specifically, on *existence judgements* or judgements of being. A value feeling is, as it were, an ‘emotional statement’ to the existence (or being) of something. Value feelings have existence judgements as their *psychological presuppositions*. It seems that Meinong considers this psychological presupposition even as the defining characteristic of value feelings. This, however, leads to questionable consequences. But I will postpone the criticism of Meinong’s explication of value feelings until the end of this section.

As Meinong states in IVT, values are based on value feelings. Applied to the value property of being beautiful, this means: an object’s being beautiful is based on a positive value feeling in a subject.

What exactly does it mean that the value property ‘is based on’ a value feeling? According to the standard interpretation, Meinong advocates a sort of value subjectivism in IVT and turned into an objectivist only much later. Undoubtedly, there is strong evidence in favour of this interpretation. For in IVT, Meinong states explicitly that there are no absolute values, that is, no values without a subject who is able to experience value feelings. However, closer investigation shows that things are not that clear-cut. For Meinong emphasises that the value is not identical with the value feeling. It is impossible, Meinong argues, that having value is the same as being appreciated, because, on the one hand, it often happens that something is appreciated although it doesn’t have value; and, on the other hand, it often happens that something has value and is not appreciated. In other words, our value feelings are not always appropriate. People sometimes fail to recognise (either because of intellectual or of emotional deficiencies) the value objects have for them. Furthermore, as Meinong observes, if a thing has value for me, it has value for me not only during the limited periods while I am thinking of it. However, my value feelings for the object exist only as long as I am thinking of it. This is another argument to the conclusion that values cannot be identical with value feelings. The following is a concise formulation of Meinong’s early views on value (by ‘early’ I mean here before 1912):

In general, one can say: the value is not bound to the actual appreciation but to the possible appreciation, and even for it we have to take into account favourable circumstances, more exactly: sufficient information and a normal intellectual and emotional
state. Thus, value does not consist in being appreciated but rather in possibly being appreciated under the necessary favourable circumstances. An object has value, insofar it has the capacity, for a normally disposed and sufficiently informed subject to be the actual basis for a value feeling.

(AVT, § 9)

A very similar formulation is to be found in the essay ‘Über Werthaltung und Wert’ (‘On appreciation and value’, henceforth ‘AV’) that appeared only one year later, in 1895: ‘The value of an object can be defined (. . .) as its capacity to be appreciated by an intellectually and emotionally normal subject’ (AV, 248). Meinong’s reference to the concepts of ‘favourable circumstances’ and a ‘normal subject’ in his early definitions of value already shows a tendency towards objectivism (at least to semantic objectivism). But the real breakthrough for Meinong’s value objectivism comes with the essay ‘Für die Psychologie und gegen den Psychologismus in der allgemeinen Werttheorie’ (‘For psychology and against psychologism in general value theory’, henceforth PPGVT) from 1912. Here, Meinong states that absolute, impersonal values are the proper objects of value theory. His latest publication on this matter was the treatise Über emotionale Präsentation (On emotional presentation) from 1917. Here, Meinong develops a theory that is already outlined in PPGVT, namely the theory of emotional presentation. The gist of this theory is the following: in general, objects are presented to the mind by means of certain mental states. More specifically, different kinds of objects are presented to the mind by different kinds of mental states. In fact, Meinong’s classification of objects mirrors his classification of mental states. Meinong distinguishes two kinds of mental states: intellectual and emotional ones. The intellectual states are divided into presentations (Vorstellungen) and thoughts (Gedanken); the emotional ones fall into feelings (Gefühle) and desires (Begehungen).

Originally (around 1900, when Meinong developed his theory of objects), Meinong distinguished two kinds of objects: objects in the narrower sense (Objekte) and objectives (Objektive). Objectives are those objects that can be denoted by that-clauses (e.g. the objective that it is raining, the objective that 2 plus 2 equals four, etc.).

Objects (in the narrower sense) are presented to the mind by presentations. Objectives are presented to the mind by thoughts. Thus, both kinds of intellectual mental states have a presentational function: they present either objects in the narrower sense or objectives. As far as the emotional mental states (feelings and desires) are concerned, Meinong’s original view was as follows: only the intellectual states have a
presentational function; feelings and desires are just emotional responses to those objects that are presented by presentations and thoughts, but they themselves do not present something to the mind. However, according to the theory of emotional presentation, the emotional states also have a presentational function. Meinong maintains that values are presented by emotional states.

An object does not have value, in this so far neglected sense, insofar as a subject’s interest is directed to it, but only insofar as it deserves this interest. More simply, it could be put thus: it has value insofar it really possesses that which is to be presented through a value experience; and in this lies the even simpler determination: value is that which is presented through value experiences. Of course, the emotionally presented object as such is no more an experience than the intellectually presented one. It is true that value in the sense we are talking about here is grasped through an experience, like anything that is grasped, but in its nature it doesn’t have a relation to an experience anymore: it is neither personal nor relative, may thus well be called an impersonal or absolute value.

(PPGVT, 280; my italics)

Thus, the late Meinong was an overt ontological objectivist with respect to values. He considered values as properties ‘of higher order’, i.e. properties that are based upon more fundamental properties but are not reducible to those. For instance, the beauty of a flower may be based upon the flower’s colours and shapes, but to say that the flower is beautiful is more than just to say that it has such-and-such colours and shapes.

If one grants that there are value properties, Meinong’s claim that we grasp values by means of feelings, is extremely plausible. For it is obvious that we cannot grasp value properties by means of intellectual faculties. For instance, it is easy to imagine a being that has the same perceptual and intellectual faculties that we have but is completely unable to experience beauty.

At this point, however, it should be mentioned that Meinong would not consider the experience of beauty as a value feeling, but as an aesthetic feeling. Meinong’s distinction between value feelings on the one hand and aesthetic feelings on the other is grounded in his doctrine that value feelings always have existence judgements as their psychological presuppositions. In contrast to this, he characterises aesthetic feelings as feelings that have either mere presentations or assumptions as their psychological presuppositions (see Meinong 1917, § 10). Assumptions
are, as Meinong explains, ‘judgements without belief’. Just as judg-
ments, assumptions present objectives to us; but in contrast to
judgements, assumptions are not held to be true. Meinong observes,
correctly, that assumptions are extremely important for aesthetic
experiences. For instance, when we read a (fictional) novel, normally we
do not believe the sentences we read to be true; we do not judge that this-
and-this is the case, we just assume it. (We have found a similar insight
into the nature of fiction already in Bolzano.)

However, it is just not plausible to distinguish, as Meinong does,
value feelings from aesthetic feelings. Rather, it seems that aesthetic
feelings (like the feeling of beauty) are just a special kind of value
feelings. Aren’t beauty, grace and harmony values? Moreover, it is
implausible to assume that value feelings must be based on judgements.
It seems that value feelings, even ethical value feelings, can also be based
on mere assumptions (and sometimes even on mere presentations).
Readers of Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina feel compassion for the heroine.
Although there is a difference between the feeling of compassion for
Anna Karenina and the feeling of compassion for, say, Monica Lewin-
ski (the first one is based on assumptions, the second one on judge-
ments) it seems odd to classify the latter as a value feeling and the
former not.

**Stephan Witasek’s theory of immanent aesthetic objects**

Stephan Witasek belonged to the inner circle of Meinong’s favourite
disciples. However, due to unfavourable circumstances, Witasek was
denied the career that other disciples of Meinong had. He earned his
money as a librarian and worked for many years in Meinong’s ‘psycholog-
ical laboratory’ in an honorary capacity. Only two years before his
early death in 1915, he received an academic position.

Witasek’s scientific interests were twofold: experimental psychology
and aesthetics. He published two treatises on aesthetics: the monograph
Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik (Foundations of general aesthetics,
1904, henceforth referred to as ‘FGA’) and the short essay ‘Über
ästhetische Objektivität’ (‘On aesthetic objectivity’, 1915, henceforth
referred to as ‘AO’).

In FGA, Witasek analyses the concepts of aesthetic experience, aes-
thetic properties and aesthetic objects (i.e. objects that are the bearers
of aesthetic properties). The main theme of Witasek’s aesthetics is the
struggle between aesthetic relativism/subjectivism and aesthetic abso-
lutism/objectivism. To draw a very rough picture, one could say that
Witasek turned from aesthetic relativism and subjectivism (in FGA) to
a sort of aesthetic objectivism (in AO). However, at closer inspection things turn out to be more complicated.

Witasek distinguishes two kinds of properties: real properties and ideal properties. Real properties can be perceived (either through sense perception or through ‘inner perception’, i.e. introspection); ideal properties cannot be perceived, neither through sense perception nor through introspection. Relations (for instance similarity or dissimilarity) are ideal properties, according to Witasek. In FGA, Witasek claims that aesthetic properties must be ideal properties, more exactly, disguised relative properties. The two terms of the relation are the aesthetic object on the one hand and the ‘mental behaviour’ of the recipient on the other hand. The basic idea is that an aesthetic object causes a particular mental state in the recipient. The aesthetic property is a disposition to cause a particular mental state in the recipient, or, as Witasek himself puts it, ‘the capability to have an aesthetic effect’ (FGA, 22). Witasek calls this particular mental state ‘aesthetic behaviour’. The aesthetic behaviour is essentially an emotional state, a particular kind of feeling.

The relationship between the aesthetic object and the recipient is a complex one that goes in both directions: on the one hand, there is a causal relation between object and recipient (the object causes a certain emotional response in the recipient); on the other hand, the recipient’s aesthetic feeling is directed to the aesthetic object. Witasek calls the latter relation ‘target relation’ (Zielrelation), because it is aimed at the object.

In FGA, Witasek states:

Whether an object is to be called beautiful or ugly depends on whether, given that there is a subject, the object arouses pleasure or displeasure. Moreover, the degree of beauty or ugliness that we apply to it is a function of the intensity of our pleasure or displeasure.

(FGA, 353)
were in themselves aesthetically indifferent. It would be wrong to say of a given object that it is beautiful (or ugly) per se; at best one could say that the object is beautiful (or ugly) for a particular subject (FGA, 27–32).

One might expect from the above quotation that Witasek chooses the relativist option, i.e. the view that the beauty of an object ultimately depends on the dispositions of a given recipient. However, this is not the case. Witasek explicitly rejects the relativist contention that one and the same thing can be both beautiful and ugly and that it is therefore impossible to divide objects into beautiful and not beautiful ones (FGA, 342f.). In this regard, Witasek’s point of view is clearly objectivist.

The big problem of aesthetic objectivism is how to explain the differences of aesthetic responses not only between individuals but also between cultures and epochs. Witasek is, of course, fully aware of this problem. In a first attempt to cope with it, Witasek observes that the conditions for aesthetic responses might be more or less favourable. The relevant conditions include not only external factors (the way in which an object is presented), but also the dispositions of the subject. As Witasek states, if we want to determine whether an object is objectively beautiful, only aesthetic responses under most favourable conditions are pertinent (FGA, 354f.). This holds both for external and internal conditions (the dispositions of the subject). Unfavourable external conditions are, for instance, bad lighting in an art museum, an inappropriate distance or perspective, bad acoustics or coughing neighbours during the performance of a piece of music, and so forth. Here are some examples of relevant internal conditions, i.e. dispositions that might be relevant for an aesthetic experience: power of concentration, sensitivity, acquaintance with other art works (perhaps with works from a particular school or of a particular genre or style), the absence of (non-aesthetic) emotions connected with the work, its author and its cultural setting. (For instance, a general aversion against American popular culture is not a favourable condition for the assessment of the aesthetic qualities of Jazz.) However, Witasek does not assume that all differences in aesthetic responses can be explained by pointing out differences in the relevant circumstances.

In chapter VI of FGA Witasek introduces the concept of the ‘aesthetic norm’. The aesthetic norm is explained as a regularity of aesthetic behaviour which is supposed to be grounded in human nature as well as in the cultural environment. Aesthetic responses may or may not correspond to the aesthetic norm.
Accordingly, the fact that there is an aesthetic norm is based on two things: first on the fact that, despite individual particularities, there are general laws of the mental life; and second on the fact that, again despite individual particularities, the environment is within certain (temporal, spatial, cultural) limits by and large the same for all human beings. Insofar there is a normal psychology, and insofar the environment is for the big majority of a group the same, insofar there is an aesthetic norm. However, insofar the laws of normal psychology are changing, furthermore, insofar the environment differs according to time, place and cultural society, insofar also the aesthetic norm is variable.

(FGA, 367f.)

As the quotation shows, Witasek admits the existence of different aesthetic norms, varying according to cultural contexts. This suggests strongly a cultural relativism. However, Witasek explicitly assumes a ‘hierarchy’ of different aesthetic norms: some norms are ‘higher’ than others. That is to say that in conflicting cases not all aesthetic judgements have the same claim to validity. Assume that according to an aesthetic norm N1 an object A is beautiful and according to another aesthetic norm N2 the same object A is not beautiful. According to cultural relativism, there is no way to decide whether ‘A is beautiful’ is true or false. Rather, the question doesn’t even make sense. An object cannot be beautiful or ugly simpliciter but only beautiful or ugly according to a particular aesthetic norm. Accordingly, ‘A is beautiful’ must be considered to be an incomplete judgement. A complete aesthetic judgement has the form of ‘A is beautiful according to Nx’. Of course, there is no real conflict between ‘A is beautiful according to N1’ and ‘A is not beautiful according to N2’. Both aesthetic judgements may be true. But Witasek does not take this path. According to him, ‘A is beautiful’ may be understood as a complete aesthetic judgement; and if ‘A is beautiful’ is considered to be true in the lights of an aesthetic norm N1 and false in the lights of an aesthetic norm N2, whether we should consider A as beautiful or not depends on whether N1 or N2 is the ‘higher’ aesthetic norm.

This raises the question of how we can decide which of two conflicting aesthetic norms is higher than the other. Witasek answers: ‘The more comprehensive norm, the norm that can be applied to a wider extension of objects, the norm that belongs to a bigger group of individuals, is the higher one’ (FGA, 368).

It is plain that this answer is not at all satisfying. There is no obvious reason to assume that the taste of the majority is pertinent for the truth
of an objective aesthetic judgement. Moreover, in fact, we tend to trust the judgements of experts, that is, persons who are particularly educated and sensitive; and normally, these are a minority. But there are much deeper problems with the aesthetics Witasek develops in FGA. It seems that Witasek is torn between relativist and objectivist intuitions and that in the end neither of the two sides can gain the upper hand. The result is, to put it carefully, that the theory of FGA is a sort of hybrid between relativism and objectivism with heavy inner tensions. That it is not a full-blown relativism should be clear from the foregoing paragraphs. The claim that there is a hierarchy between conflicting aesthetic norms so that some of them are closer to the truth than others is surely not consistent even with weak forms of relativism. On the other hand, Witasek’s insisting that aesthetic properties are relative properties dependent on aesthetic responses of recipients, is obviously inconsistent with a full-blown objectivism.

It is indeed not easy to combine the different strands in Witasek’s early aesthetics into a consistent overall picture; perhaps it is impossible, unless one decides tendentiously to neglect certain formulations as mere ‘slips’ of the author.

In his essay from 1915, Witasek makes a fresh start. He focuses on the following two questions: (1) What is the meaning of an aesthetic judgement, a judgement of the form ‘A is beautiful’? (2) Can a judgement of the form ‘A is beautiful’ ever be true and, if so, what facts in the world make it true? More specifically, are there aesthetic properties and aesthetic facts in the world? Witasek starts by rejecting semantic subjectivism:

The property that we originally mean to apply to A in the judgement ‘A is beautiful’, that, which the word ‘beautiful’ originally and naturally means, is not the fact that A triggers a feeling of pleasure.

(AO, 4f.)

Witasek argues for this claim in exactly the same way as Bolzano argued against subjectivism some 70 years earlier: all we have to do in order to see that ‘A is beautiful’ cannot have the meaning of ‘A triggers a feeling of pleasure in me’ is to engage in introspective observation whenever we form a judgement of this sort. If ‘A is beautiful’ meant the same as ‘A triggers a certain feeling in me’, then, in forming this judgement, we would have to be directed to our feelings, not to the object in question. But this is simply not the case. In fact, when we judge that an object is beautiful, our attention is directed to the object, not to our feelings.
this respect, aesthetic judgements are analogous to ‘sense judgements’, i.e. colour judgements, sound judgements, taste judgements, and so forth.

When I come to the judgement ‘The grass is green’, then I read, as it were, the property green from the object grass. In a similar way, I read the property beautiful from the object A by examining the object, without thinking of relations, without paying attention to what is inside me. I find the ‘beautiful’ with its particular attractive, gripping, elevating, moving quality inside the object, it beams out of the object to me as an objectual quality which is found, ‘perceived’, without any involvement of inner perception. However, I talk indeed of something psychical of what is inside me, when I say ‘A pleases me’, just as when I say ‘I see the grass green’.

(AO, 6)

Thus, the answer to the semantic question of what aesthetic predicates and judgements mean is clear. Witasek might be called a ‘semantic objectivist’ with regard to aesthetic judgements. But this does not determine an answer to the ontological question of whether there are aesthetic properties and aesthetic facts. That we obviously believe that there are aesthetic facts does not imply that there actually are aesthetic facts. In other words, semantic objectivism does not imply ontological objectivism.

Is the late Witasek an ontological objectivist? There is no short and simple answer to this question. Indeed, one might say that Witasek develops a sort of ontological objectivism, but it is a very specific sort of objectivism, one that is compatible with standard forms of subjectivism.

Crucial for Witasek’s theory of aesthetic objects is his distinction between immanent and transcendent objects. An immanent object is something that exists in dependence of a particular mental act or state; a transcendent object exists independently of a particular mental act or state. For instance, suppose I imagine the tree in front of my house. Of course, the tree that stands in front of my house is a transcendent object; its existence does not depend on its being perceived or imagined or thought of by me or anybody else. However, according to Witasek’s theory, while I am imagining this tree, there exists in addition to the transcendent, physical object an immanent object, the ‘tree of my imagination’, as one might put it. The existence of the tree of my imagination depends on this particular act of imagination. It comes into being with the beginning of this act and it ceases to exist when I
stop imagining the tree. When my neighbour imagines the tree in front of my house, she imagines of course the same transcendent object, but the tree of her imagination is numerically distinct from the tree of my imagination – even if our two imaginations are qualitatively alike, that is, even if she imagines the tree in exactly the same way as I do. And when I imagine the tree in front of my house today and again tomorrow, then the tree of my imagination today is numerically distinct from the tree of my imagination tomorrow, even if the two imaginations are qualitatively alike.

It may happen that there is an immanent object without a corresponding transcendent object – as in cases of dream and hallucination. But immanent objects do not only occur with acts of imagination, dream and hallucination but also with acts of veridical sense perception. If I perceive the tree in front of my house, there is, in addition to the transcendent tree, the immanent object of my perceptual act – the ‘tree-as-perceived-by-me’, as one might call it. If both my neighbour and I perceive the same transcendent tree, her tree-as-perceived-by-her and my tree-as-perceived-by-me are two numerically distinct objects. If I turn away or close my eyes, the tree-as-perceived-by-me ceases to exist, while the tree-as-perceived-by-her may continue to exist, or the other way around.

According to Witasek’s late aesthetics, there are aesthetic properties as ‘real’ properties, but the bearers of aesthetic properties are not the transcendent, but the immanent objects, and only those. In other words, the world that surrounds us is aesthetically neutral, is neither beautiful nor ugly. Beauty and ugliness are properties of our immanent objects of imagination and perception.

Christian von Ehrenfels: against aesthetic scepticism

A view that seems in certain respects similar to Witasek’s theory of aesthetic properties as properties of immanent objects is expressed in Christian von Ehrenfels’s only posthumously published essay ‘Über das ästhetische Urteil’ (‘On the aesthetic judgement’, henceforth referred to as ‘AJ’). In this paper, Ehrenfels argues against what he calls ‘aesthetic scepticism’, that is: subjectivism. Against the subjectivist claim that ‘This is beautiful’ is equivalent to ‘This pleases me’, Ehrenfels argues:

There is no doubt that this opinion goes against a view that has been held for millennia, the most certain evidence of which is the fact that one always used to treat the domain of tastes different from the domain of beauty. According to the conviction of so
many thousands, who considered the beautiful in a particular way, all those impressions that are properly called beautiful have something in common, to whose existence in the particular case the judgement ‘this and that is beautiful’ was supposed to point to. If one had not intended to say by this anything else than that this and that has a pleasant effect, then there would have been no reason for the use of the word ‘beautiful’. Furthermore, it would not be possible to explain why there are many things which one does not call beautiful, although they have surely a pleasant effect (like, for instance, drink and food, healthy air and exercise, or a good consciousness, a revenge that one was longing for for a long time etc.).

(AJ, 202)

Furthermore, Ehrenfels argues that the aesthetic sceptic cannot explain the fact that the aesthetic qualities of works of art are often subject of debate, whereas with respect to the taste of food the old saying ‘de gustibus non est disputandum’ (‘there is no disputing about tastes’) is generally accepted.

The upshot of all these arguments is that semantic subjectivism has to be rejected: it is plain that in general we intend to express by sentences of the kind ‘A is beautiful’ something different from ‘A has a pleasant effect on me’.

The following quotation concerns the ontological side of the problem:

If, for the time being, we consider only the domain of human art, certainly nobody should, no matter how fervently he defends the existence of something that is common to all beautiful works, assume that this common something is in the external objects, which convey to us the artistic impression. It is not the vibrations of air brought about by the instruments to which we apply beauty, but the sound object of our imagination which those vibrations cause in us. (. . .) This is even more conspicuous with a poem that we read. It is not the printed sheet of paper that contains the beauty of the poem, but the complex of presentations which it arouses in us. In the same way, it is not the painted canvas as such that bears the beauty which we admire in the picture. This will be particularly evident if one takes into account that there are no colours at all outside us, but only fabrics which set vibrating the ether in such a way that it, by means of our sense organ, causes the colour sensations in us.

(AJ, 203)
Ehrenfels states that the ‘complexes of presentations’, which are, according to him, the real bearers of beauty, are created by the subjects of these presentations. Just like Bolzano, he claims that in a certain sense works of art are created only through the imagination of the recipients.

Unfortunately, however, the nature of Ehrenfels’s ‘complexes of presentations’ is left unclear. It seems obvious that the term ‘complexes of presentations’ cannot be taken in its literal sense, i.e. in the sense of ‘complexes of mental acts of a certain sort’. For a complex of mental acts cannot be a ‘sound object’, nor can it be coloured. One might interpret them as ‘immanent objects’ in Witasek’s sense; but one might also interpret them as ‘merely intentional objects’ in the sense of Roman Ingarden, i.e. objects that come into being through intentional acts, but whose further existence is independent of mental acts. Thus, Ehrenfels’s remarks on the ontology of aesthetic objects in general and works of art in particular are at best a rough sketch that might stimulate further investigation.

However, Ehrenfels gives a very detailed and convincing description of the role of imagination in the process of the perception of a work, with respect to paintings, sculptures, architecture, music and literature. In general, the role of imagination is twofold: first, we need ‘recollective imagination’ in order to get a more or less complete presentation of the object in question; second, we need ‘creative imagination’, among other things in order to add certain details which have been only outlined by the artist. Furthermore, we need imagination in order to grasp the mental states of represented persons (AJ, 204–11).

Ehrenfels uses his insights in the role of imagination in order to give an explanation for the obvious lack of intersubjective agreement with respect to aesthetic judgements. The explanation goes as follows: different persons have a different amount of talent of imagination and therefore produce different objects of presentation under the impression of the same external objects. These differences may be partly innate but they may also be the result of the environment, the conditions of life and the personal history of development of a person. This explains both individual and national and social differences in aesthetic judgements (AJ, 211f.).

**Conclusion**

It was not my intention in this chapter to give a complete survey of aesthetics within Austrian philosophy. Rather, I wanted to highlight a number of contributions that strike me as highly original as well as
distinctive for Austrian aesthetics and, not the least, still relevant for current debates within aesthetics, in particular within so-called ‘analytic aesthetics’. Analytic aesthetics is characterised not only by a distinctive style and methodology, but also by a strong emphasis on questions concerning the *foundations* of aesthetics, questions concerning the ontology of aesthetic properties, objects and facts and the semantics of aesthetic concepts and judgements. If a reader who is interested in questions of this sort gets the impression that it may be worthwhile to study the writings of Austrian aestheticians, the chapter has fulfilled its task.*

**Notes**

1. For exceptions see Smith 1994.
2. However, the family resemblance theory of art was subject to serious and warranted criticism. See, for instance, Mandelbaum 1965.
3. All translations in this chapter are mine.
4. For more on aesthetic subjectivism versus aesthetic objectivism see the section ‘The struggle between subjectivism and objectivism’ below.
5. Meinong distinguishes between existence and mere being; but this is not important in the present context.
6. Meinong uses the German word ‘Objekt’ for a particular kind of entities and the German word ‘Gegenstand’ for entities of all kinds. Since there is just one English equivalent for both terms (namely ‘object’), the distinction is a bit hard to convey. I use ‘object’ for ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘object in the narrower sense’ for ‘Objekt’.

*I’d like to thank Johann Christian Marek and Mark Textor for useful advice and constructive criticism.*

**Bibliography**


Austrian aesthetics 323


Witasek, S.: Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik, Leipzig: Barth, 1904. (FGA)


Name index

Ahlman, E. 119–20
Ajdukiewicz, K. 172, 219–20, 224–5, 241, 243–4
Alston, W. 81 n.35, 82 n.37, 88
Anscombe, G.E.M. 75 n.26, 87, 129, 155, 157
Aquinas, T. 26, 262
Aristotle 2–5, 16–7, 26, 34–5, 38, 42, 45, 163–5, 172, 186, 231, 237, 239, 302
Armstrong, D.M. 39, 62, 67 n.11
Aydede, M. 5
Ayer, A.J. 217, 241, 244
Ayers, M. 155, 157

Barber, K. 154, 155, 157
Bar-Hillel, Y. 198, 220, 226, 234, 236, 239, 242, 244
Bassenge, Fr. 123, 125
Baumgartner, W. 18
Beermann, W. 110, 125
Bell, D. 20, 34
Bennett, J. 155, 157
Berg, J. 19, 181, 234, 236, 238, 244
Bergman[n], S.H. 194–5, 234, 245
Boghossian, P. 242, 244–5, 248, 242
Bollnow, O. 125
Brand, G. 103, 114, 125
Bühler, K. 112, 124–5
Burge, T. 240, 242, 245

Cage, J. 304

Campbell, J. 68 n.12, 86, 155–6
Campbell, K. 155–7
Cartwright, R. 237, 245
Caston, V. 17, 26, 34
Child, W. 72 n.23, 87
Chisholm, R. 5, 7, 17–18, 80 n.32, 81 n.35, 81 n.36, 85, 87–8, 127, 158, 235, 242, 245
Cleland, C. 155, 157
Coffa, A. 16, 245
Cohen, L.J. 123, 125
Collingwood, R. 118, 125
Cometti, J.P. 16
Crane, T. 5

Davidson, D. 142, 155, 157, 248
Deutscher, M. 70 n.17, 86
Dokic, J. 73 n.25, 87
Dummett, M. 1, 11, 16, 130, 226–8, 240–1, 246

Ehring, D. 155, 157
Engel, P. 123, 126
Evans, G. 38, 62, 69 n.15, 86
Etchemendy, J. 19, 238, 246

Fichte, J. G. 301
Field, H. 33–4
Findlay, J.N. 16, 35, 126, 170, 182
Follesdal, D. 32, 34, 102, 123–4, 126, 220, 226, 231, 242, 246
Foster, J. 45, 63
Frege, G. 1, 10–11, 15, 96, 155, 157, 162, 173, 175, 177, 179, 189, 194, 210–12, 227–9, 233, 240–2, 244, 246
Frint, J. 266, 268
Furlong, E.J. 78 n.29, 79, 87
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ganthaler, H.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gehlen, A.</td>
<td>89, 124, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gellner, E.</td>
<td>266, 289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George, R.</td>
<td>15, 16, 19, 181–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldstein, L.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gottlieb, D.</td>
<td>244, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grossmann, R.</td>
<td>154–5, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanslick, E.</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harman, G.</td>
<td>22, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrod, R.F.</td>
<td>78 n.29, 78 n.30, 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartmann, N.</td>
<td>124, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havlicek, K.</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazay, O.</td>
<td>124, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegel, G. W. F.</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hempel, C.G.</td>
<td>217, 241, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinton, J.M.</td>
<td>72 n.23, 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoerl, C.</td>
<td>66 n.7, 69 n.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland, R.F.</td>
<td>78 n.29, 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hossack, K.</td>
<td>5, 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hume, D.</td>
<td>56, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingarden, R.</td>
<td>171, 304–5, 321, 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irving, A.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, F.</td>
<td>35, 48, 63, 154, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacquette, D.</td>
<td>16, 18, 26, 35, 86, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kant, I.</td>
<td>3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 159, 184, 193–7, 197, 210, 212–14, 216, 218–19, 231, 234–7, 240–1, 245, 250–7, 260–1, 263, 300–1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koehn, G.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim, J.</td>
<td>54, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowlton, B.</td>
<td>66 n.9, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kober, M.</td>
<td>124, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraus, O.</td>
<td>28, 31, 34, 163–4, 166, 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kriegel, U.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kripke, S.</td>
<td>34–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Künne, W.</td>
<td>14–16, 18–19, 154, 156–7, 240, 242, 246, 289–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lange, A.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lange, E.M.</td>
<td>104, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lehrer, K.</td>
<td>156–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leibniz, G.W.</td>
<td>11, 135–6, 169, 235–7, 239–40, 247, 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levinson, J.</td>
<td>156, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis, D.</td>
<td>56, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyendecker, H.</td>
<td>89, 113, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locke, J.</td>
<td>48–9, 63, 73, 87, 210–11, 219, 239–42, 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loux, M.J.</td>
<td>154, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowe, E.J.</td>
<td>156, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGee, V.</td>
<td>156–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mally, E.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malcolm, N.</td>
<td>67 n.10, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malthus, T.</td>
<td>276–7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mancuso, P.</td>
<td>11, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandelbaum, M.</td>
<td>322–3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marion, M.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, C.B.</td>
<td>70 n.17, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, M.G.F.</td>
<td>66 n.7, 69 n.14, 85–6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marty, A.</td>
<td>2, 13, 119, 123, 127, 163, 166–72, 182, 235, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meinong, A.</td>
<td>1–4, 6–9, 16–17, 64ff., 99, 123, 124, 127, 130–1, 134–6, 141, 146, 148, 154–5, 157–8, 163, 166–70, 172, 182, 293–4, 305, 308–13, 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mellor, D.H.</td>
<td>134–6, 141–5, 155, 157–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mertens, P.</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mertz, D.W.</td>
<td>155–6, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mill, J.S.</td>
<td>134, 155, 158, 271, 278, 291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore, G.E.</td>
<td>1, 16, 104, 106, 168, 184, 231, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moran, D.</td>
<td>20, 32, 35, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morrison, J.C.</td>
<td>25, 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moyal, D.</td>
<td>102, 123, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulligan, K.</td>
<td>15–18, 27, 35, 66 n.8, 71 n.19, 84 n.43, 85–6, 88, 127, 155, 157, 158, 182, 231, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musen, G.</td>
<td>66 n.9, 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagel, T.</td>
<td>34–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neumaier, O.</td>
<td>18, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neurath, O.</td>
<td>176–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newman, J.</td>
<td>98, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ni, L.</td>
<td>123, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ortega Y Gasset, J.</td>
<td>9, 89ff., 123–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owens, D.</td>
<td>73 n.25, 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palacky 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pap, A.</td>
<td>241–2, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papineau, D.</td>
<td>48, 63, 79 n.31, 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsons, C.</td>
<td>217, 241, 247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsons, T.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasquarella, L.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacocke, C.</td>
<td>242, 245, 247–8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perner, J.</td>
<td>73 n.25, 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poincare, H.</td>
<td>34–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name index</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
326 Name index

Pollock, J.L. 81 n.34, 81 n.35, 87–8
Popper, K. 159, 178–82
Price, H.H. 98, 128
Prihonsky, F. 11, 236, 238, 240, 242, 247
Prior, A. 13, 18
Proust, J. 234, 239, 247
Putnam, H. 237, 248
Quintilianus, M.F. 248
Reicher, M. 9, 15, 17
Reid, T. 6–8, 36ff., 82, 84, 87
Reimer, W. 128
Reimach, A. 94–6, 108, 111, 123, 128, 171
Reiner, H. 89, 94, 98, 123, 125, 128
Rollinger, R. 17, 154–5, 158
Routley (Sylvan), R. 16
Ruffman, T. 73 n.25
Rusnock, P. 15, 182
St Augustine 265
Salas Ortueta, J. de 128
Saunders, J.T. 78 n.29, 87
Scheler, M. 9, 89–90, 92–3, 95–6, 100, 102, 109–11, 113–14, 117, 119–21, 123–5, 128–9
Schottländer, R. 125, 129
Schlick, M. 175–6, 181–2, 242
Schnieder, B. 6, 154–6, 158
Schubert-Kalsi, M.-L. 76 n.28, 87
Segal, G. 21–5, 35
Sellars, W. 1
Shapiro, S. 242, 248
Shoemaker, S. 56, 63
Siebel, M. 16, 19, 231–4, 236, 238, 244, 246, 248
Simons, P.M. 12, 15–9, 28, 34–5, 155–6, 158, 180–3, 231–3, 237, 242, 248
Siewert, C. 67 n.11, 86
Slote, M. 140, 154–5, 158
Smith, B. 16–17, 20, 25–7, 32, 24–5, 127–8, 155–6, 158, 322, 323
Sorabji, R. 26, 35
Sosa, E. 81 n.35
Squire, L. 66 n. 9, 86
Stalnaker, R. 31, 35
Steward, H. 155, 158
Stone, M. 15
Stout, G.F. 156, 158
Strawson, P.F. 155, 158, 222, 223, 228–31, 239, 241–4, 249
Stumpf, C. 2, 17, 181, 246
Sundholm, G. 11, 18
Swartz, R. 18, 87
Tatzel, A. 19
Teroni, F. 7
Textor, M. 16, 34, 85, 123, 155, 158, 232, 237–8, 241, 246, 249, 322
Thiel, Ch. 18
Thomasson, A.L. 17, 34–5
Tulving, E. 66 n.9, 86
Twardowski, K. 1, 2, 10, 16, 32, 172–3, 181, 183, 233, 235, 243, 249
Van Cleve, J. 79 n.31, 87
Vendler, Z. 154, 158
van den Hoven, M.J. 123, 126
van Benthem, J. 19
von Ehrenfels, Ch. 2, 9, 164, 293–4, 308–9, 319–23
von Kotzebue, A. 268
von Wright, G.H. 129, 237, 241, 249, 263
Wedberg, A. 208, 239, 249
Weitz, M. 294, 323
Winkler, R. 122, 125, 129
Witasek, S. 9, 293–4, 308–9, 313–19, 321, 323
Wittgenstein, L. 1, 9, 12, 15–17, 88ff., 94–5, 97, 100–4, 106–8, 112, 114–15, 117, 119–21, 123, 125, 126–9, 173–6, 249, 262, 289, 294
Wolenski, J. 233, 244–7, 249
Wolfram, S. 249
Wolterstorff, N. 156, 158
Wright, C. 124, 129, 245
Zahavi, D. 17, 32, 34–5
Zalta, E. 16
Zemach, E. 67 n.10, 69 n.14, 86
Zimmerman, R. 2, 236, 249
Subject index

abstract reference 131–3
administration 269, 271, 279, 281
aesthetic experience 313, 315
aesthetic judgement 306, 316–17, 319
analyticity 14, 184–249, 250; autarky
conception of 216–18; Bolzano’s
definition 255–7, 259; Carnap’s
definition 257–9; conceptual
containment conception of 212–14;
hidden 208; in the broad sense 192–6;
Kant’s definition 251–4; logical
196–207, 219–31; merely apparent
207
appearance 36–7, 40–4, 53, 55, 57,
59–60
artwork 303, 305
assumption (‘Annahme’) 168–9
attributes, particularised 130–58; as
subjects of change 136–41; as causal
relata 141–5; as parts of objects
145–8
attributes, shareable 131–3, 153–4
bearer-uniqueness 148–54
beauty 10, 294–7, 299–301, 303, 312–15,
319–21
capitalism 287
Catholicism 266, 289
certainty primitive 8, 89ff.
coherence 102, 116, 121, 174, 176
consciousness 36ff.
consequence, logical 2, 14, 19, 234, 244
correspondence 75, 86, 153, 160, 163–5,
disobedience 273
emotion 9, 18, 51
emotivism 309
epistemic circularity 76–9
equality 274, 285–6, 288
evidence: direct vs. indirect 74–85
fact (‘Tatsache’) 102, 133, 136, 142–4,
169, 174–5, 178, 309
fallibilism 80–5
falsity 13, 83, 160, 163, 165, 184, 190,
193, 200, 202, 218, 220, 228–9, 234
foundationalism 72, 80–5
form, logical 257–8
formal ontology 200, 227, 237
freedom of expression 279
free logic 206–7, 215–16
grounding (‘Abfolge’) 14
identity 134–5, 150, 200–1, 215–16,
222–4, 227
idealism 36, 43, 63
imagination 46, 69, 300, 318–21
immanent object 21, 318–19
inexistence, intentional 4, 5, 20ff., 41, 53,
55
intentionality 2, 4, 5, 20–1, 24, 27,
29–34, 68, 92, 102, 114, 163
introspection 36–9, 42, 49, 59–62
judgement 4, 8, 10, 12, 21, 27, 38, 42, 50,
60–1, 65, 66–70, 80–6, 89–90, 94,
97–9, 109, 117, 163ff., 214, 235, 273,
278, 288, 308–9, 316–20; and
experience 70–4; of correspondence
75
logical empiricism 259–60
logical form of a sentence or statement
257–8
marriage 275
Subject index

meaning-rules 224–6
memory: epistemology of 74–85;
   evidence 74–85; images 66;
   judgements 65, 69–76; kinds of 66–8;
   phenomenology 66–7; restricted
   conception of 66–8; meta-logical
   concepts 200

notion (‘Vorstellung’) 65, 66
notion (‘Vorstellung an sich’) 185–9,
   192–5, 197–200, 202, 205–6, 208,
   210–11, 213–18, 234–6, 238–40, 243–4
object 2, 4–5, 9, 10, 12, 21ff., 39, 48,
   50–3, 56, 61, 119, 122, 134–7, 141,
   143–8, 151–3, 160, 162, 168–70, 172,
   174, 185–6, 196, 200, 206, 210–11,
   215, 220, 231, 233, 237, 239, 284, 294,
   297–300, 302, 304–5, 308–12, 314–21
objective (a la Meinong) 168–9
ontology of art 293, 301
ontology of literature 303

phenomenology 1, 8, 16, 36, 68, 104, 124
phenomenalism 27–9, 32, 34
presentation (‘Vorstellung’) 4, 40–5, 50,
   53–7, 60–2, 65, 68–70, 73; vs.
   judgements 65
principle of utility 270
probability 82–5
properties see attributes

proposition (‘Satz an sich’) 10–14, 33,
   43, 52–3, 95, 100, 102, 115, 117, 119,
   137, 159–62, 164, 167–71, 173–4,
   180–1, 184ff., 270, 296; existential
   214–16

qualia 36, 37, 45, 47–51, 58–9, 62

realism 71–3
rebellion 273–81
reform 288
reism 180

scepticism 80

semantic paradoxes 162, 172,
   177
sentence form 257–8
social security 283, 286–7
statement form 257–8
surmise 97–8

synthetic a priori 259–61
tropes see attributes, particularised
truth 2, 7–8, 12–14, 23, 28, 42, 65, 92,
   97, 105, 115, 131, 133, 144, 146,
   159ff., 184ff., 259, 262, 270, 273–4,
   208–9, 316–17
truth-bearer 167–9, 173, 176, 179,
   180
truth-maker 13, 167–9

universities 269, 281, 292

unfact 168–9

validity, degrees of 187–92
value: experience 9, 312; feeling 310–13;
   judgement 294; objectivism 311;
   subjectivism 310
Vermutungen (conjectures) 80–5, 94

works, literary 302–4

works of art 283, 294, 298, 301–4,
   306–7, 320–1